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
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
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BEAUTY AND UGLINESS



MOSAIC FLOOR PATTERN IN THE FLORENCE BAPTISTRY
Drawn by C. Anstruther-Thomson

BEAUTY & UGLINESS AND OTHER STUDIES IN PSYCHOLOGICAL ÆSTHETICS

BY

VERNON LEE, pseud. of
Violet Paget.
AND "

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TO
M. TH. RIBOT
DE L'INSTITUT
IN GRATEFUL RECOGNITION OF
ALL WE OWE TO
HIS WORKS
AND TO HIS KINDNESS

V. L.
C. A. T.

*" O Lady, we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does Nature live ;
Ours is her wedding-garment, ours her shroud !"*

COLERIDGE'S "Ode on Dejection "

*" We may accordingly conjecture that the æsthetic feeling
originates in a relation of the perceived impression to
the reproduction which it excites."*

KÜLPE, " Outlines of Psychology,"
Titchener's translation, p. 252

PREFACE

DEALING with my previous volume, *Laurus Nobilis*, the most intelligent of my critics complained that I took our æsthetic preferences for granted, without explaining their nature or even proving their existence. If that rash reviewer really thirsts for psychological æsthetics, he may find some temporary refreshment in the present volume, which contains as much of the *How* and *Why* of Beauty and Ugliness as I have been able to squeeze out of some rather dry books and out of fifteen years of my own and my fellow-worker's observations. If he, or any other inquisitive person, should then remain with unslaked curiosity about æsthetics, he must go to the Psychological Laboratories of Germany and America, where he may, in return for further knowledge, be used up as an experimental subject.

And this gives me an opportunity for saying a few words to another kind of critic, namely, the Experimental Psychologist. Since preparing this volume for the press, indeed not longer than a week or ten days ago, I have had the great privilege and pleasure of visiting Professor Külpe at the University of Bonn, of hearing what he was good enough to explain of his method, and of being present at some of the examinations—notably one on æsthetic judgments of value by Dr. Pohl—conducted by his students. And I have come away with the conviction

not only that theirs is the future way of studying æsthetics, but also that is the way in which, alas ! I can never hope to study them. My æsthetics will always be those of the gallery and the studio, not of the laboratory. They will never achieve scientific certainty. They will be based on observation rather than on experiment ; and they will remain, for that reason, conjectural and suggestive. But just therefore they may, I venture to think, not only give satisfaction to the legitimate craving for philosophic speculation, but even afford to more thorough scientific investigators real or imaginary facts for their fruitful examination.

Indeed, thinking over those recent conversations with Professor Külpe and his ardent young disciples, I am coming to see my collaborator and myself in the light of travellers and antiquarians of the old school (*dilettanti* they called themselves, unconscious of self-censure !), as compared with the systematic excavators of our own day. In a certain obscure region of the soul, we two have noticed odd, enigmatic, half-hidden vestiges, which might be (and might also not be !) walls, terraces, and roadways ; we have filled our pockets with shards of pottery and tesseræ of mosaic ; we have made rough sketches of what looked like masonry unless it was rock, and noted down peasants' tales of buried treasure. Well ! Let the excavating engineers come, those who methodically shovel up each clod, and examine and classify every prehistoric kitchen midden of the human mind, and let them dig up that mental region in every direction. If there is anything where we suppose, why, they will, even without our notes and sketches and maps, be bound to find it. And sooner or later—who knows ?—the

ground plan, the column-bases of the soul's highest temple may be displayed, nay the gold and ivory god be discovered and set together ; the God whom we believed to lie hidden in that unnoticed corner of the mind, Apollo himself, the radiance of life shaped in the image of man.

And in this presumptuous, yet not immodest, mood, let me thank not only Professor Külpe and my other kind critics at Bonn, but my older friends, M. Th. Ribot and Professor Karl Groos, without whose generous encouragement and help I could never have done even the little I have.

VERNON LEE

CHELSEA, *July* 1911

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BEAUTY AND UGLINESS

ANTHROPOMORPHIC ÆSTHETICS

IN an article published in the *Quarterly Review* for April 1900, dealing with Tolstoi's *What is Art?* I had occasion to allude to a new science of æsthetics, which, in my opinion, could already dispose of some of the great Russian's arguments, and indicate a reconciliation between art and life different from his ascetic conclusions. It is the object of the following pages to give some account of these new æsthetics, to define the various problems which they are gradually seeking to resolve, and to point out the tracks of study along which they may eventually attain a solution. ✓

I have said that these æsthetics are new, and I should add that they are still rudimentary, full of hypotheses admitting as yet of no demonstration, and of collections of facts requiring to be brought into intelligible connexion. Nor could it be otherwise. Whereas the æsthetics of the past were, in the main, a branch of purely constructive philosophy, concerned rather with logical coherence than with verification, and therefore systematic and dogmatic; the æsthetics of to-day are, on the contrary, not so much what is actually expounded by any single writer as what results from the unintentional concordance of various students, and the convergence, rather inevitable, than actual, of several kinds of

study. For the problems concerning beauty and ugliness, and concerning those artistic activities which increase the one and diminish the other—these problems of æsthetics—are being approached from two sides, and by two sets of investigators, who are often ignorant of each other's existence and, oftener still, ignorant of the very questions which they and their unknown collaborators are between them narrowing into definite existence.

✓ These unconnected studies, thus unconsciously converging in the new science of æsthetics, are themselves recent and immature. They are, respectively, the science of mind which, under the name of psychology, has only lately detached itself from general philosophy; and the various sciences dealing with the comparison, the origin and the evolution of artistic form, and which are still dependent on ethnography and anthropology on the one hand, on archæology and what is called connoisseurship on the other. Thus it is significant that whatever materials for an eventual science of æsthetics have been left us by the past exist as fragmentary facts, partial observations, and lopsided hypotheses, scattered in the works of philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, Kant, Schiller, Schopenhauer, Spencer, on the one hand, and, on the other, in the works of specialists of some definite branch of art like Winckelmann and Morelli, or pleaders in the cause of some definite artist, like Ruskin in *Modern Painters*, and Nietzsche in the *Wagner Case*. There remains, besides, a large amount of fact and theory eventually applicable to æsthetics in books on children, savages, and lunatics, and the whole literature admirably represented by Professors Ernst

Grosse, Yrjö Hirn, and Henry Balfour.* And the methods to be employed, the analogies to be followed, nay, the underlying reasons of the phenomena under consideration, will be learned mainly from biologists, psychologists, students of bodily and mental evolution, who, for the most part, misunderstand or disdain the very existence of æsthetics.

The object of the present paper is to show some of the points on which all these separate studies are tending to converge, in the hope that an attempt to map out the vague field of æsthetics may contribute to the definition of its boundaries and its tracks, and eventually to its thorough systematic cultivation.

II

The first problem of æsthetics involves a definition of the adjective from which this study takes its name; and of the study itself. We need not trouble ourselves, any more than with other historical questions, with the adventures of the word "æsthetic" and its transformation from the philosophical adjective connected with perception, to its current connexion with art and the beautiful. But it is important to decide whether the word, thus misapplied, should be considered as the adjective referring to art or the adjective referring to beauty; the alternation between the two meanings having, with most writers, contributed not a little to confuse these already rather inextricable inquiries. For, if "æsthetic" means "that which has to do with art,"

* *The Origins of Art.* By Yrjö Hirn. London: Macmillan, 1900.
Die Anfänge der Kunst. By Ernst Grosse. Freiburg, 1894.
 (Translation: New York, 1897.) *Kunstwissenschaftliche Studien.*
 By Ernst Grosse. Tübingen, 1900. *The Evolution of Decorative Art.* By Henry Balfour. (Rivington, 1893.)

and also "that which has to do with beauty," there arises a tendency to identify the two notions, and a consequent series of self-contradictions. No one, for instance, can deny that the drama, the novel, poetry in general, are of the nature of art. But no one can deny that in all of them, besides appeals to our desire for beauty, there are appeals to quite different demands of the human soul, such as the demand for logical activity, for moral satisfaction, and for all manner of emotional stimulation, from the grossest to the most exalted; let alone the demand for self-expression, for construction, and for skilful handicraft. All these demands, involved in every form of art, are of course demands for pleasure, but some of them are consistent with the production and perception not of beauty but of ugliness.

Now, if "æsthetic" is made synonymous with "artistic," and brings the connotation also of "beautiful," the pleasure taken in art will be confused with the pleasure derived from beauty; and we shall be landed in that casuistry which admits of beauty dependent on logical clearness, or mechanical skill, or practical fitness, or moral legitimacy, or scientific exactitude, or dramatic interest—in fact, beauty which has every quality except that of not being ugly. Thus the formula of Keats—"beauty is truth, truth beauty"—either limits the meaning of truth or extends the meaning of beauty to include a great many very unbeautiful items. The application of the word "beautiful" to whatever peculiarity an æsthetician recognises with satisfaction in a work of art, has so far been the chief reason why the problem of beauty and ugliness has been defrauded of any study commensurate to its import-

ance and its difficulty. It is therefore urgent, as a first step in all æsthetics, that separate expressions should be reserved for "that which has to do with art," and "that which has to do with the beautiful"; and since we already possess the perfectly intelligible adjective "artistic," there is every reason that the other adjective "æsthetic" should be reserved for the designation of the phenomenon of beauty and its correlative ugliness, instead of complicating already intricate inquiries by the shifting of meanings or the introduction of unfamiliar words.

The foregoing discussion may seem a mere dispute about terms. But we shall find that this is not the case, and that the definition of the word "æsthetic" provides a clue to the whole question, "What is art, and what has the beautiful to do with art?" For we shall find that it is the demand for beauty which qualifies all the other demands which may seek satisfaction through art, and thereby unites together, by a common factor of variation, all the heterogeneous instincts and activities which go to make up the various branches of art. ✓

This view is nowadays almost universally replaced by some version of the theory, first broached by Schiller in his *Letters on Æsthetics*, and revived by Mr. Herbert Spencer, according to which art is differentiated from other employments of human activity by being a kind of play. The "play" theory takes up all the various branches of art, insisting especially on the literary ones and neglecting, as a rule, those where beauty is united to utility, and connects them by the common characteristic of disinterested contemplation, that is to say, the fact, true or false, that they serve no practical aim and constitute a kind of holiday in life. To Schiller's ✓

theory of art being a kind of play, and valuable in virtue of its freedom from care, Mr. Spencer added the notion that art, like all other forms of play, was the result of stored up energy which found no other modes of venting itself. But this hypothesis of a specific "play instinct," of which art was merely one embodiment, overlooked the fact that nearly all efficient, and certainly all creative work, however much directed to practical ends, must depend upon some surplus of energy, and is, in nearly every case, attended by the pleasure special to the measured doling out of such superabundance.

✓ Professor Groos, not merely one of the most remarkable of living æstheticians but the greatest authority on Play as such,* has, moreover, been obliged to admit, in his masterly volumes on the play of men and of animals, what is a very damaging fact to his own theory of art, namely, that it is incorrect to speak of any "play-instinct" as such, and that playing is not a specific activity, but merely one of the modes in which many or most human activities may spend themselves. Professor Groos has therefore rejected Mr. Spencer's formula of the "Art-as-play" theory; but having eliminated the Spencerian notion of the "surplus energy," he has merely returned to Schiller's theory that the pleasurable-ness of art is due to the characteristic of all other kinds of play, namely, the sense of freedom or of holiday.

But this is surely an inversion of the true order of facts. We do not take pleasure in playing because playing makes us feel free; but, on the contrary, we get greater and more unmixed pleasure while playing, because we are free to leave off and alter—in fact, to do what we cannot do while working,

* *Die Spiele der Menschen*. By Karl Groos. Jena, 1899.

I accommodate our activity to our pleasure. Professor Groos has himself, in a memorable formula which we shall meet anon, connected the special pleasurable-ness sought for by art with an activity totally different from play as such. And I hope to show that Schiller's opposition between the serenity of art and the severity of life is very far from fundamental. I hope, assisted thereto by some of Professor Groos's own hypotheses, to suggest that the æsthetic condition is, on the contrary, the outcome of nearly all healthfully constant and repeated acts of attention ; and that art, so far from delivering us from the sense of really living, merely selects, intensifies, and multiplies those states of serenity of which we are given the sample, too rare, too small, and too alloyed, in the course of our normal practical life.

And here we find ourselves once more in presence of the distinction between " artistic " and " æsthetic," and the necessity of reserving the second of these terms for our impressions of beauty and ugliness. For, after having found that the artistic employment of certain faculties cannot be differentiated by calling it play, we shall find that the very finest works of art have been produced by the expressive, constructive, logical, and other activities, when most practically employed, and to the exclusion even of all decoration, which might be explained as a parasitic excrescence of play upon work. There is no playing when a potter or an architect alters the shape of a vessel or a building until it become what we call beautiful ; nor when a writer arranges his sentences or a stonecutter his lettering in such a manner that we shall not merely learn but be pleased in the course of learning. And

if a freedom from practical considerations is undoubtedly implied in such making of necessary things beautiful, that freedom is not the aim of this artistic process, but its necessary condition, since we do not act freely in order to take pleasure in freedom, but please ourselves because we happen to be free to do so.

If, therefore, we give the name of art to every such attempt to add another quality beside that of utility to useful things or useful acts, there is a common character which differentiates art from all other activities, whether working or playing. And this common character, which makes sometimes play and sometimes work artistic, and whose absence removes play and work alike from out of the category of art, is precisely that character, absolutely *sui generis*, for which I desire to reserve the word "æsthetic." For if we examine all the categories of art, we shall find that, whatever their primary object—whether the construction of something useful, the expounding or recording of something significant, the expression of an emotion or the satisfaction of a craving, the doing of something whether practical or unpractical, useful or mischievous—this primary object's attainment is differentiated by the attempt to avoid as much ugliness and to attain as much beauty as the particular circumstances will admit. The required building or machine may be inevitably awkward in parts; the person to be portrayed may be intrinsically ugly; the fact to be communicated may be disgusting; the instinct to be satisfied may be brutal or lewd; yet, if the building or machine, the portrait, the description, the dance, the gesture, the dress, is to affect us as being artistic, it must possess, in greater or lesser

degree, the special peculiarity of being beautiful. And where, on the contrary, this demand for beauty has not been manifest, where there has been no attempt to substitute beautiful for ugly arrangements of line, space, colour, sound, words or movements, there the word *artistic* is inapplicable in contradistinction to the phrases *technically ingenious*, *logically reasonable*, *practically appropriate*, *sensually agreeable*, *emotionally exciting*, *morally commendable*, or any of the other qualifications of human work or human play. (Art, therefore, is the manifestation of any group of faculties, the expression of any instincts, the answer to any needs, which is to any extent qualified, that is to say, restrained, added to, altered, or deflected, in obedience to a desire totally separate from any of these, possessing its own reasons, its own standards and its own imperative, which desire is the æsthetic desire. And the quality answering to this æsthetic desire is what we call Beauty; the quality which it avoids or diminishes is Ugliness.)

We have now come to the second main problem of æsthetics: what is Beauty? Is it a specific quality, more or less universally sought for and recognised? or is it the mere expression of certain variable relations, of suitability, novelty, tradition, and so forth? That beauty is visible adaptation to an end, human or divine, continues to be brought forward as a whole or partial explanation by a number of æstheticians. The notion is implicit, for instance, in Ruskin's insistence on the merely constructive and practical necessities of architecture. Yet this explanation has little philosophical credit, and was thoroughly refuted already by Kant, whose *Urtheilskraft* is, by the way, an important contribution to æsthetics. Another explanation of beauty

confuses it with the technical skill or the logical clearness necessary for its manifestation ; another notion recurs in a subtler form in the recent tendency to make ease of perception not a condition,* but an equivalent, of beauty ; the identification, for instance, of such simplifying of lines and planes as makes a picture or statue easily apprehended with such arranging of them as makes it repay our apprehension of it. And this erroneous view is extremely difficult to avoid, and, in the present day, often goes with the greatest subtlety of artistic perception among æstheticians.

The alternative notion, that to be beautiful implies a relation entirely *sui generis* between visible and audible forms and ourselves, can be deduced from comparison between the works of art of different kinds, periods, and climates. For such comparison will show that given proportions, shapes, patterns, compositions, have a tendency to recur whenever art is not disturbed by a self-conscious desire for novelty. Such comparison will show that mankind has normally preferred its visible goods and chattels, for instance, to embody certain peculiarities of symmetry and asymmetry, balance and accent ; and has invariably, when acting spontaneously and unreflectingly, altered the shapes afforded by reality or suggested by practical requirements until they have conformed to certain recurrent types. Such comparative study as this, just beginning in our days (thanks in some measure to mechanical facilitation like casting and photography), should become the very core of all æsthetic science. For only the study

* See Cornelius [*Elementargesetze der Bildenden Kunst*] (1908), in whom it is derived from Hildebrand, *Problem der Form*. Cf. *The Central Problem of Æsthetics*, pp. 80-81 of present volume.

of the work of art itself can reveal what answers to the name of beauty, and on what main peculiarities of form this quality of beauty depends. And until we know this we shall continue the vague or even fruitless speculations of former philosophers as to how and why beauty affects us at all, and the random guesses of art critics as to the manner in which such beauty has been obtained.

This comparative study of art—the comparison of category with category, work with work, detail with detail—has depended, hitherto, mainly on the attempts to ascertain the authorship of individual works of art, on the part, for instance, of archæologists of the type of Furtwängler, Löwy, and Wickow, and of connoisseurs of painting of the Morelli school. And, on the other hand, it has been greatly helped by the studies and demonstrations of a small number of practical artists, like the sculptor Hildebrand in his book on *Sculptural Form*, and like Ruskin himself, not merely in his writings, but in the diagrams and illustrations with which he supplemented them. This study of the real constitution of the work of art will probably sooner or later be enriched by the methodical comparison, not merely of form as it exists in art—art of the weaver, the potter, the armourer as much as of the architect or painter—and as it exists in superior and inferior work, but by the comparison also of form in real objects and form as modified, “stylised,” by art. In the finest sculpture, antique and mediæval, the play of muscles, for instance, is not given as it is mechanically inevitable in reality; and many facts of bodily structure are deviated from in the search after agreeable surface and mass. Similarly, the perspective, the composition, of great pictures is at variance

with that of real landscape ; and in pattern as such, animal and vegetable shapes have been made congruous, symmetrical, rhythmical, so as to suit an æsthetic imperative recognisable equally in the basket-work of savages and the carvings of Gothic stonemasons.

I have used more than once the expression *æsthetic imperative*. Such an imperative is implicit, of course, in all artistic tradition, and directs the practice of every craftsman and every school. Nay, could we but translate into logical terms, into intelligible words, the unspoken and unformulated preferences which every artist, great or small, obeys, we should know very accurately what is and what is not beautiful, and wherein resides the essential quality of every work and every school of art. But as artistic practice is its own and only expression, and the reasons determining the craftsman are necessarily unconscious—in so far as we identify consciousness with logic and words—the study of what beauty is can be carried on only by the scientific methods of comparison and elimination. And we can symbolise as well as exemplify this method as applied to visual art, by taking the photograph of a real object and that of the same object artistically rendered ; effacing, adding to, altering each until the two have become similar ; pursuing the same system of practical analysis and synthesis with works of different kinds and degrees of merit ; determining by such elimination and integration what constitutes what we call “ beauty ” ; and then verifying our conclusions by statistically treated comparison of recurrent artistic forms, of which the uniformity of recurrence would prove the universal acceptability. (But why should we thus prefer certain arrange-

ments of lines, colours, surfaces, and sounds—let alone of words?) The psychological side of æsthetics, and its interdependence with all other questions of mental science, begins with this question, of which the scientific statement would be as follows : (What facts of consciousness in the first place, what physiological processes in the second, appear to underlie or to accompany the satisfaction in certain forms as being beautiful, and the dissatisfaction in certain other forms as being ugly ?)

This problem, whose final solution is naturally conditioned by the general advance of psychology, of course repeats itself with reference to every kind of art, and every craft involving questions of beauty and ugliness. But in literature the question is immensely complicated by other interests, logical, emotional, and practical, which make up the bulk of what is only partially fine art ; and it is obscured by detail questions like those of the direct action of words, none of which have been properly examined as yet. The æsthetics of music are, if possible, in a still more backward condition, owing to the special difficulty of self-observation and the hopeless confusion of the terms employed. So that, despite the value of men like Stumpf, Hanslick, and Dauriac,* I am not aware of much progress since the masterly analysis of the late (Edmund Gurney, whose great work on *The Power of Sound*) refuted all existing explanations without substituting any new ones. But the arts appealing to the eye have proved less refractory to psychological investigation ; as they have, moreover, thanks to connoisseurs, archæo-

* Stumpf, *Tonpsychologie*, 1st volume, 1883 ; Hanslick, *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*, new edition, 1896 ; Dauriac, *L'Esprit Musical*, 1904 ; also Billroth, *Wer ist Musikalisch ?* 1898.

logists, and anthropologists, been far more scientifically examined. So with regard to them it is already possible to show the chief tracks along which observation and hypothesis are moving, the direction in which all categories of art philosophy will be bound to go.

III

One of the most valuable negative results of modern æsthetics—a result to which the various students, connoisseurs, archæologists, historians, psychologists have co-operated without fully appreciating its importance—is the distinction between the qualities of a visible figure, pattern, or, more summarily, “form,” and the qualities suggested by the identification of this form as representing a given object. For each of these sets of qualities can affect us independently, even sometimes contradictorily; and the manner of perceiving them is not similar. Thus it is possible that a given form, that is, a given arrangement of lines, planes, and colours, may affect us as being what we call ugly, although the object represented, that is, the thing which we are made to think of, affects us as being what we call beautiful.*

Take, for instance, certain painted or carved garlands: they give us the pleasure of thinking of the beauty, freshness, sweetness, etc., of flowers and the pleasantness of concomitant circumstances; yet they give us, at the same time, the displeasure of their broken lines and irregular bulgings, of confusion and lack of harmony; the flowers suggested were delightful, but the pattern suggesting them was wretched. Or take a portrait, say by Van Eyck or Rembrandt. It may strike us as ugly when we

* Cf. *Æsthetic Responsiveness*.

recognise it as the face of a human being, and endow it with its associated peculiarities of disagreeable texture, poor health, and bad temper or sensuality. But it may at the same time strike us as beautiful if we attend to its intrinsic peculiarities as a visible form, the manner in which it fills up space, the movement of lines and surfaces, the total harmony of its appearance.

This difference between the thing seen and the thing suggested explains why crowds will be interested by pictures which lovers of art reject utterly; and why, on the other hand, æsthetic persons will be fascinated by patterns on stuffs and shapes of utensils which the man bent on practical or literary interest passes by without a glance; and, similarly, why so many "works of art," illustrations to books or portraits for instance, will be thrown aside as eyesores after a moment's keen interest; whereas quite unobtrusive things, barely commented on at first, a cornice, a chair, a table, a pot, may work their way into our affections and cause positive distress by their defacement.

This difference between what is commonly designated as form and subject (though it were clearer to say "form and object") corresponds with that between seeing and recognising.* When a sportsman sees a hare previous to firing at it, he does not, he cannot, see the whole shape of the animal; but he notices, he detects, some peculiarity which, given the surroundings, suggests the notion of a hare. Neither more nor less than the notion of a hare, that

* Such a recognition is what is meant when Binet writes: "*Une perception est le processus par lequel l'esprit complète une impression des sens par une escorte d'images.*" See Binet's *Raisonnement* and Taine's *L'Intelligence*.

Drama-masochism

is to say, a synthesis of various qualities, is suggested to his dog by a certain scent. What are wrongly called optical delusions, by which we misjudge sizes, directions, and shapes, and occasionally take one thing for another, a flat surface for a bossy one, smoke for water, a bush for a man, are a proof that the supposed act of seeing is, nine times out of ten, the mental (construction of an object upon one or two visual indications.)

This abbreviated way of seeing is usual whenever we have to decide what a fact of sight probably represents in order to adapt our action or to pass on to some other similar interpretation ; it is the way of seeing characterising either rapid change in the world around us or rapid shifting of our own attention. But the thorough and, so to say, *real seeing*, the perception of the visible form in its detail and its whole, takes place whenever we are brought long or frequently before the same external things, and have occasion to grow familiar with their aspect : it is in this manner that we see the rooms we inhabit, the country we live in, the clothes we wear, the tools we handle, the persons we take interest in ; the characteristic of this seeing, as distinguished from recognising, being the survival, in our memory, of an image, more or less vivid, of that thing's visible presence. Therefore, as already hinted, we may tolerate ugliness when we merely recognise, that is, detect a characteristic and follow a train of suggestion ; but we demand beauty whenever our attention recurs to a form, lingers on its details, or is confronted steadily with its image in memory. And conversely, we avoid and forget the ugly facts of reality, while we seek to see once more, or to remember, all sights which have affected us as being beautiful. And

whereas, of course, attractiveness of suggestion is the extrinsic quality of works of art, and the quality liable to change and to wearing out; their enduring fascination, their intrinsic merit, consists in the attractiveness, which we call beauty, of their form.

Now, the thorough seeing of form, the dwelling of our attention upon its intrinsic peculiarities, the realisation, in fact, of form as such, implies upon our part a special activity which, according to the case, is accompanied by satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This special activity is the interpretation of form according to the facts of our own inner experience, the attribution to form of modes of being, moving, and feeling similar to our own; and this projection of our own life into what we see is pleasant or unpleasant because it facilitates or hampers our own vitality.

The discovery of this projection of our inner experience into the forms which we see and realise is the central discovery of modern æsthetics. It had been foreshadowed by various psychologists, and is implied in the metaphors of many poets. But it owes its first clear statement and its appropriate designation to Lotze, who, fifty years ago, wrote in his *Mikrokosmos* a passage destined to become classic in mental science, and which I quote, because it presents this rather intricate psychological phenomenon in very familiar and intelligible instances.

“Our fancy meets with no visible shape so refractory that the former cannot transport us into it and make us share its life. Nor is this possibility of entering into the vital modes of what is foreign to us limited to creatures whose kind and ways approximate to ours; to the bird, for instance, who sings joyously in his flight. We participate just as well in the narrow existence of the mollusc, realising in imagination the monotonous well-being got by the opening and shutting of its shell. We project ourselves not merely

B

into the forms of the tree, identifying our life with that of the slender shoots which swell and stretch forth, feeling in our soul the delight of the branches which droop and poise delicately in mid-air. We extend equally to lifeless things these feelings which lend them meaning. And by such feelings we transform the inert masses of a building into so many limbs of a living body, a body experiencing inner strains which we transport back into ourselves." (Book v, cap. 2.)

"To imagine things as they are for themselves,"* writes M. Souriau, a most suggestive psychologist, whose æsthetics would have been extraordinarily valuable if only he had added a knowledge of contemporary German thought to his own investigations on the subject :

"to imagine things as they are for themselves, is tantamount to imagining what they would be if they had an obscure consciousness of their own existence. Now we have only one way of thus imagining things from inside, and that is, to put ourselves inside them."

For this "putting ourselves inside" the things to which we attribute modes of feeling and acting similar to ours the German language has afforded a most fortunate expression ; it calls it *Einfühlung*,† literally "feeling ourselves into." Such projection of ourselves into external objects, such interpretation of their modes of existence by our own experience, such *Einfühlung* is not merely manifest throughout all poetry, where it borders on and overlaps moral and dramatic sympathy, but is at the bottom of numberless words and expressions whose daily use has made us overlook this special peculiarity. We say, for instance, that hills *roll* and mountains *rise*, although we know as a geological fact that what they really do is to suffer denudation above and thickening

* *L'Esthétique du Mouvement*. Paris, 1889.

† The reader will see further on (*Æsthetic Empathy*) that this fortunate expression has not been without serious drawbacks.

below. Also that arches spring, cupolas soar, belfries point, although the material buildings merely obey the laws of gravitation. Nay, we attribute movement to motionless lines and surfaces; they *move, spread out, flow, bend, twist*, etc. They do, to quote M. Souriau's ingenious formula, what we should feel ourselves doing if we were inside them. For we *are* inside them; we have "felt ourselves," projected our own experience, into them, or more correctly into the pattern which they constitute. And here, before going deeper into this subject, and coming into the presence of the greatest discoverer in this field of æsthetics, let me ask the reader to think over the last sentence in my quotation from Lotze: "We transform by such feelings the inert masses of a building into so many limbs of a living body." That is the text suggestive, but still very fragmentary. Here is the commentary, full, clear, and of the most far-reaching application, as given us by Theodor Lipps in his great work on *Spatial Æsthetics and Optical Illusions*":

"When the Doric column lifts itself, what precisely is it does the lifting? Is it the mass of stone of which the column is made? . . . It is not the column, but the spatial image presented us by the column, which does this lifting. It is the lines, the surfaces, the bodily shapes, not the material masses embodying the surfaces, bounded by the lines, filling out a figured space; it is the lines, surfaces, and shapes which bend or wind, which expand or contract. They also, and they alone, are for our æsthetic contemplation the leading element. It is not the roof of a building which presses down; it is the visible surface of the roof which presses down or obeys a downward tendency. . . . The material masses combine, in the measure requisite to their material existence, their material weight, cohesion, carrying power, etc.; or combine them according as is most conducive to the material existence of the whole. The forms combine in the manner of their æsthetic character or in such manner as shall be æsthetically significant. Such significant combination of æsthetic relations is given in idea [*i.e.* to our imagination].

The arrangement of material masses constitutes the technical creation; but only this combination of æsthetic relations for our imagination constitutes a work of art. As in every other case, so here also the essential of the work of art is an imaginary world unified and self-contained [*'eine und in sich zwar geschlossene ideelle Welt'*]."

This phenomenon of æsthetic *Einfühlung*, or, as Professor Titchener has translated it, *Empathy*,* is therefore analogous to that of moral sympathy. Just as when we "put ourselves in the place" or, more vulgarly, "in the skin" of a fellow-creature, we are, in fact, attributing to him the feelings we should have in similar circumstances; so, in looking at the Doric column, for instance, and its entablature, we are attributing to the lines and surfaces, to the spatial forms, those dynamic experiences which we should have were we to put our bodies into similar conditions. Moreover, just as sympathy with the grief of our neighbours implies in ourselves knowledge of the conflicting states—hope, resignation, pain, and the efforts against pain—which constitute similar grief in our own experience; so this æsthetic attribution of our own dynamic modes to visible forms implies the realisation in our consciousness of the various conflicting strains and pressures, of the resistance and the yielding which constitute any given dynamic and volitional experiences of our own. When we attribute to the Doric column a condition akin to our own in keeping erect and defying the force of gravitation, there is the

✓ * Titchener, *Psychology of Thought Processes* (Macmillan, 1909, p. 21):

"This is, I suppose, a simple case of empathy, if we may coin that term as a rendering of *Einfühlung* . . ." and p. 181:

"They shade off gradually into those empathic experiences," etc. etc.

revival in our mind of a little drama we have experienced many millions of times, and which has become registered in our memory, even like that less common drama of hope, disappointment, and anguish which has been revived in the case of our neighbour's grief and attributed to him.

But modern psychology, ever since the early work of Wundt, has inclined to teach us that a revival in memory is a repetition, however much blurred and weakened, of a past process. So that when we project into the soul of our bereaved neighbour such feelings as we have ourselves experienced on similar occasions; when we interpret the forms of architecture in the terms of our own muscular pressures and strains, of our own volitional yielding and resistance, and of those combinations thereof which we designate as *rhythm*; we are in both cases, however seemingly different, producing in ourselves that particular dynamical experience which we attribute to the person we have sympathised with, to the form "into which we have felt ourselves." The projection of our experience into the *non-ego* involves the more or less vivid revival of that experience in ourselves; and that revival, according to its degree of vividness, is subject to the same accompaniment of satisfaction or dissatisfaction as the original experience. So, when this attribution of our modes of life to visible shapes and this revival of past experience is such as to be favourable to our existence and in so far pleasurable, we welcome the form thus animated by ourselves as "beautiful"; and when all these processes of attribution and revival of our dynamic experiences are, on the contrary, unfavourable to us we avoid that form as "ugly." Nor must the reader suppose that such Empathy can

↓ be found only in our complex and fanciful dealings with the world of art. (On the contrary, if Empathy has conditioned the being of art and can therefore explain it, this is precisely because Empathy is an elementary (or next door to elementary) mental phenomenon accompanying all spatial contemplation, however much our very familiarity has made us overlook it.) Let us ask ourselves, for instance, the meaning and corollaries of Professor Külpe's statement (*Outlines of Psychology*, p. 336) that "*figure is a sum of extensions.*" Evidently! But *extension*, when not a mere verbalism (and in order to have become a verbalism!), must be *our extension*, for the inert cannot *extend* or indeed *tend* in any literal sense, and the attribution of extension is therefore an attribution of an item of our own active experience. This *extension* may become a mere verbal symbol, what we call a mere metaphor, meaning thereby that its complete meaning is not mentally realised. But whenever this complete meaning *is* realised, whenever this "metaphorical" extension becomes in our fancy a literal extension, awaking in us, not the sensations of present acts of extending done by us, but the memories of our past acts of extension connected with the seen spatial figures, then there is Empathy: we feel activity and life, because our own activity, our own life, have been brought into play.

Such, roughly stated and deduced out of the many examples and repetitions in his volume, appears to be the central hypothesis of Professor Lipps's *Spatial Aesthetics*. Exclusively interested as he is in the problems of consciousness as such, averse from the materialistic tendencies of psycho-physics, and suspicious of all attempts at reducing ideas and

emotions to bodily conditions, Professor Lipps proceeds no further in his examination of this question. Considered as an activity of the soul, *Empathy* [for so we shall now call it] cannot be denied existence. We irrefutably do possess dynamic experience; we revive it and derive satisfaction or dissatisfaction from its projection into what we call visible form.

IV

This is all that Professor Lipps has cared to teach; and the teaching of this is enough for the unrivalled greatness of a single philosopher. But other æstheticians, unable to attain to Lipps's satisfactoriness of explanation, have pushed the problem of *Einfühlung* or *Empathy* a good deal further. And here we come once more into the presence of Professor Karl Groos, who is, after Lipps, decidedly the most important of contemporary German writers on these questions. Already in his earlier *Introduction to Æsthetics*, in 1892, he had insisted on a kind of æsthetic *Einfühlung* [*Empathy*] to which he had given the somewhat misleading name of "Inner Mimicry"; and he has returned in his *Spiele der Menschen*, and his second volume on æsthetics, to the notion that—

"in complete æsthetic enjoyment there are present motor phenomena of an imitative character, and that these show the sympathy in question (*Miterleben*) to be a bodily participation."

The dynamic experience invoked by Lipps is referable, after all, to original movements. Does not its revival imply a renewal of some, at least, of the bodily phenomena constituting those movements? Professor Groos reminds us that feelings of muscular strain have been recognised, ever since

the studies of Lotze and Fechner, as accompanying in many persons the sight, even more the recollection, of fencing or billiard matches; that similar sensations in the vocal organs have been even more commonly remarked attendant on the hearing or thinking of musical intervals; that there are such physical accompaniments to almost all emotional states, and that they have been disputed over, as universal or as limited to Charcot's "motor type," by physiologists quite innocent of æsthetics, like Professor Stricker and Dr. Ballet.* Moreover, Professor Groos has pointed out the sense of bodily excitement and well-being often accompanying strong æsthetic emotion, of which innumerable expressions in ordinary language are witness.

That æsthetic *Empathy* is based upon, or universally accompanied by, actual bodily changes, Professor Groos seems unwilling as yet to assert in the teeth of Lipps's hostility to such a notion.† But having admitted that bodily accompaniments of æsthetic conditions may exist only among

* The "motor type" was discovered (or invented!) as a result of pathological study of such cases of partial amnesia as obliterated the visual or auditive memory and reduced the individual to memory of movements, a fact corresponding to some of Galton's discoveries concerning the various individual methods of learning by heart. The "motor type" has got, perhaps accidentally and wrongly, entangled with a type of person who, 1st, localises usually unlocalised bodily processes; 2nd, whose "muscular" reflexes are less than usually inhibited, so that he has difficulty in thinking without articulate speech or gesticulation.

Let us hope that the inquiry undertaken for the Berlin Psychological Society by Dr. Richard Baerwald may help us to disentangle some of this complexity of psychological phenomena or (perhaps) confusion of psychologists' thought.

† For Professor Groos's present views and my own, cf. *The General Problem of Æsthetics*, p. 77.

the large class of what are called "motor individuals," as distinguished from "visualisers" and "auditives," he boldly claims that thorough æsthetic realisation, or what he calls "inner mimicry" and consequent vivid æsthetic satisfaction, is limited exactly to the individuals of more or less "motor" type, to those, in fact, presenting such bodily accompaniments to æsthetical conditions.

"It is probable," he writes, "that it may appear presumptuous on the part of us individuals of the motor type, if we believe ourselves to be capable of æsthetic enjoyment more intense than that of such others as are without all similar bodily resonance. But this view is only natural; the difference between us and them is just in the summation of present sensations with past ones, that is to say, in a more complete condition than theirs is." *

V

Contemporaneously with the speculations of Lipps and of Groos, and in complete ignorance of both, an attempt was being made, by two English students of art history, to carry the same ideas still further in the direction of psycho-physical parallelism. In an essay on *Beauty and Ugliness*, published in the *Contemporary Review* (October-November 1897), the æsthetic seeing, the "realisation," of form, was connected by C. Anstruther-Thomson and the present writer with bodily conditions and motor phenomena of a most complex and important kind. It was claimed by one of these writers that a long course of special training had magnified not only her powers of self-observation, but also most probably the normally minute, nay, so to speak, microscopic and imperceptible bodily sensations accompanying the

* I have had to extend this sentence for greater clearness.

action of eye and attention in the realisation of visible form. Among these habitually disregarded or completely fused sensations there could be distinguished, with certain individuals at least, not merely the "muscular strains," already noticed by Lotze and Fechner, and the vaguer organic perturbations referred to by Groos, but definite "sensations of direction" (tensions corresponding to *up*, *down*, *through*, *alongside*, similar to those remarked upon by William James in his *Psychology* *) and sensations of modification in the highly subtle apparatus for equilibrium; and finally, sensations of altered respiration and circulation sufficient to account for massive conditions of organic well-being and the reverse.

These observations, whether they deal with mere individual idiosyncrasy, with peculiarities (as Professor Groos suggests) of the "motor type," or whether they prove of more general character, were welded into a theory of æsthetic pleasure and pain by the perhaps hasty acceptance of what is known in recent psychology as the "Lange-James Hypothesis." † Professors Lange and William James had,

* Experimental psychology has since added a number of similar sensations; see particularly Professor Titchener's *Thought Processes* (1910) and *Feeling and Attention* (1908).

† W. James, *Principles of Psychology* (1890), p. 449, vol. ii :

"Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that *the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion.*"

P. 451 : "I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole theory, which is this : *If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no 'mind-stuff' out*

it should be explained, independently of one another, suggested that the conditions of bodily change, *e.g.* the reddening and shrinking of shame, the constriction, turning cold and white, the semi-paralysis of fear, which had hitherto been accepted as after-effects of various emotions, were, on the contrary, the contents of that "feeling"; in fact, constituted, together with the idea of the feeling's objective cause, the whole of that feeling, say of shame or of fear. By an obvious analogy, the feeling of the various muscular strains, changes of equilibrium and respiratory and circulatory changes, might be considered as constituting the special æsthetic emotion, varying with every form contemplated, and agreeable or disagreeable according as these changes were or were not favourable to life as a whole. The hypothesis advanced in the *Contemporary Review* sinned first by building upon the Lange-James theory, of which itself would be one of the strongest proofs; and secondly, by misapprehending the still most difficult problem whether pleasure and pain are separate emotions or merely modalities of all emotion. But, despite these and many other faults, the essay on *Beauty and Ugliness* has an undeniable importance—that of originating not in psychological speculations, but in study of the individual work of art and its individual effects; and thereby attacking the central problem of æsthetics, and arriving at the fact of *Einfühlung* of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains."

Page 453: "If such a theory is true, then each emotion is the resultant of a sum of elements, and each element is caused by a physiological process of a sort already well known. The elements are all organic changes, and each of them is the reflex effect of the exciting object."

or *Empathy* from sides other than those whence Lipps, Groos and their followers have started.

If the authors of that essay were to restate their views after study of contemporary German æstheticians, and after additional observation and meditation on their own part, the result might be summed up, and the theory of *Einfühlung* [or *Empathy*] rounded off as follows : All visual perception is accompanied by interpretation of the seen shapes in terms of previous experience. When attention shifts rapidly for the sake of practical adaptation or expression, the shape is seen in the most summary and partial manner, barely sufficient to awaken the idea of peculiarities which may be associated with it, as texture, weight, temperature, position, smell, taste, use, etc., and to initiate, in most cases, some series of movements by which we adapt ourselves to these peculiarities. This process is that of recognising, naming ; and it becomes an ever-shortened and more automatic act of guessing from a minimum of data at the real nature of the seen object and at our proper reactions towards its presence. Such is visual perception considered as recognition. But when, instead of such perfunctory shifting, the attention deals long or frequently (in actual present fact or in memory) with any visible shape, there sets in another kind of interpretation ; and other data of experience become fused with those of sight. There come to be attributed to that shape not objective qualities with which it has previously been found accompanied, but modes of activity of our own evoked in the realisation of the relations of that shape's constituent elements ; and, instead of adjusting into movements destined to react upon the seen object, our motor activities rehearse the

tensions, pressures, thrusts, resistances, efforts, the volition, in fact, the life, with its accompanying emotions, which we project into the form and attribute to it.

Here we are back at the *Einfühlung* or *Empathy* of Lipps. Now this projection of our own dynamical and emotional experience into the seen form implies a reviviscence of those particular dynamical and emotional experiences. If, as there is reason to think, revival in memory is tantamount to actual repetition of an inner process,* this attribution of our life to seen shapes will, just in proportion to its intensity, imply or induce an activity in the bodily systems involved in the original dynamical or emotional experiences thus received and thus projected outside ourselves. And, whether through direct connection with the original dynamic experience, or owing to their greater or lesser facility, other bodily conditions, alterations, for instance, in the respiration and circulation, will also come into play, and add their particular quality and force to the total phenomenon of consciousness. According as this total condition, bodily or mental, is favourable or not to life, pleasure or displeasure will result; and, in all probability, this pleasure or displeasure will itself provoke fresh organic alterations, adding, in their turn, new doses of satisfaction or dissatisfaction to the existing mass.

Thus, whether we accept the Lange-James theory and view the revived dynamical conditions and their associated organic changes as constituting the

* But not by any means processes in the organs concerned; a *central*, i.e. cerebral, reviviscence is more consonant with biological economy. See Semon's *Mnemische Empfindungen* (1909). Cf. discussion of this point at p. 135, and cf. Münsterberg at pp. 143-4.

æsthetic emotion ; or whether we rest satisfied with the statement that the revived dynamic conditions are the cause, and the organic changes the result, of this æsthetic emotion—whichever alternative we choose, we should yet possess an hypothesis explaining why attentively realising a visible shape should produce a feeling of pleasure or displeasure—a feeling sometimes filling the whole soul and occasionally marked by unmistakable bodily sensations. Thus the logical development of the notion of æsthetic *Empathy*, its conception as a deep-reaching and intricate complexus of action and reaction of what we distinguish as body and soul, would explain how beauty has come to be associated with all our notions of order, of goodness, of health, and of more complete life ; and ugliness, on the contrary, with everything by which the life of body and soul is diminished and jeopardised.

After thus analysing the presumable nature of the æsthetic phenomenon, it is perhaps well to remind the reader that, by the very constitution thereof, such analytical knowledge of it is normally denied us during its duration. For, in the first place, the dynamic conditions generated by constant repetition, and therefore bearing no sort of “local signs,”* are, by the act of *Empathy* (*Einfühlung*) projected out of ourselves and attributed to the seen shapes, much in the same way as changes in the eye and optic nerve are not localised in them, but projected, as the attribute colour, into the objects originally producing them. And, in the second place, the accompanying organic changes are also divested of definite “local signs,” and fused into a complex emotional quality (well-being, *malaise*, high or low spirits)

* Cf. Groos and Münsterberg, pp. 134 and 143-4.

which must be disintegrated before its components can be picked out. Hence, whatever the processes into which the æsthetic phenomenon be analysed by methods of special introspection or reasoning, the phenomenon as such remains a dualism expressible only as follows: "This form is beautiful"; and "I like seeing this form." Moreover, as both Professor Lipps and the authors of the essay on *Beauty and Ugliness* insist, the æsthetic phenomenon is individual, and varies with every single individual form; and, since it consists in the attribution of an individual and varying complexus of dynamic (and perhaps organic) conditions, it must always, in real experience, bear the character of the individual form by which it is elicited. There is, in reality, no such thing as "the Beautiful." There are only separate and different beautiful forms.

VI

The acceptance of some such explanation of the preference for beauty and the aversion to ugliness will make it evident why the æsthetic instinct, instead of calling any art into existence, in reality regulates the various formative, imitative, and expressive impulses which variously combine in the production of art; imposing upon these activities a "how," an imperative as categoric as the one which the moral sense imposes on the practical impulses of existence. Considered, moreover, as such a regulating instinct, æsthetic preference is evidently concerned with a field far wider than that of art. And, indeed, study of the crafts and manufactures whose evolution has not been (as in our transitional civilisation) abnormally rapid, shows

that all objects and all rites on which the attention dwells frequently or long have taken that æsthetic character which we nowadays associate, most falsely, with notions of uselessness or play. Indeed it is historically demonstrable (as Ruskin and Morris guessed) that the production of "works of art" as such, and independent of ulterior purposes, is a mark of æsthetic decay or anarchy; for no form can be either fully perfected by the craftsman or appreciated by the public unless it be familiar; that is to say, unless its complete *Empathy* or *Einfühlung* be secured by repetition in every variety of application, as we find it the case with the forms of Egyptian, Hellenic, or Mediæval art, which exist equally in the most exalted and the most humble applications. And similarly the separation of a class of "artists" (with its corresponding class of "art-lovers") from ordinary craftsmen and average mankind has always brought about æsthetic uncertainty, since this independent class has invariably tended to what is called "art for art's sake," that is to say, art in which technical skill, scientific knowledge, desire for novelty or self-expression have broken with the traditions resulting from the unconscious sway of spontaneous æsthetic preference.

These traditions, representing the satisfaction of the æsthetic instinct through universal and long practice, are the stuff of every artistic style. The individual artist, however great, merely selects among the forms habitual in his youth and alters them, even as the mechanical inventor or the philosopher alters and develops the appliances or the systems of his predecessors. One of the earliest results of the historical and critical work of archæologists and "connoisseurs" has been the

recognition of the kinship between the masterpiece and the "schoolwork" from which it arises and which arises from it ; how many persons could tell a Giorgione, for instance, from a Cariani, or a Botticelli from a Bottacini ? And the problem of what individual temperamental difference accounts for the irresistible vividness, the inexhaustibly harmonious richness of the masterpiece, this unsolved problem of artistic genius shows by its very existence that the greatest innovator does not create out of nothing, but transmutes already existing forms into something possessing the familiarity of the old and the fascination of the new.

Hence we see that the most sovereign art has always arisen when genius has not been wearied in the search for novelty nor wasted in the making of things appealing only to the idle and superfine. We must not be misled, like Tolstoi, by the æsthetic anarchy resulting from that rush of inventions and reforms, that confusion of historically and geographically alien habits and standards, which has marked the last hundred years. Such moments of ferment and disintegration are necessarily rare and passing ; and their artistic chaos or sterility is abnormal and of little consequence. The history of art shows, on the contrary, that even barbarism has not atrophied or interfered with the æsthetic instinct. We see that in any civilisation which was widespread, homogeneous and stable, the most consummate works of art could be enjoyed by every one, because the forms embodied in, say, the Egyptian temple or the Gothic cathedral, the Greek statue or Japanese painting, were the forms familiar in every craft, through an unbroken succession of kindred works of every degree of excellence. Applying the

conceptions of recent æstheticians, we understand that the art of any time or country was the common property of all the men thereof, simply because the craftsmen had the habit not merely of those general relations of proportion and dimension whose *Empathy* (*Einfühlung*) is agreeable to the normal human being, but also of those more special forms into which the men of different places and periods have been wont to project, by æsthetic sympathy, the modes of acting and willing most favourable to their well-being.

That such æsthetic well-being, whatever its precise psychological and physiological explanation, is of a very deep seated, highly organised, and far-spreading kind, has been, I trust, made evident to the reader of these pages. Dependent on all our habits of movement, of resistance, and of effort ; commensurate with our experience of balance and volition ; re-echoed through our innermost bodily life, it is no wonder that æsthetic well-being should be associated with our preference for order, temperance, for aspiring and harmonious activity ; or that philosophers, from Plato to Schopenhauer, should have guessed that the contemplation of beauty was one of the moral needs of the human creature.

Evolutional speculation may indeed add that this harmonious vitalising of the soul, this rhythmical co-operation of so many kinds of feeling and doing, this sympathising projection of man's modes into nature's forms, and this repercussion of nature's fancied attributes in man's own life, have answered some utility by unifying consciousness and rhythmically heightening vitality. And, in the light of these theories, the irresistible instinct will be justified, by which all times and peoples, despite the doubts of

philosophers and the scruples of ascetics, have invariably employed art as the expression of religion and bowed before beauty as a visible manifestation of the divine.

Such are the main problems which the new science of æsthetics has undertaken to solve; and such a few of the answers which it is already enabled to foreshadow.

APPENDIX TO ANTHROPOMORPHIC ÆSTHETICS

Quotations from Lipps's *Raumæsthetik* and
Æsthetische Einführung

[I have purposely refrained from all attempt to give any English form to these translations for fear of misinterpreting Professor Lipps's occasional obscure expressions.—V. L.]

Raumæsthetik.

Already when, looking at the spiral, I follow it, and take in its separate portions successively, I am making this spiral *come into existence for me or in my perception*. The spiral is first wide, then narrow; or, reversing the way of looking at it, first narrow and then wide. As a consequence the spiral *becomes* successively narrower or wider, it *narrows or widens itself*, and it does this in a definite manner. The existence of the spiral is a *becoming*. We have here a first connecting point for the representation of the conditions, according to which (with reference to the mechanical experience I have collected ever since my first day of life) such a spiral line would have *objectively* originated. But the shape itself of the line already gives occasion for such suppositions (*Vorstellungen*) concerning its natural origin and conditions (*Entstehungsbedingungen*). For forms habitually arise in reality under specified mechanical conditions, and I have already seen the origin of all kinds of curves, increasing and diminishing, and of this particular shape or similar ones. And lastly, even if Forms do not arise in this way, yet *they assert themselves* so. And this also happens under specified mechanical conditions. Now to these mechanical conditions we give the name of *forces, tendencies*, mechanical activities. In so far as we cause the line

(i.e. the spiral in question) to arise out of these, we are interpreting its shape mechanically.

And to this we add, or rather to this there adds itself, the representation of possible inner relationships of my own person (*meiner selbst*)—not of the same result (*Ergebniss*) but of the same character, *that is, there adds itself the representation of possible kinds of my own doing, in the process of which forces, motors, tendencies, or activities realise themselves freely or impeded*: there takes place a yielding to influences, or an overcoming of resistances, there arise strains, tensions (*Spannungen*) between impulses, and these are in turn resolved, etc. etc. Those Forces and force results (*Kraftwirkungen*) appear in the light of these categories of my own relations, of these categories of my activity, these impulses and tendencies and of these modes of this realisation.

Ästhetische Einfühlung, by Th. Lipps, in *Zeitschrift für Psych. u. Phys. der Sinnesorgane*, vol. 22, 1900, p. 439 *et seq.*

. . . I do not create the *living* spiral by objectifying some particular manner of myself living in spiral manner; but I make the spiral to be alive, by adding my life—(which has nothing to do with the spiral as such, but all the more to do with force, with inhibitions and freedom, with resistance and resistance overcome, with tension and solution)—by adding *my* life to the forces, inhibitions, resistances, etc., which appear to me to be present in the spiral; and by making this addition of *my* life I put my life also into them. In other words, the act of *Einfühlung* does not consist in giving this personal quality (*Färbung*) to the spiral and to the manner in which the spiral appears to rise, not to the *spiral's form*, but to the forces through which that form comes to exist. But, of course, as this personal quality is added to this particular mechanical action, or is assimilated to it, so this personal quality becomes the quality of a mechanical fact of this particular description, namely, of the mechanical fact *spiral*. My own mode of existing is transformed in the spiral to whatever extent it is attributed by my feelings (*Eingefühlt*) to the spiral; my own mode of existing is transformed into a mode of existence in the shape of spiral. But this appears first in the spiral, not first in me. . . .

When I lend a soul (*Beseele*) to the form of an animal's body, to a cat or a dog, does this mean that I myself have existed as dog or as cat? And yet it remains certain that the creature can be thus endowed with soul or life, only because I attribute to it characteristics of my own life.

How does this come about? The answer is obvious: I attribute to the animal's body those peculiarities of my own life, the attriba-

tion of which is suggested by such experiences as have been made by me in connection with the sight of that animal. I attribute them (*hinein tragen*) in the degree, with the modifications, in the combinations to which this experience necessitates me. By this means those peculiarities of my own life take the especial form and direction and the concrete contents, through which life (in general) becomes the specific life of a dog or a cat. This may be expressed, if one chooses, by saying: "I live myself in the form of the animal." It is in this sense that, with reference to the spiral, I also live my life in the mode of the spiral's shape (*lebe ich auch Angesichts der Spirale in Form der Spirale mich aus*).

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Let us proceed a step further. We have shown clearly the similarity, but also the difference between the *Einfühlung* into the spiral and the previously mentioned *Einfühlung* into the gesture of anger. The difference consists in this, that in the case of the spiral my own mode of activity which I transfer into it (*einfühle*) is connected with the mechanical forces, tendencies, activities to which the spiral is due, not owing to association of experience, but through association of resemblance, or more strictly, association of similarity of character.

Wishing to give a further instance of such association by resemblance (of character), and, in so far a further instance of that kind of *Einfühlung* in which the connexion is due to resemblance (of character) between me and the object, I will choose as illustration *Rhythm*.

The regular sequence of accentuated and less accentuated syllables, or the rhythm of tones in music, necessitates, as did the spiral, a special movement of perception. This perceptive movement is of a particular kind: I am and I feel myself hurried along from element to element, from group to group. That which is hurrying me (pushing me?) is the similarity of the elements and groups. Every psychic action has the tendency to continue itself in the same manner. This law is no other than that of similarity. At the same time every element and every definite group holds me fast. The accentuated syllables hold me tighter and longer than the unaccentuated; those more strongly accentuated more than less strongly accentuated. It is in this alternation of pressing forwards and being held back, and in the consequent alternation of freer progression and rest, of tension and solution, conflict and overcoming, and in the regularity of this alternated psychical activity, in this that consists, first and foremost, and looked at psychologically, the phenomenon of Rhythm. *Rhythm is, therefore, primarily a rhythm of the acts of perceiving the accentuated and unaccentuated or less accentuated syllables. . . .*

But this is not all. The law of association through similarity is also a law of the extension of every characteristic kind of psychical excitement or movement, a law of irradiation owing to similarity . . . a law of the co-resonance of similar or similarly tuned "chords" of our inner nature, a law of the psychical resonance of the similar. . . . Every category, or every specified *rhythm* of a psychical excitement or movement which takes place in any part of the soul (psyche), *i.e.* which is realised in any items of consciousness, has the tendency to spread itself further and over as wide an area as possible, a tendency to fill the whole "psyche," and hold it; *i.e.* to sustain, reproduce, to cause to vibrate all that which has the same modality of psychical happening.

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Rhythm, taken as a whole, is a specific manner of sequence among separate psychical acts of the same kind. It can, therefore, be simply transposed from one sequence of such acts to another, for instance, from a sequence of syllables or tones to a sequence of motor-images (Bewegungsvorstellungen). On the other hand, it is a natural essential of the universal *character* of a rhythm, of its particular easiness, freeness, heaviness, *legato* quality (Gebundenheit), etc., that psychical acts of whatever contents you choose (beliebigem Inhalt) can become vehicles of this rhythm. In this manner we can get a radiation over the *whole* psyche or over all kinds of contents thereof, a sympathetic vibration of all possible *chords* of our inner nature.

And since such a co-vibration *can* happen, it *must* in greater or lesser degree happen.

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I use the word *rhythm* in its largest sense, namely, as a characteristic mode of psychical *happening* (Ablauf) in general.

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. . . The reproductive force of rhythm is not directed upon the particular *contents* of such former experiences, but *upon the mode of psychical movement which is realised in them*. The result is the reproduction of a *general condition of my being* corresponding with the rhythm, the perception (Vorstellung) of a unifying or embracing (umfassend) "general mood" (Gesamtstimmung) of freedom and necessity, of passionate pushing forwards or quiet moderation, or seriousness or cheerful play, etc. What I experience internally when I hear a rhythm is, therefore, double: *first, the particular movement of the activity of perception forced upon me by the rhythm.*

Inasmuch as this movement is forced upon me by this rhythm and directly connected with it, inasmuch as this movement is directly implied in the rhythm's perception, so this movement *seems to belong to the rhythm or the rhythmical object, seems to be its movement and movement tendency*. And secondly, it is *I* who am experiencing this general condition (Gesamtstimmung) of my personality. . . . What connects them (the rhythm and the mood) is that they are both one and the same movement. The mood is that *in me occasioned movement itself*, but not merely as movement limited to that point of consciousness (psyche) where it originated, but as movement of the total personality, whose nature is defined by everything which I have *at any time* experienced and can now be reawakened in me ; and therefore possessing the character of co-operation of the total ego.

* * *

Seriousness or cheerfulness of a rhythm . . . ; breadth, restfulness, weightiness, and their contraries in tones ; depth, warmth and cold of colours—these are none of them qualities of the perceived rhythm, tones and colours, that is to say, they are not qualities which we find in these items of consciousness as such. I do not *bear* seriousness or cheerfulness when I hear the sequence of accentuated and unaccentuated syllables ; I do not hear the thinness (Leerheit) and the fullness, the breadth and the quietness, when I hear a sound ; I do not *see* the depth, the warmth or cold, when I see the colour. But these words denote the sensible manner in which I am internally moved, when I perceive the sounds and the colours ; these words betoken the “ affective character ” of the process of perception.

Zeitschrift für Psych. u. Phys., vol. 22, p. 416 :

Æsthetic pleasure is dependent upon the attribution of Life, of soul (Belebung, Beseelung). Æsthetic contemplation, out of which æsthetic pleasure arises, always contains such Belebung or Beseelung. But it is impossible for me to see or hear *life, living* outside myself, or otherwise perceive it with my senses. I can find it only in myself as a peculiarity of my personality. In æsthetic contemplation I therefore lend to the æsthetic object my own personality in a particular manner, or at all events a mode of my personality's existence. The Object, to which I æsthetically lend life or soul, carries in itself a reflection of my personality.

Raumaesthetik.

P. 61 : Such geometric-optical delusions arise universally from the representation of the Forces, Activities, Tendencies, which appear to

operate in the spatial images, or through whose operation these spatial images appear to have their existence.

P. 62 : We have seen that the activity, through which a form, or any form-element appears to come into existence, cannot be thought of as without counter-tendency or counter-action. It is only through the working against one another, and the balance of activity and counter-activity that we obtain the resting (*ruhende*) Form.

P. 63 : We must carefully discriminate between the Activity and the Tendency, both of which lead to a given spatial act, and this spatial act itself. It is not the *act* but the tendency, the striving, the impulse produces the necessity of an optical delusion.

P. 79 : This fact . . . is the fundamental fact of æsthetics. For space is an object of æsthetic perception, only inasmuch as it is a *space which has been given life* (*belebter Raum*), only inasmuch as it is the vehicle of an inner tension, of an exchange of activity and counter-activity. It is the mission of the arts of beautiful spatial form to increase this interchange of activities and to diversify it ; and to present to us in the forms a meaningful Rhythm of living, which rhythm of living is self-enclosed into a meaningful whole ; to show us in the forms a directly intelligible exchange of comparative constraint (*Gebundenheit*) and of freer action ; to show a regulated progress of single activities to conflicts and of conflicts to resolutions ; to show a beautiful Combat and Victory of material, and yet never *merely* material, forces.

P. 84 : . . . The particular power of resistance against the attempt to abolish or diminish its existence, which we attribute, in greater or lesser degree, to every object when compared with mere empty space.

P. 84 : The straight line "unites" its extreme points or disposes itself between its extreme points ; at the same time the straight line "stretches" itself between its extreme points.

P. 94 : If in a spatial element there happen to meet two or more independent activities which are neither foreign nor hostile in their direction and which, for this reason, can be united in one representation or the representation of one activity, then these two or more activities will reciprocally heighten each other. And with this will be heightened the optical result thereof.

P. 115 : I finally wish to remind the reader what an æsthetic importance the peculiarity of vertical extension has, and the contrast between vertical extension and horizontal extension in the ornamental spatial arts. Geometrically speaking, there is no qualitative difference between them. But in architecture, sculpture, and ceramic,

the contrast between the two is the original factor of the existence of form. The works of these arts *bound* themselves horizontally and *erect* themselves vertically. . . . Out of the interchange of these activities arises above all the life quality (*Lebendigkeit*), which is active in these works.

P. 118: No activity or tendency can be apparently increased without our being obliged to conceive the contrary activity or tendency as increased also. But as the latter increase is assumed by us virtually because we had assumed the first increase, the first becomes the primary, the other the secondary. As a result a modification takes place, apart from this mutual increase . . . in the direction of that primary increase—(I suppose Lipps means we feel the primary more).

P. 259: When two lines are moving near each other in different directions, every one sees the movement of the second of these lines in the light of a contrary movement. If I see the principal parts of a building rising vertically, then every oblique line of the building, which I see alongside of or between them, appears to me to oppose itself to this vertical movement. I seem to feel naturally in those vertical lines at the same time as in the whole building to which they belong, a traction of vertical movement. This traction is not followed by the oblique line, therefore this oblique line opposes the traction. If it did not, it would be dragged along and would no longer be the oblique line which it is. On the other hand, the perception of the oblique line awakens in me the idea of a traction (on the whole) in an oblique direction. In comparison with it the actually vertical movement seems to me less self-obvious; it becomes for my conception more and more of an accomplished fact (*Leistung*). It withstands that traction and therefore realises in itself a tendency in another direction.

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At the moment of passing from the perception of the vertical line to that of the oblique one, I am filled with the representation of the vertical movement; I, therefore, continue having it in the presence of the oblique line. In so far as my perception of this oblique line is influenced by the impression of the vertical line, it will seem to me that the oblique line ought really to run vertically also; in a manner I *expect* that it should do so. And as usual, the perception that it does not, awakens the sense of something opposing itself to this expected action.

P. 279: Every unified spatial form possesses for our representation a tendency to the particular effect which seems to be realised at a

given point of its course ; it possesses this tendency *as a whole* and already *before* the point where the effect is actually produced. Hence arises a particular optical delusion.

P. 337 : We cannot possibly get it out of our mind that the widening or letting itself go into breadth *must* render vertical movement slower, and that the narrowing in horizontal sense must quicken the vertical movement.

P. 341 : Every unified line possesses at every point the tendency to that mode of being a boundary (Begrenzen) or enclosing, which that line seems to realise in its further course ; and in a degree commensurate to the directness with which it seems to continue from that point of its course to this point of it.*

P. 347 : In architecture we see everywhere unified masses, particularly in vertical direction, projecting and receding. Everywhere do we meet the *motif* of the upper and lower projections in the most universal meaning of this word. Through these the mass is transformed into a living rhythm of tension and resolution. The receding parts not merely *go back* but *hold back*, or affirm their spatial existence against the force of widening out or the tendency to coming forwards, which becomes visible in projections. They (the receding parts) thereby embody a greater horizontal tension or achieve an increased inner cohesion. At the same time the energy of their vertical activity increases. On the other hand, the projections, in so far as they yield in horizontal direction, seem also vertical—not to go *out* of themselves, but to go back into themselves. They become points of rest in the vertical movement. Finally the vertical movement as a whole is increased, etc. etc.

P. 396 : One word about the *fluting* of a column. In the flutings we see the column drawing itself together towards its axis, then coming forward out of itself, withdrawing again, etc. etc. There takes place on its surface a rhythmical interchange of tension and resolution. The corners (or edges) in which (in the Doric pillar) the flutings meet are points of solution or of diminished tension. The counteraction towards the enclosing action of the boundary of the whole, or against the horizontal pushing out of the mass is directed by the corners inwards ; it is concentrated in the nucleus of the column and held in check by the boundaries of the nucleus. By this means the whole outer boundary or boundary of the whole is unburdened. Its enclosing activity is an easier, securer one, and less threatened by the

* I remember the late Mr. G. F. Watts showing me that curves affected us as wide or narrow according as we imagined them to be segments of larger or smaller circles.—V. L.



DORIC COLUMN FROM PARTHENON
From a photograph by the late W. J. Stillman

counteraction from within. At the same time, the vertical action in the ribs or sharp edges of the fluting, or of the boundary of the whole which they determine, is less tense, has a more certain effect and is more reassuring. And inasmuch as the impression of the whole is necessarily determined directly by this "boundary of the whole," the whole column appears naturally with this character. This diminishes the over-estimation of the height which would have resulted from the rounded shaft. As a fact the height of a fluted cylinder is *under-estimated* in comparison with that of an unfluted one.

It is obvious that in the Doric column this *unburdening* (Entlastung) of the whole is motivated by the tapering, in short by the constraint (Gedrungenheit). The total impression is that of a secure mode of being (Daseins) united with immense achievement, or else an impression of the quiet unhesitating execution of the achievement. If the fluting were absent in the swelling width of the column, there would be danger of the column appearing to make a cumbersome and fatiguing effort. One understands equally that, in the reverse case, that is to say when the impression of an important intended achievement is missing, that is to say in intrinsically lighter forms, the fluting gives the impression of the elegant, the superficially tense, of an ostentatiously displayed certainty, in short of the really weak, but stiff (*Kraftlos gespreizten*).

P. 5: The shape of the column . . . does not merely *exist*, but *becomes*, and that not once for all but over again at every moment. In other words, we are making (*i.e.* the shape of) the column into the subject of a mechanical (*i.e.* dynamical) interpretation. We do so not intentionally, or as a result of reflection; on the contrary, the mechanical interpretation is given directly with the perception. Now the processes of such mechanical *becoming* do not occur merely in the world *outside* us. There is a category of mechanical *becoming* (or *happening*—*geschehen*) which is in every sense of the word more closely connected with ourselves: namely, the *becoming* in us. . . . We therefore consider the *becoming outside* of us according to the analogy of the becoming *in* us, that is to say, according to the analogy of our personal experience.

A similar way of considering things can already be noticed whenever we speak of a "Force" residing in an object; more clearly even whenever we realise a "tendency" or "striving" (*streben*) in anything that happens, whenever we realise (*i.e.* outside of ourselves.—V. L.) any "doing" or "being done to," any "activity" or "passiveness." All such giving life to our surrounding realities comes about, and can come about, only inasmuch as we

attribute to outer things our own feeling of force, our own feeling of striving or willing, our own activity and passiveness. . . . Such an attribution brings outer things closer to us, makes them more intimate and in so far more seemingly intelligible. . . . We are reminded of processes which we can experience in ourselves, not of individual concrete instances of such processes, but of processes similar in character. There arises in us the image of similar proceedings of our own and with the image the particular feeling of ourselves (*selbstgefühl*) which naturally accompanies such proceedings. The mechanical proceeding which seems to fulfil itself with "ease" suggests such "doing" of our own which fulfils itself with similar freedom and ease; and the large expenditure of mechanical "*Energy*" (*italics sic*) suggests a similar expenditure of our own power of will. On this depends in the one case the happy consciousness of ease and freedom of our own activities, and in the other case, the equally happy consciousness of our own power. . . . The column seems to gird itself up (*sich zusammen zu fassen*) and erect itself, that is to say, to proceed in the way in which I do when I gird myself up and *erect myself*, or *remain* thus tense and erect in opposition to the natural inertness of my body. It is impossible for me to be aware of the (shape of the) column without this activity seeming to exist in the shape I am thus aware of.

All our pleasure in spatial form (*i.e.* visible shapes.—V. L.) . . . is therefore due to sympathy of a happy kind (*ist Freude über räumliche Formen . . . beglückendes sympathiegefühl*).

ÆSTHETIC EMPATHY AND ITS ORGANIC ACCOMPANIMENTS

Translated by R. L. Shields from the original French of Vernon
Lee in the *Revue Philosophique*, vol. lxiv (1907)

I

As already pointed out in the foregoing introductory essay, Professor Lipps laid the foundation of a new and real philosophy of beauty and art when he formulated his hypothesis of Empathy (*Einfühlung*): an hypothesis which may be compared to that of natural selection in its originality and its far-reaching importance. To apply the idea of Empathy will be the principal method whereby the æsthetician of the future may solve the problems of morphology and artistic evolution: to analyse, verify, and refer the phenomenon of Empathy to more elementary phenomena of mind will be the main future task of psychology as applied to æsthetic activities. A new Darwin (and not without his Wallaces), Professor Lipps has given us the hypothesis of *Einfühlung*; let us examine what he has done with his discovery and what it behoves us to do with it. ✓

II

To begin with, let me remind the readers of my other studies on Professor Lipps, and let me explain

to those who are unfamiliar with them, what is hidden beneath this very German and seemingly fantastic formula: *Einfühlung*, or, as Professor Titchener has translated it, Empathy. This word, made up of *fühlen*, to feel, and *ein* (*herein, hinein*), *in, into*, conjugated (*sich einfühlen*) with the pronoun denoting the reflective mode—this word *Einfühlung* has existed in German æsthetics ever since Vischer and Lotze; * and furthermore it has existed in literary phraseology at least since Novalis and the Romanticists. We shall see later on at the price of what ambiguity and deviation from his own thought Professor Lipps has bought the dangerous advantage of using an already existing expression for a new idea. *Sich einfühlen, to transport oneself into something in feeling* (the German reflective form has a sense of activity which to *feel* does not give, and which one cannot render except by the help of a verb such as *to transport, project, enter into*)—*sich einfühlen into something, or into some one*, has in ordinary German the meaning of *putting oneself in the place of some one, of imagining, of experiencing, the feelings of some one or something*: it is the beginning of sympathy, but in this primary stage the attention is directed entirely to the feeling which one attributes to the other, and not at all to the imitation of that recognised or supposed feeling which is the act of sympathising (German *mitfühlen*).

It is in this sense that, even before Vischer, Fechner, and Lotze, people spoke of *einfühlen oneself into the life and movement of a plant or animal*. But in *feeling oneself into the place of a branch of a tree swayed in the sunshine* (the example, now

* The lectures, afterwards collected as Vischer's *Das Schöne und die Kunst*, were given before 1870.

famous, is given by Lotze in the *Microcosmos*) it was evident that the feelings in which one was supposed to share were feelings which the branch of the tree did *not* experience; they were the *feelings which we should have had, not in becoming a branch, but in transporting into the branch our own human nature.* ✓✓ The recognition of this is the beginning of Professor Lipps's theory of *Einfühlung*, or rather, it is the meeting-point of his use of the verb *Einfühlen* and that verb's ordinary meaning. *When we put ourselves in the place of some one or something*, what we call *the place* is the feelings characteristic of that place or situation, feelings of which we have had direct experience in our own past, and which we now attribute for one reason or another (by no means always the same sort of reason) to a creature other than ourselves. It is no concern of the present inquiry whether this other be, more or less literally, similar to ourselves; whether the perception of a resemblance is what suggests this attribution, and whether, in short, this attribution of direct data of our experience coincides with the reality of facts or whether, on the contrary, the person or thing to which we have attributed our own conditions be more or less dissimilar to us and incapable of feeling what we would feel in its place. What must be grasped by the student of Æsthetic Empathy is that there exists, for one reason or another, an act of attribution of our energies, activities, or feelings to the *non-ego*, an act necessarily preceding all *sympathy*, and that this projection of our inner experience necessitates the revival of subjective states in what we call our memory. It is necessary to insist on this elementary psychological fact, because it explains the essential nature of all sympathetic movement :

and, what concerns us for the moment, the nature of everything which the German language, before or with Professor Lipps, means by the word *Einfühlung*.

It is because the states attributed by us to the perceived person or thing, the states which we believe we recognise in it, are *our own states*, that reviviscence of these past states will be accompanied in us by satisfaction or dissatisfaction, intense in proportion to the greater or less vivacity of this reviviscence and to the presence or absence of other states capable of corroborating or inhibiting it. Our pleasure or displeasure in the subjective state which we recognise or imagine, is due to this subjective state *having been ours*, and becoming ours again when we thus attribute it. In other words, every subjective phenomenon, emotion, feeling, state of well-being or the reverse, etc., can only be known directly and in so far as given by our inner experience; consequently, what we take for the perception of its existence outside us is only the consciousness of its strong or weak reviviscence in ourselves. Let me repeat and re-repeat it: Empathy, or *Einfühlung*, that is to say, the attribution of our modes to a *non-ego*, is *accompanied by satisfaction or dissatisfaction because it takes place in ourselves*. Now, there is a category of this attribution of our modes to a *non-ego* which is distinguished by the fact that this *non-ego* is not capable of the modes thus attributed to it. I refer to the attribution of movements, of motor conditions and even of intention and volition and effort, in a word, of character, sensitiveness, and movement to inanimate and motionless shapes. Let me give an example which is also a quotation from Professor Lipps's earlier book.

"The Doric *abacus* widens itself out in comparison with the column, and seems, consequently, to yield to the pressure of the entablature and to spread out as it gives way. But while thus yielding it pulls itself together vigorously (*fasst sich zugleich kraftvoll zusammen*) and asserts itself (*behauptet sich*) against this action of the superimposed weight. Thus it becomes the intermediary capable of resisting the vertical thrust of the column and the weight of the roof concentrated in the architrave."

But, the reader may object, all that is simply the description of the play of mechanical forces taking place in the Doric order. Yes, of course this play of forces is well known to us, and especially in the case of the Doric building. But where does this play of forces really take place? Is it in the stone of which the edifice is built? The stone has qualities of weight and cohesion, and these qualities have limitations: the weight of the superimposed part might, in certain positions, exceed the cohesion of the lower part; then this lower will crack, and the building may even fall in. But the stone can neither *spread out*, nor *pull itself together vigorously*, nor *resist an activity*. Stone knows neither *thrust* nor *resistance*. In using these expressions we are yielding to the habit of applying the modes of our own existence in explanation of the outer world. Let us note, in passing, this tendency of our mind, for it serves as a clue to the often obscure windings of this question of *Einfühlung*. But, to return, when we apply to certain buildings, or to their details, terms such as *rising up*, *thrusting out*, *extending*, *expanding*, *contracting*, etc., we are not referring to the material part of them, stone, brick, or wood; we are referring to *their form*. We will take some

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more examples of this from Professor Lipps's first book (*Raumästhetik*).

"The whole column, after having widened out at the base to adapt itself to the ground, draws itself together in its shaft and raises itself vertically with a concentration of energy, a rapidity and security corresponding to this concentration." We understand perfectly the meaning of these words, and in so far as we have a visual memory and familiarity with architecture, they give us an inner vision of the forms in question. All this is part of our daily habits, and there is nothing new in it. But let us ask ourselves in what sense an architectural form, that is to say a given assemblage of lines and planes, can accomplish actions which we have recognised as impossible to stone, brick, and, in a word, to the material in which this form is presented to us ?

It is obvious that visible form, made of stone, or merely drawn on paper, is, in itself, incapable of action, unless we give a literal and incorrect meaning to the expression "to act on our perceptions." Form *exists* ; it does *not act* ; it is, on the contrary, our faculties which act in furnishing the relations and directions which make up this form. Thus the more we analyse the more we recognise the presence of activity on our part, and the absence of activity on the part of the form.*

There is another point to consider : all this activity manifests itself in time, and breaks up into successive phases ; in speaking of the column, that is to say of the *form of the column*, in terms of

* Compare also *Raumästhetik*, p. 22 : "The column *erects itself*, it is not *made erect*. The erecting is the column's own deed, it is the realisation of its own active force, it is the column's free and willing act."

activity, we have also spoken of it in terms of *time* ; we have even come to attribute to this column, to this motionless shape, all of whose parts co-exist without change, modes of movement, of rapidity and security in an action which it is reputed to accomplish ; and this action we have subdivided into successive moments !

What is the meaning of this succession of untruths universally accepted even in our most exact phraseology ? Simply our incapacity to think otherwise than in terms of our own experience, the incapacity to explain to ourselves the *non-ego* except by the inner data of our consciousness : *succession, movement, activity* and their different modalities. The temporal existence, attributed to this form really existing only in space, is *our existence in time* ; the succession of moments attributed to the co-existing qualities of this form is *the succession of our impressions* ; movement, rapidity, and security do not belong to the form, but to *our taking possession* of this form ; and the activity we speak of is *ours*. "The serious or gay character of a rhythm," says Lipps (see above, p. 39), "the fullness, gravity, restful character of musical sounds : the depth, warmth or coolness of a colour-scheme—these are qualities which do not belong at all to rhythm, sounds or seen colours ; in other words, these are qualities which do not exist in these items of perception, taken in themselves. I do not hear the serious or gay character when I listen to a succession of accentuated or unaccentuated syllables : nor do I hear poverty, abundance, or rest in listening to a sound ; I do not see depth, warmth, or coolness in seeing colour. These words express the manner in which my inner sensibility is moved at the moment

of perceiving sounds and colours: these words designate the *affective character* [of the perceptive process].” *

Moreover, with a merely perceptive process there is usually associated an explanatory process: complete apperception of a thing includes certain acts of comparison not only among the elementary sensations produced by this thing, but also certain acts of reference of our present impressions to past impressions; to take cognisance of an existence or quality means to join it with other existences and other qualities: it is an integration of the new sensation into a previous synthesis.

The perception of a form, then, comprises, around a nucleus of simple sensations, the consciousness of the psychic process, of the mode more or less easy, more or less continuous, regular and energetic of this psychic process; and consequently, as Lipps observes, the consciousness of the affective character of such a mode. But the perception of a form includes, in addition, the reference of our psychic process to other processes: we integrate the synthesis of our actual activities into an already known and analogous synthesis; and our consciousness of making an effort, of bending, or of drawing up, of yielding or resisting weight, of balancing ourselves, of extending ourselves in height, or depth, or breadth is complicated by the previous experience of similar states, and is enriched by accompaniments

* Compare also *Raumästhetik*, p. 42: “Der Impuls ist ein bestimmt gerichtet räumlicher Impuls. Es ist unmöglich, einen solchen Impuls vorzustellen . . . ohne dass wir ihm in unserer Vorstellung, sei es nur andeutungsweise, folgen. Wir folgen ihm in unserer Vorstellung, dies heisst aber nichts anderes als: wir lassen in unserer Vorstellung das, worauf er gerichtet ist, entstehen.

particular to this experience. So, when two lines meet, the *modes of activity* of which we have consciousness in the more or less rapid and easy and continuous perception of their relations are complicated by modes of activity of which we have had consciousness on the occasion of an analogous encounter between our body and foreign bodies. Thus we explain the relations in space of these lines in terms of movement in time; we attribute to these lines not only balance, direction, velocity, pace, rhythm, energy, but also *thrust, resistance, strain, feeling, intention, and character*. In a word, in perceiving forms made up of lines and planes, that is to say, in directing our attention successively to their different parts, in measuring, comparing, and referring one to the other, and in referring them in their details and totality to our previous experiences, we go through an incident or a drama, and this incident or drama not being localisable in ourselves, through lack of "local signs" * attached to these states, is projected by us into the form on which, for the moment, such a large number of our energies are concentrated.

But since all this incident, all this drama, takes place in ourselves, since it consists in the reviviscence of activities and experiences stored up within us, it cannot be indifferent to us, it must be subject to the pleasure-displeasure alternative which accompanies the consciousness of our activities. That is

* Cf. *The Central Problem of Æsthetics* and Münsterberg in Appendix.

For *Local Signs*, see W. James's *Psychology*, ii, 155, 167; cf. Wundt, *Grundriss der Psychologie*, 3rd edition, pp. 125, 130; *Komplex Lokalzeichen*, pp. 156, 161; *Komplexe L. der Tiefe*, p. 165; also Külpe, *Outlines*, Titchener's translation, pp. 26, 344, 365, 417.

why a form to which we direct our attention will arouse in us a more or less distinct state of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This state will produce a tendency, perhaps even an act, to prolong or shorten it according to its agreeableness or disagreeableness; and this tendency, this act, will recall our attention to ourselves. To the objective and passive formula "this form is beautiful" will be added the subjective and active formula "*I like* (that is to say, *I try to keep in relation with*) this form."

Such is, it seems to me, the analysis, the description of the process which Professor Lipps has pointed out as at the base of all preference or aversion with regard to visible shapes. And it is to this process Professor Lipps has applied the term, already existing in his language, *Einfühlung*.

III

The expression "*Æsthetic Einfühlung*" has the advantage of connecting a complex and little studied psychological phenomenon with certain facts of daily observation. But this advantage is counterbalanced by connecting with this new scientific idea the other meanings of an expression which had already been used in different circumstances. Thanks to its name, *Einfühlung* became more acceptable, but it did not remain the same. The verb "*sich einfühlen*," literally *to feel oneself into something or some one*, implies, by its reflective form, the idea of an *ego* which enters into the *non-ego*: and Professor Lipps seems to have yielded to this implication. Admitted in an entirely conventional manner in his first book on the *Æsthetics of Spatial Form*, this connotation latent in the word *Einfühlung* has grown

with the development of the hypothesis in his book on *General Æsthetics*, the second volume of which occupies our attention at this moment. The grammatical *I* implied in the form of the verb has become little by little a metaphysical *ego* possessing essential qualities and unity. Professor Lipps has come to speak fluently of the projection of *our ego* into the object or form seen : *ich fühle mich ein*, he repeats constantly ; and this *ich*, this *ego* becoming more and more personal, finally ends by participating in the conditions which it has created in the *non-ego* and feeling the recoil of it as a child may try to imitate the movements of its own shadow.

Am I unjust in attributing to Professor Lipps a little metaphysical mythology ? Most times, certainly, especially when he limits himself to the problems of elementary shapes of which he has made so masterly a study, Professor Lipps conceives and explains Empathy as a psychological phenomenon of reviviscence and of projection of our past states. But as happens in all mythology, the mythological moments, if I may so call them, are intermittent : one believes and one does not believe ; with the result of having an uncertain, confused impression in which hovers many a troublesome *perhaps*.

“ All that we perceive in the inanimate world (*in der unbeseelten Welt*),” says Professor Lipps (p. 339), “ is merely *being* and *becoming*. But this being and becoming we perceive and conceive (*nehmen wir wahr und fassen es auf*), that is to say, that we make it ours by an intellectual process. But,” Professor Lipps continues, “ while doing this we fill up the perceived phenomena with our own activity, with our life, our strength, in a word, with *ourselves*.”

This quotation is an instance of the gradual encroachment on obvious facts of an assertion which requires rigorous examination. Of course *in taking note of a phenomenon* we apply to it the data of our own experience; in the cases foreseen by Professor Lipps, we attribute to this phenomenon certain modes borrowed from our activities: activities which are known to us because they are ours. But between *attributing certain modes of our activity*, *attributing certain activities which belong to us*, and *attributing our activity*, there is a difference which is not always taken into account. Thus, having transformed the attribution of *activities which we know*, insomuch as they are ours, into a projection of *our activity*, Professor Lipps, continuing to take the part for the whole, transforms *our activity* into *our life*, *our strength*, to end the crescendo by a final metamorphosis: *our life*, *our strength*, become "ourselves" (*uns selbst*). Will the reader object that these are merely figures of speech, and that we must not fall foul of words? But with abstract thinkers, with definers and systematisers such as Professor Lipps, verbal expression is itself subjected to analysis and used to furnish generalisations. To speak of *attributing to phenomena certain activities*, or rather *certain modes of activity*, is to limit oneself to the data of psychological observation: we are aware of having modes of activity and of interpreting external phenomena in terms of these modes. But to speak of *projecting ourselves into external phenomena* is, first of all, to postulate the entity, the unity of an *ego*; it is moreover to formulate a psychological fact (the projection of ourselves) which does not agree with the data of introspection. One has a right to ask, to begin with, in what way the *ego*, granting its

literal existence, could divest itself of the subjective, inner character which belongs to it, and clothe itself in the objective, external character of the *non-ego* into which it is supposed to have entered? And putting aside this difficulty (of a rather theological aspect), is it possible to assert that inner experience gives us examples of such a transference of the *ego* into the *non-ego*? It is indeed true that the feeling of *self* has been connected with the sense of effort by a school of psychologists; and common parlance suggests that the feeling of self disappears in moments of great "absorption." This much is certain, that whenever the attention is concentrated on an object outside ourselves, this attention is proportionately little concerned with what is taking place within us. But that such an absorption in the *non-ego*, such a loss of the feeling of self and self's functions is inevitable in the phenomenon of *Einfühlung*, is an assertion exceeding psychological experience and, even, occasionally clashing with the data of such experience. To explain the pleasure or displeasure accompanying perception of a given form by the entrance of *our ego* into this form is a metaphorical method tempting to minds more literary than philosophic, but which Professor Lipps should not encourage by using expressions as misleading as they are picturesque. Neither do I imagine that Professor Lipps could fall into such a metaphorical trap. But the *ego* of *Einfühlung* leads directly to this pitfall, and makes it more difficult to follow the real process which is hidden under this phraseology. The process in question is that which we have described in our first pages, namely, the process of interpreting visible shapes in terms of our own activities, just as we interpret all external data

in terms of our experience, a process which implies a more or less distinct reviviscence of previous motor conditions and, therefore, the pleasure-displeasure alternative attached to these conditions.

Does Professor Lipps make this process the explanation of æsthetic satisfaction and dissatisfaction? Doubtless, since it is Professor Lipps who first pointed out the phenomenon of *Einfühlung*, and since the process in question is hidden in the phenomenon of *Einfühlung*. I emphasise the words *is hidden there*; for in using these words I am showing both my acceptance of Professor Lipps's ideas and my divergence from them. For while the simple process of attributing certain of our activities, and of interpreting by certain facts of our experience, sometimes stands out clearly in Professor Lipps's thought and words, at other times it is hidden or masked. It is perfectly plain and distinct when he speaks of "the throb of life felt in penetrating by contemplation into a work of art, the throb which, for this very reason seems to belong to the work of art and to be the throb of its own inner life": and again when he identifies the pleasure of *Einfühlung* with the pleasure "of the inner expansion and contraction which I accomplish (*an der ganzen inneren Bewegung, die ich vollziehe*), when I follow the (architectural) forms." But if the psychological process stands out clearly in these words, is it not singularly obscured in the following sentence? "The *ego* which remains in this æsthetic contemplation, is a super-individual *ego*, in the same sense that the scientific and ethical *egos* are super-individual. The *ego* lives in the thing contemplated (*es lebt in der betrachteten Sache*)."

Would it not be more in keeping with facts to say

that the contemplated object lives in the mind which contemplates it? And does it not seem that one catches a glimpse in Professor Lipps's thought of the vague entity of a homogeneous *ego*, separate and almost material, leaving the realm of reality (imagined in some way as dimensional space) to take up its abode in "the work of art," to participate in its life and to detach itself from its own, after the fashion of the Lenten retreat of a Catholic escaping from the world and purifying himself in the life of a convent?

This metaphor might be applied, but it would make us forget that the *ego* is not an entity apart, not a personage able to go in and out of a given place, but is a group of subjective phenomena, or rather a special kind of feeling intermittently present in consciousness. Moreover this metaphor would make us forget also that "work of art" is the name given sometimes to an object existing outside ourselves, and sometimes to the image of it which we make for ourselves, and to the inner condition accompanying the perception of this object. Now it is only in this last sense that the work of art possesses a life in which we can share; and all the real truth in the *Einfühlung* hypothesis is connected with the subjective existence of the work of art, that is to say, with the idea of it which we make for ourselves; an idea made up in part of our experiences of life and activity; I would venture to specify even further, made up in part of the experience of movements of our own body.

IV

It is this last possibility which Lipps absolutely refuses to entertain, and to which he seems constantly concerned in closing every avenue. One might almost believe that it is the dislike of admitting the participation of the body in the phenomenon of æsthetic Empathy which has impelled Lipps to make æsthetics more and more abstract, *a priori*, and metaphysical. This concern for safeguarding the spiritual purity of *Einfühlung* by the interposition of an *ego* equivalent to an immaterial entity seems not to have existed at the time when he wrote his first and best æsthetical book, his admirable *Raum-æsthetik*. Beginning with the very well-known but insufficiently studied phenomena incorrectly called "optical illusions," phenomena consisting in falsifying the real proportions of geometric shapes through the application of judgments derived from our other experience, Lipps devoted himself to studying with genial sagacity the ideas (to which current language bears testimony) of activity, of temporal existence, of motion, accompanying in our consciousness the sight of lines and planes which (in the phraseology itself testifying to the existence of these phenomena) *meet* and *unite* in order to *make up* what we call *forms*. From this study has come, if not the theory, at least the empirical and the logical demonstration of the process to which Professor Lipps has given the convenient but misleading name of *Einfühlung*.

"Every unified spatial form," he writes in his first book on *Æsthetics* (*Raumæsthetik*, p. 279), "has in our representation of it a tendency towards the special effect which seems to take place at some point of its existence. The form has this tendency in its

totality and before, as well as after, the point where this effect takes place. The result is an *optical illusion* of a particular kind." Why? Because (*Raumæsthetik*, p. 304) "we see, so to speak, what we expect to see, because we have this expectation, and because the reality does not thwart it."

Similarly (*Raumæsthetik*, p. 337), "it is impossible for us not to think that widening out necessarily implies a slackening of the vertical movement, and that, *vice versa*, horizontal contraction does not imply an acceleration of the vertical movement." In the same way (*Raumæsthetik*, p. 260), "When one stone resting on another does not fall . . . this fact awakens in us the representation of a *counter-tendency* which we attribute to the stone's prop. Or, more correctly, when we analyse what really takes place, the counter-tendency is only the denial of our expectation of seeing this stone fall."

Let us ask again why it should be so? *Raumæsthetik* (p. 35) gives us the following reply:

"Daily life shows that we are guided, in practice as well as in mere judgment, by experiences of a mechanical order, without our having a conscious memory of the content of these experiences.* It is therefore certain that past mechanical experiences act unconsciously in us. . . . When past experiences belonging to the same category become sufficiently numerous they crystallise in us so as to form a Law. And once crystallised into a Law these past experiences no longer act separately in us, but only united in this law, realising the elements they possess in common. And just as we are not conscious of past experience taken separately, so neither are we necessarily conscious of this Law. Although this law has no intrinsic and isolated existence, it acts in us as if it really existed: *that is to say, that we submit individual cases to it*. . . . And not only cases similar to those of which we have had experience in our past, but also new and varied cases; provided always that these new cases fall under the same law. . . ."

The last part of this chain of explanation is perhaps expressed in rather too general terms, but

* *Raumæsthetik*, p. 35: Everyday life shows that in our judgments and practice we can be guided by mechanical experiences, without the data [*Inhalt*] of these experiences now existing consciously in memory. Past mechanical experience therefore undeniably produces unconscious workings in us.

the reader will notice that in all the passages we have just quoted, Professor Lipps is dealing in psychology based on observation and not in metaphysics containing *a priori* statements. In these quotations there is no mention of an *ego entering into* the thing contemplated and letting itself be moved by the activities emanating from itself. Empathy (for Professor Lipps already uses the word *Einfühlung* in his earlier book)—Empathy depends upon the *condensation* of past mechanical experiences acting in the present as a real law, that is to say (in empirical wording), upon the residue of motor conditions which have been deprived by repetition of all marks of origin and environment; briefly, the activities which we attribute to perceived shapes are activities which have become, so to speak, abstract, and recur without the revival of details, in the same way as another kind of conditions, namely, those dealt with by M. Ribot's hypothesis of *Emotional Memory*.

"When reality does not thwart it, our expectation is verified because we have it," says Lipps, a saying which could be paraphrased more technically: an active or emotional condition arises in us when its suggestion is not inhibited by other active or emotional conditions of a contradictory nature.

In the theory of *Einfühlung* thus formulated in Professor Lipps's first book there was nothing which could not be accepted by empirical psychology, nothing to which I did not subscribe in my account of his *Raumästhetik*, nothing of which the masterly pages of an eminent experimental psychologist, Hugo Münsterberg (*Principles of Art Education*, New York, 1905), are not an amplification in more technical terms.

Unfortunately, it would seem that, at this point, Professor Lipps's thought was checked along these lines, deflected in the direction of old-established æsthetics, metaphysical, abstract, and even *a prior-istic*. Professor Lipps would seem to have stumbled against certain opinions which were converging with his own, by which he was offended. One of the most distinguished recent German æstheticians, Karl Groos (*Spiele der Menschen* and *Æsthetik*), starting from the examination of the so-called "play-instinct," basing his views upon introspection, happened to formulate at the very moment of the appearance of Professor Lipps's first book (of which he borrowed a page), an explanation of æsthetic pleasure and displeasure based on a phenomenon which he called "Inner Imitation" (*Innere Nach-
abmung*). This *Inner Imitation*, which Professor Groos, a writer of an observant rather than a systematic mind, made no attempt to define exactly, almost corresponded to Professor Lipps's *Einfühlung*. But it differed in so far that the *Inner Imitation*, a phenomenon known to Professor Groos through personal introspection, contained a very unmistakable trace not only of *motor images*, but of muscular sensations, similar to those which Fechner had discovered in himself while watching a fencing match, or a game of billiards, and to those in which Stricker, though refuted in this by M. Gilbert Ballet, imagined auditive memory to consist.

The existence in *Inner Imitation* (such at least as it was first formulated by Professor Groos), of this element of *muscular sensations*, connected Groos's hypothesis with the "Lange-James" theory of the part played by organic sensations in emotional states; and at the same time allowed the explana-

tion of a part at least of æsthetic pleasure by organic conditions favourable to life. The alliance with such ideas, repugnant to the wholly intellectual, if not wholly spiritualistic, æsthetics of Professor Lipps, seems to have made him recoil. There may also have been something further; and here I am compelled to speak of myself and of my essay (in collaboration with C. Anstruther-Thomson) which was published in 1897, under the title of *Beauty and Ugliness*.^{*} This essay, in which I had given a psychological setting to documents furnished by a fellow-worker of extraordinary æsthetic experience and of even more highly developed gift of introspection, contained (quite independently of all influence from Professor Lipps, whose ideas we did not yet know), the discovery made contemporaneously by him, by Professor Groos, and by us, of a tendency to *attribute human activities, nay movements*, to visible shapes; moreover our essay also used this fact as the principal explanation of the pleasure and displeasure accompanying æsthetic contemplation of such visible shapes. So far one might have expected that the agreement of our ideas with those of Professor Lipps, who dealt with our essay in the *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* (VI. Band, Heft 3, Berlin, 1900, p. 385), would have corroborated the ideas formulated in his *Raum-æsthetik*. But, just as in the case of Professor Groos, this resemblance of our ideas with those of Professor Lipps was vitiated in his eyes by the addition of notions which he reprobated.

As yet but novice in psychology, I had subscribed with a novice's enthusiasm to the so-called Lange-

^{*} *Contemporary Review*, October-November 1897. See p. 153 of this volume.

James hypothesis ; and what was worse, generalising on the introspective observations furnished by my collaborator, I had deduced the quite unwarranted conclusion that certain organic phenomena and localisable motor conditions were the sub-conscious accompaniment of the perception of visible form ; in fact, that æsthetic pleasure and displeasure were due to organic reverberations produced by such subconscious changes in the muscular, circulatory, and respiratory apparatus, changes which the self-observation of my collaborator had demonstrated in herself as an accompaniment of very intense visual perception. Of the theoretic part of this essay (the observations, which were due to my collaborator, ought to have been verified by experimentation and the method of *Questionnaires*) Professor Lipps picked out with pitiless clearness all that was confused, fantastic, illogical, presumptuous, and untenable. Although unjust in certain details, this criticism by Professor Lipps was of the greatest use in my subsequent work on æsthetics. It would have been even more so if, before reading it, the study of his *Raumæsthetik*, in which I instantly recognised the clue to the whole subject, had not already sifted out all the ideas I had previously held. Without Professor Lipps suspecting it, I was already his enthusiastic disciple, and the rebukes he administered in the *Archiv für systematische Philosophie* were only the more felt and the more efficacious. But while this criticism of my work was thus fruitful for its victim, it would seem to have had a less suggestive effect on the mind of its writer. In Professor Lipps's second book I find in a chapter, *Kritischer Exkurs*, allusions to the essay *Beauty and Ugliness*, nay the quotation of an

English expression I had used there, justifying the suspicion that this essay may have been the stumbling-block which deflected towards abstract, and almost spiritualistic æsthetics, the mind of Professor Lipps already disagreeably impressed by the resemblance between his *Einfühlung* and Professor Karl Groos's *Innere Nachahmung*. Is this piece of literary biography mere fantasticality due to my inordinate self-importance? Possibly, but it may, nevertheless, serve as a diagram of the evolution of Professor Lipps's thought. This evolution appears to have been as follows: Analysing case by case those "optical illusions" which prove our habit of projecting our mechanical experiences into linear shapes, and comparing these elementary cases of *Einfühlung* with the far more complex phenomena of attribution of human activities and human motor conditions to architecture, in fact dealing with observation, Professor Lipps laid the foundations on which psychological æsthetics of the future must be built. But hostility to all interference of psychophysiology in psychological questions, impatience with isolated facts and a passion for formula have made Professor Lipps attempt to construct deductively a complete system of æsthetics, with every detail deducible from a preceding detail, the whole being logically derived from a single premise: the existence of *Æsthetic Einfühlung*.*

* Cf. *Archiv für system. Phil.*, Neue Folge, VI. Band, Heft 3, Berlin, 1900, pp. 385-390; at the latter page begins a review of Karl Groos's *Spiele der Menschen* with the words: "Diese Verwandtschaft lässt es . . . erscheinen, dass in K. G.'s *Spiele der Menschen* den Auslassungen von Vernon Lee und Anstruther-Thomson wert beigelegt wird."

In the review of *Beauty and Ugliness* we read, together with some

I have insisted thus lengthily on the distinction between Empathy considered as an elementary postulate, and Empathy as a *Sufficient Reason* in æsthetical theorising, because it is important for the utilisation of Professor Lipps's discoveries that the reader of his three badly arranged and redundant volumes should be given a clue consisting in a clear distinction between these two aspects of Professor extremely deserved censure of certain confused ideas we had been guilty of, these sentences :

"Der Kultus der Körperempfindungen ist zur Manie geworden."

"Es ist Verzeihlich, wenn ein geistreicher Kopf wie James auch einmal barocke Einfälle behaglich ausspinnt: aber das endlose Weiterspinnen derselben sollte man nuhn lassen."

In *Die æsthetische Betrachtung und die bildende Kunst* (Leipzig, 1906), a section of the *Kritischer Exkurs* deals (p. 417) with "Æsthetischen Eindruck und körperliche Tätigkeiten," and contains (p. 439) a reference to a passage of *Beauty and Ugliness* concerning *Light-heartedness* as a result of certain bodily accompaniments of æsthetic perceptions. The *Exkurs* ends with the admonition that unless one can answer his criticisms :

"Schweige man endlich von diesen angeblichen Faktoren des æsthetischen Genusses, es sei denn, um sie dem gebührenden spott auszusetzen."

Now it happens that one of Professor Lipps's unanswerable objections is the following :

"*Es ist unmöglich* (underlined) dass ich von diesen Veränderungen in meinem Körper, den Muskelspannungen, etwa weiss, so lange ich eine Säule betrachte und in den Genuss ihrer Schönheit versunken bin."

The dispute turns upon the meaning of *Versunken*. Of course, if *Versunken* means by definition that one can absolutely perceive nothing except the column and one's pleasure, then evidently one perceives no organic sensations or anything else. But if by *Versunken* we mean no such mono-ideistic condition, there is no reason why a person with habits of such observation should not remark a sensation which seems *relevant* to the column experience, just as much as he may remark a sensation (say a tight boot) which is *irrelevant* to the column experience. I fear that this notion of being so *Versunken* in contemplation of columns merely shows how little even great æstheticians have observed their normal degree of æsthetic attention.

Lipps's theories. There is, so to speak, one Professor Lipps who has opened and who continues to open up (in those chapters of the newer volume which resemble the *Raumästhetik*) a vast and fruitful field for æsthetic research ; or, to put it better, a Professor Lipps giving, as Darwin did to biology, a new direction to all thought, and all observation, concerned with Beauty and Art. But there is also a Professor Lipps who is trying to confine in a neat system, and in abstract formulæ, a subject which is complex, connected with others, and moreover exceedingly obscure. There is a Professor Lipps who, after fixing the boundaries of the subject, having defined its terms, prescribed the method and built up the system, proposes to limit all future æsthetic study to amplification and exemplification, in a word, to a commentary on a (quasi-theological) system whose first sentence reads—"In the beginning was *Einfühlung*" : a Professor Lipps who treats as heretics and perverts those seeking truth by other methods and from other premises ; and above all, a Professor Lipps who, at the slightest allusion to psycho-physiological parallelism, or at the faintest attempt at connecting the phenomena of Beauty with organic states and feelings, silences us with : "All that has nothing to do with æsthetics."

Now, such pretensions must be rebelled against. Let us study—and every psychological study of Beauty might profitably begin with this study—let us study Professor Lipps's hypotheses, analyses, and definitions ; and the more we do so with respectful independence, the more we shall find them a mine of valuable ideas. But we ought to study Professor Lipps in order to continue and to correct his work. I even venture to say that it will be only through a

long work of criticism, a work in which all methods and all individualities may unite, that the wealth of Professor Lipps's thought can be adequately utilised and even properly appreciated.

V

On the one hand, we ought to take the hypothesis of *Einfühlung* (after having stripped it of all that is not purely psychological, and perhaps of its misleading name) and apply it to all branches of art, to all categories of shape, following in this the masterly example of Professor Lipps in his analyses of the elementary forms of architecture and pottery, reducing these forms to a certain number of schemes of interplay of æsthetic forces. We shall thus get on the one hand the analytical classification of these elementary schemes of visible shape, whose number Professor Lipps has calculated as about 1620. On the other hand we shall have the statistical enumeration of these different elementary æsthetic schemes as applied in the art of all ages and all times. Such artistic morphology will clear the way for a study of the evolution of form, a study destined to constitute the real history of art. The phenomenon of *Einfühlung* will thus explain, on the subjective side, our morphological preferences and aversions in the realm of visual form; or, considering the matter objectively, it will explain the predominance and recurrence of certain elementary schemes of form, and the tendency to elimination of the schemes which are æsthetically opposed to these.

But when this is done, half of the problems of æsthetics will still remain. *Einfühlung* does not explain everything in the artistic phenomenon : the

relations of form to what it represents or suggests there constitute a whole group of psychological problems where judgment and recognition play the chief part. An end must be made to the confusion (existing sometimes even in Professor Lipps), not only between the *form of the object represented*, that is to say the anatomical, material, real structure, and the *æsthetic form* representing, that is to say *recalling*, the aspect of this represented object. We shall have to guard against confusions such as that of classifying (as Professor Lipps does) among *plastic* problems the *logical* question of whether a bronze crown should be put on a marble head, and (what is worse still) the legitimacy of placing one figure on the pedestal supporting another. In all this vast, obscure field of the relations of *æsthetic form* with the idea of *the object which it represents*, the hypothesis of Empathy cannot serve as a clue.

This is not all : if we consider æsthetics as a part of psychology, as Professor Lipps rightly does (calling his book *The Psychology of Beauty and Art*), we have the right, nay the duty, to consider the phenomenon of Empathy no longer as an explaining cause, but also as itself an effect requiring to be explained. It will not do to repeat that *Einfühlung* is accompanied by pleasure or displeasure, according as the "activities" stirred up are agreeable or not. We must ask (many scientific men have asked in a way far from flattering to art and beauty !) what can be the use, and consequently the reason, for the development rather than the elimination of this play of imagination *in vacuo* ? In other words, we must ask what advantage accrues to the individual and the race from this strange phenomenon of Empathy, and why æsthetic sensitiveness, leading

apparently to no practical advantage, should be biologically encouraged by the implication therein of intense, massive and durable pleasure? What has *Æsthetic Empathy* been able to contribute to the survival of the individuals and of the races gifted with this æsthetico-dynamic delusion?

And this brings us back, *pace* Professor Lipps, to the study of the phenomena accompanying the æsthetic phenomenon, to the study of the reverberations of Empathy on our physical as well as our psychic condition. I would therefore submit, if not to Professor Lipps, at least to all the disciples I wish him (and whom my work will, I hope, tend to increase), I would submit certain reflections on the scientific attitude to be adopted regarding these "organic sensations" which Professor Lipps requests us to talk no more about. In this, as in every question, psychological or otherwise, the student must learn to define and criticise his own thought, not to allow himself to be led astray by words: in short, to know exactly what he is talking about. To identify the pleasure experienced at the sight of a picture with the feeling distinguishable (when strong enough to be distinguished) in the head, chest, back and so forth, is not to know what one is talking about; or, it is to talk, as I was guilty of doing in my first essay on these questions, without having cleared one's ideas. But is the prevailing confusion on these points a reason for forbidding all examination into muscular or organic phenomena, into conditions of physical exaltation or depression, such as the student may happen to observe as accompanying his æsthetic experience?

Surely not. It is only in keeping a record of these facts that we can determine their relation to

æsthetic conditions, or the absence of any such relation. Are these muscular or organic sensations, whose existence Professor Lipps does not deny, simple repercussions of the activities which our Empathy has attributed to visible shapes? Or are they the indication, *the local sign*, of processes integrated in the physical substratum of the activities revived in us while thus attributed to the *non-ego*?* Are they, as Professor Groos seems to think, the accompaniment of the most developed æsthetic activity, which redouble this same activity? Or are they, on the contrary, like perhaps the laryngeal and respiratory and oral sensations of imperfect *auditives*, the result of an insufficient æsthetic sensibility seeking to reinforce itself by a second appeal to the attention?†

Each one of these possibilities requires to be studied; the result of such study would throw much light on the psycho-physiological mechanism of Empathy and, consequently, on the psychological nature and the evolutionary cause of this very strange phenomenon. It might also clear up an obscure point in the psychological explanation of Empathy, that is to say the origin of the qualities of *weight* and *direction*, among those attributed to visible shapes:

* Karl Groos, *Æsthetik*, p. 429:

“Dass wir motorischen in . . . der Ueberzeugung leben, einen intensiveren Genuss zu haben als solche, denen jede körperliche, Resonanz fehlt, wird man Unbescheiden, aber doch wohl auch natürlich finden; denn die Verschmelzung mit Vergangenen ist ja bei unsernenfalls vorhanden; wir Unterscheiden uns also durch ein Plus von den anderen.”

† The answers to a *Questionnaire* on the individual differences in musical receptivity, on which I am at present engaged, lead me to think that such “sensations in the vocal parts” are commoner among the imperfect *auditives*, the latter being characterised for me by lack of memory of simultaneous sound combinations.

qualities which might seem, like *warmth* and *cold* attributed by Professor Lipps to colours, to require the co-operation of distinctly sensorial and muscular reviviscence with the more abstract, and so to speak *spiritual*, modes of mere motion, effort, and resistance, all of whose subjective synthesis is projected by us into objective forms. And, to wind up this list of what seem to me desirable inquiries, an inquiry into the bodily well-being or *malaise* (more or less localisable) accompanying certain cases of æsthetic contemplation might shed some light on the direct or indirect racial advantage which accounts for the development instead of the atrophy of our æsthetic faculty, and in so far upon the evolutionary reason of the pleasure-displeasure alternative attached to seemingly useless activities. The æsthetic phenomenon is enmeshed with the phenomena of memory, attention, and the connection between thought and motor reactions, even if it is not entirely dependent upon them. And the riddle of pleasure and displeasure connected with the æsthetic interpretation of shapes merges into the larger riddle of pleasure and displeasure in general. To forbid the study of the physiological accompaniments of æsthetic contemplation is, therefore, to exclude many hypotheses and probably also many syntheses of facts bearing upon the entire field of psychology. However much the æstheticians of the eighteenth century and certain modern laggards have thought to the contrary, æsthetics will not help us much in appreciating the beautiful and disliking the ugly. But in showing the reason for intuitive preferences and aversions connected with *beauty* and *ugliness*, psychological æsthetics will contribute to the general and applicable knowledge

of that microcosm of complex and obscure movements which we call the human soul.

I do not entertain the hope of influencing the ideas of the master to whom my own owe a good half of their value. I shall be satisfied if I persuade some readers to take their stand with me among the disciples of the great German æsthetician. And I shall fulfil more than my expectation if I succeed in pointing out to those who are already disciples, a possibility of further utilisation of the master's doctrine, not by restricting it to the limits he would himself impose, but by applying it, carrying it on and, if need be, fitting it to the constant progress of psychological thought and observation.

APPENDIX TO ÆSTHETIC EMPATHY

(SCHMARSOW AND VAN DE VELDE)

Professor August Schmarsow (*Unser Verhältniss zu den bildenden Künsten*, Leipzig, 1903) has taken up and pushed to the utmost the explanations implicit in Groos's hypothesis of Inner Mimicry and its organic accompaniments, making the beholder's sense of his bodily existence and objective movement the measure, so to speak, of his interest in visual shapes. The agreeableness of the third dimension in art is therefore explained, not by a furtherance of our interest in the movement of lines, but as a promise of freedom of our own locomotion and respiration, for instance (p. 110):

" . . . This pushing back of the nearer planes into the distance, this enlarging of the field of vision beyond the factual region . . . this 'Stand off three steps' ('Drei Schritt vom Leibe!') . . . is already the conquest of the third dimension, and locomotion is needed to measure the width of our glance: the give and take of our eyes and our body teaches us the beneficent effect of having and of keeping a free field of action around us. After feeling ourselves narrowed in and confined, we can now breathe freely, and we enjoy

our deeper breathing as a gift from space. . . ." This corporeal-mimetic-kinæsthetic explanation naturally makes Professor Schmarsow very impatient with Lipps's analysis of the Doric column, which he demolishes as follows (p. 100) :

"The supposed recognition of such strife (such opposition of forces) in a Greek temple was nothing but a Gothic infection (eine gotische Infektion) asserting itself as the result of æsthetic analysis. The real impression of the Greek column depends rather on the plastic roundness, the harmonious unity, and the moderate *activity* of the well-grown shaft. . . . When we look at such a column, we project ourselves completely, put ourselves in braced and close attitude, into this architectural-plastic figure ; project our own body as a growth akin, from head to foot, to that figure. We feel the echo of our own organic unity and self-sufficingness in this column, inasmuch as it stands on its own feet and carries its own head. . . ."

The expression "Innere Nachahmung"—occurring several times in Professor Schmarsow's text—leaves no doubt of the origin of his æsthetics. Despite a great many ingenious points (particularly in his more recent contributions to the *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*) these æsthetics have the drawbacks inherent in the "Inner Mimicry" theory—first, that they do not explain (as the Lippsian æsthetics of dynamic empathy essentially do) the different æsthetic impressions made by, let us say, bad Vitruvian Doric (Professor Schmarsow even speaks of the Doric column sharing with the human body the possession not only of a head, but of feet !) and good Greek Doric ; let alone the difference of impression made by the Doric of Pæstum and the Doric of the Parthenon, and which is precisely due to differences in the empathic play of forces corresponding to slight differences in the lines ; and secondly (which is also firstly !), that the *mimetic* process is produced not by the essential visible qualities of the shape, but by the suggestion that the shape is, or is intended to be, that of something else, namely, of a human body. In short, the Doric column acts, not inasmuch as the shape which it is, but inasmuch as something different which replaces it in our attention. On the other hand, the well-known "art nouveau" architect, Henry Van de Velde (*Vom neuen Styl*, Leipzig, 1907), has misappropriated the most obvious part of the Lippsian æsthetics to the extent of informing us that "We have set up the Law that Line is a force" ("Wir, die wir das Gesetz aufstellten dass die Linie eine Kraft ist," p. 80). But instead of applying this Lippsian principle by analysing *what given kinds of lines and combinations of lines correspond to given combinations of forces*, an analysis which might prove unfavourable to the kind of shapes in which he deals, Herr Van de Velde goes on

to identify *line as such* with *gesture as such* (a perhaps legitimate contention), and to conclude that as every individual has his own gesture, so every civilisation has, or might have, its own *Line*. The "Line" of our own period, being, of course, that of the "Jugend Styl."

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF ÆSTHETICS

This chapter appeared, translated into German, with slight differences, in the *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik* for 1910, under the title of *Weiteres über Einföhlung*, etc.

I

IN the often quoted but little read essay entitled *Beauty and Ugliness* which I published in collaboration with C. Anstruther-Thomson in the *Contemporary Review* for October-November 1897, we put forward as explanation of æsthetic preferences and aversions the probable existence, in all visual form-perception, of a factor which I subsequently identified mainly with the phenomenon described by Professor Lipps as *Ästhetische Einföhlung*, while recognising that this supposed factor in æsthetics also bore considerable analogy to what Professor Groos has called *Innere Nachahmung*, and, in his recent admirable paper, *Ästhetisches Miterleben*.*

The comparison of my own views with those of Professors Lipps and Groos and even of other less epoch-making æstheticians, and also fourteen additional years of my own observations and experiments in the field of æsthetics—all this has brought some alteration in my attitude on these subjects. And it is this alteration I propose to explain, not from

* *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, IV. Band, Heft 2, 1909.

any wish to justify myself, but because the explanation may save younger students some of the confusion of thought which I have gradually cleared up for myself: the confusion, principally, between, first, the explanation of æsthetic preference by habitual interpretation of visible shapes in terms of *human dynamical experience*, which is all I accept of Professor Lipps's *Einfühlung*; secondly, the explanation of this anthropomorphic habit by a more or less localised and more or less externalised act of mimicry; and, thirdly, the explanation of the satisfaction-dissatisfaction quality and the emotional resonance of æsthetic perception by a supposed participation of those great organic processes, cardiac, respiratory, equilibratory, and locomotor, which the so-called "Lange-James" hypothesis invokes as the chief factors in everything which we call "mood" or "emotion," a participation suggested or corroborated to me in 1896 by Professor Sergi's *Dolore e Piacere* (cf. *Beauty and Ugliness*). These three suppositions were confused in my mind (if not in that of the fellow-worker who furnished me with the experimental and less abstract portion of the essay) at the time of my collaboration in *Beauty and Ugliness*. I have since got to understand that they are closely connected together, but they are independent of one another; and if I succeed in making younger students hold them asunder and study them separately, I shall have done much for the progress of æsthetics. In the following pages I shall examine in what relation the three propositions may be found to be when the analysis and especially the personal observation of subjective and objective facts shall have taken the place of the dissection of mere definitions and

abstractions which has hitherto engaged so-called æstheticians. I shall point out what kind of evidence is requisite and procurable for the final acceptance of any of these three propositions; and, while attempting to put a little order into the problems of a future science of æsthetics, I shall, I trust, bring home to the student the immense complexity, the immense (perhaps irreducible) obscurity of the vast intermeshed phenomena which we æstheticians, great and small, have each of us attempted to explain by some tiny, tidy, little "all-embracing" principle of our own.

The following pages will therefore deal, in as undogmatic a manner as possible, with the facts in favour of first, Lippsian *Einfühlung* (Empathy), of secondly, *Innere Nachahmung* (Inner Mimicry), and thirdly, of the application, let me call it *Sergian*, to æsthetic phenomena of the Lange-James hypothesis.

Before doing this, and during the whole course of doing it, I shall, however, be employed in putting a little order into all our thinking about the various sides of the æsthetic problem, and this, by insisting upon the recognition and temporary isolation of what I find it convenient to call the Central Problem of Æsthetics.*

* Since writing the above my attention has been called to the results of experiments, particularly those mentioned by Legowski (*Beiträge zur Experimentellen Ästhetik*), 1908 on simple geometrical figures, and their apparent conclusions that greater ease of comprehension may be at the bottom of our preference for certain elementary æsthetic relations like symmetrical division. Such ease of comprehension probably does account for some degree of preference, and anything which economises our attention or gives it a new impetus (like partial asymmetry) must be reckoned as so much to the good. But I do not see how ease of comprehension can explain our preference for certain qualities of line and certain conjunctions, *impacts*, of lines in cases where there is no symmetry at all. A merely geometrical

II

And in this I can best explain myself by reference to my own work and to the evolution of my own ideas.

In that, as I said, often quoted but little understood essay called *Beauty and Ugliness*, what was least understood by our readers, and not at all by our critics, was the fact of the limitation of our inquiries to such a *central problem of æsthetics*. My collaborator and I were not investigating into the nature of the work of art as a whole, with its representative, evocative, dramatic (*so to say novelist's emotional*) functions, its powers of imitating, recording, suggesting objects and events belonging to the real external world or the real human vicissitudes outside itself. We were trying to account for the interest and powers of one factor only in the work of art's effects: the factor of mere visible shape (or "form") by which the visual arts convey all imitation, representation, suggestion, expression, and general emotional stimulation; and which shape or form can please and displease, fascinate or repel entirely apart from any such imitation, representa-

shape is easier to grasp than the artistic deviation from this shape. But the latter is alive, its aliveness interests, attracts, or worries us, while the shape drawn with ruler and compass fills us with despairing boredom. There is, in all art, what Ruskin called the Lamp of Life; and it is with it that my æsthetics deal. There is, moreover, a preliminary to all making shapes beautiful, and that is making them *clear*. Indeed, some of the artist's chief practical work consists in this preliminary, as Hildebrand has pointed out when he compares the methods of *showing* of art with the methods of *biding* resorted to by what we call Nature for the preservation of animals. Lack of such making shapes clear retards æsthetic appreciation, and sometimes puts it off to the Greek Kalends.

tion, suggestion, etc., and even not unfrequently in direct contradiction thereto.

This *problem of visible form* is not the problem to which Hildebrand and his disciple Cornelius have attached that name, meaning as they do the *adequate suggestion, by means of visible forms, of properties and groups of properties not really shown or necessarily visible*; in other words, the way to employ artistic form in order to suggest something beyond itself.

The problem we dealt with in *Beauty and Ugliness* was, on the contrary, that of the *intrinsic satisfactoriness* of visible form as such, and the pleasure (or the reverse) which its contemplation can awaken. In fact, we were dealing with the same problem which has been almost exclusively treated (and nowhere else in so masterly a manner) in Lipps's *Raumästhetik* and those portions of his other works in which Professor Lipps is satisfied with amplifying and applying the principles put forward in the *Raumästhetik*. And I shall call this the *central problem of æsthetics* because the other æsthetical problems ramify from or lead up to it, complicating and obscuring it in every way, but leaving it, whenever we can put them aside, as an essential core of all questions concerning the satisfaction and dissatisfaction produced by visible shapes independently of the (probably chemico-physiological) action of colour.

The second part of *Beauty and Ugliness* contains, at page 682 (p. 228 of present volume) of the November 1897 number of the *Contemporary Review*, the following statement which I select for brevity from a great number of similar ones :

“We follow lines by muscular adjustments more considerable than those of the eye, and these muscular adjustments result in a

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sense of direction and velocity in ourselves and a *consequent attribution of direction and velocity to the lines thus perceived.*"

I have underlined the second part of this sentence because it contains the essence of the theory of *Ästhetische Einfühlung* as set forth in Lipps's *Raum-ästhetik*, while the first part of the sentence contains a hypothetical explanation of that "attribution of direction and velocity to the lines thus perceived." If the magnificent analyses of Lipps had been known to me at the time of my collaboration in *Beauty and Ugliness* (the *Raumästhetik* was published in 1893-7 and came to my knowledge from a quotation in Karl Groos's *Spiele der Menschen* published in 1899), I should not indeed, as Professor Lipps expects of his disciples, have accepted this attribution of direction and velocity, and, of course, of human energy and all its modes, to lines and motionless shapes, this *Einfühlung*, as an ultimate psychological fact requiring no explanation. But I should have recognised, as I now recognise, that this phenomenon, which brevity obliges me to designate by Professor Lipps's most misleading title of *ästhetische Einfühlung*, or Professor Titchener's translation *Æsthetic Empathy*, does not require either for the verification or for the explanation of its presence the existence of any such "muscular adjustments" as the observations of my fellow-worker and, in some measure my own self-observation, had led us to connect with it. The phenomenon of *Einfühlung* (as connected with visible lines and shapes) can be demonstrated by such purely psychological facts as Lipps himself has accumulated, with a magnificent masterliness, in his analyses of the *Raumästhetik* and cognate parts of his other works.

And it can be explained (without even Lipps's

decidedly metaphysical phraseology about "projection of the ego" or other animistic conceptions due to that misleading expression *Sich einfühlen*) by reference to merely mental phenomena. The attribution of the mode of our human dynamics is (or is not) a psychological fact, and is explicable by other psychological facts, real or not real. Modern psychology (and even modern philosophy, thanks to Bergson) has prepared us to understand that æsthetic *Einfühlung* would not be a sudden phenomenon starting *ex nihilo*, but a mere regrouping of senses of movement which are for ever present in our consciousness, indeed which seem to form its woof. "Feelings" (as distinguished from "sensations") of dynamic conditions and attractions are among the *immediate*, the primary data of our psychic life; feelings of direction, of velocity, of effort, of facility, all the notions expressed by verbs, adverbs, and prepositions constitute as large a part of our consciousness as those verbs, adverbs, and prepositions do of our speech. They are always present in our "thought"; * they are two-thirds of our knowledge

* Le Dantec, in a review of Bonnier's *L'Orientation* in the *Revue Philosophique*, 1901, quotes as follows from Bonnier:

" . . . je répète que nous ne sentons pas si nous avons, dans nos segments de membres, ces choses qui sont des os, des muscles, des articulations, etc. Nous ne sentons pas que le levier osseux s'est incliné dans tel sens, car nous ignorons sensoriellement qu'il y a un levier osseux; nous ne sentons pas le glissement articulaire, la tension des tendons, des fascia, le refoulement des aponévroses sous les muscles gonflés, ni même le gonflement des muscles, car ni articulations, ni tendons, ni fascia, ni aponévroses, ni muscles ne nous sont révélés sous n'importe quelle forme analytique et figurative. Mais l'ensemble de ces variations intimes de la masse segmentaire et profonde nous est révélé sous une forme obtuse synthétique et globale, mais absolument consciente en tant qu'image d'attitude ou de variation d'attitude. C'est-à-dire de mouvement."

Italics mine.

of our own existence.* Nothing would be more natural than that, in the constant process of referring the less known to the better known, of expressing the future in terms of the present, we should interpret the relations of seen lines and shapes in the modes of our own ever-present activities, since those lines and shapes are themselves perceived, apprehended, measured, compared and reconstructed by complex processes of such activity on our own part. This would be the first part of the Lippsian *Einfühlung*.

The second would follow equally naturally, since the peculiarities of our own modes of activity, whenever not localised † in ourselves by any actual movements with their accompanying sensations, would tend to attach itself to the exterior objects which had awakened the thought of them, very much as owing to the unlocalised nature of the sensations from our eye the qualities of colour are transferred to the seen objects; so that the qualities of swiftness, smoothness, energy, direction, etc. etc., really appertaining to our own experience would be attributed to the lines and shapes in the course of whose perception (*i.e.* of a real activity of measurement, comparison, and reconstruction) such modes

* Cf. Richard Hamann's extraordinarily interesting *Ueber die psychologischen Grundlagen des Bewegungsbegriffes* in *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, vol. 43.

"Whenever we attribute *Motion* and *Repose* to a foreign body, we are using up our own inner experiences. Our habit of describing the change of place-relation between an isolated body and its 'background' in terms of *Motions* and *Repose* is so much anthropomorphism, all the stronger when what we are speaking of happen to be inanimates. Such judgments of *Movements* are proceedings similar to that by which we interpret facial changes as expressive movements."

† Cf. Münsterberg in Appendix to this essay.

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of activity would have been awakened in our consciousness.* And finally—and this is the third

* Cf. *Revue Philosophique*, November 1910, N. Kostyleff, *Les travaux de l'école de psychologie russe: Étude objective de la pensée.*

P. 495: "Ainsi, d'après la théorie de Wundt, dans les perceptions visuelles, le rôle dominant appartenait aux sensations motrices ('Bewegungsbild') qui étaient censées déterminer non seulement les dimensions, mais encore la distance de l'objet et sa localisation dans l'espace."

P. 495: "L'œuvre capitale de Bourdon qui en résume un grand nombre, fait ressortir très nettement tout ce que les sensations rétinienne ont perdu de leur ancienne importance."

P. 495: "*D'après Bourdon, les données les plus élémentaires de la grandeur et de la forme sont également déterminées par des processus moteurs.* Pour la grandeur, il reconnaît que la projection de l'objet sur la rétine n'est rien sans les mouvements que nous effectuons pour le parcourir des yeux, sans la mesure de la distance qui le sépare de nous et sans l'idée que nous nous sommes faite de sa grandeur absolue. L'image rétinienne n'est donc que le point de départ des processus qui tous sont plus ou moins moteurs."

P. 497: "Fidèle à son principe d'écarter toutes les données introspectives et d'étudier uniquement la manière dont les photo-réactions observées chez les animaux se développent et se compliquent chez l'homme, il commence par décrire l'héliotropisme des animaux inférieurs, le passage du dermatropisme aux réactions d'un organe spécial de la vue et les progrès successifs de cet organe, des somato-réactions générales constituées par un simple mouvement du corps, aux icono-réactions accompagnées d'une distinction plus fine des détails de l'objet. Abordant ensuite la vision de la direction chez l'homme, il reconnaît que 'les photo-réactions de la rétine ne sont parfaites qu'au niveau des cônes de la fovea' et constate que l'adaptation progressive de l'organe produit une modification du mécanisme primitif 'de façon que maintenant, comme premier effet d'une photo-réaction non maculaire, il survienne un mouvement somatique qui tourne la rétine iconoptique vers l'objet.' Ce mécanisme complémentaire se compose, d'après lui, de mouvements fixateurs du corps, de la tête et de l'œil, mais le réflexe oculaire se développe graduellement et finit par remplacer les autres. C'est le jet de ce réflexe qui renseigne sur la direction de l'objet."

P. 498: "L'erreur à peu près générale, dit l'auteur, consiste à rattacher la localisation psychique directement aux mouvements

step in a purely psychical analysis of *Einfühlung*—these modes (or combination of modes) of activity would be accompanied by the “pleasure-displeasure” alternative, and amount to an “emotion” whenever their isolation in the field of attention (by Lipps’s “æsthetic isolation”) brought all these *feelings of movement* (movement of “attention” and movement associated by the act of interpretation) to play the chief part in our consciousness. Such would be the purely mental phenomenon described by Lipps as *æsthetische Einfühlung*, and such its explanation by purely mental data; and the acceptance of such a hypothesis would depend merely upon the correct observation and analysis of the psychical facts of the preference of certain

oculaires, alors qu'elle est l'épiphénomène psychique de la photo-réaction somatique. En général, nous avons conscience de nos réactions qu'en tant qu'elles ont un rapport direct avec le monde extérieur; nous n'avons pas conscience des réactions de nos organes viscéraux, et l'œil en est un. Les photo-réflexes somatiques deviennent conscients dans une phase qui suit celle qui a ressenti l'influence du réflexe fixateur, c'est-à-dire dans la phase cérébrale.”

P. 499: “L'œuvre de Nuel achève l'évolution commencée par Wundt, la substitution, à la sensibilité rétinienne, de l'expérience motrice de l'organe visuel.”

P. 508: “Mais l'effort de Mach ne s'est pas arrêté à cela. Cherchant à préciser la nature des éléments sensoriels qui forment une image mentale il essaya d'analyser celles qui sont le plus près de la perception, les images visuelles et auditives, et arriva finalement à conclure qu'elles se composent de sensations motrices qui accompagnent les réflexes du cerveau.”

P. 507: “La psychologie objective dit que ce sont les sensations motrices qui avaient rendu la perception initiale consciente.”

P. 507: “Ce n'est donc pas la sensation du contact immédiat qui nous donne la connaissance des choses, mais bien les réflexes cérébraux dont elle est le point de départ. Autrement dit, ce n'est pas le processus de contact, mais le processus de mesure et d'identification qui fait la connaissance des choses et revit ensuite dans la pensée.”

visible shapes whether it is constant and regular, for instance, and upon the verification of the alleged presence of ideas of movement and their transfer from our consciousness to the objective reality which had awakened them.*

Such purely psychological testimony to a purely psychological explanation of a purely mental process of *ästhetische Einfühlung* Professor Lipps has

* The conclusions to be drawn from this explanation by purely mental facts are shown from the unpublished note written by me in April 1904, and inserted at p. 334 of the present volume in *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, and which agrees extraordinarily with the sentence marked A in my quotation from the book which Professor Münsterberg published in 1905, and with the sentence marked A in the quotation from Professor Groos's article on *Miterleben* published in 1909. I point out the independent manner in which we have arrived at these conclusions because the coincidence is, I think, indicative of their correctness.

Groos's *Das ästhetische Miterleben* (in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, IV. Band, Heft 2, p. 181):

"We can separate three different stages (*i.e.* in æsthetic *Miterleben*). Whenever during the contemplation of an object our bodily feelings and moods (*Körperliche Gefühle und Stimmungen*) corresponding with the expressive forms of the object (*Ausdrucksformen des Dinges*) happen not to be perceptibly localised in our own body, then they will simply fill the object. . . . When the emotional (*gefühlreiche*) organic sensations corresponding to the expressive forms (*Ausdrucksformen*) are still too weak and too obscurely localised for them to *withdraw* our attention from the (*i.e.* perceived) thing, but sufficiently strong to produce a marked effect upon the whole condition of consciousness, then when these kinæsthetic sensations also possess the active-motor property of kinæsthetic epiphenomena (*wenn sie die aktiv-motorischen Elemente der Kinästhetischen Nacherzeugung enthalten*), *then* there arises that condition which subsequent reflection makes us designate as *projection of ourselves* into the object (*Selbstversetzung in das Object*). . . . If we go yet a step further, we shall find that localisation in our body breaks the spell of the projection of ourselves."

[N.B.—I must beg the English reader's forgiveness (here and hereafter) for the intolerable involution and obscurity due to my fear of departing from the literal sense of the German original.

accumulated in the analyses of simple and complex shapes contained in his *Raumästhetik* and other of his works. Other evidence on the subject of a purely psychological order could be obtained, as I shall endeavour to illustrate experimentally, by scrutinising the words and expressions implying movement habitually applied to motionless shapes and objects, and noting the degree of cogency which such words are admitted to possess by persons employing them.

III

But at the time—in 1896-7—of my collaboration in *Beauty and Ugliness* I had no knowledge (and my collaborator still less) of Lipps's theory of *Einfühlung*. I was too much of a novice in general psychology to recognise, as I now do, that merely "mental" data might afford an efficient and sufficient basis for a hypothesis of *attribution of processes in the perceiving subject to the perceived object* (or rather its *visible shape*). Moreover, the Lange-James theory * had, for reasons which will be obvious, offered itself as a preferable explanation.

* I now (1911) consider that Empathy may in many cases be the result of processes no longer in consciousness. Cf. Titchener's *Thought Processes*, p. 32 :

"We have learned, again, that physiological conditions may produce their effect not within but upon consciousness ; that nervous sets and tendencies may direct the course of conscious processes without setting up new and special processes of their own. . . . What is now, so to say, a mere tag or label upon a dominant formation may, a little while ago, have been itself a focal complex."

And again, p. 170 :

"I regard as a mental element any process which proves to be irreducible, unanalysable, throughout the whole course of individual experience."

But there were other reasons besides my immaturity of psychological thought and the vogue of a striking hypothesis, which prevented my remaining, as Professor Lipps has more than once textually and in severe allusions * admonished me to do, satisfied with merely psychological descriptions and explanations of the phenomenon which my fellow-worker and myself had, as I have shown, discovered independently. My own observation of the *central æsthetic process* (i.e. form preference), and the amazingly developed self-observation of the collaborator to whom I owed all my examples and experiments and indeed my first notion of such a factor as Empathy (*Einfühlung*) had made me aware of the presence of other phenomena which, in some cases at least, accompanied the æsthetic contemplation and preference of visible shapes. I did not arrive at the hypothesis of a purely mental or psychic (call it as you like best !) act of *Einfühlung*, at the hypothesis of the projection of mere *ideas* of movement and movement's modalities, because it seemed to me that what I afterwards learned to think of under that convenient and misleading name of *Einfühlung* was *not* a purely mental process, and that at the base of æsthetic preference there lay not mere *ideas* of a motor kind, but actual *muscular sensations* and even *objective bodily movements*.

In the sentence already quoted from p. 228 of this volume (p. 682 of the *Contemporary Review*,

* In *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*, Neue Folge, VI. Band, Heft 3, Berlin, 1900, pp. 385-390, Professor Lipps connects our essay, *Beauty and Ugliness*, of which this is a review, with the *Spiele der Menschen* of Karl Groos (containing a quotation from us). Professor Lipps returned to the charge in *Die æsthetische Betrachtung und die bildende Kunst* (1906), pp. 431-441. For detail see "Professor Lipps on Æsthetic Empathy," p. 19, footnote.

October–November 1897), the “attribution of direction and velocity to the lines perceived” had been described by me as the result of “muscular adjustments *more considerable than those of the eye.*” On a previous page (545) (p. 158) I wrote that—

“In the opinion of the authors of this paper . . . the subjective states indicated by the objective terms *height, breadth, depth*, by the more complex terms *round, square, symmetrical, unsymmetrical*, and all their kindred terms (can) be analysed into more or less distinct knowledge of various and variously localised bodily movements.”

On page 673 (p. 211) my collaborator wrote, speaking of the difference between the mere *recognition* of real *objects* and the *contemplation* of artistic *shapes*—

“We are usually satisfied with the mere optical perception of real figures, or even the mere recognition of them by qualities which serve as labels. But when we come to works of art we demand *certain senses of adjustment in our own bodies*; and to obtain these we require that the fact of lifting up and pressing down, like the facts of bulk, should be strongly realised in the painted figures.”

Again, p. 676 (p. 216), my collaborator wrote—

“For the movement of an arch consists of the balance of its two half-arches, and this balance we follow by shifting our own weight from one foot to another”

And p. 678 (p. 220)—

“In this way do good antiques improve our consciousness of existence by literally forcing us to more harmonious movements. But there are other ways also in which our necessity of *miming by our own muscular adjustments* the forms and figures which we focus,” etc.

Indeed *Beauty and Ugliness* consists very largely of self-observations of my collaborator proving the existence, in her case at least, of so-called sensations of movement, and even of actual objective muscular activity, as accompaniments of intense contemplation of visible shapes.

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Here, therefore, we had got, thanks to experimental self-observation of my collaborator in which (as I shall later explain at length) I refused to share for fear of auto-suggestion, and thanks also to accidental observations (like those of the muscular sensations connected with architecture) in which I did share, we had got to a hypothesis by which the æsthetic perception of visible shapes is dependent not any longer upon *motor images or ideas*, but upon *muscular adjustments*, inner or outer, upon a bodily process to which, as the last quotation exemplifies, I had allowed my collaborator and myself to attach the convenient but disastrous name of "miming."

Thus *Beauty and Ugliness* contained not merely a psychological hypothesis analogous to the one which Lipps developed under the name of *Einfühlung* (Empathy), but also, with the result of much confusion and a good deal of ridicule, a hypothesis coincident in many points with the one to which my friend Professor Karl Groos had given the name of *Innere Nachahmung*.*

This hypothesis, which I shall call, for convenience' sake, the mimetic or muscular hypothesis, is not necessary for the *Einfühlung* or psychological hypothesis; but it presupposes *Einfühlung* and attempts to explain it. The second part of these pages will attempt to shed a little of the light of fact upon this mimetic (*Nachahmung*) element as well as upon the supposed *Einfühlung* (Empathy) process, or at least attempt to show that both these hypotheses, æsthetic Empathy (*Einfühlung*) and æsthetic Mimicry, must be tested empirically. For the moment it is sufficient that the reader should hold the two

* *Spiele der Menschen*, 1900.

things, *Einfühlung* ("Empathy") and *Nachahmung* ("Mimicry"), separate in his mind, and thus save himself much of the confusion to which my collaborator and myself, together with every other æsthetician dealing with *Innere Nachahmung*, have fallen victims.

The same remark applies to a third part of the subject, always confused, and sometimes directly connected, with mimicry, and to which, using my *Beauty and Ugliness* as *corpus vile* of this logical demonstration, I shall now proceed.

This third part of the subject has been treated of by Professor Groos in his recent masterly article (*Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, 1909) under the name of *Kinæsthetic sensations*, "*Empfindungen aus dem Körperinnen*." But the importance which I gave to the respiratory-cardiac (as distinguished from so-called "muscular") accompaniments of æsthetic form-perception was due in part to the influence of *Dolore e Piacere* by the anthropologist Sergi, published in 1894, whose summing up of the causes of æsthetic pleasure will be found in a footnote to *Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 552 (p. 171).

IV

In the very first page of *Beauty and Ugliness* there occurs the following sentence which, although obscurely worded, sums up what was then my position regarding the relation of form-perception and kinæsthesia :

"Our facts and theories, if at all correct, would establish that the æsthetic phenomenon . . . is the function which regulates the perception of Form, and that the perception of Form, in visual cases certainly, and with reference to hearing presumably, implies

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an active participation of the most important organs of animal life, a constant alteration in *vital processes* requiring stringent regulation for the benefit of the total organism."

These *vital processes* are summed up on p. 680 (p. 225) in the following manner :

"The greater or lesser agreeableness of artistic experience is, therefore, due to the dependence of one of our most constant and important intellectual activities, the perception of form, *on two of the most constant and important of our bodily functions, respiration and equilibrium.*"

This connexion between perception of visible shape and such bodily functions (to which the cardiac one should, of course, be added) is explicable by a sentence on p. 562 (p. 190) :

"*As the breathing works in closest connexion with the eyes . . . (this) widened way of seeing is necessarily accompanied by a widened way of breathing, . . . and the respiratory expansion inevitably produces a general sense of expanded existence.*"

and, with reference to the equilibratory function, by a sentence on p. 567 (p. 199) :

"We are indeed always (*i.e.* apart from form-perception) balancing ourselves more or less . . . and we are therefore so accustomed to this fact as scarcely to notice it in ordinary life. But as soon as we see *something else adjusting equilibrium, our own balance seems to swing on a wider scale, and this wider balancing brings a sense of our limits being enlarged in every direction, and our life being spread over a far wider area.*"

The very numerous experimental observations made by my collaborator, whose record constitutes a good half of the whole work, are illustrations of the various manner and combinations of manner in which the intense perception of visible form in its elementary details and in its most complex applications (for instance in an Italian Church façade, in the interior of a French Gothic Cathedral, and in

Catena's *St. Jerome* as compared to Titian's *Sacred and Profane Love*) can produce sensations testifying to such connexion between ocular perception of shape and these respiratory and equilibratory functions.

The essay entitled *Beauty and Ugliness* contains, therefore, besides a recognition of the attribution of our own modes of movement to visible shapes (æsthetic Empathy, *Einfühlung*), and the assertion of the existence of "muscular adjustments more considerable than those of the eye" resulting in "a sense of direction and velocity in ourselves and a consequent attribution of direction and velocity to the lines thus perceived" (p. 682 [p. 228]), or in our unfortunate phrase a "miming process" analogous to the *Innere Nachahmung* of Karl Groos—our essay contains, connected with this mimetic theory and intended as explanation not only of it but of the *Einfühlung* (Empathy) theory above mentioned, a third hypothesis to the effect *that æsthetic perception of visible shapes is agreeable or disagreeable because it involves alterations in great organic functions, principally respiratory and equilibratory, which are themselves accompanied by feelings of more or less well-being or the contrary. In this way does the "Lange-James" theory, identifying emotion with alterations of our bodily conditions, find its application to æsthetics.**

* For the rest, this application, to æsthetics had already been made by Professor James himself. Cf. *Principles of Psychology*.

P. 473: "An object falls on a sense organ, affects a cortical part, and is perceived; or else the latter, excited inwardly, gives rise to an idea of the same object. Quick as a flash the reflex currents pass down through their preordained channels, alter the condition of muscle, skin, and viscus; and these alterations, perceived, like the original object, in as many portions of the cortex, combine with it

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I have analysed at some length the chief headings of this joint work of C. Anstruther-Thomson and myself in order to distinguish between the various connected (but not necessarily dependent) theories of *Einfühlung*, *Innere Nachahmung* and *Lange-James participation of organic functions*, into which what Karl Groos now * calls *ästhetisches Miterleben* ought to be analysed for the purposes of investigation.

But this is only part of my present purpose. Having, as I hope, put some order into the theoretic

in consciousness and transform it from an object-simply-apprehended into an object-emotionally-felt. No new principles have to be invoked, nothing postulated beyond the ordinary reflex circuits, and the local centres admitted in one shape or another by all to exist."

Vol. ii. p. 468 : "Æsthetic emotion, *pure and simple*, the pleasure given us by certain masses, and combinations of colours and sounds, is an absolutely sensational experience, an optical or auricular feeling that is primary, and not due to the repercussion backwards of other sensations elsewhere consecutively aroused. To this simple primary and immediate pleasure in certain pure sensations and harmonious combinations of them there may, it is true, be added secondary pleasures ; and in the practical enjoyment of works of art by the masses of mankind these secondary pleasures play a great part."

P. 470 : "These secondary emotions themselves are assuredly for the most part constituted of other incoming sensations aroused by the diffusive wave of reflex effects which the beautiful object sets up."

P. 470 : "In all cases of intellectual or moral rapture we find that, unless there be coupled a bodily reverberation of some kind with the mere thought of the object and cognition of its quality ; unless we actually laugh at the neatness of the demonstration or witticism ; unless we thrill at the case of justice, or tingle at the act of magnanimity ; our state of mind can hardly be called an emotion at all. It is in fact a mere intellectual perception of how certain things are to be called—neat, right, witty, generous, and the like. Such a judicial state of mind as this is to be classed among awarenesses of truth ; it is a *cognitive act*."

* In his article in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, "*Das ästhetische Miterleben*."

side of the question, I desire to examine the nature of the facts upon which these three connected theories are founded; to examine what further theoretic distinctions these facts should lead to; and, finally, to examine into the probability of obtaining data sufficient to accept or reject some or all of these hypotheses.

And here I again find it simplest to treat my own work in the domain of æsthetics as the *corpus vile* of my demonstration.

I have just alluded to the three theories—the (more or less Lippsian) *Einfühlung* (Empathy); the (more or less Karl Groosian) *Nachahmung* (Mimicry), and the *Lange-James* theory of bodily emotion, as being founded upon facts. I do not mean by this that they will be proved true by facts; but merely that they have been suggested by observation which may be confirmed or invalidated by observation on a larger scale and accompanied by more rigorous analysis. The *Einfühlung* (Empathy) theory appears to have been suggested to Professor Lipps by purely mental facts united with examination of forms recurrent in works of art. The (*Nachahmung*) mimetic theory and the *æsthetic application of the Lange-James theory* have evidently been suggested to Professor Groos by his attention being drawn to mimetic processes (actual or merely “felt”) and to phenomena of what we will call “bodily resonance” which have accompanied æsthetic contemplation in his own case. As regards *Beauty and Ugliness*, all these three theories (which neither my collaborator nor myself sufficiently distinguished) were suggested, so far as *Einfühlung* went, by my own introspection and my observation of the vocabulary of movement universally applied to motionless visible shapes;

and, with regard to *Nachahmung* (Mimicry) and "Lange-James" theory, they were suggested to my collaborator, C. Anstruther-Thomson, by accidental self-observation in the course of art-historical and practical artistic studies; and confirmed in part by observations, as distinguished from experiments, made by myself.

And here it is well to repeat what ought to have been premised in writing *Beauty and Ugliness*, namely, that the experimental accounts refer, with few exceptions, to one person only. For, while encouraging my collaborator to push introspective experiment to the utmost and develop her capacity for it to the highest point of lucid self-analysis, I did not attempt to make such experiments myself, well knowing that I personally should never be secure from auto-suggestion, and having remarked in myself a certain deficiency in spontaneous consciousness of motor and respiratory sensations, my own spontaneous accompanying phenomena (or, if you prefer, epiphenomena) in æsthetic conditions being connected rather with rhythmic-auditive peculiarities and with cardiac symptoms.*

* Dr. Richard Baerwald, who is at present making a great *enquête* on the *Motor Type* as such, and without special reference to its alleged importance as an æsthetic factor, has very kindly summed up the result of the answers made by C. Anstruther-Thomson and myself (separately, of course) to his very elaborate list of questions and experiments. Professor Baerwald says he is greatly struck by the similarity of result in both our cases, and sums us both up as belonging to the decided "motor type" with "motor representations of three categories." I will add in his own words: "Bei Ihnen beiden ist der verbale Typus vom Sachlichen ungewöhnlich stark unterschieden. Bei Ihnen beiden scheint die reine motor-Vorstellung zu Gunsten der sie ersetzenden Bewegungs-Empfindung verkümmert zu sein." But Dr. Baerwald adds that C. Anstruther-

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I had ended the essay on *Beauty and Ugliness* by an appeal to psychologists and æstheticians to seek for whatever accompaniment of "*bodily sensations we may discover to them (æsthetic and other psychological phenomena) in the dim places of our consciousness.*" But, although copies of *Beauty and Ugliness* were sent to a great number of psychologists, nothing came of this appeal except a brief but friendly notice of M. Arréat in the *Revue Philosophique*, a quotation (to which all subsequent notices are probably due) in Professor Karl Groos's great *Spiele der Menschen*, and a scathing but most useful criticism by Professor Lipps in the *Archiv für systematische Philosophie*.*

Nothing daunted by this silence, I appealed once more to the specialists who ought to have been interested in the question, and laid before the Fourth Psychological Congress a *Mémoire et Questionnaire sur le rôle de l'élément moteur dans la perception esthétique visuelle*. I need scarcely add, for those who have experience of the treatment of æsthetics by general psychologists, that not the very smallest notice was taken of this summing up of the problems and hypotheses discussed in *Beauty and Ugliness*. I determined to cease appealing to

Thomson is of more developed *motor* type, and that in myself a comparative poverty of "movement-representations" is explicable by probable diversion of my attention to an extraordinary copiousness of visual representations. Perhaps Dr. Baerwald's meaning may be connected with the fact that while my collaborator's "visual representations" have been constantly combined with the motor-processes involved in all kinds of artistic *technique*, my own "visual representations" have remained in isolated dignity, as I have never been able (or indeed tried very hard !) to master any kind of handicraft.

* Cf. p. 65 of present essay and *Æsthetic Empathy*.

psychologists, and to pursue my investigations without their assistance. I reprinted the *Mémoire et Questionnaire soumis au 4^e Congrès de Psychologie*, and circulated it privately among such of my acquaintances as were supposed to take pleasure in art, requesting them to answer as many of the questions as possible. This proceeding produced a collection of forty-eight written answers to the *Questionnaire*, and with these I am now going to deal, premising a few explanations about the *Questionnaire*.

First, it was the result of a suspicion which had arisen in me (as it did in Professor Groos in a work which I did not then know *) that some of the phenomena described by my collaborator, C. Anstruther-Thomson, in *Beauty and Ugliness*, might be special to individuals belonging to what I then (if no longer) believed in as the "motor type," and that susceptibility to preference, to satisfaction and dissatisfaction connected with the perception of visible shapes might be confined to persons belonging to such a "motor type." My *Questionnaire* therefore attempted to ascertain the relation between the degree of æsthetic sensibility of my subjects and certain peculiarities which I supposed to belong to the famous "motor type." The questions were grouped with this in view. The degree of æsthetic sensitiveness was tested by a single question (Question 9): "L'arrangement des divers plans d'un tableau, la convergence ou la divergence des lignes qui s'enfoncent plus ou moins, vous donnent-ils soit un sentiment de soulagement, d'attraction et de bien-être, soit (dans l'arrangement contraire) un malaise vague, une

* *Der æsthetische Genuss*, 1902.

espèce d'oppression et de dégoût, presque de l'antipathie et du chagrin ? ”

I need scarcely say that this question was quite insufficient for its purpose, as it left out pleasure and displeasure at mere two-dimensional lines, and made many people think that I was talking about questions of technical perspective of which they knew themselves to be ignorant ; the differentiation ought to have been obtained by asking : “ Do you care for pictures independent of the subject represented and the technical interest, just for the pleasure of lines and composition ? ”

The majority of the questions were intended to discover whether the person interrogated belonged to the motor type or to the purely visual one. This was tested by questions suggested by the experiments detailed in *Beauty and Ugliness*, and bearing upon the subject's habits of remembering scenery and persons (whether *en pose* or in motion), his habits of standing still or moving in connexion with real landscapes and of free standing statues and the interior of monuments, and by his considering (or not) words and metaphors attributive of movement to motionless objects and forms as “ literal ” or “ conventional ” forms of expression ; and finally by asking whether he was conscious of states of *motor tension* independent of real objective movement.

With this intention the questions were grouped together in a manner calculated to connect them for my purposes, but also, as I soon found, to confuse them almost inevitably in the minds of the persons interrogated. To these essential mistakes, due to inexperience and thoughtlessness, and rendering my *Questionnaire* very practically ineffectual, must be added that having been originally intended for the

psychologists of the 4th Congress (who paid no attention to it) its text was bristling with technical expressions and began with a question calculated to frighten off laymen, the almost (as I now think) unanswerable question: "Avez-vous des indices qui vous rattachent à vos propres yeux au *type visuel* ou au *type moteur*?"

I have gone into detail about the badness of this *Questionnaire* because this badness may account, to some degree, for its failure, and leave hope for better success if an inquiry were better conducted. But the failure was only partial. Despite much confusion and more refusal to answer, certain facts did come out, and facts which shed some light, I think, upon the three hypotheses of *Einfühlung*, *Nachahmung* and *Sergian application of the Lange-James theory*, and upon their relation with one another. It is for this reason that I shall place before the reader the results of a second scrutiny which I have now made of the answers to my *Questionnaire sur le rôle de l'élément moteur dans la perception esthétique visuelle*.

This second analysis of the answers to my old *Questionnaire* has been made after nine years, and when my views respecting the problems of æsthetics, their formulation and relation, have been changed, not only by additional knowledge of general psychology and by the illuminating study especially of the work of Lipps and of Karl Groos and of Professor Münsterberg, but also by my constantly noted down observation of psychological conditions spontaneously accompanying (*i.e.* not obtained by deliberate experimental introspection) such familiarity with works of art as is constant and habitual in the life of a person living in the midst of

galleries and monuments (Florence, Rome, Venice, Paris, London) and chiefly known to the general public as a writer on art. Such additional study has convinced me not only of the existence of a theoretic separation between the hypothesis of *Einfühlung* and those of *Nachahmung* and *Sergian application of the Lange-James theory*, but moreover, independently of the answers to my *Questionnaire*, to which I shall soon return, it has placed before me several extremely suggestive facts. The first is that, as regards myself, there is evidence of the attribution to lines and shapes of modes of movement, energy, and vitality occasionally approximating to such "delusions" as thinking that a mountain *rises up* as we go towards it rapidly in a boat, a motor-car, or on a bicycle (a delusion already poetically described by Wordsworth * and admirably studied by Richard Hamann in the *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, vol. 43). I find myself in absolute agreement with my former collaborator, C. Anstruther-Thomson, in ascribing to mere arrangements of lines and planes, to mere two-dimensional or three-dimensional "forms," actions like *rising up, lifting, pressing down, expanding, going in, bulging out, balancing*, and all the other actions employed in the descriptive parts of *Beauty and Ugliness*. But I also recognise that in my own case the attribution of such qualities of movement is so complex that it would no more occur to me that the movements were in my mind than it would occur to me, except as a result of scientific teaching, that what I call *colour* is a phenomenon

* An extreme instance of such "movement attributed to lines" will be found in *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, Diary for April 29, 1904. I earnestly request the reader to refer at once to that example, which lack of space prevents my reprinting at this point (p. 319.)

taking place in my eye and nerves, or that what I call a *musical tone* is, similarly, not in the vibrating body or the air but in my own organs of perception. In other words, these qualities are, in my case, thought of and perceived as *really existing in the external shape or object*, however much my reason tells me that a motionless object or a mere two- or three-dimensional form cannot be performing any of the actions which I attribute to it; in fact, I seem to distinguish between two kinds of movement *outside* of myself: the movement of things which are moving in space, occupying different parts of space (covering other objects) and presenting different portions of themselves to my eye; and the movement of things which are *not* shifting place in space and which do *not* present different parts of themselves to my eye. But, in my individual consciousness, these two different kinds of movement are equally independent of any participation of my ego: I *follow* them because they seem *outside* of me.

And here, while taking this opportunity of protesting against Professor Lipps's formula of *projection of the ego* as distinguished from *attribution of states of the ego*, I must point out a slovenliness of thought of which C. Anstruther-Thomson and myself were guilty at the time of writing *Beauty and Ugliness*, and of which even so acute a critic as Karl Groos is not entirely free. Throughout *Beauty and Ugliness* we talked of "following lines"; we also talked of *miming the balance, miming the movement of an arch, of "perception of the grip of the ground by a façade's base,"* and of "*downward pressure of the mouldings and cornices*"; of "*involuntary imitation of the legs of the chair pressing hard on the ground*"—when in reality a mere visible form cannot *press*,

cannot *grip*, cannot *balance*, except in so far as we imagine it to do so, nor can lines *move* except because we attribute to them the movement by which we, as we express it, *follow them*, whereas there is nothing to *follow* since there is nothing that moves. In fact we were guilty of explaining a movement or action on our own part as "miming," that is, as called into being, by a previously existing "movement" which we had previously (and correctly, I think) explained as being *attributed* to motionless form because it accompanied that form's perception.]

I shall have to return later to this logical oversight, in connexion with the theory (and the facts) of *Æsthetic Mimicry* (*Nachahmung*). What I wish to insist upon at this moment is simply that examination of my own æsthetic experience has shown me that whatever activities of *following*, or *miming*, or *liking* or *disliking* certain two- or three-dimensional shapes may take place in myself, there is always a primary fact of certain shapes seeming to possess movement which is entirely objective in the sense of thought of without reference to myself. The shapes, as I correctly stated it in p. 568 (p. 200) of *Beauty and Ugliness*, "*seem* to balance and move," and I am not in the least aware of this *seeming* being dependent upon any thought or act of my own; my thoughts and acts come in secondarily, and as a seeming result, often a very different result, of the "*seeming*" balancing, moving, or other proceedings of the lines and shapes.

My personal experience here confirms the belief in Empathy as a purely "mental" phenomenon, requiring no bodily "sensations," no definitely or vaguely localised "feelings of activity." And it

seems to me that the very wording of many of my collaborator's experiments takes for granted an unlocalised, a wholly unperceived act of Empathy preliminary to the localised phenomena and the objective movements by which the movement attribution is explained in those experiments.

Now let us return to my *Questionnaire sur l'élément moteur* and see whether the answers to it can throw any light upon the question about which I have just been consulting my own experience, namely, "Does such a process as *Einfühlung* (Empathy) really exist? Do most persons, or many or any, except professional æstheticians, habitually attribute modes of their own movement and life to motionless and inanimate shapes?" This can be examined by considering current modes of speech. Forty-five persons, of whom I was one, were asked whether they could attach any kind of literal meaning to such expressions as "*lignes qui s'élancent*," "*toit qui s'abaisse*," "*groupes qui s'équilibrent*," or other verbs of movement applied to motionless objects, or whether they considered these expressions as purely conventional and without intrinsic truth. Of these forty-five persons, fourteen gave no answer, nine answered *No*, while twenty-two, that is to say only one less than half, answered *Yes*. Considering that the abstentions from all answer, whether accidental or intentional, cannot be counted to the *Noes*, it seems to me that we may conclude that at least half of the persons interrogated presented cases of Empathy pure and simple.

V

The most important evidence obtained by my *Questionnaire* is on the subject of what Professor Groos has accustomed us to think of as *Innere Nachahmung* ("Inner Mimicry") meaning thereby states of muscular strain which accompany or emphasise the æsthetic phenomenon, and which vary from faint and only vaguely localised sensations to actual beginnings of movements which are sometimes carried out; muscular states in confirmation of whose existence Professor Groos has more than once done my collaborator and myself the honour of quoting from our joint work on *Beauty and Ugliness*. It is, I repeat, upon this subject that the answers to my *Questionnaire* are the most important and instructive. They are so, strange as it may at first appear, exactly because they are utterly contradictory to one another and even contradictory in themselves. On the questions referring to such phenomena, out of forty-five persons interrogated thirty-nine have answered. But of these thirty-nine answers only a small proportion can be put under a rubric of *yes* or *no*. Ten answer *not at all*. Only *two* answer *yes* or *certainly*. Twenty-seven answer with *provisos* and *distinguos* which sometimes constitute apparent contradictions. *Six* limit the imitative impulse to *remembering* or *describing* (A. when memory is lively; B. rather when thought of; C. in describing; D. in recalling only; E. as result of thinking about it, etc.).

Another group of five answers (of which myself) speaks of *dramatic* imitation or imitation of the *human action* of a work of art (F. only or especially if the attitude represented is forced; G. only in the

case of inferior or badly restored statues; H. if a picture is lifelike, but enjoyment is greatest when body is at rest).

Two (not myself) discriminate still further, saying (I.) that outer imitation distracts the attention, and (J.) that imitation brings home the "human quality of a represented gesture" but that this "does not affect the æsthetic appreciation."

We now come to another group of answers to which I wish to draw particular attention. I will put these answers in a *crescendo* of suggestiveness. K. speaks of slight indication with his body of the pose of a statue. This is ambiguous, but L. leaves no doubt that he means Mimicry (*Nachahmung*) not necessarily of a dramatic sort, speaking of impulses to imitate "braced or languid attitude." This distinction between mimicry of the *action represented* (dramatic mimicry) and mimicry connected with mere *shape* becomes accentuated in our series. M. speaks of "tending to *draw* the work of art in imagination." N. thinks that "a beginning of muscular imitation must be connected with lines." O. has only very slight unlocalisable "feelings of direction," and these are connected with lines and planes. P. and Q. speak of mere "inner tensions" and "innervations," and Q. adds but "outer imitation disturbs æsthetic pleasure."

The significance of this group of answers is made clearer by details in other answers.

That there is no mimicry in connexion with statues or works of art is affirmed very distinctly by R., S., T., and V.; and W., X., Y., and Z. declare bodily "ease" (that is, no attempt at assuming the position of a statue) as most favourable to æsthetic enjoyment; while yet another subject

remarks that æsthetic enjoyment *is accompanied by forgetfulness of one's own body.*

The groups in which I have placed these answers are intended to suggest my own explanation of the discriminations, contradictions, and incoherences contained in them.

My own gallery diary during ten years succeeding the publication of *Beauty and Ugliness* has made this meaning clear to me. This diary (large extracts from which will be found in the essay on *Æsthetic Responsiveness*) gives * overwhelming proofs that in dealing with Inner Mimicry we are dealing with two phenomena, sometimes connected and inter-meshed but frequently in violent contradiction, but which other æstheticians (Professor Groos, Mr. Berenson, and even Professor Lipps when he passes beyond the limits of his *Raumæsthetik*) have usually mixed up together, and which some of the vocabulary of *Beauty and Ugliness* was not calculated to discriminate as clearly as it ought to have done. For the entries in my diary show that, as I myself answered to the *Questionnaire*, it is (1) only statues and pictures lacking definiteness and harmony of lines, owing to their being by inferior artists or to having been badly restored, which provoke in my own case any vivid realisation, such as might produce incipient imitation of the action which they are intended to convey, and (2) that it is only on days when æsthetic enjoyment is difficult and the attention easily diverted by the presence of real people that such realisation of the represented action becomes dominant to the amount of an obsession. The explanation of this curious fact, verified in my own case during several years, and

* See p. 254 *et seq.* of this volume.

verified also by my pupil, Dr. Maria Waser-Krebs, agrees with the testimony of the *Questionnaire*, answers and explains the apparent contradiction of persons speaking of *non-imitative* positions being the most propitious to artistic enjoyment, others expressly stating that imitative sensations are called forth only in response to works of art being *lifelike*, that *imitative* sensations are called forth mostly in *remembering* or *describing*, that imitative sensations do not favour æsthetic enjoyment, and finally that, as one of the interrogated persons puts it, æsthetic enjoyment makes one forget one's own body; while, on the other hand, a group of answers informs us that there are "beginnings of muscular imitation connected with planes," "feelings of direction connected with lines," statements which may be further illustrated by the statement that one of the subjects "tends to draw *in imagination* the work of art before him." These muscular sensations provoked by the sight of the lines and planes, the mere shapes contained in or constituting a work of art, are of a different nature from the muscular sensations provoked by the realisation of a *gesture* or *action* which those lines and planes, those mere *shapes* suggest to our mind, that is to say, to our stored-up experience. And they are, though sometimes connected, on the whole opposed to one another. For an action or gesture requires change or a series of changes of visible shape (as is proved by the cinematograph), and the thought, the *realisation* in ourselves through muscular sensations, of such alterations of shape must necessarily divert the attention from thorough contemplation of the unchanging relations of lines and planes constituting a definite visible shape. We may indeed (and often

do) think in rapid alternation of the aspect which a picture or statue presents and of the aspects which would be presented if the action or gesture suggested were carried out, but the one process cannot be dwelt upon without checking the other. Thus, if we think of the horse of Marcus Aurelius as really walking, if we think of (and, in some cases, *bodily feel*) the next positions of the horse's legs and the rider's arm, we are diverted from the full realisation of the interplay of lines and planes constituting the shape of the horse and rider *as they are*; and *vice versa*, if we are absorbed in *following* (I use the verb purposely, meaning thereby that our attention takes time to pass from point to point) this interplay of lines and planes, then the realisation of what action is intended to be suggested, or, in other words, the imaginary going on to the next moments of that action, is in so far impeded. I shall give (cf. p. 255) numerous extracts from my Gallery Diaries, recording (1) my frequent difficulty in deciding whether a good antique is *walking* or standing still (compare Taine's remark that an antique *does* nothing, but merely *exists beautifully*); (2) the annoying emphasis or *suddenness* of the gesture of painted or sculptured figures, whose lines do not combine into a sufficiently unified pattern, and the disagreeable feeling—"There he is still at that! Why doesn't he do something else?"—due to my motor imagination being first excited and then frustrated. (Compare the common belief, formulated by Lessing, that painting and sculpture should not take sudden, transient, or violent movements for their subject, a view contradicted by the *Laocoön* itself, which *represents* movement as sudden, transient, and violent as one can choose, but does so in a particularly

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elaborate pattern which forces the attention to dwell upon and return to the same points, thus producing a sufficiently restful æsthetic impression.)

I have insisted at great length upon this difference between the motor images (Empathy) and the muscular sensations (Inner Mimicry) provoked by (1) the suggestion of locomotion or change of position inherent to all objective movement in *represented* things, and (2) the suggestion of motor-dynamic images accompanying the perception of motionless shapes and due to *our attention moving* across them in the acts of measurement and comparison and to our tendency to attribute to what we see the modes of our unlocalised activity of seeing. In other words, I have insisted on the difference (which the answers to my *Questionnaire* as well as my personal experience reveals) between *dramatic* mimicry and that process which is most unluckily called *mimicry of shape and pattern* in the essay on *Beauty and Ugliness*; and I have done so because this latter is the only sort of Inner Mimicry referred to in that essay, and also because the failure to see the difference between the two processes has not only diverted æstheticians from the *central* problem of æsthetics, namely, the problem *why some shapes (independent of what they represent) are liked and called beautiful and other shapes disliked and called ugly*; but has also contributed to confuse this central æsthetic problem with the subsidiary problem how shapes can be made most representative or suggestive of things or actions extrinsic to themselves, and has thus led speculation to erroneous explanation of the "vitalising" or "life-enhancing" powers of artistic form. I shall illustrate this confusion by reference to the writings of Mr. B.

Berenson, choosing them rather than others because, besides possessing æsthetic experience and acumen incomparably superior to that of nearly every other writer on the subject, and hence speaking with far greater authority than even the most distinguished psychologists, Mr. Berenson's works contain some of the earliest, most independent and therefore genuine and important testimony to the existence of motor processes in connexion with æsthetic phenomena; his *Florentine Painters*, in which he first put forward his theory of what he calls "Tactile values," having been written most certainly without knowledge of my own essay, also written without knowledge of his theories, on *Beauty and Ugliness*, and also, to all appearance, without knowledge of the cognate ideas of Messrs. Lipps and Groos. Indeed, I have chosen Mr. Berenson's work as an illustration of the practically universal confusion between the two kinds of Inner Mimicry (and indeed of Lippsian *Einfühlung* also) because it enables me to add, without interrupting my exposition, Mr. Berenson's extremely valuable authority to the other evidence first hand (that chiefly of Lipps, Groos, C. Anstruther-Thomson and myself, and the subjects of my *Questionnaire*) to the existence of such phenomena as Empathy (*Einfühlung*) or of Inner Mimicry (*Innere Nachahmung*).

I must premise that in the following quotations the words *tactile sense* appear to be employed with the meaning of *muscular sense*, and, even occasionally, in connexion with realisation of the third dimension, with the meaning of sense of *locomotion* of the whole or part of the body.

Tuscan Painters, p. 9: "The stimulation of our tactile imagination awakens our consciousness of the importance of the tactile sense

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in our physical and mental functioning, and thus again, by making us feel better provided for life than we are aware of being, gives us a heightened sense of capacity."

P. 14: "Our eyes scarcely have had time to light on it a (Madonna by Giotto) before we realise it completely, the throne occupying a real space, the Virgin satisfactorily seated upon it, etc. *Our tactile imagination is put to play immediately, our palms and fingers accompanying our eyes more quickly than in presence of real objects*, the sensations varying constantly with the various projections represented as of face, torso, knees, etc."

P. 9: "I never see them (Masaccio's paintings) without the strongest stimulation of my tactile consciousness. I feel that I could touch every figure, that it would yield a definite resistance . . . that I should have to expend thus much effort to displace it, that I could walk around it."

P. 86: Speaking of the nude, "For here alone can we watch those tautnesses of muscles and those stretchings and relaxings and rippings of *skin which, translated into similar strains in our own persons, make us fully realise movement.*"*

P. 35: "The essential in painting . . . is the rendering of tactile values (see above for definition of these), including the suggestion of walking round and pushing away, that is to say, suggestions of locomotion and of muscular effort, such as 'finger and palm' sensations cannot represent (except *symbolically*) of the forms represented, because by this means, and this alone, can art make us realise forms better than we do in life."

P. 84: "*We realise objects when we perfectly translate them into terms of our own states, of our own feelings . . . because we keenly realise the movement of a railway, speak of it as going or running, instead of rolling on its wheels. . . . The more we endow it (our object) with human attributes, the less we merely know, the more we realise it, the more does it approach the work of art.*"

P. 69 *et seq.*: "Those of us who care for nothing *in the work of art but what it represents* are either powerfully attracted or repelled by

* Cf. Wölfflin's *Klassische Kunst der Renaissance* (1899), pp. 250 and 254. Professor Wölfflin has very kindly answered a letter in which I asked whether his words should be interpreted in the physical or the psychical sense:

"In speaking of the Innervations called forth by a drawing of Michelangelo's," he writes, "I mean physical phenomena, although the effect may not always be so strong."

his (Botticelli's) unhackneyed types and quivering feeling; but if we are such as have *an imagination of touch and movement that is easy to stimulate*, we feel in Botticelli a pleasure that few, if any, other artists can give us. . . . Imagine shapes (of hair) having the *supreme life of line you may see in the contours of licking flames* Ibid., take the lines that render the movements of the tossing hair, the fluttering draperies and the dancing waves . . . take *these lines alone with all their power of stimulating our imagination of movement*, and what do we have? *Pure values of movement abstracted, unconnected with any representation whatever.* . . . Imagine an art made up entirely of these quintessences of movement values. . . . Tactile values were translated (in Botticelli) into *values of movement* and, for the same reason and to prevent the drawing of the eye inward, to prevent it and to devote itself to the *rhythm of the line*, the backgrounds were either entirely suppressed, etc.

In these quotations it seems to me that there are allusions to two wholly different things, namely, (1) to visible shapes which *suggest* objective movements of the *represented objects* and call forth in the spectator feelings or "sensations" of strain such as he would have if he made those movements himself; and (2) visible shapes made up of lines and combinations of line which awaken in the spectator *feelings of movement abstracted, unconnected with any representation whatever*, movement to which, in the next sentence, Mr. Berenson attributes the formal, the æsthetic, quality of *rhythm of the line*. Nay, the *abstract, non-representative quality of this movement* (which produces *rhythm of the line*) is made more unequivocal by the remark that in order to enable us to devote ourselves to the *rhythm of the line*, the backgrounds were (sometimes) *entirely suppressed*, that is to say, that the *imagination of movement of the represented thing in real space* was refused a great part of the third dimension without which the movement of *represented objects* cannot be thoroughly realised. This transition from (1) the interest in represented

or suggested movement (*i.e.* of movement implying body and change in that body's aspect) to (2) interest in the *movement* (including, of course, rhythm) attributed by us to *motionless and bodiless lines and shapes*, is hidden under the expression "translating tactile values into values of movement."

I will add one more quotation which, while constituting an additional repetition of so experienced an æsthetician's testimony in favour of motor processes and Inner Mimicry, will serve to show how this confusion between the motor accompaniments of æsthetic form perception and the motor accompaniments of mimetic sympathy with the actions of represented beings has forced Mr. Berenson into explaining æsthetic pleasure as due to facilitated thought, about circumstances connected with the represented object as distinguished from the visible form by which it is represented (or suggested), and has thus led him to overlook or evade what I call the central æsthetic problem, viz. the problem of the preference and antipathy inspired by visible shapes entirely apart from any object or action which they may (as in the case of decorative patterns of architecture) or may not suggest; the problem dealt with in Lipps's *Raumästhetik*, and to which he has applied the hypothesis of *Einfühlung* (Empathy).

"I see," writes Mr. Berenson (*Tuscan Painters*, p. 50), . . . "two men wrestling; but unless my retinal impressions are *immediately translated into images of strain and pressure in my muscles*, of resistance to my weight, of touch all over my body, it means nothing to me in terms of vivid experience, although a wrestling match may, in fact, contain *many genuinely artistic elements*. Our enjoyment of it can never be quite artistic; we are prevented from completely realising it not only by the dramatic interest in the game, but also by the succession of movements being too rapid

for us to realise each completely, and too fatiguing if realisable. Now if a way could be found of conveying to us the realisation of movement without the confusion and the fatigue of the actuality, we should be getting out of the wrestlers more than they themselves can give us, the heightening of vitality which comes to us whenever we keenly realise life such as the actuality would give us, plus the greater effectiveness of the heightening brought about by the clearer, intenser, and less fatiguing realisation. This is precisely what the artist who succeeded in *representing movements achieves*; *making us realise it as we never can actually, he gives us a heightened sense of capacity.* . . . In words already familiar, he extracts the significance of movement just as, in rendering tactile values, the artist extracts the corporeal significance of objects. . . . What a pleasure to be able to *realise in my own muscles, in my own chest, with my own arms and legs, the life that is in him as he is making his supreme effort* . . . *how after the contest his muscles will relax and rest trickle like a refreshing stream through his nerves.*"

In the same way that Hildebrand and his follower Cornelius * identify beauty of form with the easy and satisfactory suggestion of corporeal qualities and locomotor possibilities of the object represented (what Mr. Berenson calls "extracting the corporeal significance") so Mr. Berenson here explains our pleasure in an arrangement of visible shapes (Pollaiuolo's *Herakles and Antæus*) by the increased facility with which our attention wanders off from those visible shapes to the realisation of a dramatic action and of successive moments (even the rest after the contest!) which must present totally different visible shapes to our perception, very much as if we identified the pleasure afforded by a picture with its being the starting-point for a cinematographical performance.

I hope by this time to have distinguished between

* Hildebrand, *Das Problem der Form in der Bildenden Kunst*, 4th edition, 1903. (English translation exists.)

Cornelius, *Elementargesetze der Bildenden Kunst*, 1908 (253 illustrations).

such dramatic mimicry as this and those imaginary or incipient or actualised movements to which my collaborator and myself referred whenever, throughout *Beauty and Ugliness*, we applied the fatally misleading word *miming* to the "lifting up" and "pressing down," the "gripping of the ground," the "balancing" of symmetrical sides of the mere shapes of pottery, furniture, architecture, and accepted from common usage the scarcely less misleading word *following* as applied to the "movements of lines" in pictures.

Beauty and Ugliness, p. 566 :

"These movements of lines are, in fact, *our movements* in looking *at the lines*, movements in most cases so slight as to be hardly perceptible, or like the faintly sketched out movements which accompany our hearing of dance music while staying at rest."

The difference is difficult to keep steadily in the mind, as is shown by even so acute an analyser as Professor Groos; and I am afraid that at the time of writing *Beauty and Ugliness* there was an occasional confusion even in my mind on the subject of the "miming of the gesture" of a statue, in consequence of the experiments of my collaborator having shown that "we cannot satisfactorily focus a stooping figure like the Medicean Venus if we stand before it bolt upright and with tense muscles, nor a very erect and braced figure like the Apoxyomenos if we stand before it humped up and with slackened muscles." The observations on myself contained in my gallery diary have convinced me that the realisation, whether or not accompanied by bodily tension, of the action or gesture of the human being represented in a work of art is in inverse ratio to the realisation, accompanied or not by bodily tension, of the *movements* attributed to the lines and shapes

of that work of art ; and that what I must call the *translation of the visible shapes into terms of human locomotion, gesticulation or such proceedings as produce* (compare the cinematograph) *a succession of different visible aspects*, is in my case frequent only when there is (from artistic inferiority, mutilation, or mistaken restoration in antiques) a lack of defined and unified "movement of lines," or else when I have not yet had time to be absorbed in such a scheme and quality of *line movement*, and am still busy with the initial question which occurs in every new act of visual perception : What is the thing of which I now see the shape ? Or what thing does this shape represent or suggest by resemblance ?

It will be remembered that some of the answers to my *Questionnaire* spoke of tendencies to assume a tense or slack attitude according as the "pose" of the statue was braced or slack, and apart from any tendency to mimic its represented action. This observation has been confirmed to me in conversation by one of the most important writers on the laws of sculpture. And it is to such conformity of our own bodily tensions (whether definitely localised or not) with the dynamic suggestions of a statue's shape, that my collaborator and myself now limit the remark (*Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 677), "When we adjust our muscles in imitation of the tenseness or slackness of the statue's attitude the statue becomes a reality to us."

In order to remove any ambiguity lurking in these words or suggested by the perhaps defective wording of *Beauty and Ugliness*, I have obtained from my collaborator, C. Anstruther-Thomson, a summing-up of the experimental self-observation made by

her previous and subsequent to the writing of our joint essay:

"No, I don't feel the movement of the statue as human movement that I feel inclined to copy.

"I have not the slightest inclination to adopt the attitude of holding up a child when I look at the *Hermes*, nor to scrape oil off my arm when I look at the *Apoxyomenos*, nor to sit on the ground when I look at the *Dying Gladiator*. None of these statues strike me as doing solely what they are represented as doing. My interest in them as human beings is engulfed by my interest in them as works of art.

"To explain my meaning, here is an instance. My eye falls on the *Venus of Milo*. I don't say to myself, 'Here is a beautiful woman! What a pity she has no arms.' What I say to myself is, 'She moves like a sailing yacht,' and my balance slews a little to the left and right, following the lines of the inclination of her body. (I balance with my right side while she balances with her left side. My way is the opposite way to hers, of course, as we are face to face.) I find my pleasure in her is due to a complex image she presents of being both a woman and a vessel in full sail, for the combination gives her a stateliness, almost a look of majesty.

"My connexion with her is through my motor impulses, and so I feel just as much connected with her drapery as with her body; both of them balance and have movement. She does not look like an alive woman who is wearing inanimate drapery; but she and the drapery are one. The connexion that I do feel with her shape is that which I spoke about in a previous answer.

"The pressure of my feet on the ground is pressure that I see in a marked degree in the feet of the statue. The lift-up of my body I see done more strongly and amply in her marble body, and the steadying pressure of my head I see in a diminished degree in the poise of the statue's beautiful head. These movements I may be said to imitate, but I should find them and imitate them equally in a Renaissance monument or a mediæval chalice. They are at the basis of all art.

"Another connexion that I feel with her is by the balance and shifting of my weight from side to side in order to follow her balance."—C. A.-T.

These words leave, I think, no doubt as to the nature of the motor processes and muscular sensations of which my collaborator spoke in *Beauty and Ugliness*. They are of the nature, not of dramatic mimicry, but of what, on its purely psychological

side, Professor Lipps has described in his *Raum-ästhetik* under the name of *ästhetische Einfühlung* or *mechanical* (dynamical) *interpretation of form*. Whether such motor processes can really be detected in our æsthetic experience, whether such muscular sensations accidentally come up to the surface of our consciousness during æsthetic apperception, or can be detected in its obscure undercurrents by trained self-observation, is a question upon which answers to these questions would shed a very necessary light. Meanwhile I am able, thanks to the generous helpfulness of Professor Karl Groos, to lay before my readers the personal evidence of the founder of the *Innere Nachahmung* theory himself. Here are the questions put by me to Professor Groos, with his admirably clear answers.

(1) Is *Innere Nachahmung* (Inner Mimicry) in your experience always or ever accompanied by

(a) *Sensations localised in your body* ? or by

(b) Actual objective changes of position, from one foot to another, or by moving hands, or balancing ?

(2) Or is *Innere Nachahmung* (Inner Mimicry) merely a vague bodily state not localisable and not manifesting itself externally ? Or is it a purely mental (*geistig*) state ?

(3) Is *Innere Nachahmung* at all a *dramatic* miming ? For instance—

(a) Do you feel (either with or without localisation) as if you would like to put yourself into the *attitude* of a painted figure or a statue ; or

(b) Does the feeling of activity (localisable or not) follow rather the *lines*, the *architectural shape* of a figure or a group ?

(4) Have you ever observed whether you feel the *action* (the dramatic action, the action represented) more in inferior or badly restored statues or in “masterpieces” ?

I am now speaking not of *following lines* and feeling their dynamic quality, but of a mimicry of the action which a figure is supposed to be doing. Do you see a *sitting* figure better when you yourself are seated, a figure drawing itself up better when you yourself draw yourself up ? Does the sight of the Dying Gladiator give you any wish not to stand erect ?

Such are my questions; here are the answers kindly given by Professor Groos:

(1) "Inner sensations localised in my body" and principally of the nature of movements of the *eyes* and *breathing*. Possibly also innervations of the muscles of face and nape of neck. Sometimes also of the muscles of upper body, particularly of the torso, legs only when there is musical measure (*Takt*).

(2) I am unable to say to what extent all this is "externally manifested." At any rate, my *inner* motor *Mit erleben* (*with-living*, participation) is *never* "purely mental." In other words, I believe that in my case there is always "kinæsthetic accompaniment" whenever I am "*mitgerissen*" ("carried away" by the work of art).

(3) On this point compare R. Vischer's *Optische Formgeföhle*. He confirms what I have said in No. 1 that my "inner mimicry," so far as bodily position is concerned, particularly refers to the head, neck, and torso of the represented *figure*. Or, more precisely: at this moment, when I search in my memory, it is these parts of represented figures which occur chiefly to me. I have no *wish* to assume the attitudes of the figures in question; I am merely aware that I do so with very faint indications. *Far more important* than such indications of imitation of attitude is for me the accompanying or following or re-creating (*Nacherzeugung*, literally *after-begetting*) of seen forms through movements of the eyes and of the organs of *speech including respiration*. In this matter of the breathing exists in my experience the connexion between the enjoyment of visual art and of music. With reference to this, what interests me in pictures is not the single figures but the *ensemble* of lines and general composition.

(4) The above facts explain why I cannot confirm from my own experience that of C. Anstruther-Thomson. The attitude of the Dying Gladiator does *not* produce in me any tendency to leave my own upright position, because I *mime* (*Nachahme*) principally with the eyes and the respiration. *Unintentional experiments* have shown me more than once that the *mimetic indication* of the represented attitudes by means of my own body, at least of my *eyes* and *upper body*, that such *mimetic indication* tends to make æsthetic enjoyment easier, so that I become a little excited (*gepackt*, literally *taken bold of*), a thing which does not usually happen in *voluntary experimentation*.

My intense æsthetic enjoyment is rarely of the nature of *jubilant delight*. But it is not a "cheerful reposefulness." It is a *being-*

laid-hold-of (*Ergriffensein, saisissement*) which partakes both of *oppression* and of *pathos* (poignancy, melting mood). In music it is *adagios* which act most on me, all movements which are *legato*, still, solemn, subdued.

I do not in the least think that all real emotional phenomena during æsthetic enjoyment are emotions of "*Mitleben*" (*i.e. sharing the life of*) or of inner miming. What I refer to is merely *particular* conditions, which some persons know (not perhaps always from their own experience) and which I myself know only in *intense* and *uncritical* moments. Such conditions become rarer as I grow older and more reflective; they are commonest in my case with regard to the beauties of nature.*

* I am now able to add the result of a few more answers to the above *Questionnaire*, some of these answers being by persons having taken part in the "Würzburg Experiments" described at p. 148.

A. answers that "Inner Mimicry" is usually, perhaps always, accompanied in his case by sensations, chiefly "muscular" and organic, although eye-movements and respiratory changes are occasionally felt. The organic sensations are rather diffused than localised, *e.g.* a general contraction of many muscles rather than of any special ones. A. has rarely, and then only faintly, a wish to put himself in the attitude of a painted or sculptured figure. A. has not noticed whether such sense of activity accompanies perception of the lines and architectural shape of a work of art, thinks that the "Inner Mimicry" of the dramatic (*i.e.* represented) action is greater in case of good works of art. But the whole process does not play a great part in A.'s æsthetic appreciation.

B. knows "Inner Mimicry" and organic accompaniments only in connexion with music, and thinks that its absence may account for the "coldness" of his enjoyment of visual art.

C. premises that "Inner Mimicry" is a rare occurrence. C. has experience of a wish to imitate the attitude of a statue or a painted figure, but considers such a phenomenon as merely *preparatory* to æsthetic enjoyment. What really interests C. is following the lines and the architectural shapes. C. finds that the tendency to imitate the dramatic or represented action is greater in dealing with inferior works; in great works "the dynamic quality of the line" is what dominates. "Inner Mimicry" may result in actual change of attitude, but C. cannot say that such a change of objective attitude would facilitate æsthetic appreciation.

D. is unconscious of any wish to alter his position or balance, and finds no difference in looking at a standing figure while seated

Leaving it to other observers and experimenters to determine this question of facts, I shall examine what interpretations may be put upon such phenomena of Inner Mimicry (*Innere Nachahmung*) as have already been brought to light.

But before doing so I must pass on to the third part of my subject—the question of organic accompaniment or resonance of æsthetic apperception of visible shapes, in other words, to that “Sergian” application of the Lange-James theory which attributes æsthetic emotion, pleasurable and the reverse, to “the perception of form implying an active participation of the most important organs of animal life, a constant alteration in vital processes requiring stringent regulation for the benefit of the total organism.” (*Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 545 [p. 157].)

I have already remarked that, owing to the defective drawing out of my *Questionnaire sur l'élément moteur*, the evidence obtained on what I must call “Empathy (*Einfühlung*) as such,” namely, the attribution of movement and modes of activity to motionless objects and shapes, lost much of its value. For the answers referred not merely to the question whether certain common expressions like *lignes qui s'élancent* were to be taken as merely

or *vice versa*; but D. is conscious of “Inner Mimicry” by movements of the hands, both in presence of works of art and in recollecting them.

Finally, E., a well-known and very æsthetically gifted archæologist, is unable to remember any “Inner Mimicry” in the presence of works of art, and knows imitative tendencies only in *speaking* of works of art, in which case the gesture is merely an adjunct to verbal description, and may exist equally where no art, but only real persons or objects, are in question.

The student can sum up these answers for himself, and compare the result with that given by the “Würzburg Experiments,” as on p. 148 *et seq.*

conventional or as corresponding to some literal reality, but also to other questions grouped under the same heading owing to their dealing with language and "metaphor," but which were really quite separate judged from the point of view of an inquiry into Empathy (*Einfühlung*) as such. These questions were :

"Vous rendez-vous compte de ce que nous entendons par sentiments de *bien-être organique*, quelquefois vagues, quelquefois localisés dans la région cardiaque et respiratoire et dans la tête (pas dans les muscles de l'œil) lorsque vous vous trouvez en présence des tableaux et des paysages réels qui vous plaisent ? . . . Quelque chose en vous même semble-t-elle répondre à ces verbes de mouvement appliqués à des objets immobiles ? Et pour les états plus complexes et déjà affectifs, rattachez-vous un sens en quelque sorte littéral aux mots "une voûte qui écrase l'âme"—"les arceaux gothiques qui donnent l'essor à l'imagination"—"une coupole sous laquelle on respire à l'aise, on se sent la poitrine gonfler"—"un paysage peint (ou effectif) qui nous fait le cœur léger, qui nous délivre du poids des soucis, qui accélère ou régularise le rythme de la vie ?"—ces expressions vous semblent-elles des formes de pure convention, sans vérité intrinsèque ; ou vous semblent-elles accuser des états physiologiques dont vous avez vaguement conscience dans vos expériences esthétiques ?"

Among the twenty-two affirmative answers respecting the literal or conventional nature of the "metaphoric" or Empathic (*Einfühlung*) expressions grouped confusedly in my *Questionnaire*, ten answers contain the additional information that "something in oneself answers" or that "there is something bodily, physiological" in the case ; or that there are "dynamical sensations."

But the answers to my *Questionnaire* contain other evidence on this "Lange-James" part of the subject.

To the question whether arrangements of lines and planes in pictures, in nature, and in architecture produce organic *bien-être* or *malaise*, nine give no

answer, *six* answer *No*, and the rest assent in various ways, *two* limiting this to natural scenery, *one* specifying particularly architecture, *two* speaking of a sense of organic restfulness, *one* speaking of "heightened vitality," *one* answering "highly physical," *two* adding "not localised," *four* mentioning sensations connected with the heart or respiration, *one* speaking of a muscular sense of uplifting, and *one* of *beautiful forms seeming to caress one*.

But the subject of bodily accompaniments or resonances of æsthetic perception is further illustrated by a negative test. My *Questionnaire* asks (Question 13): "La dépression physique, la fatigue, l'indisposition avec malaise ou tiraillement, vous empêchent-elles de jouir pleinement d'une œuvre d'art ? Ou bien la vue de celle-ci a-t-elle, à un degré plus ou moins prononcé, le pouvoir de refouler momentanément votre état pénible ?"

To this question *eighteen* of the forty-five subjects give no answer. *Two*, both of them priests and who have previously disclaimed all interest in artistic form as distinguished from subject or moral suggestion, answer that only moral and intellectual satisfaction can overcome fatigue or slight pain; *eleven* persons answer that fatigue and depression stand in the way of artistic pleasure; *eleven* that it is a matter of degree of previous fatigue or *malaise*. Only *three* answer that the presence of beautiful things is "always restorative" (one answers "unless deadly ill"). *One* makes it a question of novelty acting as a stimulant, and *three*, of which one myself, remark that a degree of initial unwillingness due to physical depression may sometimes be overcome by an effort; these latter groups of answers testifying to the confusion existing in people's mind between

the partial or total impeding of artistic pleasure (and indeed attention) by physical depression or *malaise* and the physically restorative action of such pleasure once it has been awakened.

To this evidence in proof of the existence of bodily conditions unfavourable to æsthetic pleasure there may be added, by those who accept the Lange-James theory independently of æsthetics (as I understand Professor Groos to do in his latest publication), another indirect piece of evidence : five or six of my subjects answer affirmatively (and with detail, leaving no doubts) to the question whether, after the visual image of a work of art has disappeared from their memory, a sort of emotional *halo* clings to its name and revives a slight emotion of pleasure. According to the Lange-James theory such a stored-up and revived emotion would answer to a revival of the bodily condition without which (always according to the Lange-James theory) no real emotion can exist.

Now such sense of *bien-être* and *malaise* provoked by the lines and planes of pictures, statues, architecture, or natural scenery does indeed suggest that lines and planes have a direct influence upon our vitality ; but they do not in the least explain why they should have it. “Organic *bien-être*”—feelings of expansion about the chest, of increased stature and improved balance, or particularly of diminished weight, are one or all an accompaniment of all sudden or great happiness, whatever its cause, but their existence does not explain why one kind of visible shape should provoke happiness plus *bien-être* and another kind of visible shape provoke dissatisfaction and *malaise*, and it is just this latter problem which the “organic accompaniments” detailed in

C. Anstruther-Thomson's experiments in *Beauty and Ugliness* attempted to solve by an application of the Lange-James theory to æsthetics. Professor Groos describes an experiment of his own which he seems to consider as crucial :

"Close your eyes ; breathe *in* very slowly, steadily, and deep, so that the nostrils, in a state of slight tension, give you the sensation of the gentle pressure of the in-streaming air. At the same time give your head a very faint tendency to slow movement upwards and backwards (by the way, this attitude has become a common one of modern painters in their representation of ideal feminine beauty, from Herkomer to common posters, etc.). These movements result in a slow motion of the thorax and diaphragm ; and they are accompanied, so far as the circumstances of the experiment will allow, but with astonishing clearness, by a psychic condition which has usually something both of being oppressed and of being touched. The oppression arises from the chest ; the feeling of *being touched* (Rührung) is due to a slight movement above the muscles of the brow (*einer Kleinen über die Stirnmuskeln hinstreichende Regung*). We receive a quite similar, but much completer, complex of feeling when we are profoundly affected by the beauty of a quiet evening landscape or by a slow and *legato* (*eine Getragene*) melody.

But such a manner of holding the head and of taking and emitting the breath may indeed be characteristic of æsthetic delight mingled with a certain nostalgic clinging to the passing moment, as it is certainly characteristic of other delight and clinging not at all determined by the peculiarities of lines and shapes : but such carriage of the head and such breathing are not those which could possibly accompany the act of perceiving visible form (an act of ocular exploration and of measurement and comparison), still less those differentiating the perception of such form as gives pleasure from the perception of such shapes as give dissatisfaction : it is certainly not because of any such holding of my head or holding and emitting of my breath that I

am impelled to alter, if I can alter, the lines of a dress, the balance of a hat or the angles and curves presented by a group of plants or of furniture. Above all, it was not such bodily changes and emotional conditions which were dealt with in *Beauty and Ugliness* and brought forward in explanation, not only of æsthetic pleasure, but also of æsthetic displeasure. Our "Sergian" application of the Lange-James theory to the central problem of æsthetics (*i.e.* that of the differentiation between beautiful and ugly visible shapes) did not deal with bodily accompaniments of delight in things *already recognised as beautiful*, but with what my collaborator claimed to be the bodily accompaniments (normal though not normally perceptible) of the movements made by the eyes and the head in the process of exploring visible shapes, and they can be exemplified by the following quotation from *Beauty and Ugliness* (p. 559), "adjustments of bilateral breathing, of equilibrium transferred with regularity from one side to the other, tensions of lifting up and pressing downwards, *as the eyes move along the symmetrical outline of the jar.*"

Now the question is : Do such adjustments of the balance and alterations in the breathing really take place ?

Let us first examine the answers of my *Questionnaire*. One subject speaks of "tending to draw in imagination," but this may refer to tensions accompanying the thought of reproducing the lines with a pencil, tensions connected with the movements of drawing with the forefinger, and of modelling with the thumb which we have all of us noticed in painters or sculptors when describing visible objects. Several allude to "inner tensions,"

one to a beginning of muscular imitation connected with lines, another to very slight unlocalisable feelings of direction connected with lines and planes. But not one has answered *Yes* to any question of shifting the balance, nor have I been able to find any indication of alterations in breathing. As regards myself, I have not, in ten years' registering of my gallery experience, observed in myself any such following of lines with the breath, the balance, or the muscular sensations. What I have observed on the surface (beyond which I have deliberately refused to penetrate) of my consciousness have been phenomena of altered breathing—particularly in the nostrils—distinctly connected with the output of attention, but rather as a matter of degree than according to the nature of the shapes perceived; and analogous, as it seems to me, to the respiratory changes of which I am aware while talking, thinking, writing, in fact giving my attention to other things than visible shapes and lines; respiratory changes often, perhaps always, accompanied by sensations of palpitation, "rat in the chest," and, generally speaking, of alterations in cardiac action, to which medical examination shows me to be morbidly subject. On the other hand, my self-observations possibly afford some negative evidence about the respiratory and equilibratory and muscular accompaniments of ocular movements in the fact that such alterations in the rhythm of the heart seem to make it easier in my case to attend to certain visible shapes than to others (as I have ascertained after going up flights of stairs), while, if the sensations of palpitation or heart irregularity become very strong, *all* attention to visible shapes, like all attention to trains of thought, in fact all regular grasping or

holding with the attention, becomes extremely difficult and sometimes impossible. Now what is such *grasping* and *holding* with the attention, or rather, why do we apply to perception, to memory, and to logical concatenation words suggesting motor experiences and even muscular processes? And if we feel that we *hold* or *grasp* without any sensations in the hands or arms (for I am not alluding to anything resembling in the least Mr. Berenson's sensations in the palms and fingers), with what do we feel that we *grasp* or *hold* (particularly *hold steady*)? Remark that we employ the same expression *hold* to our breathing. Does this not suggest that there is an element of muscular tension common to prehension with the arms, hands, and (as regards the ground) the feet, and prehension (or, as we call it, *comprehension*) with the eye or mind, and that this common element may be an ill-localised sensation of *holding*, of *gripping*, or of letting go in the respiratory regions, sensation testifying to some real alteration in the taking in and giving out of our breath? Is not the *breath* connected, by immemorial usage (far more than any cardiac action), with the *life*? In short, may our attribution of *life* to inanimate objects, to mere bodiless shapes, often to mere two-dimensional patterns of lines, not be connected with our attention to such objects and shapes being accompanied by sensations, vague or clearly localised, which we are accustomed to think of as the *sensations of our own life*? As regards my own inability to detect such sensations of respiratory adjustments as accompaniments to the perception of visible shapes, I may put forward one or two suggestions. (1) That alterations in the heart's action swamp everything except very strong and

clearly localised bodily sensations (as they tend to divert *all* attention to themselves), and that persons who, like myself, are excessively subject to cardiac sensations, probably cease to perceive the far more delicate respiratory sensations (except, as I said, in the nostrils), nay, that the respiratory changes may in such individuals (and they are probably numerous among nervous, hence among æsthetically sensitive subjects) tend to be translated immediately into *cardiac* changes, which dominate the consciousness by their insistence, and which heighten a factor (too much neglected by *Einfühlung* and *Nachahmung* and *Mitgefühl* hypotheses equally) in all æsthetic experience, the factor of *rhythm*. I make this suggestion because, while my Gallery Diaries give no direct evidence upon such respiratory and equilibratory sensations as my collaborator, C. Anstruther-Thomson, has discovered by dint of highly trained introspection, these Gallery Diaries of mine (in which, as remarked, I have never noted down anything which did not spontaneously offer itself on the surface, so to speak, of my everyday æsthetic consciousness) testify to the existence in myself of a very curious idiosyncrasy: the greater or lesser vividness of the perception of various visible shapes due to the accompaniment of various musical themes. As the account of this peculiarity contained in the *Revue Philosophique* (1905, Nos. 1, 2) * has not been clear enough to prevent a decided misapprehension on the part of Professor Groos, I wish to explain myself better. The tunes or rhythms corresponding to given visible shapes, or rather to their easy and complete perception, are not, as Professor Groos has imagined, *evoked* in me by the sight of those given shapes.

* Reproduced in *Æsthetic Responsiveness*.

They are tunes which happen to be already in my head (I am nearly always aware of a fragment of melody performing itself in me, particularly when moving about) and also other tunes which, on noticing that the spontaneously haunting one (with which I have come armed into the presence of a work of art) somehow impedes my æsthetic seeing, I have purposely rehearsed in my mind until I have found one (often after much trying) which seems to allow or even favour my full visual attention. A great many observations have convinced me without a single exception that—

(1) The tune by which I happen to be haunted and which might be supposed to be connected with my momentary condition is by no means calculated to favour the perception of every work of art upon that occasion, nor in particular that of the work of art with which I happen to begin my day's round.

(2) That the tune, whether brought with me to the gallery or obtained after much trying, which favours or impedes the seeing of a given picture or statue on one day, nearly invariably favours or impedes the seeing of that particular picture or statue on other occasions, although I should not be aware of the fact if my notebook had not recorded it.

(3) That the "expression" of the tune is in no relation whatever with the "subject" or "expression" of the picture or statue, and that the attention which is favoured (or impeded) is one dealing exclusively with the *visual form*, that is, the lines and planes of the general composition and the particular quality—the *graphic* quality—of the lines along which the eye can travel, whether these coincide or not with the *outlines* of represented objects.

A similar phenomenon has been verified by my pupil, Dr. Waser-Krebs, and, without any methodical observations, to a certain extent by my collaborator, C. Anstruther-Thomson. A similar facilitation of the perception of one given picture during the objective performance (on the piano) of a given piece of music with a corresponding impeding of the perception of another picture was observed upon accidentally in my presence by a painter, who had certainly never heard of my then quite unpublished observations on this subject, and who happened to be listening to music in a room hung with a number of water-colours by different painters. But I have never found any other person to whom this phenomenon was known, nor any person who would take the trouble to make observations on the subject; and it can probably only be verified by individuals who are, like myself, most often accompanied by some remembered fragment of melody.

I mention this idiosyncrasy because the existence of characteristics of *tempo*, rhythm, and accent, of something corresponding to the muscular *span* of a musical interval* common to given visible and given audible patterns may possibly represent in my case the existence of respiratory and equilibratory as well as muscular accompaniments to the only sensations of adjustment of which I am conscious during visual perception, namely, adjustments in or about the eyes.

And here I wish to quote a passage from Professor

* A very musical friend, telling me how all her impressions tend to "translate themselves" (*i.e.*, find accompanying equivalents) into musical sounds, mentions that she habitually estimates distances, when walking about, in musical intervals, *which she bears internally*.

Groos's recent essay, because it represents the result of self-observation entirely uninfluenced, I believe, by the experiments and theories contained in *Beauty and Ugliness*.

"As already suggested, the explanation of the emotional effects (of æsthetic contemplation) does not require that we should base it principally upon such emotional 'values' as are peculiar to the *mimetic* muscular adaptations above mentioned. It is probably far more important (in this matter) that such muscular adaptations constitute the means by which the (already existing) excitement is propagated to the Inner portions (German: *ins Innere*, doubtful whether in sense of *visceral* or cerebral), until, particularly in the field of visceral sensations, this excitement produces those emotions which have been previously connected with similar movements of the limbs, of the torso, and the face. This being the case, mere suggestions and analogies of the really executed objective proceedings might suffice. Such suggestions and analogies might awaken the underlying emotional processes in the same manner that, during sleep, a slight muscular tension can produce the liveliest emotions of the dreamer; a phenomenon which Robert Vischer already pointed out (in his *Optische Formgefühl*) as comparable to what I am talking of.

"I have said that mere suggestions and analogies would suffice. This remark leads us to two other mediators of kinæsthetic epiphenomena. . . . Considerable evidence seems to show that in the case of visible objects mimetic-ocular movements are of very essential service. We must not, however, imagine that movements of the eyeball are sufficient to follow adequately the detail of the visible shapes . . . it is probable that imaginal (*reproduktive*) tactile factors conduce in completing the sensorial experience. The eye itself *sweeps* (*wischt*) with suitable movements round the forms of the object, and has no more need to follow its outlines slavishly than a housemaid requires to make an octagonal sweep with her arm when she is wiping an octagonal tray. The close connexions established during infancy between the exploring (*tastenden*) hand and the "following" eye are sufficient for such modifying and enriching of our motor images (*Bewegungsvorstellungen*).

Is such an accompaniment of ocular movement by respiratory or equilibratory adjustments a constant factor in the æsthetic perception of visible

form ? The question remains for the present an open one. For it is necessary to point out that, as was especially stated in *Beauty and Ugliness* (p. 687), this phenomenon is *hidden*, can be watched only in especial experiments like those made by my collaborator as the result of specially trained attention, and is, by the very fact of normal æsthetic attention, being withdrawn from the perceiving subject and fixed upon the perceived object, translated at once into qualities of the visible shape (*Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 546).

“Our attention has become engaged, not with the change in ourselves productive of the sense of height, or roundness, or symmetry, but with the objective external causes of these changes ; and the formula of perception has become, not “*I feel roundness, or height, or symmetry,*” but “this or that object *is* round, or high, or symmetrical.”

There is yet another reason why the absence of knowledge of such alleged phenomena is no argument against their real existence, viz. (and here comes in the importance of the *motor type* which Professor Groos once connected with æsthetic sensitiveness) that there is great difference between individuals with regard to their power and habit of attending to their own movements and still more in their power of localising any attendant sensations ; hence a great difference also in the recollection of localised sensations, and (by a vicious circle) in the recognition of them when, by some chance, they come to the surface. The *localisation* of sensations of muscular strain, etc., depends partly upon a visualisation of one's own body which many people scarcely possess, partly upon some schematic sense of the relation of various sensitive tracts of the body, a probable sense of *unvisualised* geography of one's body, which in

most of us is excessively imperfect, as is shown by the extreme difficulty many of us have in knowing "how" they accomplish the simplest muscular function, and the still greater difficulty of finding the parts which are to accomplish any unusual movement, for instance, to set the vocal parts and to breathe with the full lungs under the order of a master of "voice-production." There is, for instance, a difference *toto cælo* between the power of localisation of muscular processes possessed by my collaborator, C. Anstruther-Thomson, and myself: in my collaborator, skilled from childhood in every kind of bodily activity and possessing every kind of dexterity of hand, an athlete, rider, coachman, dancer, painter, modeller, cutter-out, etc. etc., there is a constant interest in locomotion and manipulation as such, a thinking in terms of *bodily movement*; in myself, neither facility nor training in bodily activities, incapacity of learning a piece of music except by ear or eye, incapacity of learning (despite rather remarkable visual memory) to draw; conscious life concentrated, so to speak, on the eye and the literary faculties, translation of everything into visual images and into words; and moreover, as before remarked, liability to very frequent sense of cardiac changes such as must swamp other organic sensations by their insistence and their rhythmical quality. Now consider that the "motor subject" is, very probably, an imperfect visualiser and deficient in the habit of turning experience into words, while the *visualiser* and the *verbaliser* (who could visualise the parts where they feel movement and store up and communicate experience in words) are probably deficient in observation and storage of muscular experiences;

consider all this and you will understand why it will always be difficult to obtain information about phenomena, which, if they exist, are normally subconscious and, by the very nature of æsthetic perception, are translated into qualities attributed to the visible objects, qualities thought of as existing *outside* ourselves, and for which we have as little the habit of looking inside our bodies as we have the habit of looking for the colour red in our eye, the middle *la* of the violin in our ear, or the smell of a flower in our nose.

But although I thus insist that absence or insufficiency of testimony to the existence of the bodily accompaniments (or partial constituents) of visual shape perception does not in the least militate against their real and constant existence, I desire to make it clear that I do not think we have a right to accept their real existence, still less to make it (as I was guilty of doing in *Beauty and Ugliness*) the basis of explanation, unless we obtain evidence of a kind totally different to that of any introspection. And about this matter I found all my hopes upon objective investigations such as can be carried on by physiologists and psycho-physical experimenters. It seems to me that it ought to be possible to invent some graphic apparatus which should register any bodily alterations which may attend, not the simple (and quite artificial) states of æsthetic perception studied (to no purpose that I can see) by men like Fechner, but the bodily alterations—changes in heart action, respiration, contraction, and in muscular tension (if possible) in the organs and equilibrium, during normal æsthetic experiences (say repeated visits to galleries and monuments or magic lantern exhibitions) of whose “intellectual” and

"emotional" sides the subject of experiment should keep a record; so that we should know, by a perfectly automatic process, not what the subject of experiment *felt to be going on in his body* while he looked at works of art, but what actually *was* going on in that body at moments when the very existence of his body was forgotten in the intensity of æsthetic attention. For, after all, in attempting to explain variations in æsthetic consciousness by alterations in bodily processes, we must surely suppose that what exists in consciousness is not the knowledge (*knowledge* which is itself a psychological fact!) of bodily processes in themselves, but some sort of translation or transmutation thereof into—well, into those mysterious things which we can only, for the moment, call *modes of consciousness*, and among which exist those very terms, "knowledge," "localisation," "sensation," etc. etc., which alone tell us of our bodily existence; for we are in a vicious circle: we can know our bodily states only in, or through, or by, what we call our mental ones.*

* Titchener, *Feeling and Attention*, p. 292:

"Affective experience is the obscure, indiscriminable correlate of a medley of widely diffused excitatory processes. The excitatory processes will report the 'tone' of the bodily systems from which they proceed, and the report will vary, and can only vary, between 'good' and 'bad.' At this point, of course, the theory takes account of 'mixed feelings' . . . and lastly, the theory explains the introspective resemblance between affections and organic sensations. Genetically, the two sets of processes are near akin, and it is natural that they should be intimately blended in experience. . . . It seems to me that it is better policy to look at the affective processes (*i.e.* pleasure-pain) in the manner here outlined, than to think of them as apperceptive reactions, or as centrally aroused concomitant sensations, or as indices of the state of nutrition of the cerebral cortex, or as symptoms of the readiness of central discharge. But every one cannot be right; and where our positive knowledge is practically *nil*, there is no disgrace in being wrong. . . . Let

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I shall now attempt to define my own present attitude towards the three hypotheses dealt with in the foregoing pages.

I will begin with Inner Mimicry—in order to dismiss it. Not because the phenomena it alleges are unverified, since they are, on the contrary, those whose existence reposes upon the greatest amount of evidence. But because, as I have endeavoured to show, only one of the two kinds of so-called *Nachahmung* or *mimicry* can be applied to explain our interest in and our likings and dislikings in the matter of mere visible shapes as such, namely, such *mimicry*, such actual movements or muscular sensations as *follow the movements of the eye*, and correspond to peculiarities (height, breadth, depth, bilateralness, symmetry, etc. etc.) of the shapes as such and correspond also to characteristics (slackness, tension, swiftness, weightiness, lightness, etc.) which we attribute to lines and shapes *absolutely independent of what objects or movements these lines and shapes are intended to suggest to our mind*.

As regards the other kind of actual movements or muscular sensations provoked by the thought of such represented objects or actions, such as prehensile and locomotor sensations of the sort alluded to by Mr. Berenson and by Professor Groos in part of his evidence, these, or the mental states which produce or are produced by them, no doubt play a part, perhaps an important part, in the excessively complex and varying group of phenomena connected with works of art. But although they may enhance or diminish, although they may influence in a dozen ways the output of our æsthetic attention and its us take it as agreed that affection is an independent mental process, inherently obscure, and evincing a qualitative duality."

pleasurable or painful, its "emotional," effects, their origin is in an act of recognition of what the visible shapes resemble or suggest, and their existence cannot explain preferences for peculiarities in those shapes independent of any such act of recognition. I am the first to admit that "æsthetic pleasure," or, as I should prefer to call it, "artistic pleasure," contains intellectual, moral, dramatic, and many other important factors besides the factor of perception of visible form. But these I wish to keep out of the present discussion, which is the same as that which I had previously headed with the words, expressive of the intrinsic qualities of *form, Beauty and Ugliness*.

The other half of the alleged mimetic movements and muscular sensations is directly connected with the hypothesis that the agreeable or disagreeable effect of certain shapes is due to their perception being accompanied by alterations in the breathing and the balance and in whatever vital functions may be intimately connected with these. And here again I wish to put in a proviso, namely, that I am as deeply persuaded as any one of the pleasure and displeasure due to mere perception of visible shape being enormously heightened by all manner of organic resonances which are intrinsically dependent on totally different functions (Mr. Santayana has pointed out the increase of æsthetic sensitiveness connected with sexual development). Indeed I think it is conceivable, though not probable, that the *central* æsthetic phenomena of form-preference and aversion may owe nine-tenths of its emotional quality to organic resonances * connected, by some

* Titchener, *Feeling and Attention* (1908), p. 159:

"Now I personally believe that the organic sensations play an

grouping of functions, with the mental characteristics, perhaps the muscular accompaniments of the states of mere "preference" and "aversion" as such, and that the "poignancy" of certain æsthetic experiences may be due rather to a psychical (or perhaps a physical) gesture of *seeking, grasping, clinging to*, what we have already preferred than to the act of preference itself. But that act of æsthetic preference, even if we imagine it to have but little emotional quality of its own, would remain to be accounted for, and the hypotheses brought forward by C. Anstruther-Thomson and myself in *Beauty and Ugliness* all bear upon alleged or possible concomitants, intrinsic and constant, of form-perception in itself, and not upon any secondary and connected phenomena of dramatic mimicry and organic "radiation" by which æsthetic form-preference may or may not be complicated.

As regards, therefore, this central æsthetic phenomenon of visual form-preference, there arises the question: * Is the act of ocular perception of shape accompanied by (1) muscular adaptations other

important part, not only in feeling and emotion, but in many other departments of the mental life: in the formation of sensory judgments, in the mechanism of memory and recognition, in motives to action, in the primary perception of the self. . . . Well! I believe that organic sensations are responsible for the dimensions of excitement-depression and tension-relaxation. . . . When I observe a difference of pleasantness-unpleasantness in everyday life—a difference on the level of the sense-feeling—I seem to find a reason for it in concomitant organic sensations.

* Dr. Legowski, a pupil of Külpe's who has (*Beiträge zur experimentellen Ästhetik*, 1908) recorded a most interesting series of experiments with simple geometrical figures, considers that "the personal participation (*Miterleben*) in suggested processes (*i.e.* mimetic interpretation of geometric shapes—V. L.) depended upon the setting up of instantaneous organic sensations and movement-impulses."

than those of the eye itself ; and (2) by adjustments in the functions of respiration and equilibrium, and other consequent organic changes ? In other words, are the bodily phenomena described in *Beauty and Ugliness* and the cognate bodily phenomena described in Professor Groos's recent article on *Ästhetische Miterleben, the cause, or the result*, of the æsthetic preference for certain lines and shapes ?

This question remains open, and, after considerable fluctuation of opinion on the subject, I confess that I am at present in absolute uncertainty, and that it seems to me that this matter of the bodily origin or bodily results of the psychic act of æsthetic form-preference requires to be submitted not only to much and rigorously compared introspection, but even more to physiological or psycho-physical scrutiny. This question is interdependent with the Lange-James hypothesis in general ; and, while the hypothesis of a connexion of body and soul in the æsthetic phenomenon will share whatever fate is reserved for the Lange-James hypothesis, that hypothesis may, I think, be ultimately accepted or rejected largely as a result of investigations of the æsthetic phenomenon. This is, I think, a question less of æsthetics than of psychology, or rather psycho-physiology. But putting aside all such questions of the parallelism or perhaps the dovetailing of "bodily" and "mental" processes, there remains the question of our interest in visible shapes for their own sake and of our satisfaction and dissatisfaction, and the explanation thereof by the hypothesis of the attribution of our own modes of dynamic experience ("motor ideas" as distinguished from "muscular processes") to the shapes whose perception is a result not merely of the bodily

activity of our eyes, but of the "mental" (perhaps ultimately bodily) activities of measuring, comparing, combining of the visual data; and is accompanied by the reviviscence of motor experience as distinguished from muscular sensations in what we call our "mind."

Such a hypothesis as this—in many respects answering * to the psychological nucleus round which Professor Lipps has spun the metaphysical phraseology of his *Einfühlung*—I wish once more to accept as the only one which tackles the central problem of æsthetics and does so in accordance with the facts and theories of modern mental science.

Such are the hypotheses contained in that essay on *Beauty and Ugliness*, the amplification and correction of whose facts and theories will continue to afford work to my collaborator and myself, and will, I

* Although this book is already in the printer's hands, I cannot refuse myself the satisfaction of quoting Professor Külpe's summing up of the results of some of Stratton's experiments (*Gegenwärtige Stand der Experimentellen Ästhetik*, 1907), because I find in it the corroboration of my own views, not only by Mr. Stratton, but by Professor Külpe himself:

"We must therefore regard the æsthetic object only as a psychic (*geistig*) or central creation. It depends far more upon attention and fancy, active comprehension and sympathy, than upon bodily sensations. The thought of Life and Life's forces, of unifying laws and self-enclosing wholes, Empathy and the love of participating in co-ordinated activity—these are the æsthetic appreciation of spatial forms. The sensations which we experience in mimicking the seen shapes (*das Gesehene*) are only subsidiary means of making the impression more personal and more lively. They may be compared to the drums and cymbals of an orchestra. It is very satisfactory," adds Professor Külpe, "to find these views more especially in the case of an American investigator."

I may therefore accept them as Professor Külpe's own views, and point out that they really agree both with Lipps's hypothesis and with Professor Groos's present attitude.

trust, be carried on by younger æstheticians who may profit, not only by whatever we have achieved, but by the very mistakes we have committed.

APPENDIX TO "THE CENTRAL PROBLEM"

I

Quotations from Hugo Münsterberg, *The Principles of Art Education* (New York, 1905), p. 82 *et seq.* :

"Every curve or line or space division is thus psychologically a system of eye-movement sensations. Is this enough to explain why certain combinations or divisions of lines and spaces are agreeable or disagreeable? Certainly not. . . . The motor impulse of the brain may radiate to other muscle groups of our organism. The light points on the right may stir up not only the eye muscles to move our eyes to the right, but may excite our whole organism to turn to the right side, extend the arms in that direction, to grasp with the hands for the object. The brain mechanism for this transmission of stimulation into bodily action does exist and must exist, for it is clearly the condition for the local adjustment of our actions in practical life. Whenever one object in the field of vision demands our practical action, perhaps our grasp of it, the locally related system of movement-impulses is brought about through the optical impression. The object high in the field of vision turns our whole body upwards, the low object downwards.

"Now there are three possibilities, three cases, which we can clearly separate theoretically, although practically no sharp demarcation line exists, and endlessly many combinations and transmissions between the three schemes are found. The first case is that in which the motor impulse to the body finds the organism engaged in other activities under the control of more vivid impressions or ideas or thoughts. The new excitement is thus inhibited; that is, the eyes follow the outlines of the visual objects, but the body as a whole remains unmoved. That is, of course, the most frequent case. We see in every instant plenty of forms, but they do not engage our organism outside of the eyeballs, and the result is that the forms are merely local distances and directions. The second case is that in which the objects in the visual field demand from us an action; whether we approach the thing or escape from it, whether we change

it in one way or another is, of course, determined by the qualities of the object, but the general local adjustment depends necessarily upon its local forms ; we grasp the thing by its handle, we put the foot to the side-walk, etc. . . . In this second case the optical impression does produce a bodily movement, but the corresponding movement sensation is felt as a state of one's own personality, as indication of the subjective reaction. We perceive the thing and we perceive ourselves as performing the action. . . . We may say in general : whenever the given optical impression connects itself with the idea of a future effect or change, the resulting motor impulse is felt and interpreted as our own activity, directed towards the future end. But a third case is possible. The optical impression, as it is at present and for itself alone, may absorb our mind ; then the motor impulse to the organism will discharge itself and lead to localised tensions and movement sensations. Here the impulse is not, as in our first case, checked by motions in the interest of other objects, for the presupposition was that one object alone filled our mind. On the other hand, the impulse cannot now lead to a practical action, as in our second case, for we saw that every practical action involves the idea of an end to be reached ; thus leading beyond the present impression which, according to the presupposition, fills the whole mind. The suppression and inhibition of the idea of practical future end thus creates a suppression of the real external movement, an effect which is produced in the organism by an innervation of the antagonistic muscles. That which the motor impulse produces is thus not an actual movement, but a system of tensions and contractions which gives us subjective feelings of strain, of effort, of tension, of direction, of movement-intention. But further, we have assumed that nothing beyond the idea of the optical impression was to be in our mind ; thus we are not thinking of ourselves as objects, as empirical personalities ; every thought concerning ourselves and our actions would lead us away and would link the visual impression with something else. (A)* *The result must be that the feelings of strain and impulse which go on in ourselves are not projected into our body, but into the visual impression ; just as the optical sensations were all the time joining themselves with the movement sensations of the eye muscle, so, in this case, optical sensations and eye-muscle sensations are fusing with sensations of bodily tension, and while the*

* This letter (A) is intended to draw the reader's attention to similarity between the passages thus marked and my own words in *The Central Problem*, p. 105, and *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, p. 334. Cf. also p. 353.

muscle-sensations of the eyes give the local values and distance relations to the light-impressions and thus build up ideas of geometrical forms, *these sensations of impulse and strain give to the optical forms an element of force and energy. We ourselves are contracting our muscles, but we feel as if the lines were pulling and piercing, bending and lifting, pressing down and pushing up; in short, as soon as the visual impression is really isolated, and all other ideas really excluded, then the motor impulses do not awake actions which are taken as actions of ourselves, but feelings of energy which are taken as energies of the visual forms and lines . . . in the æsthetic apperception . . . the lines mean energies, while in every practical relation or scientific apperception the lines mean distances only.*

"But we can go further. If the energies which we feel in the lines are external projections of our own energies, we understand the psychological reasons why certain combinations of lines please us and others do not. . . . They ought to be such that they correspond to the natural energies of our own organism and represent the harmony of our own muscular functions, because every interference with the natural innervations of our system would turn our attention to our own body and would destroy thus the isolation; the movement impulses would appear again as states of ourselves. For instance, we are symmetrical beings, our natural movement tendencies are equally distributed to the right and to the left; the result is that we demand from the play of lines that they balance each other. On the other hand, our organism is not symmetrical as to the upper and lower half; we feel in our muscular energies that our lower part has to give us stability, while the upper half has the free mobility of action; the result is that we do not want a vertical symmetry in the energies of our optical forms; they, too, must show the stability in the lower, the freedom and ease in the upper part. In every case the interest, and thus the beauty, must grow with the complexity of energies involved; the bilateral balance of rigid geometrical symmetry is thus less interesting than the balance of unequal combinations of lines where, for instance, the length of the lines on one side is balanced by the strangeness of the curves or by the outward bending of the line, or by the heaviness of the line combination on the other. *The richer and more manifold the motor impulses which reflect in our consciousness, the higher is the æsthetical value of the form, but even the simple symmetrical design is completely beautiful because it corresponds, by the energies which its lines express, completely to the energies of our own personality. . . .* The optical impressions of the framing lines work as stimuli for motor impulses to push us towards the centre; they indicate the regions beyond which we must not move, and this motor influence, exerted from all

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sides at the same time, must *concentrate our whole motor energy* to the centre, so that every movement-impulse gets a reinforcement from its nearness to the centre, etc. . . . *There is no form and no combination of lines whose formal beauty cannot be understood psychologically by their correspondence with the natural motor energies of our body.* But we must never forget that all this is true merely for the one case in which the optical impression is the only idea which *fills our mind in complete isolation*; as soon as we connect the impression with ideas which lead beyond it, the motor *reaction becomes interpreted as our activity and not as energy of the lines* . . . simply because in such a case the lines (in a geographical map) do not come in question for their own account."

As Professor Münsterberg mentions, in answer to a *questionnaire* (similar to that answered as above quoted by Professor Groos), that such questions could be answered only "on the basis of careful experimental analysis," it seems probable that the above remarkable sentences are also the result of much personal investigation. But even if I were mistaken in this inference from Professor Münsterberg's letter, and if the passages quoted should prove to be mere restatements in psycho-physiological terms of statements made (independently of one another) in Lipps's *Raumästhetik* and in my own *Beauty and Ugliness*, it seems to me that even the mere adoption of these notions by one of the most eminent psycho-physical investigators would constitute a most important confirmation of their scientific value.

II

Quotations from Titchener, *Psychology of Feeling and Attention* (Macmillan, 1908), p. 262 :

"Whenever in the state of attention two stimuli are given simultaneously or in immediate succession, they form a connected whole."

Titchener, *Feeling and Attention*, p. 313 :

"We may assume that attention, in its beginnings, was a definitely determined reaction, sensory and motor both, upon a single stimulus. As sense organs multiplied, two or more disparate stimuli might, each in its own right, claim the organism's attention; here, in sensory and the conflict of motor attitudes, we should have the birth of active attention. When, later on, image supervened upon sensation, *conflict and rivalry were largely transferred to the field of ideas*, and we find in consequence that separation of the receptive, elaborative, and executive attitudes, of which I spoke just now."

I have italicised a sentence of Professor Titchener's because it has reference to Lipps's and my own view of Empathy.

Titchener, *Thought Processes*, p. 20 :

"As recently as 1904 I was not sure whether or not I possessed free kinæsthetic images. I could not decide whether my kinæsthetic memories were imaginal, or whether they involved an actual re-statement in weaker form of the original sensations. . . . I had hardly recorded my difficulty when the criterion was found . . . it may be roughly phrased in the statement that the actual movement always brings into play more muscles than are necessary, while ideal movement is confined to the precise group of muscles concerned. You will notice the difference at once—provided you have kinæsthetic images—if you compare an actual nod of the head with the mental nod that signifies assent to an argument, or the actual frown and the wrinkling of the forehead with the mental frown that signifies perplexity. The sensed nod and frown are coarse and rough in outline ; the imaged nod and frown are cleanly and delicately traced. . . . I seem to find (also) that the kinæsthetic image and the kinæsthetic sensation differ in all essential respects precisely as visual image differs from visual sensation."

It is these *kinæsthetic images* thus distinguished by Professor Titchener from kinæsthetic *sensations* which probably underlie, in my opinion, the phenomenon of formal-dynamic empathy.

III

THE WÜRZBURG LABORATORY EXPERIMENTS

Emma von Ritoók, *Zur Analyse des Ästhetischen Wirkung*, in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, V. Band, Hefte 3 und 4, 1910. Fräulein von Ritoók's admirable analysis and tabulation of æsthetical experiments (made with magic lantern) in Professor Külpe's laboratory and on himself and nine of his students, contains some suggestive evidence and some important generalisations on *Einfühlung*, *Nachahmung*, and *kinæsthetic sensations*, although, as her paper is a survey of all the psychological data connected with artistic impressions, it would be desirable to analyse the whole mass of answers from my point of view, instead of examining only the fragments given by Fräulein von Ritoók and placed under headings of her own.

In the first place, Fräulein von Ritoók divides Empathy (*Einfühlung*) into *subjective* and *objective*, or rather objective and subjective, according as the *mode of being* is merely attributed to the visible form

or recognised object or is experienced secondarily by the subject of the experiment; and this implies that the Empathy I am studying in explanation of our preference in the domain of mere form, is not sufficiently separated, for the purposes of my study, from the Empathy of a human or dramatic kind which attributes our *emotional* experience to the person or thing *recognised as represented by those forms*. Making this reservation, I think it useful to quote Fräulein von Ritoók's second paper, p. 524: "It became evident that the motor reaction does not invariably stand in causal relation to *Einführung*. In the case of 'motor subjects' (of experiment) this motor reaction served to help out the insufficient indication of the expressive movement (*i.e.* represented expressive movement—V. L.). Where there was greater artistic habit the motor reaction had not this importance, as in these cases a foreshortening or a more complicated attitude was understood without mimicry." This generalisation of Fräulein von Ritoók's would therefore, by analogy, suggest that the attribution of modes of motion and energy to visible forms, what I call *purely æsthetic Empathy*, can exist *without* the accompaniment of motor reactions, and that such locomotor processes (whether actually externalised or merely felt) may be a means of helping out, elucidating, or emphasising insufficiently developed æsthetic empathy, *i.e.* the empathy which makes us describe lines and planes in terms of movement and volition. This is borne out by the fact that Fräulein von Ritoók's Experimental Subject No. II., a person of quite exceptionally *formal-æsthetic* interest, never mentions any kind of kinæsthetic sensations or even refers to such a thing as "following the lines": his accounts of the works of art exhibited and of his feelings about them are always in terms of the linear and plastic relations (composition) of the work itself. The only reference to *his own* activity consists in the remark that he is "the whole time busy trying to bring one of the figures of the picture more forward." On the other hand, Experimental Subject No. III. speaks of "a contrast of directions, the mouth (*i.e.* in the picture) pulled downwards, the eyes upwards, which has a certain charm"; also of "very distinct sensation (*Empfindung*) of something gay, free, of something which *opens upwards*." . . . "I go down with my glance" . . . "contrast with the height. I have objective empathy." Again, "First impression of a braced (Knapp) attitude; followed the line upwards right and left—I projected the involuntarily produced (motor?) representations into the Figure. . . ." Also, in a very charming æsthetico-sentimental description of the *Diadumenos* this person says, "alternate attention to the *line* and to the suggested action. . . . There is a certain amount of kinæsthetic representa-

tion as if one inclined one's body in a similar way, a kind of a faint *promise* or gentle consolation in it."

Now it is this Experimental Subject No. III. who volunteers the opinion: "What I consider the principal point (*i.e.* in a work of art—V. L.) is the *subordination of the artistic means to the thing intended to be represented*," a remark which shows, to say the least of it, a minor degree of *æsthetic empathy*, if *æsthetic empathy* can be measured by interest in form.

Another Experimental Subject (No. VIII.) tells us, speaking of a lantern-projection of the Parthenon Horsemen: "Much pleased. A feeling all over my body like intensified organic sensations, a feeling of delight, perhaps also bodily, but so vague that I can't be sure. This first impression was produced by the lines. How lightly, naturally, one of the riders sits!" But this same Experimental Subject No. VIII. shows himself unable to take any satisfaction in the mere form and composition of Holbein's *Dead Christ*, begins his account with "A terror as of something dreadful . . ." and winds up with horror at the suggested thought of people buried alive, and "indignation with the artist who can represent such things." In striking contrast to which combination of *tendency to kinæsthetic sensations* with overwhelming interest in the *thing represented* as distinguished from the visible form, another Experimental Subject (No. VII.) says of the same *Dead Christ* by Holbein, "Experienced nothing except continued enjoyment of the *stretched-outness*, the *flattening-downness*. No sensations of movement. I did not think of Christ at all." An answer showing very vivid *æsthetic empathy* unaccompanied by *kinæsthetic* or *mimetic* sensations.

All this may be pure coincidence; and specially instituted and varied laboratory experiments are required to settle whether it is a purely accidental one; but the coincidence, so far as it goes, confirms my suspicion that *mimetic* and *kinæsthetic* sensations will be found to be *cæteris paribus*, in *inverse* proportion to *æsthetic* or *formal empathy*.

Cæteris paribus. For how do I explain the apparent contradiction offered by the case of my own collaborator, who evidently has both *æsthetic empathy* and *kinæsthetic* and *mimetic* sensations to the highest extent, since it was she who first made me understand the existence of either phenomenon? The case of Miss Anstruther-Thomson is, I am inclined to think, as follows: There is a high degree of *æsthetic*, *i.e.* purely *formal æsthetic*, empathy (its purely formal nature proved by singular indifference to the *subject or thing represented*), developed by artistic training in drawing, modelling, and

analysis of pictorial composition, and by the habit of very long, steady ocular attention ; and this *trained* empathic interest naturally leads to habitual thinking of works of art in terms of movement, of direction, and of every variety of output of energy and attention.

On the other hand, the coincidence of easier contemplation of given works of art, when accompanied by given peculiarities in taking breath, having made a great impression on a mind constantly speculating *on the explanation of form-preferences*, there would have sprung up a habit and a power of attending to, and perhaps producing, any kinæsthetic phenomena which could possibly accompany æsthetic attention. In other words, I think that my collaborator is probably naturally given to mere *objectified* empathy, like Subjects II. and VII. of the Würzburg experiments, but that she has, owing to an accident suggesting a long-desired hypothesis, trained herself by intensive and very prolonged (*minutes* where the Würzburg experiments count *seconds*) introspection into those habits of kinæsthetic and mimetic accompaniments which normally belong to a more rudimentary æsthetic type and are replaced, in cases of developed formal empathy, by the awareness formulated in "the *line does*, the composition *does*, the work of art *does*," etc., instead of the kinæsthetic and mimetic formula, "in looking at the work of art *I do* or *I am*," etc.

The ninth person in the Würzburg experiment has the following answer, which is fairly like the wording of some of my collaborator's experiments. "Very fine ; pleased me much . . . an involuntary following of the lines upwards, and with this following comes immediately the feeling (*Gefühl*) of being raised, of going into heights. I make a movement backwards ; deeper breathing. Saw the lines cross. It was as if I bent backwards, as if I *were in it*, and in the last moment, as if I were in a little corner and followed the beautiful lines." This Experimental Subject No. IX. (who says elsewhere, "I involuntarily mimed the attitude, but the picture did not become more alive," and "I can't bear symmetry") is by no means among the more æsthetic of the Würzburg experimental subjects, but, on the other hand, apparently the most careful in his introspection, and the richest in introspective details. Does not this coincide with my explanation of how my collaborator came to possess so much kinæsthetic and mimetic experience ?

PREFATORY NOTE TO "BEAUTY AND UGLINESS"

THE present condition of æsthetic theory, and even more of æsthetic experiment and observation, making it difficult to foresee what may remain, or become, valuable suggestion for future students, the essay *Beauty and Ugliness* is here reprinted without alteration as it appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, October–November 1897.

The portions contributed by C. Anstruther-Thomson have been enclosed within initialled brackets, and it may be taken for granted that they are still in accordance with her views and experience, any alteration in these being expressly stated in a foot-note similarly initialled and dated 1911.

As regards the remaining portion of the text which was furnished by myself, I have added foot-notes only in correction of detail statements, as the rest of this volume, and particularly the essay entitled *The Central Problem of Æsthetics*, contains sufficient evidence of the modifications in my views since 1897. These modifications, as has been, I trust, made clear to the reader, consist in a different valuation of organic and mimetic sensations in the explanation of the phenomenon of æsthetic form-preference. While admitting the secondary importance of such organic and mimetic sensations, I am more and more inclined to consider that mere

formal-dynamic empathy as such, that is to say, considered as a mere mental phenomenon (whatever its physiological origin or connexions) is the direct, the primary explanation of the æsthetic phenomenon; and, in taking up this position, I have evidently followed along the lines of Lipps's hypothesis of *Einfühlung*. My collaborator, on the contrary, adheres to our original point of view as expressed in the following pages; and in so far she must be grouped rather with Groos and those more recent æstheticians who, like Schmarsow, also lay stress especially upon mimetic processes and organic accompaniments, in fact upon what Professor Groos originally called *Innere Nachahmung*.

Both hypotheses are, as I have constantly repeated, in all probability necessary for a complete and physiologico-psychological explanation, the divergence between my collaborator and myself being concerned with the comparative importance and relative position, primary or secondary, of the two hypotheses. But I wish to point out, as I shall do at more length in my summary, that my own present theory of Æsthetic Empathy is the offspring, or rather only the modified version, of the theory set forth in the following essay, a theory due mainly not only to my collaborator's self-observations, but, as the initials will show, to her own generalisations upon it.

Having spoken of this modification of my attitude, I may mention a merely detail question upon which my collaborator and I have exchanged sides, namely, that mentioned on pp. 221-2 of *Beauty and Ugliness*, concerning the more or less realism of antique sculpture: my collaborator, as is perhaps explicable as a development of her distinct preference for the

hypothesis of organic and mimetic processes, having given up her contention that antique sculpture is radically unrealistic ; while I, on the contrary, have followed Hildebrandt to a recognition of the essential differences which, consisting in a rearrangement of lines and planes and culminating in so-called frontal composition thereof, necessarily separate all great sculpture from the representation of any human models as such, however much those models may themselves be perfected in their tensions and movements.

VERNON LEE

Easter, 1911

BEAUTY AND UGLINESS

BY

VERNON LEE

AND

C. ANSTRUTHER-THOMSON

Reprinted from the *Contemporary Review*, 1897

I

THE facts and theories we are about to exhibit constitute an attempt at giving to the phenomena of æsthetics an explanation different from that furnished by recent mental science, but an explanation more really consonant with the psychological thought of our day.

These facts and theories will allow us to discard, as mere side issues, the doubtful assumptions concerning association of ideas and the play instinct, as well as the various attempts to account for notions of beauty and ugliness by reference to transmuted recognition of utility and inutility, to sexual selection, and to the survival of obsolete primeval activities, and they will also render superfluous all recourse to a mysterious ultimate principle of super-sensuous, not to say supernatural, origin.

For our facts and theories, if at all correct, would establish that the æsthetic phenomenon as a whole is the function which regulates the perception of Form, and that the perception of Form, in visual

cases certainly, and with reference to hearing presumably, implies an active participation of the most important organs of animal life, a constant alteration in vital processes requiring stringent regulation for the benefit of the total organism.

After giving a summary indication of the results of their observation and reflection, and before entering on the detailed exposition of these views, the joint authors of these notes are desirous of premising that their object in publication is considerably to invite criticism, correction, and amplification of their ideas; and this not merely from physiologists and psychologists, but likewise from all persons who possess the faculty and habit of æsthetic introspection. In the present condition of æsthetic problems it would be unreasonable to hope for thorough knowledge of facts or complete validity of hypotheses, so that the following notes are expected to prove only that the subject demands a new method of study, and that its problems admit of new solutions; in other words, that æsthetics, if treated by the method of recent psychology, will be recognised as one of the most important and most suggestive parts of the great science of perception and emotion.

Moreover, before proceeding any further, the joint authors judge that it is well to forestall one of their own conclusions—namely, the validity of the theory advanced by Dr. Lange, by Professor Sergi, and above all by Mr. William James,* according to which various bodily sensations, hitherto regarded as

* Lange, *Les Emotions*, translated by Dumas; Giuseppe Sergi, *Dolore e Piacere*, 1894; William James, *Larger Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 300, 437, 503; vol. ii. pp. 137, 322, 449. Some of these pages contain passages referred to in later parts of these notes.

the after-results of various psychic conditions, are themselves the conditions which we recognise as their supposed causes. In the same way, and with the same initial mystery concerning the fact of recognition, that certain sensations of movement in ourselves can be identified as constituting what we call a state of grief, of joy, of anger, or of tenderness, nay, perhaps, as Mr. James's remarks seem to suggest,* as constituting what we might call the state of *but*, of *and*, of *because*, or of *notwithstanding* ;† so, in the opinion of the authors of this paper, can the subjective states indicated by the objective terms *height*, *breadth*, *depth*, by the more complex terms *round*, *square*, *symmetrical*, *unsymmetrical*, and all their kindred terms, be analysed into more or less distinct knowledge of various and variously localised bodily movements.

This indication of the nature of our more elementary results may serve to introduce a brief account of the method by which they are obtained ; or rather it suggests *ipso facto* what that method must be. This method consists, even like the method evidently employed by Mr. James, in bringing under observation, by means of isolation, diminution of rapidity and repeated repetition and comparison, processes in ourselves which constant repetition and constant connexion with other processes have made so swift, so blurred, and above all so subordinate to an objective synthesis, that we have in our normal condition no clear notion of their

* *Psychology*, vol. i. p. 240 and following. Mr. James indeed calls them excitements of brain parts, but he describes them in motor images.

† Cf. quotations from Titchener in *Central Problem of Æsthetics*, and Appendix thereto.

nature or even of their existence. For it must be remembered that the practical necessities of life tend constantly not merely to shorten every conscious process, but also to direct our attention away from our subjective phenomena to the externalised summing up of our conditions which we conceive as the objective cause of those phenomena. Instead of being conscious as such of changes of condition in our eye and ear, we have long since become incapable—probably utterly incapable—of knowing them otherwise than as objective qualities, colour or pitch, of the non-ego; and similarly, though to a less degree, our attention has become engaged not with the change in ourselves productive of the sense of height, or roundness, or symmetry, but with the objective external causes of these changes; and the formula of perception has become not “I *feel* roundness, or height, or symmetry,” but “this or that object *is* round, or high, or symmetrical.”

It is only the rarer and more sudden alterations of our condition summed up as *emotions* which, on account of this rarity and violence, have preserved obvious traces of their real nature, though even in this case so rooted is the habit of summing up and separately naming the objective factors of what we call mental states that it has required the boldest psychological glance to identify the emotion with what had hitherto been separated as its after-result. It must, therefore, surprise none of our readers if they are unable to recall, and even, perhaps, to elicit, any of the bodily sensations * which we shall enumerate

* I no longer consider such sensations as explaining or even necessarily accompanying the activity of form-perception. Cf. *Æsthetic Empathy*, p. 70, *The Central Problem of Æsthetics*, p. 96 *et. seq.*, and *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, pp. 334, 353.—VERNON LEE (1911).

as accompanying, and, in our opinion, originating, the various perceptions constituting *Form*. Practical or thoughtful habits have diminished, to an extraordinary extent, that full perception of Form which alone can enter into the æsthetic experience, and most of the business of life, and the work of reasoning, is carried on through the mere recognition of a few qualities in objects and the labelling them accordingly for use, so that the majority of persons go through existence with comparatively few thorough realisations of Form, and few occasions for the æsthetic pleasure and displeasure by which such realisation is attended; while, on the other hand, highly æsthetic natures, and artists more particularly, are undergoing a constant training which makes the phenomena of perception so rapid, contemporaneous, and homogeneous as to defy all analysis. Such specially developed persons are in the position of a fencer or pianist of whom we should ask for detailed description of the minute adjustments constituting some perpetually repeated series of movements. Students of psychology may judge of the difficulty of obtaining these data of æsthetics by asking themselves how many men of science and of letters could probably confirm, from their own experience, the details which Fechner and Mr. William James have given us of the psychical sensations accompanying or underlying certain of their intellectual cognitions.

So much for our method. It is necessary, moreover, to limit our subject. The explanation we hope to give refers to the question: *Why should a specific kind of condition, either agreeable or disagreeable, accompany the recognition of those co-related qualities of form called respectively Beauty and*

Ugliness ; and this explanation itself rests upon the explanation of a previous question : *What is the process of perceiving Form, and what portions of our organism participate therein ?*

Now, we all know that visible and audible Form is a grouping of elementary impressions furnished by the senses of sight and hearing ; and we all recognise that these sense impressions are themselves liable to the distinction of agreeable and disagreeable, in common parlance, beautiful and ugly. In so far, therefore, as these sense impressions enter into the perception of Form, there is given to Form a quality of agreeableness or disagreeableness due to its elementary constituents ; and this emotional quality of sense impression has often been made to explain in large measure the agreeable or disagreeable quality of our æsthetic experiences. But this explanation has invariably broken down (many far-fetched items being used to fill up the gap) because it is a matter of universal experience that a sense impression, the quality, for instance, of a colour or of a sound, exists quite separately from that of the Form into which it enters ; and that elementary visual or audible qualities of undoubted beauty may enter into a Form which is nevertheless admitted to be ugly, and even *vice versa* ; nay, that the chief qualities of the Form, its beauty or ugliness, may remain unaltered despite a change in its constituent sense elements, provided the relations of those constituent sense elements remain unaltered ; for instance, that the same pattern may exist in red, orange, and white, or in blue, violet, and white ; or the same musical phrase preserve its identity despite a change in pitch, let alone a change in *timbre*, so that we recognise it and are pleased or displeased by

what we call its beauty or ugliness. *There is, therefore, a specific quality which may be agreeable or disagreeable in certain facts of relation which, united, constitute Form.* And it is into the reason for the various qualities of Form, or, in other words, for the various conditions produced in us by various arrangements of the possible relations of sense impressions, that we are about to explore. We shall exclude from consideration the peculiarities of more elementary sense impressions, first, because all that is known of the structure and function of the special sense organs seems sufficient explanation of the agreeable or disagreeable nature of these impressions;* whereas, on the contrary, the pleasantness or unpleasantness of Form has never been properly accounted for. And, secondly, because while the elementary impressions of the eye and ear are in no way more connected with the creative power of man and with the higher problems of man's soul than the impressions of taste and smell, the problem of Form is at once the problem of art and the problem also of perception. It is therefore to Form, to its reasons, and to its effects that the joint authors of these notes would limit the meaning of the æsthetic phenomenon.

II

And now let us proceed to examine what happens, apart from the stimulation of the special sense organ, when we perceive visual Form—that is to say, what phenomena, besides the mere sense impressions, can

* I must apologise to all readers versed in psychology for this cocksureness of extreme ignorance.—V. L. (1911).

be detected in ourselves as the raw materials of an æsthetic cognition.

* [The object of perception shall be this chair. It is about four feet six inches high, an oblong about half as wide as its height. It has curved arms, rather a high square seat and a square panel on the back. The two top corners reach some inches higher than the panel and are terminated by carved foliated clumps. While seeing† this chair, there happen movements of the two eyes, of the head, and of the thorax, and balancing movements in the back, all of which we proceed to detail, following the attention (whatever the attention may be) which accompanies these movements. The chair is a bilateral object, so the two eyes are equally active. They meet the two legs of the chair at the ground and run up both sides simultaneously. There is a feeling as if the width of the chair were pulling the two eyes wide apart during this process of following the upward line of the chair. Arrived at the top the eyes seem no longer pulled apart; on the contrary, they converge inward along the top of the chair, until, having arrived at the middle thereof, they cease focusing the chair. Meanwhile the movements of the eyes seem to have been followed by the breath. The bilateralness of the object seems to have put both lungs into play. There has been a feeling of the two sides of the chest making

* All the parts of this essay contributed, like the present, by C. Anstruther-Thomson, will be enclosed between initialled brackets.

† It may be well to state that I was originally trained as a painter, and I have since acquired a power of long and concentrated attention in looking at works of art, as such. I do not imagine that what is described in the text could be observed by persons not similarly trained, although I believe that a similar training would result in other persons becoming aware of similar facts.—C. A.-T. (1911).

a sort of pull apart ; the breath has been begun low down and raised on both sides of the chest ; a slight contraction of the chest seems to accompany the eyes as they move along the top of the chair till they got to the middle ; then, when the eyes ceased focusing the chair, the breath was exhaled.

These movements of the eye and of the breath were accompanied by alterations in the equilibrium of various parts of the body. At the beginning the feet were pressed hard on the ground in involuntary imitation of the front legs of the chair, and the body was stretched upwards. At the moment that the eyes reached the top of the chair and moved inwards along the line of the top, the tension of the body ceased going upwards and the balance seemed swung along the top of the chair towards the right. At this point the movements of balance seemed to help out those of the eyes and the breath ; for, during the time of expiration, the eyes do not focus the chair so completely. During this partial interruption in the form-perceiving movements of the eyes and the breath, the balance seemed to alter, and the weight to swing across the top of the chair downwards to the right side till it seemed to land in the right foot. The weight seemed thus to have followed the oblong shape of the chair going up the *left* * side, swinging across the top and then descend-

* Cf. *Central Problem*. "I hope to have distinguished between such dramatic mimicry . . . and those imaginary or incipient or actualised movements to which my collaborator and myself referred whenever, throughout *Beauty and Ugliness*, we applied the fatally misleading word miming to the 'lifting up' and 'pressing down,' the 'gripping of the ground,' the 'balancing' of symmetrical sides of the mere shapes of pottery, furniture, architecture, and accepted from common usage the scarcely less misleading word

ing on the right side. All these changes have taken place during one breath, inspiration and expiration, and they have answered to a knowledge of the general shape of the chair.

With the next breath comes the recognition of the chair's details. Recognition of the height of the chair, begun with pressure of both feet on the ground, is accompanied by an upward stretch of the body. This stretch upwards seems suddenly checked by the sight of the heavy clump of ornament on the chair's two top corners; there is a sudden sense of the head being weighed downwards; and the size of the chair seems limited within this pressure and the previous stretch upwards; *the interest seems to concentrate itself within those limits and the height of the chair to be measured off on the body of the spectator.* The width of the chair seems meanwhile again to be felt by a swing of the balance from left to right; the two feelings, being simultaneous, seem to establish a ratio between each other.

Meanwhile, in accompanying the movements connected with height, the breathing seems limited by the limitations of the height; the breath does not rise as high as it can, but follows the rise of the eye to the top of the chair and then changes direction. There seems to be a pull sideways of the thorax, and the breath seems to stretch out in width as the balance swings across and the eyes alter their movement across the chair; then follows the expiration. The breath has thus given, first, a sense of going up, then one of width; and the two senses, begun between an inspiration and an

following as applied to the 'movements of lines' in pictures."—
V. L. (1911).

expiration, do not die out but continue to be felt subsequently.*

The movements of the eyes have been too rapid to be separately felt, and they do not seem to leave any traces behind, *whereas the movements of the breath seem to remain conscious*; and there is a double sensation in one breath of height and width going on in relation to one another. The recognition of the chair's seat is given by the eyes running all the way to the top of the chair, accompanied by the breath as described, after a long inspiration; while, in the next breath's length the eyes run up only as far as the seat, and the expiration takes place about half as soon as the previous time; *by this means, apparently, this second short movement is felt as half the extension of the first.*

The ocular movement across the width of the seat is not accompanied by a stretch of the breath, perhaps because the breath, having stopped short with the eyes, is rather too low down to be stretched very easily. But a shifting of the balance replaces the stretch of the breath, and the lateral movement of the eyes across the seat is accompanied by a change of equilibrium from one foot to the other. It is to be noted that the ocular movements seem

* Karl Groos, *Das ästhetische Miterleben*, p. 177. "In my own case, Inner Mimicry by the organs of respiration and speech does not stand alone in producing feeling, but it certainly stands in the first place. In my case the large movements of inspiration and expiration adapt themselves to the perceived optical or acoustic forms by help of the most varied processes in the larynx and the mouth, processes such as have become familiar to us in 'inner (i.e. silent) speech' and 'inner song.' . . . I am convinced that during intense *Miterleben* (i.e. empathy) we are dealing with real sensations, and that such kinæsthetic sensations are more favourable to the propagation of the excitement than would be mere memory images of movements."—V. L. (1911).

accompanied sometimes by both breathing and balancing movements, and sometimes by one or the other as circumstances make it more comfortable. The shifting of balance usually replaces or ekes out the alterations in the breathing when the latter would produce a disagreeable effort.

We now come to the third dimension. The *bulk* of the chair is much less impressive than its height or its width. But there is a feeling, apart from the ocular adjustment, different from those accompanying what we call height and width underlying the perception of the two arms of the chair : they seem to come forward, and the weight of the body is shifted involuntarily a little backward (away from them) as they are focused. Moreover, the breathing is not the same as during the perception of either height or width. . There is a sense of being able to lean upon the breath in expiration ; altogether there are more changes in the non-ocular movements than the ocular movements would warrant.—C. A.-T.]

This mass of details will show, we think, that the act of perception includes, besides the intellectual recognition which remains as mysterious as ever, elements of bodily alteration far beyond any chemical or muscular change in the eye. It is true that readers to whom the identification of emotional phenomena and of certain senses of relation with bodily phenomena is either unfamiliar or repugnant will object in this case also that the altered breathing, senses of tension, and altered balance enumerated in the foregoing experiment, are not a part of the perception of Form, but a reaction (on the same principle as the thoracic changes said to result from grief) produced by the perception itself. To this

we would answer that the objection takes perception of Form for granted, either as explicable by ocular changes which are insufficient and cerebral changes * of which there is no evidence, or as a generally inexplicable process. [While, on the contrary, although it is of course impossible to establish the identity of these non-ocular adjustments with the factors of form-relations, it is yet possible to prove experimentally that the perception of such relations as height, width, and bulk are impeded by voluntarily contrived bodily adjustments of opposed character, so that we not only perceive Form better by deliberately making these corresponding adjustments of breath, muscles, and balance, but see it much worse by deliberately counteracting them ; † indeed, it seems probable that if we could rid ourselves of all previous form experiences and the consequent recognition, so to speak, by *labelling*, we should not see Form at all.—C. A.-T.]

Various coincidences could be enumerated which point, moreover, to the fact that these adjustments of breathing and balance are the actual physical mechanism ‡ for the perception of Form, the sense

* Here again I can only humbly apologise. The only "insufficiency" was in my own knowledge and modesty.—V. L. (1911).

† To such an extent that if while trying to *visualise* an object with shut eyes we refuse to let ourselves breathe, the act of seeing the form in memory becomes impossible.—C. A.-T. (1897).

‡ Titchener, *Feeling and Attention*, p. 307. "The typical form of attention, if one induces it for purposes of introspection, is voluntary attention. Consciousness in the state of voluntary attention is composed, in part, of 'muskuläre Spannungsempfindungen.' When, then, one seeks to introspect the attentive consciousness, one comes naturally upon these sensations of strain ; they are made focal ; and in the process of their focalisation, a 'feeling of activity' must, on Wundt's view, be struck out. Hence it is impossible to

of relation having for its counterpart a sense of bodily tension. Of these coincidences two seem especially to the purpose. The first consists in the fact that, while the renewal in memory of a sensory impression, a definite colour, tone,* timbre or elementary sweep of the eye seems impossible save through an accidental stimulus and beyond the control of our wishes, the vivid remembrance of the *forms* into which these sensory impressions are grouped, of the relations in space, time, and pitch which they constitute, can be obtained by any person of sufficient visual or musical power, after sufficient familiarity has been gained. Now the sensory apparatus of the eye and ear are outside our control and require stimulations from outside; but the muscular system of the breath and equilibrium is as much in our power as that of the arms and legs. Indeed, it seems likely that the fact of our being able to think in terms of relation, relation spatial, temporal, and perhaps even logical, may be due to introspect the state of voluntary attention without discovering a 'Thätigkeitsgefühl.'"

This remark of Professor Titchener's analogically corroborates me in my suspicion that the part played by breathing (and even bodily tension) in æsthetic introspection may be due not so much to any specifically æsthetic process as to our voluntary attention.—V. L. (1911).

* The revival in memory of a musical tone seems, in our experience, always to be accompanied by a more or less complete adjustment of the vocal parts—in fact, a silent performance of the tone. As regards *timbre*, our own experience limits its reproduction in memory to such qualities of sound as we *could audibly imitate*. It seems more than doubtful whether *two* notes are ever *heard in memory* as absolutely contemporaneous and not in extremely rapid succession merely.—V. L. (1897).

This astounding statement means merely that I happen to be incapable of such harmonic reviviscence. I am simply an imperfect *auditive*. I am not sure about colours.—V. L. (1911).

the accident which has placed the muscular system in our dominion, while the special sense organs have remained outside it.

The other coincidence consists in the fact that, while the sensory satisfactions—those of smell, taste, colour, and timbre—require an interruption, corresponding to a repair in the sensitive special organs, and the large bodily pleasures, of eating, drinking, going to sleep, etc., are due to a want which is deadened by satisfaction, and can recur only after a still longer interval; the pleasure derivable from the perception of Form can continue with great constancy and unintermittence; even as we should expect to find if the pleasures due to Form were dependent upon processes which, instead of being intermittent, like the processes of sleep, food, etc., are as unintermittent as the processes of respiration and equilibrium.

Having given our answer to the question, “What is the mechanism of the perception of Form?” we can now approach the æsthetic problem as such, the question, namely: *Why should the perception of form be accompanied by pleasure or displeasure, and what determines the pleasure in one case and the displeasure in another?*

Few psychological questions have received so many and various answers. A number of them are discussed in the late and much-to-be-regretted Mr. Gurney’s very suggestive *Power of Sound*. The joint authors of these notes would wish to prove to their readers that among all these answers the most satisfactory is due, not to the scientific sagacity of Darwin or Spencer, but to the artistic intuition, the artistic experience of Mr. Ruskin, and would wish to afford an adequate explanation for his dogmatic

statement that "beauty and ugliness are as positive in their nature as physical pleasure and pain." But before proceeding any further we desire to call attention to the attempt at a similar explanation made recently by Professor Sergi; and the more so that our own notions will gain in clearness and, we venture to hope, in efficacy by comparison with his. Professor Sergi, it should be mentioned, entirely shares, thanks apparently to original thought, the hypothesis of Dr. Lange and Mr. William James concerning the identity of the emotional process with those bodily changes which have hitherto been accounted its result; and his interesting book, *Dolore e Piacere*, maintains that æsthetic pleasure, like every other, is a phenomenon, not of the cerebral, but of the organic life of the big viscera—mainly the heart and lungs. Professor Sergi maintains that, owing to the close contact and, so to speak, mixing up of the sensory nerves with the nerves regulating respiration and circulation in certain tracts of the medulla, what we call intellectual conditions and the impressions of the special senses produce alterations in the action of the heart and lungs, which alterations are perceived by us as pleasure or pain, according as they assist or impede the life of the organism.*

* Sergi, writing in 1894, really forestalls all that is crudest and least tenable in the present essay. "Se il colore, la forma e il movimento, tutti insieme riuniti, possono agire sui nostri organi sensori e produrre direttamente ciò che ciascuno di essi produce separatamente, eccitando cioè sensazioni muscolari e viscerali per alterazioni, per quanto lievi, cardiache e respiratorie, il sentimento che ne nasce misto e complesso piacevole ed attraente, è quello che dicesi estetico."—*Dolore e Piacere*, p. 356. I read Sergi's book in the course of the experiments and discussions which resulted in this essay, but I cannot now say with certainty to what extent my views and my collaborator's

Leaving to physiologists to pronounce upon the validity of Professor Sergi's theory of interaction between the various sets of nerves, we must point out that, while explaining the phenomenon of pleasure and pain in general, this theory explains why certain æsthetic experiences should produce the cardiac and respiratory alterations underlying pleasure,* or the cardiac and respiratory alterations underlying pain, only by the old and, as it seems to us, quite inefficient coalition of chemical and mechanical processes of the special organs with intellectual judgments and inherited or acquired associations and prejudices, which has done duty in the essays of Mr. Spencer, the manual of Mr. Grant Allen, and the psychological fantasies of the late M. Guyau. In other words, the special problem of æsthetics has been left behind, however much the general subject of pleasure and pain may have been helped forward.

Now, could we establish that the perception of the relations constituting Form implied the activity not merely of the special sense organs, but also of functions as important to animal life as those of equilibrium and of respiration—of respiration which, with its inevitable companion, circulation, accounts, according to Lange, James, and Sergi, for emotion in general—it would become easy to understand why various perceptions of Form have various emotional qualities, and why, to vary Mr. Ruskin's

were suggested, or merely corroborated by his. I have not opened Sergi since, and had forgotten how explicit he was.—V. L. (1911).

* In his volume on *The Sense of Beauty* (A. and C. Black, 1896), Mr. George Santayana has a paragraph on "breathing related to the sense of beauty," whose important suggestion he has unfortunately not himself followed up.—V. L. (1897).

dictum, beauty and ugliness should be positive in their nature and represent positive physical pleasure and pain. We have experimented so far on form perception as such, independent of any question of agreeable or disagreeable. Let us proceed to watch what bodily changes can be perceived to differentiate one sort of perception from another.

[This series of experiments begins with the sensations accompanying the act of looking at a blank wall, which it is convenient to call a white void. The space in front of us seems to come forward as if to swallow us up. We feel as if our profile were flattened, and as if in some extraordinary way we had lost identity. Our breathing is a mere drawing in and running out again accompanied by a slight disturbance of the heart. Breathing takes place very low down in very short weak breaths, at times barely perceptible. Our temperature is lowered, we feel depressed. Holding the breath produces no optical change.

In the second experiment we look at a blank wall which happens to be terra-cotta-coloured : impossibility of focusing ; the fovea does not seem to play a more active part than the rest of the seeing eye, whereas in looking at objects the eye seems to concentrate the act of seeing on to one point. One feels one's profile flattened. One breathes shorter breaths than in looking at objects ; there is, however, only a very slight disturbance of the heart (much less than in looking at white blank). Breathing or holding one's breath produces no difference in vividness of perception.

From *blankness* we proceed to *confusion*, or, more expressively, from *void* to *chaos* on our journey towards *Form*. One's eye now concentrates and

focuses. There is no longer the sensation of one's face being flattened. One begins to have command over one's expiration ; the breath no longer merely escapes, but issues quite steadily. There is, however, no advantage or disadvantage to perception in breathing or not breathing. Small tracts of *confusion* with spots in them one can focus while one counts two or three, after which one can keep hold of them no longer—the eye has to run about and return. One binds several dots into a sort of group by moving the eyes between them and letting one's balance follow the movements of the eyes.

Rudiments of Form.—Two straight lines meeting (but not crossing) at an acute angle can be seen while following the eye with the breath, but with an uncomfortable sense of sudden contraction ; note that such an angle has a character already of regularity. Two straight lines crossing each other at random and *irregularly* are followed by the eye and the equilibrium, but *not by the breath*. Speaking generally, both *confusion* and *irregular form*, or *irregular rudiment of form*, produce too exasperating a sense, if we attempt to follow the eye's movements along them with the lungs ; these movements of the eyes are generally followed by shifting the equilibrium and moving the head, which processes do not involve the same discomfort as movements of the breath.

A *triangle* one can focus as a whole without moving the eye perpetually about. The thoracic movements come into play, and seem to make three little pinches at the three corners. There is a sense of resistance being offered all round, and of the *chest having something to lean against*.* We have now got

* We purposely give these sensations with the nomenclature

to *complete Form*. And with *Form* we get to the possibility of æsthetic agreeableness or disagreeableness, in other words, of beauty or ugliness. This triangle, un-cubic and isolated, happens not to be remarkably agreeable as form; we have noted that while looking at it there are contractions of the thorax, and that these are rather uncomfortable. Let us hunt about for *Form differentiated as agreeable*. Here is a jar, equally common in antiquity and in modern peasant ware. Looking at this jar one has a specific sense of a *whole*. One's bodily sensations are extraordinarily composed, balanced, co-related in their diversity. To begin with, the feet press on the ground while the eyes fix the base of the jar. Then one accompanies the *lift up*, so to speak, of the body of the jar by a *lift up* of one's own body; and one accompanies by a slight sense of downward pressure of the head the downward pressure of the widened rim on the jar's top.* Meanwhile the jar's equal sides bring both lungs into equal play; the curve outwards of the jar's two sides is simultaneously followed by an *inspiration* as the eyes move up to the jar's widest point. Then *expiration* begins, and the lungs seem slowly to collapse as the curve inward is followed by the eyes, till, the narrow part of the neck being reached, the ocular following of the widened out top provokes a short inspiration. Moreover, the shape of the jar provokes movements of balance, the left curve a shifting on to the left foot, and *vice versa*. A complete and equally

which they suggest. Any attempt at physiological terminology would disturb the perfect sincerity of the experiment.—C. A.-T. (1897).

* For criticism of such descriptions, cf. *The Central Problem*.—V.L. (1911).

distributed set of bodily adjustments has accompanied the ocular sight of the jar ; this *totality* of movements and *harmony* of movements in ourselves answers to the intellectual fact of finding that the jar is a *harmonious whole*.—C. A.-T.]

If such are the adjustments in highly vital processes implied by the perception, the thorough *realisation*, not the mere recognition, of Form, if these adjustments can be thus favourable to the processes in question, it becomes easy to understand that a special instinct should have evolved which forces us to court or to shun those opposite qualities of Form which we call beauty or ugliness. Herein lies the explanation of the definition with which we began these notes—namely, of the æsthetic function as the function regulating perception of Form.

Such a definition would at first sight seem extraordinarily narrow to readers accustomed, as we have all been, to the notion of the play instinct, and accustomed, moreover, to the usual confusion between the æsthetic phenomenon and that special ramification and complication thereof which should properly be called the phenomenon of art. Having been considered rather by anthropologists than by persons of wide æsthetic experience, the æsthetic phenomenon has been supposed to involve the production of some sort of work of art ; and, moreover, a wish for neat classification has even tended to limit the recognition of a work of art or an artistic performance to objects and proceedings independent of practical utility ; hence the excessive attention given to ornament and to dancing, the identification of æsthetic feeling with the impulses of a play instinct, real or supposed, and the wearisome insistence on inutility and disinterestedness as the

chief æsthetic differentia. The careful consideration of the facts we have alleged respecting the connexion of form perception with the great activities of equilibrium, respiration, and circulation, and the consequent division of such perception into that which is favourable and that which is unfavourable to our animal life, will show, as we hope, that so far from narrowing and lowering the importance of the æsthetic instinct, we are really widening and elevating it when we define it as the regulator of Form Perception. For while we refuse it the impulses towards making or doing things (by the old theory) utterly useless in themselves, we attribute to it a selective and coercive power which fashions to its purposes the constructive and expressive impulses of mankind, and selects and rejects with the imperiousness of a great organic function among the experiments and possibilities of experience of daily life; till, from claiming a merely negative influence in the work and the play of existence, it ends, in its highest power, with setting the active impulses of man to work for its sole and single gratification, and to create out of reality a world more consonant with the most deeply organised and most unchanging modes of man's bodily existence. It is not only the superfluous ornament, the practically useless dance or song, which testifies to the power of the æsthetic instinct in primitive man; nor the merely decorative picture, the object of virtue, or the sonata or symphony unaccompanied by words and unconnected with rites, in times of high artistic development. The shape of the jar, the colour and pattern of the mat, the balance of handles, spout, lid, in every useful vessel, the proportion of benches and tables, the cut of garments,

the movements and songs in religious and warlike ceremonies, the choice of metre and rhyme in declarations of love and chronicles of past deeds ; it is all this stringent insistence that necessary objects and actions should obey a law different from that of practical necessity which really teaches us the importance of the æsthetic instinct among rude civilisations of the past and the present ; and it is the perpetual transmutation into works of art of the buildings, records, liturgies, and dramatic shows of higher civilisations which testifies to the same. The æsthetic instinct is never so utterly the master as when art is described as the servant of utility. And, as usual, the deep intuition of Mr. Ruskin has given us the truth, when, answering the "art for art's sake" theories of this age which has learned to dispense with beauty in necessary things, he has declared, in apparent paradox, that no grèat work of art was ever begun without an ulterior object. It is in the cathedral undertaken for religious or civic reasons ; in the fresco or picture intended as an illustration of a story or an aid to devotion ; in the mass, or oratorio, or opera, intended, above everything, to be expressive, that we can see the unflinching selections, the imperious orders and counter-orders of the organic desire for beauty.

In the realm of visual impressions we have watched already the inner processes which have forced the preference for one sort of elementary form rather than another. We desire to follow the same processes in the more complex cases of what is called Art. But before passing from the æsthetic imperative which controls the rudest potter to the æsthetic imperative which sways the architect, the sculptor and the painter ; before continuing to watch the

workings of the æsthetic instinct in connexion with objects on to which it forces our attention, we would wish to point out its power in the negative sense, when it purposely diverts our attention or diminishes it to avoid displeasure. We have already remarked on the tendency to substitute a mere act of recognition, often of only one or two peculiarities, for the real perception of the objects and movements which concern us in daily life, a tendency referable to the mere laziness of the human mind and its refusal to do more than the bare necessary.* The greater part of most men's lives is thus too busy to be, in any sense, æsthetic; more particularly because, as we shall have further opportunities of noticing, the condition of pursuit, of running to a goal, of hurry of any kind is absolutely incompatible, on account of its special bodily adjustments, with the particular kind of bodily adjustment requisite for full perception of Form. But besides this tendency, independent of all questions of pleasure and displeasure, to diminish actual perception of Form, the æsthetic faculty itself very frequently induces us not to realise Form because realisation would happen to be disagreeable. We are alluding to a phenomenon more important though less recognised than the condition of non-perception into which ugly surroundings end by forcing æsthetically sensitive persons, limiting their perception to mere *signs of things*, and resulting in a sort of blindness which explains why, for instance, a Whistler sketch of a dirty London street is scarcely recognised at all. [C. A.-T.—We desire to call attention to the quite neglected fact, which has momentous influence on pictorial composition, that we prefer

* Or to biological economy.—V. L. (1911).

to get our notions of the exterior world, and particularly of what we call landscape, rather when we are moving about than when we are standing still. For our bodily structure is such that standing still brings into consciousness a number of rather uncomfortable tensions, summed up in a vague sense of *not liking it all*, rendering the adjustments necessary for Form perceptions arduous, and hence producing a greater or lesser degree of æsthetic dissatisfaction with objective facts. For when standing still we are conscious of the weight of the head on the neck and the weight of our body at the waist, and very particularly of the pressure of our feet on the floor, the whole resulting in a self-centred condition to which the outer world is foreign. But no sooner do we make a step into the outer world than we are relieved of half our weight by swinging from one foot to the other. Our own locomotion seems, moreover, to modify our feeling of our own shape; instead of being disagreeably conscious of being perpendicular, and rather like a gate-post, we begin as we move forwards (whether on our feet, on horseback, or in a vehicle) to feel rather as if we were *like a streak*, and the faster we move the more *streak-like* do we feel our shape to become. This is due to the fact that, as we move, the foreground rushes to meet us, passing in two streams on each side of our head; and these two streams, flowing continuously past, produce a perceptive adjustment which makes us feel smoothed and elongated into streak-shape as they flow. Our own movement gives us the further illusion that, step by step as we approach them, all high things in the landscape draw themselves up higher and higher, and that step by step as we get nearer the width of

things opens out into greater wideness, and that the ground comes forward and pushes itself under our feet, distance turning into coming nearness. All the three dimensions seem to expand and stretch themselves bigger, growing under our eye all the time as we move. And we, seeing them grow, feel ourselves also to be growing, as if our boundaries were being enlarged. The third dimension, considered as distance,* we see and feel as distinctly as we see and feel height and width, we realise the ground lying flat and stretching away, we see the projection of things (the third dimension as bulk) really bulging forward or reaching backwards. In looking, the eye starts from the foreground and goes straight through into the background, and the scene is realised as a *whole*. This harmonious view of things comes to an end as soon as we stand still ; we

* The reason of our not realising the third dimension as easily as we realise the first and second appears to lie in our not possessing equal bodily facilities for adjusting ourselves to the third dimension. We obtain the sense of height by stretching ourselves taller, and the sense of width by stretching our chest wider ; but, so long as we stand still, we have not to anything the same extent the possibility of stretching ourselves forward. Quadrupeds or babies crawling on the floor probably do realise the third dimension as well as or even better than the two others, because the position of their bodies allows them to stretch forward. But in becoming bipeds, we have lost our equal hold on this dimension, and we get it back normally only when we move about because we then do stretch forward. We shall frequently have to notice how art reinstates the third dimension in a very special manner. Indeed the sense of harmony obtained from architecture, for instance, is due largely to this reinstatement.—C. A.-T. (1897). There is also, and besides an altered ocular adjustment like the one mentioned by Waldemar Conrad (cf. *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, p. 267), a *psychological* addition due to the third dimension being recognised so to speak, ocular, only after an act of recognition, a judgment of what exists or is represented. Cf. also *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, p. 298.—V. L. (1911).

had expected to see the landscape better, but in reality we see it worse. *We suddenly find that we have lost our hold of the third dimension.* Instead of seeing the distance as distant flatness, it begins to look as if painted on a vertical wall. We no longer feel the bulk of the various objects, nor the projections of their different parts; the trees tend to look flat like ferns. We no longer realise the landscape as a whole. The general effect has dropped to bits under our eye, and the bits are all we can quite satisfactorily see. Instead of looking into the landscape from in front, we find it more comfortable to lay our eye first on the background and travel back to the foreground. The ground no longer pushes eagerly under our feet; we soon have only an intellectual conviction of its being solid ground at all. So far as inner sensations go, we feel that our weight, which had been partly handed over to the outer world while we swung along from one foot to the other, has returned in full, and oppresses us at the shoulders and waist. We no longer breathe out with any impetus, and inspiration seems to roll over into expiration without any edge; life feels weaker and shallower, because the speed and volume of our breathing have very much diminished. We are changed beings, and beings changed for the worse; and it takes us some moments to become once more acclimatised to this less complete mode of life.

This analysis of some of the differences—for we shall see anon that there are others—between our mode of perception and accompanying physical conditions when walking and when standing still will exemplify the sort of selection which the æsthetic instinct makes in our perceptions. For, as a fact, our visual memory of things is gained during our

moments of movement. We have no spontaneous knowledge of the world as it looks when we stand in front of it, and the habit of seeing things from a single, motionless point of view is one of the most difficult and wearisome acquisitions of the student of drawing. Children, simple folk (unspoilt by drawing classes), nay, we ourselves when we are quite natural, all feel a vague disappointment at a photograph or realistic drawing of a familiar scene: the landscape or room looked different in our memory.* The æsthetic instinct has, in a way, prevented our registering one-half of our visual experiences, for the sufficient reason that these experiences were not agreeable; and we shall see, when we come to examine the composition of pictures, that the old masters, painting or, at least, composing from memory, have given us in their pictures not the scattered and feeble and fatiguing impressions we should have when standing motionless before the scene represented, but the efficacious, corroborating, and agreeable impressions we are accustomed to while moving about.—C. A.-T.]

* I am now inclined to think that the "walking" perspective in pictures may be explicable, when it exists, by our memory images of landscape being got while going into or towards it; also to the need of making up, by the acuter imaginative activity due to such perspective, for the lapsed sense of activity given by our own locomotion. My own experiments show that in my case stopping is disagreeable when the landscape happens to be one of converging lines, anything of the nature of an avenue or street, but that in looking at interesting hill outlines I require to stop once I have decided upon the best point of view, exactly as happens in my case with statues. A great deal of interior architecture affects me like an avenue, forcing me to walk on; but once I have got the best view, the diagonal one, of nave and aisles, I stop short. This requires to be examined into by collective evidence.—V. L. (1911).

III

[C. A.-T.—The various fine arts are arrangements, spontaneously and unconsciously evolved, for obtaining the maximum of agreeable activity on the part of our perception of Form. But such a maximum does not consist in mere intensity of one particular kind of inner adjustment at one particular moment. We have already seen, in analysing the bodily sensations which accompanied the perception of the jar, that we require, for that pleasantness with which we associate the word Beauty, “a totality of movements and a harmony of movements in ourselves answering to the intellectual fact of finding that the jar is a harmonious whole,” adjustments of bilateral breathing, of equilibrium transferred with regularity from one side to the other, tensions of *lifting up* and *pressing downwards*, as the eyes move along the symmetrical outline of the jar. This agreeable arrangement of agreeable movements* in ourselves, this harmonious total condition of our adjustments, is, moreover, not fugitive; the presence of the work of art, its continuous or renewed perception, enforces the continuance of this agreeable total condition, obliging the simultaneous or

* It is to such passages that Professor Lipps applies particularly scathing criticism.

“There is an obscure point in this theory. The æsthetic impression is a feeling of pleasure. Now, does this feeling *consist* in the bodily sensations, or is it connected with them? . . . Is the feeling of agreeableness different from the bodily sensations themselves, or is it a quality of them?”

While recognising the educative value which Professor Lipps has had in making me clear up my ideas, I would point out that *Der æsthetische Eindruck ist ein Gefühl der Lust* itself involves very analogous confusion of thought.—V. L. (1911).

consecutive repetition of its whole or of its parts, and excluding thereby the possibility of any other mode of being. It is to this latter fact that works of art owe their strange power of ridding us of the sense of the passing of time. The stress of practical existence is forgotten, we are no longer being driven onwards. We are safe and serene in what seems like a little railed-off or mysteriously guarded circle of existence, the circle in reality of our own balanced organic functions, of a mode of life complete and satisfactory in itself.

The simplest of these artificial arrangements for inducing and prolonging such perceptive adjustments as give the emotion of æsthetic pleasure is pattern. The rudiments of its power depend upon the fact that any visible fretting of a surface gives the eye, so to speak, something to lay hold of, and thereby provokes some of the adjustments which accompany the eye's movements.* One's eye, for instance, moves slower and more deliberately across a square foot of wicker-work than over a square foot of brown paper, and the movements are steadier and more appreciable. To this quality of mere complexity of surface, pattern adds by its regularity the power of compelling the eye and the breath to move at an even and unbroken pace. Even the simplest, therefore, of the patterns ever used have a power akin to that of march music, for they compel our organism to a regular rhythmical mode of being. These two qualities of making the movements of eye and breath deliberate and making them rhythmical are common to the most rudimentary as well as to the most complicated pattern.


* Cf. Kostyleff on eye adjustments in *Central Problem*, p. 9, foot-note.—V. L. (1911).

For an example of the action of pattern let us take the so-called Greek honeysuckle. As soon as the eye falls upon the pattern, we are conscious of being *bilateral*, for the two equal sides of the pattern call both lungs into equal play.* With the sense of being bilateral goes a sense of expansion, and the two unite into a vague feeling of harmony, which is recognised as unusual but at the same time as *eminently natural*. We catch ourselves considering the pattern as in some way the most natural arrangement in the room, although of course we are intellectually aware of its being extremely artificial. This strange sense of something being thus natural and normal because it suits the constitution of the spectator is one of the most important differentia of the æsthetic phenomenon, and a chief ingredient in all artistic emotions.

As the eyes move upwards along the pattern, the two lungs draw in a long breath and there comes a slight sensation of the sides of the thorax being stretched; this sensation of width continues while the breath moves upwards, giving us simultaneously the sense of bilateral width and of height, the proportion between which being very pleasant to breathe, accounts for a sense of well-being while looking at the pattern. If we try to reproduce these sensations of harmony while looking at the *irregular shapes* in the room, we are met by impossibility; we can no longer breathe equally on both sides, the very sense of having two lungs is gone, and with it the sense of being bilateral. But all these senses return as soon as we look again at the pattern.

After this experiment one quite realises how decorative art may have originated in the pleasure

* See note to p. 181.



HONEYSUCKLE PATTERN FROM GREEK VASES
Drawn by C. A. T.

which some prehistoric man may have found in breathing regularly and without need for readjustment when he first scratched lines at regular intervals from each other.

From pattern we can now pass on to that simpler category of architecture which might be designated as *architecture as pattern*, to distinguish it from the more complex phenomena of architecture as *spatial enclosure* and *architecture as suggestive of forces and movements*. This simpler division of the art is the architecture of façades. Let us compare with what seemed to happen inside us while looking at the honeysuckle pattern, what we seem conscious of in looking at Alberti's façade of Santa Maria Novella in Florence.

There is the same pleasant consciousness of our being bilateral. But to this is now added another pleasure due to the fact that the building is divided into three parts, and that the perception of the middle one (to which nothing corresponded in the honeysuckle pattern which was divided into two) involves an adjustment which prevents the thorax from collapsing as much as usual during the act of expiration, and thus maintains even then a certain sense of being expanded. Turning to the arcade opposite the church, and looking at two of its arches only, we at once lose this agreeable sense due to the division of the façade in three; looking at four arches of the arcade does no better. But as soon as we look at three arches of the arcade, or five considered as a double group of two with one arch between, we get the same agreeable expansion of the thorax during expiration which we had while looking at the façade. We now return to the latter. The great expanse of surface in front of us makes us

feel both widened out and drawn up far beyond ordinary life, for the act of seeing produces unusually long and wide breaths; we seem to be breathing according to the proportion of the building rather than to our own. Moreover, the façade elicits in our body sensations more complex than those of which we were conscious while looking at the pattern. *For pattern has no bulk.* It does not require a centre of gravity to keep it upright; its lines are not boundaries of a solid form; so we follow the lines of the pattern by slight movements of our balance, by a slight movement outward of the body above the waist or of the head, first on one side and then on the other, and these little swinging movements we feel as curves which balance one another. But the façade, on the contrary, is planted solidly on the ground, and the perception of this fact involves a sense of weight and lifting up in ourselves; we feel a faint desire to enclose the form between the pressure of our feet on the ground and the very slight downward pressure of the head, and the two pressures result in a sense of resisting gravitation. They can be tracked to the perception of the grip of the ground of the façade's base and the downward pressure of the mouldings and cornices. On the other hand, the arches and upspringing lines produce sensations of easy lifting up and of pleasant activity which more than counter-balance these downward pressures, so that the main impression is one of light-heartedness.*

The mention of such various pressures, and the varying ratios which may exist between them, here

* Professor Lipps has been especially, and I think justly, severe on this passage. Cf. also his *Ästhetische Betrachtung*, p. 427 et seq.—V. L. (1911).



FACADE OF S. M. NOVELLA
From a photograph by J. Reutter

leads to the consideration of what we should call the secondary or *humanly* emotional quality of the æsthetic phenomenon. For the emotion of *harmonious completeness* which we have found to constitute the main æsthetic phenomenon as manifested in every art is susceptible of variations, which, while leaving the primary characteristic quite undisturbed, add, according to circumstances, subordinate characteristics coincident with the various kinds of emotion incident in real life. These characteristics, which constitute the expressive powers of art, are due to the proportion in which various forms excite in us senses of gravity, or light-heartedness, of solitariness or confidence, and many more besides, quite independently of the main æsthetic emotion of complete and harmonious living. They attract exorbitant attention in music ; but we shall find that they exist in large though varying degrees in the arts which address themselves primarily to the eyes, affording in all the arts the easy and often misleading nomenclature taken from well-known experiences of a non-artistic sort, and diverting the attention of criticism from the æsthetic qualities which are strongly felt but only vaguely described to the emotional qualities which are felt very faintly but are immediately named and identified. We shall not separate the study of these secondary phenomena, but add it, when suitable, to the analysis of the main æsthetic phenomenon, and give an account of some of the bodily conditions accompanying the perception of emotionally various qualities of form while continuing our investigation into the bodily conditions accompanying the perception of artistic form merely as such. And we shall find that even as in music the same emotional

characteristic pervades two melodies, of which one is æsthetically excellent and the other æsthetically worthless, so also in architecture, the power of awakening a definite kind of emotion may be common to two buildings of opposite degrees of æsthetic merit, so that, for instance, the predominance of one set of dimensions over another will produce the same religious emotion in churches so different in everything else as the cathedrals, say, of Amiens and of Cologne.

This double phenomenon of æsthetic emotion, differentiated by what we must call *human* emotion, becomes almost inextricable as soon as we consider architecture as an art of spatial enclosure; or, in other words, as soon as we cease contemplating the outside of a church and submit ourselves to the extraordinary forces of its interior. Let us see what currents of bodily sensation we can detect in ourselves beneath the obvious and well-known emotions thus awakened. Coming into a large church we are conscious of a sudden and total change in our mode of being. It will be remembered that while moving about in the open the sides of the landscape *seemed to come forward towards one*. But in a church this sort of wide, lateral view seems to have increased, and it persists even when we are standing still, instead of being replaced by the narrow mode of seeing peculiar to standing still in the open. This important difference is due to our eyes having been caught on their outside by the aisles of the building, so that instead of seeing merely with the fovea, one seems to be using the whole of each eye. Now, as the breathing works in closest connexion with the eyes, this widened way of seeing is necessarily accompanied by a widened

way of breathing in which both lungs are felt, and the respiratory expansion inevitably produces a general sense of expanded existence. Besides thus *seeing wider* on account of the aisles, we are also seeing much *higher* because of the roof.* We are no longer interested in the ground under foot, the interest is above the level of the eye, in the cornices, capitals, and particularly in the arches of the roof; the breath is fetched much higher up than outside the church, and the higher breathing, producing an upward tension, makes us feel taller, feel the ground less under our feet than in the open. These senses of increased expansion and height are only enlargements of feelings we habitually have. But the interior of a church makes what is practically an addition to our sense of dimension by a remarkable reinstatement of the sense of the third dimension, which, as the reader remembers, we had found to dwindle as soon as we stood still out of doors. We get back the realisation of the third dimension in architecture because the poise of our head over its

* To this description of altered sensations and altered objective movements during the first minutes at least in a large church, I can myself subscribe, except as regards the detail of ocular adjustments and of breathing. But of *some* localised respiratory change I am conscious. I may add that the high carriage of the head, answering to the higher lighting and the strongly felt perspective, brings about in myself a feeling of being *tall and having no weight to carry and of having well-fitting shoes* (as distinguished from shuffling), such as I have lately remarked while walking at large on days of unusual physical energy, which are usually also days (*ceteris paribus*) of spontaneous æsthetic responsiveness. I can also subscribe to the special feeling of rather excited lucidity due to very good *French Gothic* interiors. There is a reference in a letter of William Morris to the *exciting* quality of French Gothic. German and Italian Gothic, and French flamboyant, give me no such feeling.—V. L. (1911).

centre of gravity enables us to make balancing movements backwards and forwards, and thus to follow the movement of lines quite easily, provided they are above the eye. So the roof of a church offers us a road into distance which we can follow with ease and pleasure.*

The full equal possession of the sense of all the three dimensions brings with it a sense of completeness in ourselves, and at the same time of closer relation with the *not-ourselves*; and a sense of isolation and lack of confidence, hitherto unnoticed, is removed and becomes apparent in its removal, whence a condition of satisfaction and of serenity. This realisation of the third dimension is accompanied by a change in the breathing. We feel during expiration as if we had something to lean upon, instead of the breath seeming to give way, and this sensation it is which gives that feeling of confidence in the outer world. Moreover, the distance down the church forwards seems to exercise a very decided attraction, like that of a weak magnet for a needle. The three dimensions of the church seem to stretch the respiration in three directions, and

* We have a facility in realising distance above the eye because our head balances on a sort of pivot held in place by muscles but allowed perfectly free play in every direction. By tilting the head a little back we poise it exactly over its centre of gravity, and in this position the smallest movement backwards or forwards gives us a very strong sensation of really moving backwards or forwards into the distance, so where we have to look high, we see the distance. But distance below the horizon or just above it we cannot realise, because in seeing it we do not tilt our head back on to its centre of gravity, but it comes forward and is held up by the muscles of the neck; moving it backwards and forwards involves a muscular effort attended by fatiguing instead of an agreeable movement of balance. So in this case we refrain from trying to realise the distance, and are satisfied with knowing that it exists.—C. A.-T. (1897).

explain very largely that special sense of completeness and harmony given by architecture which encloses, while the particular dimension which happens to predominate decides the *human emotional* colour added to this real æsthetic feeling.

While this is going on we become aware also of various subsidiary senses of *direction*. We have already mentioned that it becomes difficult to pay attention to the ground underfoot because the interest is strongest overhead. The head begins to assert its existence : we feel that it is there, that it has a back to it, and it is flanked by ears ; there is a sense of living *upwards and sideways*. These *senses of direction* seem to radiate from the centre of the head, outwards, and they are various and well-defined tensions ; indeed, the sensation of the chest and head seem more real than those which tell us that we are walking on solid ground ; existence seeming to be concentrated as height, width, and outwardness. The total effect is that of feeling the *church as a larger circumference of ourselves*, and this is the specific sensation of architecture considered as spatial enclosure.

So far we have spoken of the effects of the relative proportions of a building. Before proceeding to a few details of special emotional qualities we must say a word of actual size and the way that it affects us. In ordinary life there is nothing to bring home to us a sense of our size ; but architecture does this very strongly by the stretches imposed on us in the process of perceiving a building. Size which the eye grasps easily and without passing the duration of an ordinary breath is such as we find agreeable and, in a manner, *intimate*. Size greater than this, which can just barely be grasped at one long glance

and one long breath, begins to affect us in a special manner. Size greater still we no longer attempt to measure by our breathing and tensions, for we should crack if we did. We compose a purely intellectual knowledge of the size, while feeling it as little as we should be able to feel the meaning of forty miles. This probably accounts for the fact that while, for instance, the Cathedral of Florence still *impresses* us by its size, St. Peter's notoriously leaves us without any emotion of magnitude. Where the sense of size is very strong it, so to speak, engulfs the sense of the shape of a building. In such cases there is a curious sense, due to the increasing tensions produced by size perception, of being immensely expanded, and as if buoyed in deep water, for the sense of size has abolished the sense of our own weight.*

The special or secondary emotional qualities of various architectural types can be experimented on very simply by passing from the nave of a domed church to the space under the cupola. The change in our feelings is instantaneous and extraordinary. So long as we are in the nave we feel an attraction forwards due to the strong realisation of the third dimension; but, once under the cupola, all desire to go on vanishes, for we suddenly become aware of being surrounded, enveloped, and protected by some invisible power. This is due to the realisation of the shape of the cupola by tensions along the top and back of the head, and by an excitement of the muscles of the scalp, and more particularly of the muscles between the eye and the ear, a portion of the head which we feel thereby very peculiarly alive. The secondary, or human, emotions connected with

* In my case also most certainly, although I am not sure owing to what reasons.—V. L. (1911).

Gothic churches (and so independently of the specific æsthetic emotion that we have them equally in Gothic churches which are not æsthetically satisfactory, at Cologne as much as at Amiens) are a commonplace of literary description. These emotions are explicable by the fact that acutely pointed arches are perceived by an adjustment which feels as if the breath of both lungs were running simultaneously upwards in a point, with a consequent strain and contraction the reverse of that expansion, which is accompanied by the sense of serenity and fellowship with the non-ego. Moreover, the act of breathing far higher up, both by its unusualness and by the strain it imposes, produces a state of being analogous to that of solitary and Quixotic resolves, forced upon us by the very nature of our surroundings. It is correspondingly difficult to have such feelings, without appropriate real causes, in a low square room. In remarkably high and narrow Gothic churches, like St. Ouen, the breathing goes as high as it can, but it cannot go high enough to reach the roof; this gives us at once a sense of a superior force above us. In such a church mystic ideas seem the only natural ones, for we have lost the sense of firm ground under our feet, and seem, in a way, to hang from the sky.

In passing, as we now do, from the consideration of architecture as spatial enclosure to that of *architecture as expression of force and movement*, we desire to warn the reader against the criticism which explains the æsthetic qualities of architecture by a reference to the technicalities of building. This view cannot possibly be true, because we can take the greatest æsthetic pleasure in architecture without any knowledge of building; and because our

æsthetic impressions are often at variance with what a knowledge of building would reveal.* The question of carrying weight, however considerable its intellectual interest, is not a question which can give us any agreeable sensations; so that, for instance, the distribution of vertical pressure on the different parts of the building is a fact which possesses no æsthetic attraction, and which we do not, therefore, desire to realise. Nay, we sometimes actually shirk such knowledge as æsthetically disagreeable. Thus we realise the weight of cornices and capitals only enough to feel the steadying of the upspringing walls and columns; but we do not realise this pressure beyond that, because such realisation would merely make us uncomfortable. It is only where the construction happens to do something which we can follow pleasantly with our bodily adjustments that we wish the construction to be made plainly visible. And here we enter the domain of architecture as an expression of forces and movements, of forces and movements which we can realise agreeably in our sensations.

As an example of this, let us examine what happens in connexion with arches. The problem of how the weight carried by the top of the arch is counteracted by charging the spandrels, is one of which our sensations do not intuitively make us aware; indeed if they did we should dislike it very much. But we feel pleasant interest in the thrust of the two sides of the arch, in their mutual pressure, which keeps them both in position over the centre of gravity,

* Cf. Lipps's *Raumästhetik*, p. 13.

"That which weighs and presses down in material reality (*was tatsächlich lastet*) may be poising or soaring (*schweben*) or erecting itself as regards our æsthetic impression."

because we feel that in this case the construction is doing something which we, standing on our two feet, can also do pleasantly. We therefore want to have this part of the construction made visible, and in so far find pointed arches more comfortable than round ones, because the point, however slight, shows that the arch is made of two separate halves which press against each other, a pressure of each half which we follow by pressing our foot down on that side, with a light swing of the equilibrium, and by an inspiration on that side of the chest, making the reverse movements for the other half and obtaining, through these opposing movements, the realisation of the movements of the arch's lines.

These *movements of the lines* are, in fact, *our movements in looking at the lines*, movements in most cases so slight as to be hardly perceptible, or like the faintly sketched out movements which accompany our hearing dance music while staying at rest, yet strong enough to produce in us a distinct consciousness, in the case of the arch, for instance, a consciousness of soaring up and swinging across its two sides.* The round arch, as opposed to the pointed, does not show the mutual inclination of its two halves : so, instead of realising those two halves in

* This following of the lines by our own movements makes perception a slow process, for we can only do one movement at a time, and as each movement necessitates a special adjustment, there is a pause (sometimes of one or two breaths) between each adjustment, during which the eye merely rests passively upon the object without focusing it. In all cases the eyes do not move about independently of the movement of our head, for the independent movement of our eyes would be much too rapid for our other movements to follow. We see satisfactorily, therefore, by keeping our eyes more or less steady while executing the necessary movement with the head.—C. A.-T. (1897).

opposition to each other, we treat the whole as all of a piece, and follow its lines by a slight shifting of our weight from one foot to another, and by following the movement of our eyes upwards by an inspiration and the downward movement by an expiration.* We find the movement of the round arch pleasant and particularly so in arcades where we move freely from one arch to the other; but we miss the opposition of the two forces which we felt in the pointed arch. An interesting corroboration of this manner of seeing, and a corresponding invalidation of the notion that the æsthetic value of architecture depends upon its structural excellence, can be found in the fact that although all books on architecture explain that Gothic, as a style, depends upon complexities of vaulting and buttressing, the lay public insists upon recognising Gothic wherever it meets a pointed arch, for the pointed arch makes an impression on the most ignorant, while the structural peculiarities are visible only to the

* Owing to our consciousness of breathing with both lungs, we possess a certain degree of volition over their separate action. We can at will breathe more with one side than with the other, and thus do something which feels like breathing in on the right side and breathing out on the left and *vice versa*. Whether these adjustments really take place in the lungs or only in the throat and nostrils is a question for physiologists. Be this as it may, this kind of breathing is automatically set up when looking at mountains or at rounded arches; and it gives the sense of *swinging the breath across*, from one side to the other, which sense is singularly agreeable. Our volitional power in this matter seems due to the curious fact of a very close connexion between the right eye and the breath on the right side. And this connexion is so close that shutting the right eye greatly diminishes the breathing through the right nostril, while the same happens for the left eye and nostril. Conversely, if keeping open both eyes we stop breathing through the right nostril, the right eye no longer sees satisfactorily, and lets the left eye do all the work. The reverse is of course the case.—C. A.-T. (1897).



GOTHIC ARCHES AT VENICE
From a photograph by Alinari

initiated. Again, we take but little interest in a modern pointed arch with exactly equal sides, for the pressure of the two sides seems comparatively passive, and we feel as if nothing were taking place. But a slightly uneven-sided arch, like those of good Gothic work, affects us as extremely interesting, for we see the two sides of the arch actively pressing against each other, and this at once calls up in us active sensations of equilibrium. We are indeed always balancing ourselves more or less; nay, but for this fact, we should not be bipeds at all, or possess most of our human characteristics, and we are therefore so accustomed to this fact as scarcely to notice it in ordinary life. But as soon as we see something else adjusting equilibrium, our own balance seems to swing on a wider scale, and this wider balancing brings a sense of our limits being enlarged in every direction, and of our life being spread over a far wider area. It is upon this and similar facts that depends the æsthetic wonder and beauty of a great French cathedral; for, great as were their feats as constructive engineers, the great Gothic builders did things even greater with the *apparent*, as distinguished from the actual, equilibrium of their fabrics. They juggled, so to speak, with visible lines and made the beholder realise a whole organism of active and opposing movements, quite independently of the constructive necessity of the case, as is shown by the fact that their modern imitators have been able to make churches of the same pattern hold together without making any similar appeal to the beholder's eyes and nerves. In a great French cathedral every part seems to be balancing actively and the whole building to be, in a way, swinging, a live thing, and, to use Vasari's

expression more appropriately, "born rather than built by masons." The columns carrying the arches seem to be balanced on their bases, and the bases to be really gripping the ground. No column is quite rigid; there is always a slight deviation from the perpendicular, righted at once by a return to the perpendicular; so one is made to feel that the perpendiculars are perpendicular in an active sense and as a living fact. The same with the horizontals. They curve up very slightly, as if overcoming the forces of gravitation, so that one feels the horizontal movement as actually taking place. One is never allowed to take the direction once for all, and as a matter of course, as in modern Gothic, but the sensations of direction are actively brought home to one the whole time of looking. In such churches the arches of the aisles rarely have equal sides: the push to one side of the arch is readjusted by a push back in the next arch, and thus all down the aisle, the whole of the arches forming a group bound together by the interdependence of their balance. Both inside and outside a great French cathedral this quality is shown in every part, from the main items of construction to the smallest piece of ornament; everything seems to move and balance. This means, from the subjective side, that a strong appeal is made by such arrangement of lines to our sensations of equilibrium; and that these, which in ordinary life are almost unperceived, are developed to an importance little short of constituting a sixth sense. We feel our balance in every direction, and we really *are* balancing in every direction, for we are quite unable, while looking about us, to stand evenly on both feet. We feel *out of step* with our surroundings, unless we put our weight almost entirely on

one foot ; and when we have done so, we can fully perceive, and, so to speak, feel incorporated with our surroundings. This very subtle equilibrium which has thus been forced on us by architecture, has moreover a very noteworthy effect on our head. It brings us a feeling of clear-headedness such as we rarely felt before, and we feel as if there were nothing we could not understand. This illusion of mental lucidity seems due to an unusual activity in the back of our head, produced by the unusual demand on our balancing powers ; but what is exactly taking place is a question for physiologists. With this feeling of clear-headedness goes a keen excitement ;* we seem to be living at twice our normal rate, and life, for no definable reason, seems twice as much worth living.†

This extraordinary manipulation of our sense of equilibrium is by no means confined to the structural features, arches, lintels, columns, etc. etc., to the purely architectural details of great Gothic, but constitutes the *raison d'être* of all great Gothic sculpture, even when the figures or plants represented seem extraordinarily and exclusively realistic in treatment. Indeed, the sculpture of a fine mediæval church is very commonly employed to counteract and complicate the movement of lines of the merely constructed items. Thus, over the door of the Chapter House at Westminster the arch is steadied on one side, and its over-rapid curve is

* Cf. my note on p. 562 (p. 191).—V. L. (1911).

† If we had space to examine into the painting of rapid (as distinguished from balanced) movement, we should find that the quality of art, as given pre-eminently by Botticelli, is extremely analogous in its effects to the best Gothic architecture and sculpture.—C. A.-T. (1897).

counterbalanced by the female statue alongside. She stands in profile towards the arch, but leans away from it at such a curve that she would inevitably fall over backwards if the curve of the arch were not rapid enough to counterbalance and keep her in place. The rocking of our own balance as we look at her makes us feel the forces at work; as at once resisting and balancing one another, and equally dependent on the mutual opposition which endures for ever. Again, we can take a similar example from the Christ portal at Amiens, and more particularly from the pointed arch of the side niche. The left side of this arch presses outwards to the uttermost edge of its capital, and so impetuous is its push that we feel it must inevitably topple over outwards. But it is held back and counterbalanced by the rapid movement in the contrary direction of the wild rose-tree carved in the inside of the niche. The topmost branch makes a swinging curve to the right, and the leaves and roses all turn over to the right also, and press against the inner side of the arch, the rapid spring of the plant's movement checking the outward thrust of the arch, and the two movements balancing one another. And in looking at them we swing over to the left with the arch, and are steadied by the rapid movement to the right which is initiated in us by the sight of the rose-tree. Thus while lines which exactly balance each other, as in the soulless imitation Gothic of to-day, give us no sensation of force and reaction, the counteraction of unequal weight and speed of lines of the genuine Gothic constitute an eternal equilibrium in which we never cease feeling the conflicting forces.*—C. A.-T.]

* Restorations of Gothic which attempt to imitate the irregu-

IV

[C. A.-T.—As our dominant impression of a picture is that of an arrangement of colours,* we must begin our analysis of the perceptive phenomena in the domain of painting by an examination into the part played by colour.

As we have already shown by our first two elementary experiments comparing the seeing of a white and a coloured blank, *colour makes things easy to see*. Colour gives the eye a grip, so to speak, on shape, preventing its slipping off; we can look much longer at a coloured object than an uncoloured; and the colouring of architecture enables us to realise its details and its *ensemble* much quicker and more easily. For the same reason coloured objects larities of line of the original work without the dynamic principle which makes the parts balance each other, restorations in fact which are merely crooked, produce in the beholder an actual organic disturbance. In looking at them our equilibrium is upset and we are tormented by a sense of illogicality which no amount of arguing can remove.—C. A.-T. (1897).

For corroboration, cf. quotations from Lipps in Appendix to *Anthropomorphic Aesthetics*.—V. L. (1911).

* The question of colour-action would be easy to settle by laboratory experiments. My gallery diaries contain some evidence on the immediate attractiveness (or the reverse) of colours compared with the slower effect of form. I have often noticed in myself the sense of suffocation due to preponderance of certain colours and of liberation and "being able to breathe once more" of other colours, especially pale blue, pale green, and various shades of lilac; of course these happen to coincide with atmospheric effects. I have also been told by some persons of the *vivifying* quality of much crimson, and by others of the intolerable excitement and sensation of blood to the head produced by the selfsame crimsons. A well-known Paris physician, with large experience among artists and nervous subjects, tells me his belief that various colours act variously on different types of nutritive and circulatory processes.—V. L. (1911).

always feel more familiar than uncoloured ones, and the latter seem always to remain in a way strange and external; so that children, in colouring their picture books, are probably actuated not so much by the sensuous pleasure of colour as such, as by a desire to bring the objects represented into a closer and, so to speak, warmer relation with themselves.

The power which colour possesses of putting the beholder into more intimate relation with shapes is not explicable by the mere excitement of the eye. It is due to the curious action of colour on respiration, on the fact that, if we may use such an expression, we seem *to inhale colour*. For, while stimulating the eye, we find that colour also stimulates the nostrils and the top of the throat; for a colour sensation on the eye is followed quite involuntarily by a strong movement of inspiration, producing thereby a rush of cold air through the nostrils on to the tongue and the top of the throat, and this rush of cold air has a singularly stimulating effect: sometimes the sight of an extremely vivid colour like that of tropical birds, or of vivid local colour strung up by brilliant sunshine, has a curious effect on the top of the throat, amounting to an impulse to give out voice. Colourless objects, on the contrary, offer no inducement to draw a long breath. If one breathes in strongly, nevertheless, there results a sense of almost intolerable insipidity, like the taste of white of egg without salt.

This connexion between colour stimulation and respiration can be tested by looking at juxtaposed colours while alternately breathing and holding one's breath. This experiment brings out the unexpected fact that when divorced from respiration the eye loses much of its sensitiveness; crude colours, or

crude combinations, do not offend us equally while we refrain from breathing. Let us take, for a trial, a picture in a delicate scheme of colour : olive-trees on a pale russet hill-side ; and let us fasten a red patch at one corner and a yellow patch on the other and a bright blue patch in the middle. Looking at this appalling combination while holding the breath,* we find that it causes us no kind of distress. But as soon as we resume breathing we find that we cannot endure to look at it any longer. For the moderate sort of even respiration instinctively adopted while looking at the delicate scheme of colour of the landscape is roughly disturbed by the patches of red, yellow and blue ; they force the breathing into violent inspiration, which is felt as a sudden over-stimulation of certain tracts in the region of taste and smell, almost as in smelling a rose we should be disturbed by the sudden intrusion of a pungent smell like that of smelling-salts. When we remove the three patches of colour and look at them together we have no sense of aversion, for, although they force us to inhale more air than normally, we no longer experience an uneven stimulation, excessive and insufficient alternately. If now we look at the picture without the patches, we experience a curious complex excitement of the nature both of taste and smell, and the air breathed in seems to *have a sort of grain in it*. No part of the picture forces us to breathe sharply ; everywhere we breathe evenly and gradually, with the sort of harmonious evenness with which we inhale the delicate smell of a rose. Moreover, the agreeableness of this sensation causes us to breathe more

* Cf. *Æsthetic Responsiveness* for observations on connexion of respiratory adjustment and attention *as such*.—V. L. (1911).

frequently while looking at the picture than we did before. It is further noticeable that the scheme of colour of a picture has the power of, so to speak, *placing* the respiration. Thus, gay colours place the field of respiration high up, and sombre colours place it low down ; and the emotions accompanying these adjustments of the breathing are such that we designate the respective schemes of colour as gay or as serious.

The common expressions, *cool* and *warm* colour, really seem to be based upon fact, for our temperature is actually affected differently by colours, and one might almost say that great pictures have a climate. For instance, the rather strong, heavy colour of Signorelli heightens the temperature and gives a feeling of slight congestion, such as one suffers from when too much wrapped up on a warm day ; while the scheme of colour of a Perugino produces an immediate effect of cool peacefulness. Harmonious colour keeps the respiration well in the same area while the eye wanders over the whole picture, whereas the introduction of crude colour produces an unevenness of respiration, as detailed above.

Our dominant impression in looking at a picture is that, therefore, of an arrangement of colour ; whereas in the real world our dominant impression is that of recognition and, so to speak, *naming* of the shapes represented. For in the real world shapes are separated from each other by the air between them, and while the air lets the eye pass freely, the solid shapes, on the contrary, arrest it on its passage. But a picture is merely a flat canvas with different shades of colour laid on it, all of which offer equal resistance to the eye irrespective of what the arrange-

ment of colour may represent ; the eye being held equally by the sky, and by a solid object, and the colour of the background being seen in the same manner as that of the figures placed against it. The colour is therefore presented evenly, and we see a picture at the first glance as an arrangement of colour rather than of shapes. Moreover, as a picture is a flat surface, and the sides of a picture can equally arrest the eye, one can, so to speak, lean upon the sides of the picture all the way into its centre. This is impossible with the landscape seen through a window-pane ; here the sides seem intangible, the eye drops through to the distance, and the whole looks a mere random fragment of the external world. This fact of the resistance offered to the eye by the sides of a picture is of far greater importance than might be expected, and than is suspected by the rank and file of modern artists, who disregard it in a slavish fidelity to reality, for it enables the painter to enclose and show us a whole little world complete in itself. Moreover, it happens that this enclosed appearance coincides, as we have before remarked, with the actual appearance of a real landscape when we walk into it, for in this case our movement causes the sides of the landscape to come forward to meet us ; we seem to be walking as through a corridor into the distance, and we have the sense of being in a special world of which we are the centre. It is on this agreeable impression that we base our recollections of real scenery, for this picture-like arrangement drops to pieces as soon as we stop still, the sides of the landscape cease to belong to the background, and we lose all that sense of pleasant wholeness and enclosure. It is to be noticed that the old masters always represented

landscape as we can see it while moving, not as it appears when we stand and look at it through a window-pane.

We have now, as the reader perceives, got into the thick of the difficult questions of the dimensions in painting,* and, before proceeding to the examination of the mode of perception of the third dimension in art, we must premise that we are departing in a measure from the phraseology usually adopted. The third dimension is usually called *thickness*. But as we are treating dimensions *subjectively*, as perceptive modes corresponding to various stretches of our body, we are obliged to treat of it as *distance* and *bulk*, distance referring to the flat ground, and bulk to objects occupying space. Similarly, we divide the first dimension, *height*, into *height* and *depth*, because the sensations accompanying the act of looking upwards are totally different from the sensations accompanying the act of looking downwards. The sensations derivable from what we call height are agreeable and raise our spirits, while those we get from what we call (that is, first dimensional) depth are depressing, owing to the opposite adjustments of breathing in the two cases. As regards the second dimension, *width*, we have not required to depart from the usual nomenclature, but have considered it merely as existing either on both sides or on one side separately, because we can obtain the adjustment giving the sensation of width either as

* The eminent German sculptor, Adolph Hildebrand, has published some remarkable, though rather extreme, views on the importance of the dimensional sense in art in his book on *The Problem of Form in the Plastic Art*.—V. L. (1897).

Views with which, so far as their æsthetic importance goes, as distinguished from their psychological basis, I now entirely concur.—V. L. (1911).

unilateral or bilateral. The effect of works of visual art on the processes connected with dimensional perception is very complex: the region of our breathing is placed higher than normally, the breathing apparatus is widened equally on both sides, and some automatic adjustment is initiated in the lower part of the thorax and the diaphragm which answers to the sense of distance by giving a support to the breath in expiration. In order to avoid tiresome reiteration throughout this section, we should wish the reader to keep in mind the following facts concerning the physiological and emotional phenomena connected with the various dimensions:

First dimension (which we call height and depth). Breathing high up.* Sense of lightheartedness; our feelings rise without objective motive; we feel hopeful. One might expect good or bad spirits to be almost producible at will by lifting up or lowering the breathing.

Second dimension (breadth). Breathing with both lungs. A feeling of expansion and serene well-being. One is tempted to recognise this sense of expansion as a principal factor in all conditions of happiness and benevolence, so inevitably does it bring these feelings in its train.

Third dimension (thickness,† which we call distance and bulk‡). Breathing backwards and for-

* I have spoken of "breathing high" because that is what it feels like. The feeling is probably produced by the lift up of the ribs.—C. A.-T. (1911).

† As a fact the third dimension is usually called not *thickness* but *depth*. It would be convenient for aesthetics if *height* were divided into *up* and *down*.—V. L. (1911).

‡ We have divided the third dimension into *distance* and *bulk*, not only because these two halves of the subject correspond to

wards. A sense of confidence in the reality of things. Feelings of increased interest towards the outer world, and of an indefinable attraction resembling affection; intimate and warm relations with things outside us. It will be well, also, if the reader will remember that, as all these modes of dimensional perception are united in painting as in architecture and sculpture, there must be present, during our perception of works of these arts, a combination or alteration of these modes of breathing.

Having thus tabulated the relative æsthetic functions of the three dimensions, we can now return to the treatment of the dimensions by art, and more particularly of the first and third, having already had occasion to deal with the second in this relation.

different adjustments, but also because, owing to the difference between these adjustments, the æsthetic value of the two divisions of the third dimension are different and even opposed. For, whereas we ask from painting for an increased realisation of distance, because we enjoy going into the picture, we ask, on the contrary, for a lesser realisation of bulk than we obtain normally when walking about. For when we look at objects which we perceive to project forwards, we are obliged to begin with a sudden high inspiration which is fatiguing, and we therefore prefer that in pictures the projections should be flattened, and that we should be separated by a sort of neutral space from the objects which would otherwise bulge towards us. The greatest pictures are always rather flattened.—C. A.-T. (1897).

This is, in simpler language, one of the essentials of Hildebrand's theory of the treatment of planes not only in painting and relief, but in sculpture, a treatment which is naturally connected with frontality. Hildebrand gives such frontality and unification of planes an absolute and normative value; Löwy looks upon it as an historical phenomenon. Cf. H.'s *Problem der Form* and Löwy's *Naturwiedergabe*. Cf. also Hamann, *Dekorative Plastik*, in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, III. Band, Heft 2, 1908. There is, of course, a psychological reason against the bulging of some item of a picture or statue: it prevents our going into the composition and getting the feeling of *enclasure*. Also it often affects one like an aggression.—V. L. (1911).

The first dimension, which we must divide into height and depth, or *upwardness* and *downwardness*,* is brought home to us by art in a far completer way than in reality. It requires a good deal of experiment to verify how comparatively little reality allows us to realise the facts of lifting upwards and pressing downwards. If we compare them with figures in a good picture, we shall find that our fellow-creatures in the real world give us little sense of weight, they seem to stand on ground which seems to offer no resistance to their feet and scarcely to be underneath them. We are usually satisfied with the mere optical perception of real figures, or even the mere recognition of them by qualities which serve as labels. But when we come to works of art we demand certain senses of adjustment in our own bodies, and to obtain these we require that the fact of lifting up and pressing down, like the facts of bulk, should be strongly realised in the painted figures. And the old masters, untroubled by realism on their side, were impelled by the same instinct to paint what they felt instead of what they saw; or rather they thought they saw what they really only felt. Thus in Leonardo's memoranda-sketches churches barely two inches high give, by the treatment of perpendicular lines, the full sense of the pressure on the ground, the lift upwards of the walls and columns, and the pressure downwards of the cornices and lintels. These little drawings elicit in the beholder the sense of realisation which we obtain by feeling the pressure of our feet on the ground, the lift upwards of our body, and the slight pressure downwards of the head, feelings of which

* These I would now call, with Lipps, "senses of directions."
—V. L. (1911).

we are usually not conscious, and whose presence results in a sense of gravity and importance which we transfer to the drawings.*

We can now pass on to the treatment of the *third* dimension in art.†

It will be remembered that when we stand still we see the ground stretching away on each side of us as *width* pure and simple, but we do *not* see the ground which stretches away in front of us as *distance* pure and simple; it has, on the contrary, a certain likeness to *height*, and it is only when we walk forward that this appearance of height is replaced by that of distance as such. We have thus, when standing still, partially lost one sense of dimension; and it is very probable that we unconsciously suffer from this partial loss and the consequent diminution

* Owing to this system of weights and pressures, composition is able to take fragmentary things and turn them into complete wholes. Thus the best Renaissance busts do not affect us as being the cut off head and shoulders of a full-length figure; they are complete in themselves, owing to the arrangement of pressure on the ground, the lift up of the middle part and the slight downward pressure of the head. The same holds good of three-quarter-length portraits by great painters; we cannot conceive the subject as being longer than we see him, and the addition of the legs would undo the unity of the whole. Good composition combines things into a homogeneous and complete unity which awakens in us a quite specific corresponding sense.—C. A.-T. (1897).

† My Gallery Diaries (*Æsthetic Responsiveness*, p. 298) contain evidence to the well-admitted fact that the recognition of the third dimension, unless obtained by locomotion or prehension, always presupposes the recognition of what we are looking at as *intended to represent so-and-so*, or in real life, as likely to *turn out to be so-and-so*. Hence many "optical illusions." Külpe (*Outlines*, pp. 188-194) seems to suggest that the *name* helps us often or always in such acts of recognition.

To what extent may not the third dimension be a *multiplying factor* of the *Einfühlung* connected with the first and second?—V. L. (1911).

of the corresponding respiratory adjustments ; nay, this would account for the singular impression of harmony which results from the full reinstatement of the third dimension by art. In architecture this reinstatement is effected by the poise of our head over its centre of gravity, enabling us to make balancing movements backwards and forwards, and by the consequent ease with which we can follow the movement of lines above the eye.

In paintings we obtain the realisation of the third dimension by a different method. Various experiments point to the fact that while we stand still we cannot satisfactorily see the third dimension, either as bulk or as distance, in the *ground plane* of the landscape ; but that we can see distance satisfactorily in a shelf placed about the level of the lower part of the chest, and that we can satisfactorily realise the bulk of the objects standing on such a shelf. This peculiarity seems due to special adjustments of the thorax and diaphragm being elicited by the sight of the flat space on the level with the chest.

The adjustments of the thorax are similar to those we make in walking about—we breathe backwards and forwards, instead of up and down ; our ribs project forward while we draw our breath inward, and the simultaneousness of this outward movement of the ribs and inward movement of the breath gives us the sense of stretching backwards and forwards at the same moment, and thus enables us to realise to a certain extent the notion of distance. This realisation of distance is greatly reinforced by the adjustments taking place in the diaphragm. We do not pretend to explain what is really taking place in our body. We merely point out that in our

consciousness we feel as if our breath had something *underneath* it supporting it during expiration, something which *does not give way as it moves outwards*, and so it gains in strength and seems to move straight outward instead of dropping down. By this means we actually get a pleasant sensation from expiration, which under ordinary conditions gives rather a depressing sensation.

We are able to realise bulk by breathing backwards and forwards in longer or shorter breaths ; breathing a short breath, for instance, up to where the object stands, and a much longer succeeding breath immediately beyond the object as the eye moves past it into the distance. It may be conjectured that we are able to realise bulk and distance on a plane above the level of the waist, but not on the ground plane, not on account of any difficulty in the mere visual apprehension of the lower plane as distinguished from the upper, but on account of the depressing sensations which accompany the muscular adjustment necessary for realisation when they are connected with a plane below the level of the waist ; for, as we have already said, we always shirk realisation when the effect on the respiration would be painful. We habitually imagine that we see the third dimension on the ground plane in the same manner as the two other dimensions when we really merely know that it is there. It is only when we get the realisation of it by corroboration of it by our bodily sensations that we recognise that we have not been realising it before.

Now, painting has the power of making us thus realise the third dimension agreeably because it can place the ground plane rather in the relation toward us of the shelf opposite our chest than, as is the case

in reality, of the ground underfoot. The old masters, who followed their instinct instead of being distracted by theoretic realism, lifted up the ground plane in such a manner that if produced towards the beholder it would meet him somewhere about the level of the chest instead of underfoot. And the greater part of the pleasure which such a realisation of the third dimension causes us must be explained, we believe, in the unexpected reinforcement of the respiration which it occasions in expiration as well as in inspiration. This backward and forward breathing brings with it, as we have noticed already in speaking of churches, a heightened interest in the outer world and a warmer feeling towards things in general, both of which flag very noticeably as soon as we turn to a painting in which the third dimension is imperfectly realised.

There remains for our consideration another important factor in the feelings awakened by painting, which we have met already under different circumstances in dealing with architecture. This æsthetic element is the power of lines to awaken senses of movement, which is universally recognised in such expressions as the movement of lines, their swiftness, their ascending and descending qualities, etc. And here we must premise that when we feel movement in a work of art, it is not as the opposite of standing still. We feel movement in art as the contrast between opposing movements,* which we are forced to initiate in the process of seeing. For instance, we perceive a movement forward by balancing forward, and then moving back again ;

* For Lipps's declaration to this effect (though, of course, *not* to that of *our* movements being involved) see quotations from Lipps, p. 41 of this volume.—V. L. (1911).

the rapid movement forward contrasted with the rather passive swing backwards gives us the sense of having gone forwards. We pay attention only to the movement which we are, so to speak, *miming*—that is to say, in the direction to which we become sensible ; the lesser movement by which we resume our previous state of adjustment escapes us.

The movement of lines in architecture is in a given direction ; we see, for instance, the whole course of the movement of an arch ; and the rapidity or slowness of its curve within the given limits is all we have to deal with. For the movement of an arch consists of the balance of its two half-arches, and this balance we follow by shifting our own weight from one foot to another. Thus movement in architecture is a comparatively easily explained phenomenon ; whereas we shall find that movement in pictures—that is to say, movement of lines going freely in various directions—is a more complicated problem. For as a picture is not a set pattern, it does not present an unbroken movement all through it, but it gives us instead fragments of moving lines, often opposing each other irregularly, and constituting portions of the various shapes represented in the picture, fragments of lines which may be parts of hills, or figures, or draperies.

As a result of this, we do not follow these lines with movements of our whole balance as we did in looking at the lines of architecture, because we could not *mime*, so to speak, all these fragmentary movements ; so we follow these lines of movement in painting by a number of light, free movements of the head and shoulders, requiring no effort, and perceived by us as agreeable, and, so to speak,



RENAISSANCE ARCHES
From a photograph by I. Kaverat

caressing gesture movements. These, which we shall call *gesture movements*, play a great part in the æsthetics of painting. For as, in art, the forces of gravitation are not felt, we have no indication of the actual weight of things, but feel only the amount of weight necessary to steady the upspringing of the movement. In this way most things in a picture are, so to speak, *mimed* by these gesture movements only, which, as we have seen, are effortless and pleasant. Indeed, we perceive even the active movements of painted figures rather as rapid *gesture* than as *action*. Even in the pictures of Lotto, one of the old masters who put most active movement into his pictures, the Virgin carries the child less by a fatiguing effort of resisting weight than by a charming free gesture. Indeed, what we feel and think of as movement in painting is rather a successful arrangement of *lines of movement* than a correct representation of the muscular facts of *movement as such*. The reader will have no difficulty in remembering a dozen cases where figures are really upheld by the mere lines of their drapery; and even where drapery, which, considered as stuff, would of course give way under pressure, is actually made, as line, to support considerable weight.—C. A.-T.]

V

[C. A.-T.—It will have become evident all through these notes that for complete appreciation the spectator must be willing to meet the work of art half-way.

This is nowhere so much the case as with sculpture, because, as the sculptured figure constitutes the whole work, unaided by any arrangements to

guide the attention, we can see it adequately only by ourselves initiating the necessary adjustments; and, as the statue has the same general shape as ourselves, these adjustments involve a very considerable adjustment, not merely of our internal, but of our externally visible, movements.

We cannot, for instance, satisfactorily focus a stooping figure like the Medicean Venus if we stand before it bolt upright and with tense muscles,* nor a very erect and braced figure like the Apoxyomenos if we stand before it humped up and with slackened muscles. In such cases the statue seems to evade our eye, and it is impossible to realise its form thoroughly; whereas, when we adjust our muscles in imitation of the tenseness or slackness of the statue's attitude, the statue immediately becomes a reality to us.†

That Greek statues, unaided by *lines of direction* and arrangements of colour, are thus excessively dependent upon the movements of the spectator, can be shown by one or two other details. Greek statues, for instance, do not stand as if rooted to the ground, but stand, on the contrary, by balance; we therefore see them satisfactorily only if ourselves on our feet, and unconsciously *miming*, so to speak, their equilibrium with our own. This fact and the above-mentioned one can be experimentally tested as easily as the fact of being unable to hum or whistle a tune with one rhythm while moving our

* This example, chosen by me, was rejected by my collaborator; cf. her statement in *Central Problem*, p. 119.—V. L.

† This passage is elucidated in *Central Problem*, p. 118, "apart from any tendency to mimic its represented action. . . . It is to such conformity of our bodily tensions (whether definitely localised or not) with the dynamic suggestions of a statue's shape that my collaborator and myself now limit the remark."—V. L. (1911).

bodies according to another rhythm. Again, as Greek statues possess a definite equilibrium, it becomes necessary to walk round them in order thoroughly to realise them, because, although from some given point we might get a view of the whole figure, yet from no one point could we get the complete sense of the figure's equilibrium. We must therefore shift our position more or less continually in order to follow each part of this balance to its point of stability ; * and as our own equilibrium is affected by that of the statue we feel dissatisfied until we have realised the position in its wholeness.† In the unfortunately numerous cases, therefore, where an antique, intended to be free standing, is placed with its back against the wall, we are not only deprived of the sight of half of the statue's

* I now think that *all* pre-Lysippian statues have lines of composition, and Michelangelo's with the exception of the *Bacchus* and one or two others. Walking round such a statue destroys its composition and inhibits Empathy of its lines in my experience. Lysippian and other non-frontal statues give either imperfect points of view (owing to their limbs masking essentials) or leave confused memory images due to my being chased round them in the process of exploration. Statues of the pre-Lysippian (Hildebrand) type, I walk round in order to find the points of view ; but once the points of view found, I stop, and it is these points of view which furnish visual memory images, to which is added a sort of vague halo of knowledge that the statue had been seen from other points.
—V. L. (1911).

† We are here speaking only of antique sculpture. The sculpture of the Renaissance is partly an outgrowth of architecture ; it is largely influenced therefore by architectural laws, and must usually be taken in connexion with a definite place and point of view. See a chapter on this subject in Vernon Lee's *Renaissance Studies and Fancies* (1897).

This whole distinction between Renaissance and Antique art I now consider entirely mistaken in the light of Hildebrand's views.
—V. L. (1911).

form, but we are also deprived of the power of making the statue *unwind itself*, so to speak, under our eye by moving round it, and obtaining the living realisation of its gesture. It is only by making the statue thus unfold itself that we can obtain the full sense not merely of its shape but of its organic totality. For, as remarked before, equilibrium is a vital matter to us bipeds, who cannot stand without balancing ourselves; and we are, therefore, extremely sensitive to any check inflicted on those alterations of balance which are entailed in the perception of form. This fact will also explain our indifference, and even aversion, to certain statues, which, though undoubtedly beautiful in bodily structure, are unsatisfactory in their equilibrium. We are very grateful whenever we get good balance in a statue, even from one point of view only and by accident; indeed, it is possible that the persistent belief in the Venus of Milo as an original masterpiece of the greatest epoch may be due to the fact that the absence of arms makes her compose in the very happiest equilibrium when seen from the front.

In the best Greek figures the foot which bears the weight is placed so well under the centre of gravity that they can walk slowly without rocking, whereas real people—at least moderns—walk, so to speak, with a foot on each side, and therefore lurch as soon as they go slowly. Now, in looking at Greek statues, we are forced automatically to adjust ourselves to their walk in order satisfactorily to focus them; and this adjustment to a better balance in ourselves is extremely agreeable. In this way do good antiques improve our consciousness of existence by literally forcing us to more harmonious move-

ments. But there are other ways also in which our necessity of *miming* by our own muscular adjustments the forms and figures which we focus, gives us the benefit of the finer organism represented in a work of art. An antique statue does not merely move better than a real human being, but it has also a much finer muscular system.* The real human being, even at its very best, possesses a bony framework which would tumble down were it not tied into uprightness by the contraction of the muscles; and no movement is possible save by the pull of the muscles on the bones and the leverage of one bone upon another. Moreover, the weight of the body is perpetually dragging it down. But very different from these outward arrangements of pulleys and levers is the muscular system of the great Greek statues. In them the muscles seem to act of their own free will, not as things which contract,

* Since writing the above, indeed since answering Professor Groos in 1909 (see p. 119), I have been taught by Mrs. Roger Watts a system of athletics which has altered my view of the relation between the Greek representation of the human body and the possibilities of that body, if submitted to a particular training.

The training in question, as Mrs. Roger Watts, its inventor, has demonstrated in lectures in London and before the British Archæological School in Rome, consists in developing a state of special muscular tension, and thereby bringing all the various parts into the closest and most voluntarily controlled connexion. Hence a facility in resisting gravitation, and a consequent appearance of homogeneous existence and of freedom from weight such as we have hitherto considered the prerogative of Greek works of art.

This convinces me that an originally very select model, if gradually developed by a training in high tension, would give us something much more like the Greek figure than I could otherwise have supposed possible. And I should like to express my great obligation to Mrs. Roger Watts as the inventor and teacher of a system of movements which is, in my opinion, bound to shed great light on the whole question of Antique Sculpture.—C. A.-T. (1911).

but as things which hold up freely and without effort. The body and limbs rise up like a tree with its branches; indeed, one might say that Greek sculpture embodies the character of growing plants in forms imitated from human beings. Good antiques are not only more beautiful in structure than human beings; they carry their weight with as much ease as human beings do so with difficulty, and the muscular adjustments elicited by the sight of this easy carriage of body is accompanied in the beholder by a sense of increased lightness and strength in himself.*

The same improvement upon reality, the same fidelity only to such forms as can awaken agreeable feelings in the beholder, can be observed in the heads of good antiques. In the real human face we neither expect nor get complete harmony of lines and masses, and we accept as beauty what may, in many cases, be a look of intelligence, or goodness, or pathos; we accept, moreover, not only the traces of moral wear and tear, but the indication of continually repeated ungraceful muscular effort, as in the movement of the jaw in eating; now such indications of functions the antique sculptor simply does away with. Moreover the relation between the features is wilfully altered. The nose is, so to speak, tied to the brow and the mouth to the

* I should now add, to what my collaborator wrote above, that in my opinion good antiques have also *lines of pressure downwards*, like those of the foot of vases and chalices and the base of Romanesque pillars. I now think that a sense of downward movement in the lower half of an artistic shape (like the downward movement of a roof) is, so to speak, the negative factor of pleasure, while the uprising movement of the upper half is the positive one. Some observations on the pressing down of lower limbs of statues will be found in my Gallery Diaries. This connects with "Frontality."—V. L. (1911).

cheeks in a closeness of connexion incompatible with their true functions. The eye, which has exaggerated prominence in reality, is kept quite low in interest, while the hair is given great importance—the importance of freely growing vegetation, for instance—by the separation into conventional strands and locks. The ear also, which in real life looks like an isolated rosette, is drawn into close relation with the rest of the features. Yet we accept this constant deviation, not merely from everyday reality, but from the structure necessitated by function, because such a harmonised pattern of features gives us a totality of delightful senses of adjustment, and that feeling of naturalness—naturalness due to suitability to our requirements—which we noticed already in mere pattern as one of the chief characteristics of æsthetic pleasure. For in such Greek heads as declare themselves, by inner evidence, to be original works of great masters—for instance, the Aberdeen head in the British Museum—the features are so intimately connected that we are able to see the mouth in relation to the hair, or the nose in relation to the ear, with delightful ease, as if one's eye were travelling in a carefully made track,* and as if the sculptor had worked each detail into the rest as though he had been designing an embroidery or laying out a garden.

The expressive quality of antiques is similarly obtained (even as we found it in architecture) by presenting us with forms whose perception entails adjustments in ourselves such as accompany various emotional conditions. Thus, in the bronze head of Hypnos, in the British Museum, the expression is admirably hushed and sleep-compelling, but

* For confirmation, cf. *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, pp. 261-2.

without the smallest suggestion of sleep in the god himself. And this effect is obtained by the ears being lowered, and thus giving the head a downward bias; by the low brow weighing down the eyes, and the nose being slightly compressed, so that the breathing comes, as it does in the dark, through the mouth; while the eyes are drawn rather near together, as they seem to be when we turn them slightly inwards at the moment that sleep comes over us.—C. A.-T.]

VI

The consideration of sculpture, which we had therefore postponed to that of apparently more complex branches of art, has brought out with the greatest clearness, owing to its apparent realism and to the actual locomotion it demands from the beholder, two facts involved in all our previous examinations, which, when united, may constitute the basis of a new theory of æsthetics.

One of these facts can be summed up as follows : that our pleasure in art makes us accept, and even unconsciously demand, a systematic divergence from everyday experience, substituting for reality, forms, motions, and suggestions of structure and function entirely unreal, and that this fidelity to the subjective requirements of our organism passes muster as fidelity to objective arrangements of the world.

The second fact may be summed up as follows : that, when deduction has been made of the sensory pleasures of colour and ocular adjustment, the æsthetic pleasure in art is due to the production of

highly vitalising,* and therefore agreeable, adjustments of breathing and balance as factors of the perception of form.†

The greater or lesser agreeableness of artistic experience is, therefore, due to the dependence of one of the most constant and important intellectual activities, the perception of form, on two of the most constant and important of our bodily functions, respiration and equilibrium. And the æsthetic instinct, the imperious rejection of certain visual phenomena as ugly, and the passionate craving for certain others as beautiful, is therefore no unaccountable psychic complexity, but the necessary self-established regulation of processes capable of affording disadvantage and advantage to the organism. The whole of this view is founded, of course, upon the supposition that the movements of the eye are accompanied by a variety, forming an ever-varied unity, of bodily adjustments which, as a rule, have ceased to be apprehended as such, and have merged, even like the alteration in our tissues under-

* In his remarkable volume on Tuscan painters (1896) Mr. B. Berenson has had the very great merit, not only of drawing attention to muscular sensations (according to him in the limbs) accompanying the sight of works of art, but also of claiming for art the power of *vitalising*, or, as he calls it, *enhancing life*. Mr. Berenson offers a different and more intellectual reason for this fact than is contained in the present notes. In a series of lectures on Art and Life, delivered at South Kensington in 1895, and printed the following year in the *Contemporary Review*, one of the joint authors of the present notes had attempted to establish that the function of art is not merely to increase vitality, but to regulate it in a harmonious manner.—V. L. (1897).

Cf. *The Central Problem of Æsthetics*, pp. 112-13.—V. L. (1911).

† For my present view of this question see *Æsthetic Empathy* and *The Central Problem*; also conclusion of the present volume; also *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, p. 334 *et seq.*—V. L. (1911).

lying mere sensations, into vague emotional conditions accompanying the recognition of objective peculiarities outside us. What these adjustments are we have tried to show by experiments on our own consciousness, seeking to detect and name the more easily distinguished among these incipient or actually realised motor adjustments. But as the accounts of them thus given have been necessarily incomplete, the joint authors of these notes are anxious to forestall a wrong impression which might easily result from the casual reading of anything so rough and ready. The repetition of the same formulæ of adjustment, such as "shifting the balance," "breathing backwards or forwards," "senses of upward or downward tension," etc., without any specification of the amount of each such adjustment as compared with other adjustments, might easily leave the impression that the totality of adjustments is the same in the perception of every work of art belonging to the same category, and that the difference between individual works of art is perceived by some process independent of these adjustments; a misconception all the more probable that the human emotional quality of works of art seems to vary very little from individual work to individual work as distinguished from category to category of work, so that ten different cathedrals may strike us as equally religious and ten different marches as equally cheerful, although each of the ten be perfectly æsthetically distinguishable from the rest. But in our opinion there is no such analogy between the *human emotional* character and the *æsthetic individuality* of a work of art. The character of cheerfulness or solemnity depends upon an emotion which, once set up by some main perceptive adjust-



CATENA'S ST. JEROME
From a photograph by Mansell

ment, continues operative until some other emotion is set up by another main perceptive adjustment, so that we may continue seeing quite different details of a work of art without the human emotional condition of our feelings in the least altering. But the actual æsthetic quality, the essential individuality of a form, that which in common parlance *we see*, corresponds upon the subjective side to a totality of motor adjustments which is exactly as complex, as co-ordinated, and as individual as that which we think of as the objective form outside us. In other words, the pattern of our senses of adjustment tallies most absolutely in every detail with the pattern of the particular object we are looking at; for the simple reason that the subjective pattern of our perceptive feelings and the objective pattern of the form perceived are one and the same phenomenon differently thought of. Whatever the nature of the mysterious *ego* which is aware of the muscular adjustment and of the form, and whatever the explanation of the possibility of considering the phenomenon as a double one of subjective change in us and of objective quality outside us, there is not, in our opinion, any variation of visually perceived form which does not correspond to a variation distinguishable or indistinguishable [separately] of our perceptive motor adjustment; and every individual difference perceived by us means an individual difference in our perceptive activity.

Our formula that "the phenomena of inner motor adjustment must be, in each single case, exactly as complex, as co-ordinated, and as individual a totality as the artistic form perceived is complex, co-ordinated and individual; that every particular pattern of form tallies with a particular pattern of

motor adjustment," can, we believe, be demonstrated despite the clumsiness and insufficiency of self-scrutiny and self-expression, by comparing what happens in us in the presence of a masterpiece with what we can detect in ourselves in the presence of an inferior work of the same school. And from this analysis it becomes possible, moreover, to apprehend clearly why certain works of art give us a larger amount of pleasure, or a greater intensity of pleasure, than do certain others.

For this analysis, the last in these notes, we have chosen a comparison of two Venetian pictures of the same period, the one an excellent work of an artist of the second rank, the other one of the most consummate masterpieces of one of the greatest of masters: Catena's *St. Jerome in his Study* and Titian's *Sacred and Profane Love*.

In order to bring home to the reader the principal elements of excellence contained in Catena's charming picture, we must point out two of the qualities without which no picture can affect us agreeably, and which are the practical result of the fact, so often insisted on in these notes, that we follow lines by muscular adjustments more considerable than those of the eye,* and that these muscular adjustments result in a sense of direction and velocity in ourselves and a consequent attribution of direction and velocity to the lines thus perceived.

—C. A.-T. & V. L.

[C. A.-T.—Now, in a picture, the actual outlines of the various objects, or the ideal lines given by the

* Cf. *Æsthetic Responsiveness*, p. 336, where I have said: "We must, I now feel convinced, reinstate in all this *Einfühlung* matter the old psychological items of 'thinking,' of 'idea,' of 'memory images,'" and above all of association."—V. L. (1911).

movement of the eye from one represented object to another, can either be co-ordinated in such a way as to make of the various parts of a picture an agreeably focused whole, or they may be in vague, haphazard relations to one another in such a way that the picture reverts, more or less, from the condition of being a *form* to the condition of that which we have experimented upon under the name of *confusion* or *chaos*. If a picture possess this co-ordination of direction of lines, this element of composition, which we may be allowed to call *tie*, it is in so far agreeable; if it do not possess it, the picture is, despite everything else, disagreeable. The case of the velocity of lines is very similar. The lines in a picture (both actual outlines and ideal lines along the eye's passage) can force us to quicker or slower inner adjustments, and by this means make us acquire what we feel as the objective quality of more or less rapidity of movement. And the various velocities of the lines of a picture can, like the directions of lines, be either co-ordinated or haphazard, so that the slowness, for instance, of one line and the pause made before starting upon another, may either be in ratios agreeably perceived and evidently related to one another, or they may be irreducible to any kind of order.* In so far as a picture possesses this quality, which we may call

* That pictures possess the quality of being in or out of time, due to their provoking in us adjustments which are necessarily temporal, is proved by the curious fact that it is possible in the case of a good picture to mark its rhythm with the voice or hand, all the line movements seeming to take their place in the rhythm; whereas with a bad picture such scansion leaves out, or is impeded by, some of the linear movement.—V. L. (1897).

Cf. *Æsthetic Responsiveness*. See also Index under *Rhythmic Obsession*.

being in time, it will be agreeable; without it, it is bound to be disagreeable.* For the quality of tie and the quality of time are so closely interdependent that we never find the one conspicuously present without the other. *Tie* and *time* are the most rudimentary merits which a picture can have; and although it is difficult to demonstrate, still more to describe their nature, their absence is instantly and automatically felt by any person of normal sensitiveness, and causes a picture to be dismissed as ugly.

Having explained what we have ventured to call *tie* and *time* in pictures, we can begin our examination of Catena's *St. Jerome* by noting that all its parts are perfectly tied together, and that all its details are related to each other in perfect time. As a result of this co-ordination in the directions and the velocities of the perceived lines, we see this picture at once and as a whole, as if all the parts of it were connected by invisible ties and obeying an unheard musical beat. Thus, we see the crucifix, the bookshelf and St. Jerome not as separate items but in connexion with each other: the lion, the quail, the marble steps and the broad-brimmed hat we equally see in connexion. And the existence of all the details seems to be going the same pace and to be happening together. As a result of this double co-ordination, of spatial and temporal relations, we feel as if we were safely enclosed in a haven where the minutes do not seem to pass and the sense of hurry is removed from our lives. And, as long as we look at it, the picture keeps up steadily this sense of leisure, of order and of serenity. This is what all good art gives us, and what we obtain

* Cf. *Das Psychische Tempo*, in Stern's *Psychologie der individuellen Differenzen*, Leipzig, Barth, 1900.

only accidentally and intermittently in ordinary life.

Meanwhile the colour of the picture, by stimulating certain of our nerves connected with breathing, gives to the air which we inhale a sort of exhilarating power; and the special colour quality of *coolness*, as we very properly call it, awakens in us a feeling of temperature similar to that of a spring day.

Quite independently of what it represents, the picture thus puts us into a delightful mood. But although it continues delightful as long as we look at it, we never seem to get into closer or more intimate relations with it. It defends us from the worry of the passing moment, it encloses us, but always as a something into whose innermost we cannot penetrate. Whereas, as we shall see when we compare Titian's masterpiece with it, a greater picture allows us, while encompassing us, to enter into it, and so to merge our existence in its nature. This difference is due to the fact that Catena's *St. Jerome* is without much realisation of the third dimension; its parts connect among themselves, but do not connect with us; and upon such connexion between the beholder and the various parts of the picture depend, as we have seen in treating of the third dimension, those feelings of vivid fellowship with the picture which help to make it important and absorbing to the beholder.

Moreover, in this Catena we can note the absence of another great quality which we shall find in the Titian, and which also differentiates a great picture from a merely good one—the quality which we usually call *life-likeness*, but which is really the quality of making the beholder feel more keenly alive. In this Catena everything seems to be

motionless, at a standstill, because, as we explained in connexion with the movement of architectural lines, we attribute movement to visual forms only when they are such that their perception entails complex adjustments of equilibrium in ourselves; interplay of balance which, instead of being recognised as part of our own being, is felt, except in experiments like ours, as existing objectively in the work of art. We shall be better able to understand these qualities of realisation and vitality when we find them actually present, as in Titian's *Sacred and Profane Love*, to which we now proceed.


This very great picture has, of course, all the good qualities of the *St. Jerome*, conspicuously those exciting us through its colour, widening our breathing, of making us feel light-hearted, of making us feel enclosed, and of making us feel in perfect time. But it has many other qualities besides. First, the quality of greater *realisation*: the third dimension is wonderfully rendered, the ground lies flat, and will bear our weight right through the picture into the distance. The objects have bulk, the sarcophagus stands squarely on the ground, and we feel the farther side of it as a reality. Similarly, the tree-tops have room all round them, and seem to wave freely in space. Secondly, the quality of greater *intimacy*, due, as we have seen, to a greater and more complex unity of the picture, whose parts connect, not merely sideways with one another, but backwards and forwards with the beholder, so that we enter into the picture with each of its details. There thus arises in us a heightened interest in this outer painted world, and towards its contents a warm feeling which is almost incipient affection. But, beyond all this, there is in the Titian picture

that vital quality which corresponds to its compelling us to balance all the time we look at it, and thereby setting up a sense of *living over an unusually wide area*, of being alive, one might almost say, on both sides, instead of only in front—in other words, the quality of universal movement. Let us, after summing up these qualities, examine the picture in some of its details, for the better verification of these general statements.

The two women on either side of the sarcophagus are not detached individuals, but combine with the little Cupid in the middle to form a whole of which they are the evident parts; while they combine also with the landscape, in which a larger whole is made up of similarly balanced parts. The figures seem to be still moving,* the wind is still in their draperies; the rush of movement of the woman in the white dress begins at the outside point of her drapery, runs to the *right* along her knee, and is joined by the rush of movement to the right of her right sleeve. The wave of movement does not run up her body to her head, but sweeps sideways to the right, across her and across the tree against which she is seated, and finally swings itself across into the uplifted arm of the beautiful nude figure seated opposite at the other end of the sarcophagus. She seems to catch the movement in her extended hand, as one might catch a ball, and keeps it poised high for an instant before the return movement swings across the

* My own impression after much familiarity with this picture (seen several times every year in visits noted in my *Gallery Diaries*) is that the only foreground figure who seems in the least moving, in the sense of *doing a movement*, is the dabbling Cupid. The two women I cannot conceive as ever "doing" anything else (cf. *Grecian Urn*). What *does* give me the sense of movement is the *lines*.—V. L. (1911).

picture to the *left*. The eye is caught by the church steeple behind her ; it leans a little over to the left, and with this the return movement begins. The drapery round her arm tosses upwards and her body stretches over to the left ; this stretch to the left is taken up by the plant by her side, whose topmost branch swings over to the left. The movement to the left here meets the arm of the woman in the white dress ; it goes up her arm at diminished speed, and gradually ends when it reaches her head and the tree and castle behind her. Then our eye is caught by the two rabbits at the back, and after this pause we are swung again across to the right. The movement is, therefore, in the line of the landscape, of the figures, and of the draperies. The drapery especially does not hang as real stuff would, but lifts up and moves of itself, like a bird on the wing, freely upwards and outwards as well as downwards. All the time that we look at the picture our balance is swung from left to right, and, after a pause, back from right to left. Our interest is not allowed to settle on to one of the figures and then on to the other ; but the two unite into a whole which is, so to speak, organically produced by the equilibrium of the beholder. This wonderful pattern—reminding one of the complexities of certain symphonies—is carried on in the lesser details of the picture. The Cupid dabbling in the water and the carved figures on the sarcophagus below him make, by their movements, a second connexion between the two women ; and the movement of the bas-relief is balanced by the swing to the left of the plant growing alongside the sarcophagus. Again, the two little rabbits behind the woman in the white dress are a check on her



SKELETON DIAGRAM OF TITIAN'S "SACRED AND PROFANE LOVE." THE CONTINUOUS LINE SHOWS THE DIRECTION THAT IS TAKEN BY THE EYE

movement, and hold her in place in a wonderful way, and the church steeple on the other side of the picture leans in towards the uplifted arm of the woman with the red cloak, and balances it so that the poise of the lamp in her hand can go on for ever without giving us any feeling of effort.

This balanced movement is, perhaps, the greatest quality a picture can have ; for, in looking at it, we unconsciously *mime* the subtly subordinated complexity of movement, and we obtain, in consequence, a sense of increased vitality and of marvellous harmony of existence.—C. A.-T.]

This comparison between Catena's *St. Jerome* and Titian's *Sacred and Profane Love* will have shown the reader in what consist some of the immense differences between a merely good picture and a great masterpiece, a difference not merely in degree, but in kind, for it consists in the presence or absence of a quality of higher organism and vitality. This supreme quality, which has its analogous one in every department of art, constitutes the picture into such a whole that we, in beholding it, are not only made happy, but enclosed, forbidden to escape or lapse, and forced to move through every detail of a mood of happiness. Life outside seems obliterated, and the moment of consummate self-sufficing feeling to have come, and, as in the case of Faust, to have been fixed.

VII

Before concluding these notes, we desire to remind the reader that we are fully prepared to find that our observations have been extremely rudimentary, imperfect, and partial. Moreover, that personal

idiosyncrasies* may have passed in our eyes as universally obtaining processes; and that our object in the present paper has been mainly not to establish facts, but to suggest a method.

More serious opposition, and far wider spread, will meet us in the shape of absolute disbelief in the existence of such half-hidden motor† adjustments and the dependence thereon of a process so important, and hitherto so unexplained, as the Perception of Form. There is undoubtedly, at first sight, something startling in the notion that it is we, the beholders, who, so to speak, *make form exist* in ourselves by alteration in our respiratory and equilibratory processes, and by initiated movements of various parts of the body. But there is nothing at variance with the trend of philosophy since Kant, in thus adding *Form* to the daily increasing list of apparently objective existences which we must recognise as modes of function of our mind; still less at variance with the tendencies of the most recent psychology, in adding another of the functions of what we call *mind* to the processes of what we rather arbitrarily distinguish from it as *body*. We must point out, also, that grotesque as may appear at first sight the notion of external form being in a way executed, or, to use a convenient word, *mimed*, by the beholder, we are daily postulating, though without perceiving it, some similar

* To the extent of my having been convinced that introspective experiment (which I did not trust myself to make without auto-suggestion) would reveal in myself the phenomena discovered by my collaborator.—V. L. (1911).

† Recent psychology (Kölpe, *Outlines*, and Semon, *Mnemische Empfindungen*) admits an "Unconscious" consisting of physiological processes abutting in, but not *parallel with*, ideas and feelings.—V. L. (1911).

mimetic connexion between perception and motion. We refer to the fact that we all of us reproduce through our gesture, not merely the gestures of other creatures, but the forms, the lines of directions, the pressures and upliftings of inanimate objects ; that we can place the muscles of our face in the same position as those of the person whom we choose to mimic ; and that we can nearly all of us, from our infancy and utterly untaught, reproduce more or less correctly on paper, or with movable objects, the shapes and positions of surrounding objects. Nor is this capacity limited to visual phenomena : the power of imitating sounds, the whole process by which, without any knowledge of the parts employed, we learn to speak and to sing,* all testify to some mechanism by which the perception of form, audible as well as visible, is intimately and automatically connected with movement, full-fledged or incipient, hidden or obvious, in ourselves. The mention of audible phenomena brings with it a double confirmation of the facts we have put forward with regard to visible form. For it is patent to all of us that the perception of various rhythmical relations in music is accompanied by very perceptible stimulation of movement, often externalised in movements of the head, the feet, and what is called beating time ; and it must be a matter of experience to many that the hearing of musical phrases, and still more, the repetition of them in memory, is accompanied by faint sensations in the chest and larynx, absolutely corresponding to the actual movements necessary for audible performance. Indeed, the fact that sequence of notes is so thoroughly remembered, while simultaneity of notes

* Cf. Groos, *Ästhetische Miterleben*.

seems to escape actual vivid memory, seems to prove that while harmony is perceived only by the auditive apparatus, melody, which is essentially audible *form*,* depends for perception on motor adjustments which are reproducible in the absence of an external stimulus.† All the various externalised mimetic proceedings are so familiar that we never even ask their reason; yet, when considered in themselves, they are several degrees more unlikely than the internal and hidden mimetic processes by which, according to the present authors, they can alone be adequately explained. Why such mimetic processes should exist is indeed a difficult question, but one which physiology may some day answer. But, answered or unanswered, the difficulty of explaining the connexion between retinal and muscular sensations in the eye and muscular adjustments of the chest, back, nape of the neck, and so forth, this difficulty is not any greater than explaining the connexion between impressions on the ear and muscular adjustments of the throat, mouth, and limbs; or, perhaps, of explaining any of the numerous interworkings of apparently dissimilar and distant organs.

A more difficult question appears to be raised, yet one which psychology may perhaps some day solve, when we ask how it is possible that a combination of ocular sensations and sensations of motor adjustment should be transmuted, in our normal experience, into ideas of qualities of form in external

* Cf. Gurney, *The Power of Sound*.

† Here I must again apologise for my extraordinary ignorance of the auditive memory of other folk. In my own case the sensations (which on closer scrutiny are *not* laryngeal but connected with mouth and nostrils) accompany not the actual hearing, but the recollection, of music.—V. L. (1911).

objects ; how the subjective inside us can turn into the objective outside ? Yet such a transformation is accepted without difficulty whenever we recognise the fact that alterations in the chemical and mechanical conditions of our eye are transmitted to consciousness in the utterly different state of qualities of colour, light, and rudimentary line and curve of external objects.

Indeed, it seems to the present writers that these mysteries at present besetting on all sides the most elementary facts of mental science are not so much hindrances to the acceptance of the æsthetical hypothesis herein put forward as indications that the further progress of psychology depends in great measure upon the employment of just such hypotheses. Psychology has problems more important and more mysterious than the problem of æsthetics—memory, emotion, volition, logical connexion, intellectual construction. Before relegating any of these to the limbo of the unintelligible, will it not be necessary to seek for whatever accompaniment of bodily sensations we may discover for them in the dim places of our consciousness ? *

And, this being the case, the authors of the present notes desire to call the attention of psychologists to whatever facts and suggestions may be contained in this hypothesis of the æsthetic perception of visible form.

VERNON LEE.

C. ANSTRUTHER-THOMSON.

* This sentence still expresses my views as to the psycho-physical basis of the æsthetic phenomenon, although I consider that the "mental" phenomenon of Empathy is sufficient basis for æsthetics as such.

Cf. *Æsthetic Empathy, Æsthetic Responsiveness, and Conclusion*.—V. L. (1911).

ÆSTHETIC RESPONSIVENESS :

ITS VARIATIONS AND ACCOMPANIMENTS

Extracts from Vernon Lee's Gallery Diaries, 1901-4

I

THE following extracts from my Gallery Diaries of the years 1901-4 contain the rough material of personal experience whence have arisen the views which have confirmed, but likewise qualified, those expressed or expounded by me in that first attempt at psychological æsthetics entitled *Beauty and Ugliness*. For, while gratefully acknowledging (in three of the foregoing essays) all that the study of Messrs. Lipps and Groos has done to enrich and clarify my ideas subsequent to my collaboration in *Beauty and Ugliness*, it is desirable to point out that these ideas have invariably arisen from, or been tested by, my own personal introspection. I point this out not to avoid any charge of plagiarism, which would be as absurd as contemptible where community of views is the result of a convergence of studies and speculations; but because an essential of my own view of these matters is precisely that æsthetic receptivity or (as the *Einfühlung* hypothesis suggests our calling it) æsthetic *responsiveness* is a most complex, various, and fluctuating phenomenon, and

one upon which we must now cease to generalise until we have analysed and classified its phases and factors and concomitants in the concrete individual case. But these extracts from my Gallery Diaries contain also implicitly the method of my own contribution to such analysis and classification. This method has aimed above everything at keeping these delicate processes of feeling and imagination as free as possible both from self-suggestion and from that artificial isolation of separate factors which is bound to falsify our knowledge of phenomena whose very nature is to be complex and unstable and as dependent upon inhibitions, abbreviations, substitutions, and summations as upon any more elementary psychological factors. Indeed the value of this method is largely due to its having arisen spontaneously and unintentionally. These extracts will show the reader (and herein lies one of their uses) that the examination of certain purely objective matters led to the question: "How do I behave in the presence of a given work of art?" "How do I become acquainted with it?"; and that this led, insensibly and at first unconsciously, to a series of other questions: "How have I perceived and felt to-day in my relations with given works of art?" until little by little I have found myself with so many introspective data to verify and compare that there has ensued a deliberate system of noting down all the factors and concomitants of my æsthetic processes which cause them to *vary from day to day*.*

* Cf. Külpe, *Der gegenwärtige Stand der experimentellen Ästhetik*. Separatabdruck aus dem Bericht über den II. Kongress für experimentelle Psychologie in Würzburg, 1906: "I am happy to find that so methodical an investigator as Herr Segal is described as having

Vary from day to day. In saying this I am forestalling one of the most important generalisations which have resulted from my own observations and those (which I shall now put before the reader) of two persons who have kindly assisted me. This generalisation is : that our response to works of art in general and to any work of art in particular varies from day to day, and is connected with variations in our mental and also our bodily condition ; or, to put it otherwise, that there exist in experience no such abstractions as *æsthetic attention* or *æsthetic enjoyment*, but merely very various states of our whole being which express themselves, among other results, in various degrees and qualities of responsiveness to works of art.

Persuaded as I am of the supreme importance for psychological æsthetics of direct and varied individual evidence, I shall postpone the extracts from my own Gallery Diaries until I have laid before the reader the papers of the two assistants above referred to, and this, first, because these two observers were unbiased by any theories (having been instructed merely to answer on certain points without knowing their theoretical bearing) ; and

found that 'from one day of experiment to another there was a 'revaluation of values.' The same (elementary linear) figure would one day be the most pleasing and next day the most displeasing. . . . He (Segal) rightly insists upon the importance of an æsthetic attitude, which eliminates all memory tendencies which are foreign to æsthetic apperception."

I would draw attention to the fact that such an "attitude" as that imposed by Professor Külpe on his experimental subjects must not be sought for in my own observations, whose interest consists precisely in their being, so far as possible, a faithful description not of experiments but of spontaneous occurrences.

secondly, because their two papers, being less choked with detail and with technical considerations than my own diaries, will give a better general suggestion of the main conclusions which I shall afterwards set forth.

I will begin with a summary made by my pupil Dr. Maria Waser-Krebs from notes kept from December 1903 to the middle of April 1904, the notes themselves having been taken at my request during art-historical studies in the Florence Museums. Dr. Waser-Krebs is doctor of philosophy, and her education up to the age of twenty-four had been chiefly historical and literary. She had never regularly learned to paint, but drew with amazing natural facility, amusing herself, for instance, by copying drawings of old masters and making diagrams of pictures. She belongs to what is, rightly or wrongly, called the *motor type*, but has personal experience of only a few of the localised sensations described by C. Anstruther-Thomson in *Beauty and Ugliness*. Her powers of visualisation are good but not exceptional; while her observations on "rhythmic obsession" lead me to mention that she has a taste for music and sings from notes and from memory. To this description I must add what is an essential in all æsthetic introspection: she is spontaneously aware of her psychological states and remembers and is interested in them equally spontaneously.*

* Titchener, *Feeling and Attention*, p. 197: "... the psychological attitude, the introspective habit, which so grows on one with time and experience that at last everything, novels and games and children's sayings and the behaviour of an audience in a lecture-room, becomes tributary to psychology, and one can no more help psychologising than one can help breathing."

Here is her résumé of observations made in museums during the winter 1903-4.

(a) Only in a comparatively small number of cases am I able to feel any æsthetic emotion, that is to say, really to enjoy a work of art, to enter into it.

(b) This sense of participating in the life of a work of art, of participating in a deep, joyous, thoroughly satisfying way I experience on the same occasion only for one given work of art, or at most for a given group of works.

(c) It has never happened, for instance, that I have been thus moved (German, *gepackt*, literally "laid hold of forcibly") by all the important works in a museum. I have no experience of an æsthetic condition corresponding to works of art in general, but only to one or a few given works.

(d) I have noticed, however, occasions when there was greater facility in grasping works of art in general; but on these occasions what I experienced was not so much enjoyment and exaltation as intellectual satisfaction.

(e) My observations allow me to distinguish three different varieties and stages in my receptivity for works of art.

(f) In three-tenths of the cases a work of art takes hold of me as a *whole* (chiefly as a unity of composition and coloured impression) quite suddenly as music takes hold of one: the feeling is one of deep-seated excitement (sometimes with heart-beating) and at the same time of being satisfied. The passing of time is unnoticed, and the sense of surrounding things almost lost. There is a *crescendo* of joy, a feeling of agreement between the work of art and myself, an inner harmony, a concordance of rhythm. The surroundings are perceived only enough to produce thoughts and associations which in no way interfere with the work of art. I leave the work of art with reluctance.

In all such cases I have made the following observations upon my physical condition:

I entered the museum feeling a little tired, open to æsthetic impressions, and closed to the outer world. I was quite indifferent to the visitors in the gallery. At the same time I was dominated by a strong *rhythmical obsession*, which continued while I looked at the especial work of art and which seemed to prevent the enjoyment of other works of art.

(g) In six-tenths of the cases the work of art does not catch hold of me: I have to make an effort to enter into it. I often succeed by mechanical fixing of attention, or by some scientific interest; and

so gradually reach the æsthetic contemplation of a work of art, until at last I come to *possess* it.

In these cases (*i.e.* of artificially induced attention) I am able to assimilate different works of art successively, to enter into their secret and enjoy their specific character. But this enjoyment lacks the inner excitement, the complete satisfaction, the exaltation (*i.e.* of the cases of spontaneous attention). In this second category of experiences my general state was as follows on entering the museum: I felt in good physical spirits, very open to impressions from the outer world. The rhythmic obsession due to my walking would diminish, disappear, or be replaced by a different one as soon as I had entered into contemplation of a work of art. In cases like this it has sometimes happened that as I passed from one work of art to another the *rhythmic obsession* continued to change before each, so that I had a rapid succession of new rhythms and new melodies which seemed to result from the work of art. These rhythms and melodies often came to me then for the first time.

Whenever the rhythmic obsession was very strong I noticed that it was suspended during rigorous visual attention, to reappear as soon as the attention was relaxed or interrupted. In similar cases looking was a painful effort, a continual struggle against a force arising and preventing my entrance into the work of art.

(b) At other times, also, I noticed that the melody which pursued me before different works of art underwent modifications of *rhythm and measure*, e.g. a trochee degenerating into an iambus, the *tempo* increased or diminished.

(c) In the remaining tenth of the cases there is absolute impossibility of entering at all into connexion with the work of art.

Efforts are useless: the work remains external and foreign: it seems in a way painful to me, almost hostile; and I leave the gallery under this disagreeable impression. In all such cases I have been previously suffering either from mental preoccupation or decided physical *malaise*. Or else I have had a musical obsession so strong as to worry me, a musical obsession to which nothing seemed to answer.

(j) I have been able (continues Dr. Waser-Krebs) to make the following remarks upon the process of contemplating a work of art.

First, the glance goes to the central point of the picture or statue (no matter how high or low the work of art may be placed), then rapidly to the meeting-point of the principal lines; there it rests an instant; and then, following again the principal lines, it hastens to the lower points, towards the bottom. From there the glance goes again to the highest points and then loses itself in the less

important lines. The going up of the glance is accompanied by a feeling of joy, strength, and lightness; while the glance towards the lower part is accompanied by a feeling of weight, of difficulty in breathing, and of slackness.

And with these significant details Dr. Waser-Krebs's very valuable memorandum unfortunately comes to an end.

There are several, more precisely seven, main threads to be picked out of this piece of introspective evidence; and these I should wish my reader to grasp as clues through the far more detailed and far less systematic information which I shall presently give from my own Gallery Diaries.

First.—The difference between the act of seeing and understanding* a work of art in the sense of taking stock of its peculiarities, and the act of enjoying it *æsthetically*.

Second.—The variations in the capacity for such æsthetic enjoyment, depending upon the psychical and also the physical condition of the individual beholder on the one hand and upon the choice of the work of art upon the other; the existence of states of more or less spontaneous æsthetic interest and enjoyment, and of corresponding states of æsthetic inattention and insensibility culminating in what, by analogy with the non-receptive conditions of religious mystics, I shall refer to as *æsthetic aridity*; "I see, not feel, how beautiful things are."†

Third.—The possibility, in some cases but not all, of overcoming such *æsthetic aridity* and inducing æsthetic responsiveness and enjoyment by forcing

* Titchener, *Feeling and Attention*, p. 238: "Cognition is not clearness: it is an associative process of the assimilative kind."

† Coleridge, *Ode on Dejection*. I have so frequently made use of this line as descriptive of *æsthetic aridity* (to borrow a word from

or decoying the attention on to the work of art by such processes as historical or technical examination or by interest in whatever the work of art is intended to represent or to express.

Fourth.—The frequent inhibition of enjoyment of a given work of art by immediately previous attention to dissimilar works of art, and also by attention to too many works of art possessing no common æsthetic characteristics.

Fifth.—The existence of (subjective) *movement and rhythm* attributed by us to the work of art, *movement and rhythm* found to be compatible or incompatible with that of any melodies or rhythms which may happen to be haunting the consciousness (“rhythmic obsessions”) to the extent of the one inhibiting occasionally the perception of the other.

Sixth.—The existence of definite processes of taking stock of given works of art ; or of paths along which the attention travels in the very complex process of æsthetic perception.

The seventh item deducible from Dr. Waser-the mystics) that I had better quote the passage in which it occurs :

“A grief without a pang, void, dark, and drear,” etc.

“And those thin clouds above, in flakes and bars,
That give away their motion to the stars ;
Those stars, that glide behind them or between,
Now sparkling, now bedimmed, but always seen ;

“Yon crescent moon, as fixed as if it grew
In its own cloudless, starless lake of blue ;
I see them all so excellently fair,
I see, not feel, how beautiful they are !

“I may not hope from outward forms to win
The passion and the life, whose fountains are within.
O Lady, we receive but what we give,
And in our life alone does nature live.”

Krebs's memorandum seems almost too self-evident to be insisted on; and yet there is scarcely a writer on æsthetics, however illustrious, who has not overlooked its existence in a part (sometimes in the whole) of his writings.* This obvious and yet neglected psychological item may be summed up as follows: The process of becoming aware of the subject represented (or the object imitated or the emotion expressed) by a work of art, is essentially different from the process of becoming appreciatively aware of the work of art's visible *form*; and this difference is so essential that one of the first tasks of empirical æsthetics must be the study of each of these two processes of awareness and of the intricate interaction alternately and sometimes contemporaneously inhibitory and co-operative, of the perception of the *visible form* and the recognition of the represented, imitated or expressed, *subject*.

II

The reader will be able to verify several of the above points in the next piece of evidence I shall put before him: a detailed introspective account of two visits to the Louvre, set down on return home by my friend Mlle. C., who had been instructed what kind of phenomena to notice, but who was unacquainted with Dr. Waser-Krebs's or my own diaries.

* Cf. *The Central Problem of Æsthetics*, p. 114 *et seq.*, for examples of the confusion between *such imaginative realisation of the subject represented with æsthetic perception of the visible form* by Mr. Berenson. I may forestall a conclusion arising from my present inquiry into individual musical responsiveness, and mention that there seems to exist a tendency to polarity between sensitiveness to musical form and sensitiveness to musical *expression*.

First Visit.—Weather damp, misty, sky grey but not dark. Noises seem deadened. I am aware of slight general weariness. I am not as much interested as usual in the faces and gestures of passers-by. On the whole a state of *organic* boredom. A melody is haunting me ["rhythmic obsession"], but I have no memory of the sound, it is a mere colourless schematic recollection, a succession. Pulse and breathing normal.

I enter the museum by the Renaissance sculpture. At first a difficulty in fixing my attention; but it is not attracted by the surrounding visitors. Unable to fix itself, my glance goes by brusque transitions from one ornament and one bust to another, as if seeking something. Once or twice the attention is caught by the expression of a face (in one of the sculptures), but only in passing by.

The rhythmic obsession had ceased with my irregular walk and with my transient stoppings before works of art.

After a general extremely rapid survey I come to an abrupt stop before a statue. At first a feeling of relief, of satisfaction, as if unconsciously pleased at having found the object on which one was going to fix the attention: a feeling of general satisfaction, an "*at last*." Then my body becomes motionless, there is a pause in breathing, a sort of internal tension and stupor. After that comes a sort of tendency to imitate the gesture and expression of the face of the statue looked at. (In thinking over previous experiences I remember clearly that the imitation of the expression of the face and of the position of the head exists always in a greater or less degree in my case.)

On all this, which is almost unconscious, there follows a period when I hold a sort of conversation with myself, when I reproduce in myself a psychological state parallel to that which the contemplated image tries to represent. I have even caught myself several times saying inwardly: "Ah, yes," or "That is it."

In the above observation I was looking at one of the *Slaves* of Michelangelo, the one with his hand resting on his forehead. During the culminating moment of æsthetic impression I am no longer conscious of noises or of people coming and going. Yet I notice that sometimes I perceive the presence of people, but as if—so to speak—the people were not really alive, and they arouse in me no thought, no observation: in a word, no reaction in me. I notice no further trace of the rhythmic obsession. At the end of a little time I feel a certain *gêne*—a need to tear myself from a domination. I believe the turning of the attention is nearly always due to the presence of some visitor in whom I am suddenly interested, or something happening around. When the impression has been very deep,

I have sometimes had palpitations. I was rather in a state of nervous depression at the beginning : but after this visit I notice excitement, a keener power of reaction. During this visit, after the first strong impression, curiosity was alive and there was "*un enthousiasme spécial*."

Second Visit.—Grey weather. Sudden changes, showers. The light sometimes very white, sometimes suddenly clouded. Air light and exhilarating. My movements are quick, attention active but shifting ; it jumps from one object to another following a sort of general curiosity. Free and active state of mind : a little ironical. One of those days when nothing irritates, when things seem detached from all influence on oneself, one considers them objectively. No rhythmic obsession. Heart and breathing normal.

I go to see the Watteaus in the Lacaze Room. No notice, or barely, of the visitors in the gallery. In crossing the other rooms on my way I stop before certain pictures, but merely to revive ideas or judgments they have suggested on previous occasions ; no impressions as such, it is a purely intellectual affair.

Reach the Watteaus : there is no rhythmic obsession, and nothing distracts the attention. Nevertheless there is great difficulty in entering into the picture. I notice that a certain depression and slight fatigue are the conditions most favourable to strong æsthetic impressions. In the state I am in I have critical observations, comparisons, but no real emotions, only purely intellectual experiences, aroused by a sustained attention. Never once do I lose the sense of discussing with myself, as if my personality were too distinctly defined and did not penetrate into the essence of the work, were not sufficiently supple to take its shape.

This condition irritates me and I try to escape from it by emotional stimulation : by adjectives and all the ready-made phrases which might perhaps produce emotion by a kind of trick. (All this is unconscious at the time : I only notice it later in thinking about it.) Moreover all these efforts, almost mechanical, have no result. After several fruitless attempts I give up trying to concentrate for the day ; my power of attention is exhausted by these efforts, and I am getting bored. Afterwards I have a sense of fatigue, of depression, instead of the excitement which I felt on days when the impressions were keen and spontaneous.

These two memoranda made several days apart (and immediately on return from the Louvre) by Mlle. C. will serve to foreshadow in my reader's mind the nature of such æsthetic introspection as I

desire to introduce among psychological workers; and of which my Gallery Diaries constitute a continuous and a gradually more and more deliberate record.

A gradually more deliberate record; for the introspection begins in my case unintentionally in the process of other observations upon works of art, and becomes an aim in itself only with the gradual acquisition of introspective facts requiring verification, and the gradual arising of queries connected with such introspective facts. Thus the diaries from which I shall now proceed to quote begin, in April 1901, with an attempt to settle to my own satisfaction a question which is not a directly psychological one. I took the opportunity of a stay in Rome to verify a theory of my friend Professor Emmanuel Löwy (in his *Naturwiedergabe in der älteren Griechischen Kunst**), according to which Greek statues were at first composed from three separate points of view (*Dreiansichtigkeit*), and did not acquire absolute continuity of planes and consequent continuity of points of view (*Vielsichtigkeit*) until the time of Lysippus. This apparently quite objective question led me to inquire: how one goes about it to look at a statue, how one follows the lines and planes, where the glance and attention enters into the statue? And this was an inquiry concerning no longer the statue only, but myself, the beholder, and my activities in its presence. The attempt to verify Professor Löwy's theory, which, if true, involves the beholder standing still once he has found the desired and separate points of view of a pre-Lysippian statue,

* Translated into English, with many illustrations, as *The Rendering of Nature in Early Greek Art*, 1907 (Duckworth).

naturally led me to inquire into the correctness of another (and this time a psychological theory), brought forward by myself in *Beauty and Ugliness* (p. 220) and according to which the contemplation of a statue causes the spectator to *mime internally* the gesture of this statue* in such a way that a complete æsthetic response to the statue would be facilitated or impeded by the attitude and gesture of the spectator during contemplation; a theory which, I may say at once, the studies of that very spring, 1901, caused me to limit to inferior or badly restored statues.

This inquiry implied a *study of what took place in myself in the presence of various statues, what associations of ideas, what feelings were awakened, and how I reacted psychologically both towards the visual form of the statue and towards the thing which the statue represented or the emotion it expressed.*

These two totally separate problems (whose only original connexion was that they might lead, and did so lead, to my abandoning two theories I had upheld in *Beauty and Ugliness*) became practically connected in my Roman gallery observations. The study of each speedily reacted upon that of the other. The more I observed, both objectively and introspectively, the more queries and problems presented themselves. After the first day I found that I was examining not only the work of art, but

* At the time of my putting into literary shape the notes for *Beauty and Ugliness* furnished me by C. Anstruther-Thomson, I was under the impression that this view of "Inner Mimicry" was shared by my collaborator. But she has since (in 1909) made it clear that she was not alluding to any miming of the *represented* action, but only of the *gesture*, so to speak, and the balance of the work of art as such. See her detailed statement in *The Central Problem of Æsthetics*, p. 119.

the consciousness in which this work of art was reconstituted. The beginning of such introspection is visible in a note of April 15, 1901, made (like nearly every one of these notes) in the presence of the work of art spoken of. The statue dealt with is the so-called *Subiaco Niobid* in the Terme Museum.

"In the case of this statue (certainly later than Lysippus) one really can go round and *must*. It affects me absolutely *topographically*, and when the man turns the pivot I have a sense of the monstrous as if a mountain were to rotate. Sincerely there is no more miming on my part of its supposed human action than there is miming of Monte Rosa. . . . Of course the mutilation of antiques immensely complicates matters. In this particular statue the *mimetic balance* happens to be magnificently kept, but the *balance* of lines and masses is irreparably lost. In fact I suspect that I *feel* in myself the pressure—in a sort of attempt to restore—of an imaginary head, just a ball to steady the slew of the figure; even to some slight degree of an imaginary raised upper arm. . . ."

On the same day as the preceding there is a note on the way we perceive the objective motion of a stream of water or fountain-spurt, after a conversation about this with an engineer. The difference between the "movement of lines" (*i.e. empathically* attributed movement) and the *objective movement* (which I shall take the liberty of distinguishing as "motion") or *locomotion* of real objects and persons had long interested me; and this difference and its distinction will play a more and more prominent part in the following gallery notes. The attempt to test Löwy's theory of *Dreiansichtigkeit*, entailing experiments of moving round and standing

still in front of statues, immediately leads (as already remarked) to the question of *inner* (or outer) *mimicry* which had been raised in *Beauty and Ugliness*. A note of April 16th suggests that: "quite apart from the obvious subject (*i.e.* of the work of art) there is in plastic art a *dramatic*, a human element quite analogous to the one in music and connected not with æsthetic *Einfühlung* but with the act of recognition of the *represented* movement or intended emotional expression. This remark leads us into the thick of the question not only of *inner mimicry* but of *subject versus form*, and *dramatic*, or, as I sometimes call it,¹ *human interest* versus *æsthetic* (*i.e.* formal) interest.*

April 17. *Terme Museum*. "I am beginning to suspect that we should give but little importance to the *miming*, where it really exists, of the gesture of a statue. I mean of its *human*, actual gesture as distinguished from the *movement of lines*. . . . There seems no reason why perception of form, *i.e.* of *dynamic lines*, should be in any way connected with our own gesture. What probably *is* thus connected is the *recognition* of gesture : *i.e.* the rapid completing of a very partial visual impression by remembered experiences of our own. . . . To begin with : I think statues are not often really doing the action we attribute to them. I am now looking at a *Muse of Tragedy*, one leg raised and the other bearing the weight of the figure. But in reality what the *lines are doing* is a combination between the outline of a mountain group and the *mass* of a fluted pilaster. I think we are cozened by the *vivacity of lines* into thinking they give what with reference to our other

* Cf. discussion of this point and criticism of passages by Berenson in *The Central Problem of Æsthetics*, p. 112.

experiences we *recognise* as the gesture of the statue. In fact I think any *miming* on our own part will be in proportion, not so much to our present æsthetic perception as to our awakening of memory images ; a memory reviviscence which ought, on the whole, to disturb our present contemplation, *i.e.* if looking at a statue's hand makes me *think* of my own hand, then I may have a sensation in it ; but not if I see that other hand only *as form*. This would explain why dramatic or pathetic expression is less realised by people who look at the form. Verify this notion on *Laocoön*. . . .

"Yes, decidedly it seems to me that I *realise* better that brutal *Gladiator* (Roman bronze, in Terme Museum) when I too sit in that position or thereabouts. But what I realise is not the form but his gesture ; similarly his position makes me feel, even more powerfully, that looking at him is like looking at a real sitting man. And the peculiarity of this bronze is that it is singularly without *æsthetic weight values*. The feet don't seem really to rest much more on the heels than my own feet do. The arms are very decidedly resting with their real anatomical weight, *i.e.* but little, on the thighs, and the thighs have very little *spring*. The conventional, *i.e.* æsthetic, part seems to begin with the head and shoulders.

"Looking again at the *Subiaco Niobid*, I cannot say I feel the smallest call to do his attitude. And on reflection, I don't see how I could, for I doubt whether it is in the least a human one. To begin with, seen from one side the activity is much greater than that from the other, merely because the thrust of the lines is more complex. N.B.—This is not saying that in *thinking* of this Niobid I might

not inwardly or outwardly mime him : but that would just be because I no longer saw him well, but substituted a composite experience-image of my own."

Thus introspective observations become more discriminating. It is henceforth no longer a question of the *statue in the abstract*, but of *individual concrete statues* and my response to them. I begin to observe spontaneously and then to study deliberately what takes place in me before good or bad statues, before architecturally built up or realistically expressive ; and finally, what associations of ideas, what feelings awaken or lapse in me, how the subject represented by the work of art acts upon me, as well as the visible form, that visible form which constitutes its intrinsic existence.

April 17. *Vatican Museum. Braccio Nuovo.*
 "I am getting to believe that it is only the bad statues which tempt us to *mime*. I feel not the faintest tendency to mime, in the sense of imitating the action of, the *Apoxyomenos*. How could I feel this, since, on the contrary, I feel impelled to walk round him, looking up, while he, if doing anything, is standing still looking level. Exactly the same with the Polycletan *Amazon*, the *Doryphoros*, *Faun*; and that very charming little *Apollo Musagetes* (opposite the *Nile* and the *Demosthenes*), which are about the only good statues here. Whereas the other wretched herd do not tempt me to *mime* them. Why ? Simply because, I suspect the good ones are not really doing their supposed action, or indeed any. While the bad ones are doing their action and nothing else : they positively gibber, shrinking, showing surprise, presenting arms, raising cups, begging, and answering the bell, asserting

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themselves with every form of impertinent emphasis. And I verify that all restored arms and hands do their work with a vengeance, except the arm of the *Apoxyomenos*, restored, I believe, or mended, by Thorwaldsen. It is the *being busy*, the *doing something*, which makes bad statues unrestful and *prevents our looking at them*. We spot the action and have done. The action also, when thus realised, is disagreeable exactly because it is unnaturally arrested: we cannot continue to look probably because our *miming* instinct demands the next moment of the action and feels painfully its reiteration. (Verify this on instantaneous photographs.)

"I find myself in positive doubt whether the *Doryphoros* and *Apoxyomenos* are standing still or walking. In fact *they are not doing either* any more than a mountain. They will never be otherwise *than they are*. The 'movement' we talk of is a pure movement of lines, either of lines rising, expanding, carrying, etc., when we stand fixed before them, or of lines changing when we walk round (or in the 'frontal' ones *across*) them."

April 18, *Capitoline Museum*. Analyses of several statues with reference to the relation of *movement of lines* and *gesture*.

"The *Antinous* is, of course, merely the *Doryphoros* altered and, in so far as *Doryphoros*, has little action. It is the stoop of the head which gives the raised foot its movement, and of course it was the gesticulating, expressive hands I felt inclined to mime when lately some one spoke of this *Antinous*. I don't feel the least inclination to *mime* the *Dying Gladiator*, except perhaps a little the head. . . . The *Venus* is contradictory: in some views she is

doing her stooping only too well, from others much less. But, the outline of her head, back, and shoulders remains architectural. Her head acts like the capital of a column. . . . I think the vague immodesty is due more to this realisation of action than to the very lovely realism of the flesh."

Vatican Museum. Notes on several statues, always from the point of view of gesture and of the movement of lines.

"*Apollo Sauroktonos*: not the faintest tendency to *realise* his action. It is eternal, and the lizard will never stir.

"The *Ariadne*, with all her pretentious modelling and drapery, seems to me one of the worst statues in existence: a woman arrested in the act of falling off a sofa on which she is lying in a hideously uncomfortable position. The drapery, so far from keeping her in place, *as lines*, drags her down. . . . She is derived from the recumbent goddesses of the Parthenon: only here the legs, feet and drapery contradict that mountain quality of the great original. It is the *inertness*, the visible tumbling *out of bed* which makes the public think that she is sleeping. 'One must be asleep in order to tumble out of bed like that!' we unconsciously say to ourselves.

"*The Belvedere Hermes*. How little such a statue tempts one to *mime* is shown by the fact that his head constantly attracts one upwards: now his head is very much bowed. Moreover his *planes* tempt one to walk round. Now, if anything, he is *walking downhill*. . . . Evidently in looking at real people we are perpetually spotting and identifying action and expression. The really *motor* side of æsthetic-perception is quite distinct from this

miming—even contradictory to it. The fact of having ‘motor images’ of people does not in the least imply memory for the *balance* of a group or its lines. *Query*: What is the glance of architecturally composed statues? It must *be a way into the statue*, and must be one of the main lines of movement along its surface or profile. I think I have verified this for the *Hermes*; the awful Canovas are distinctly *looking out of themselves*.

“*The Apollo Belvedere* already has (probably because a pastiche) a little too much of the kindle and snort which makes him restless. But even with him, his glance never makes *us* look at what *he* is looking at, as the glance of real people, I think, does. (Note the singularly æsthetic impression of the glance of very beautiful real people—Princess V., Mrs. S., even Lady V., their glance making *us* look at *them*—their glance drawing *us* inwards.)

“Verified about glance in *Demosthenes*. From the position of his head he ought to be looking at *me* when I look at him; but he never catches my glance. One reason for not marking the eyeballs is that doing so directs the glance outwards; the statue focuses. Now a statue ought, so to speak, *to focus inwards*. . . .

“Women do better in a gallery, are more tolerable than men, because skirts and hats make them in a slight degree architectural: and because the *action* of their gait is dissimulated. A ‘well-hung’ skirt is one which substitutes a more agreeable movement to the real one of their legs.

“Verification of question of the glance on ten or twelve statues. *Roman statues look out at one*.

“*Braccio Nuovo*. Verification of same question on my dear little *Musagetes*. Catching his glance

I go first to the sunflower arrangement of folds round his belt, then up his extended arm by the curls round his head and the laurel crown.

"The glance seems to me to be *initial*, always—or nearly so. Our human habit makes us (where there is no objective movement) go straight for it; and in the good statues it directs our eyes along the statues' highways. Probably on a mountain a well-placed church or tree fulfils this function."

This inquiry is continued the following days. *Terme Museum. The Apollo.* "It seems to me that here the point where we leave his glance—or think we leave it (for I seem to look at the eye itself, then to follow the glance down the nose and as far as I can go, without moving my head)—is at the pectorals. My eye goes round them to the left (whether from habit of reading from left to right or because his head is turned to *my* right I can't tell), then round the shoulder and head and down the opposite side. . . ."

"*Terme Museum. Dionysos.* Here it seems to me that his glance makes me catch the middle of his bent arm and travel up from that. . . ."

"It struck me yesterday at the Cast Museum that it is the *turned head* which first invites one to take in rather more than the mere full-face view of a statue. . . ."

"The result of this inquiry about the *glance* of statues, and the way it leads us in our perception of their æsthetic (as distinguished from their anatomical) form, is summed up in two sentences of that diary, representing the objective and the subjective side of the question: 'The work of art is, so to speak, its own showman,' and 'The total impression

of a work of art is, I think, the sum of a series of acts of attention.'

"This latter formula agrees, to a degree I was not then aware of, with the trend of recent *introspective psychology*. But the psychological and introspective side of my inquiries was, almost unnoticed by myself, growing and ramifying. While noting down the relation between the glance (that is to say, the direction of the eye) of the Terme *Dionysos* and that statue's general lines of composition, I found myself adding, 'One ought to inquire into a specific pleasurableness, I don't know how to call it, of beautiful sculptural anatomical form as such. Is it the sense of planes in detail? Or the feeling of youth and vigour, human comeliness?'"

From April 22 to April 25 my observations, made in the Vatican and Capitoline Museums, and Professor Löwy's splendid Museum of Casts, are still ostensibly concerned with the question of *Dreiansichtigkeit* (frontality) versus *Vielansichtigkeit* (continuity of plastic planes) and that of the tendency to *mimic internally* the gesture and attitude of works of art. But the real subject of inquiry becomes more and more the relation of *movement of line to represented motion or locomotion*, that is to say, the relation in the spectator's mind of the work of art's *form* and its *subject*. For instance:

April 22. *Vatican Museum. Hall of Muses.*
 "... The *forward* movement so strongly marked in the *Apollon Musagetes* (I expect one would feel forward tension in thinking of him, and I find I instinctively hold my breath and dilate nostrils in looking at him) is not in the least given in his legs, which are little indicated and that little singularly inert (save the raised back foot) but in his drapery,

which is rippling back in his robe and distinctly coming forward in his mantle ;—the going back of the one half and the coming forward of the other half of the lines (in the drapery) is a first-rate illustration of Lipps's favourite formula of the sense of movement produced by lines whose tendency seems to clash. It seems to me also as if while the ripples of his hair distinctly flow backward, the spikes of his laurel wreath as distinctly press forward.

“This statue (the original of which was probably by Scopas) is a wonder of movement of lines. . . . If my *experience* tells me that there *is* movement, it is not that of a sailing-ship (though we should describe both as sailing, advancing *against the wind*) but rather of a succession of waves, where the first falls back against the advance of the second. . . . The statue of *Lucius Verus* has as much action as two ugly English boys who come suddenly in, and that apart from his restored arms. . . . He is also firmly and sheepishly looking at an object in the room.”

Several observations of the same kind follow : Why does the drapery of the *Venus Anadyomene* not seem to slip off ? Walk round the *Hermes* searching for the union of planes. “The Romans discovered that the ear was not a rosette, but an organ capable of individual expression—hence the look of *cocking* them in their busts. . . .”

Comparison of the realism in movement between mediocre Roman art and the architectural quality of Greek art summed up, “Is not the *Caryatid* the central symbol of great sculpture ?”

April 25. *Conservatori Museum*. Notes upon the *movement of lines* and the *movement of gesture* in

statues; and the greater activity of gesture in antique statues which have been badly restored :

"I am distinctly annoyed by the eagerness, the forward action of the three very bad *Tyrannicides*. They keep catching my attention and not keeping it; it is like having one's name called repeatedly. This action is an intrusion in my life; what relief in the plash of the fountain going on steadily on its own account! All the statues—all or nearly all bad—of the room (since rearranged) have the aggressive self-assertion of photographed people. Even poor old crucified Marsyas, whose lines are not even pulled by his position, is fixing a bust on the floor steadfastly. How the *Baptism* by Titian has the same permanence as in good statues—self-continued, satisfying."

April 26. *Museum of Casts*. Notes on composition in sculpture. The frivolous quality of statues lacking *architectural weight*.

The disagreeableness of real *action* in a statue is independent of the violent and instantaneous character of the action.

"I do not think even the most four-square statues intended us to take root before them. The very fact of their having subsidiary sides makes us move round, though it prevents our moving round without stopping. And the head always invites inspection from every side. There is therefore a sort of reinforcement of the emotion produced by the chief view, a consciousness of subsidiary beauty, of cubic thoroughness which makes them quite different from a relief. This is quite different from the sense of roundness, or real existence in space. It is a concession to our habit of penetrating in and behind, to our sense of abstract bulk rather than

to any knowledge that real people have cubic existence."

I would beg the reader to remark these questions of *summation* and of *cubic existence*, which he will meet with further on, and in constantly greater development. I have kept for the end of this instalment of my Gallery Diaries a note written in the Museo delle Terme and in the midst of my observations on our alleged tendency to *mimic internally* (*Innere Nachahmung*) the *represented* action or gesture of works of art.

My reason for thus keeping back and isolating this particular entry in my diary is that it happens to forestall a generalisation which has grown more explicit and certain with every day of my introspective observations and of my study of individual response not only to visual art but also to music. It is the second most important generalisation of the æsthetics in which I believe, their first general principle and basis being the *dynamic empathy* (mechanical *Einfühlung*) of Lipps's *Raumæsthetik* and of C. Anstruther-Thomson's and my own *Beauty and Ugliness*. But although less basal than the hypothesis of *Einfühlung*, the generalisation contained in the following passage is perhaps of more primary need to the student of æsthetics, because it puts order into the confusion of *Form and Subject*. And for this reason I commend it to my readers :

Of course all form which we recognise as human awakens or can awaken the various orders of feeling which are awakened by human beings : sympathetic, voluptuous, painful, etc., because the act of such recognition means a reference of them to memory impressions which must be more or less saturated with the human feelings elicited in contemplating

the human realities of which those impressions (images) are the residue. But this emotion is evoked just in proportion as we refer the artistic form to the human reality, *i.e.* in proportion as we dwell little on the work of art and much on the memory impression. Literature, appealing entirely to such memory impression, has therefore a "moral power" quite different from that of art. The more a statue makes us look at it, the more it holds us by *its* reality, the less *moral* (or immoral) feelings we shall have. These are got largely by substituting the *word* for the *form*. If men have been in love with statues, it is because they have substituted for them the flesh and blood images of their memory.

It is in this way that art, by reversing the process and furnishing us with artistic images and emotions to be revived by *real* things—by accustoming us to translate reality into form (instead of form into reality)—can purify and elevate the contents of our consciousness. The same with music.*

These observations made in museums were

* Cf. an article of mine, *The Riddle of Music*, in *Quarterly Review*, January 1906, p. 227. "In this fusion, or rather this oscillation between the emotional suggestion and the æsthetic contemplation of music lies, perhaps, the moral and social function of art. For, whether a composition affect us as a beautiful and noble experience, faintly tinged, vividly tipped, with some human emotion, or whether it affect us as an emotional experience kept within the bounds of æsthetic order, shaped in æsthetic beauty, by the presence of musical form—whichever of the two possibilities we consider, there remains an action of the æsthetic element upon the emotional; and the emotional is probably purified by the æsthetic, as the æsthetic is unquestionably brought deeper into our life by the emotional. . . . Our emotions, our moods, our habits of feeling, are schooled into the ways of lucidity and order, of braced and balanced intensity . . . of contemplative happiness, which are the ways of æsthetic form."

resumed in Florence in the winter of 1901-2, and this time especially in relation to pictures. They begin December 3, by notes on the movement of lines, the greater or less tension and cohesion in the composition of Filippino, Mariotto Albertinelli, Giovanni Bellini, and Leonardo. This is the note made on the *Allegory* of Bellini: "After looking a little I seem to *flatten down** the water, which at first looked rather a vertical wall, and in doing so I feel as if I were relieved and breathed more freely. Perhaps the flattening is a subjective effect, perhaps the slow perception of reflections, etc., on water. When a picture pleases we probably do a deal of subjective correction to it."

December 6. "I begin deliberately to ask myself, 'Why does this picture please me?'—'Why does this other displease me?' making at the same time an analysis and an inventory in both cases. As a general result the simplest attraction to distinguish is that of colour,† and that of certain tangible qualities, such as softness, and warmth of the flesh, etc. I give here the analysis headed: 'Why I don't like *Lorenzo Monaco* (large Madonna and Saints).'

* Waldemar Conrad, *Der æsthetische Gegenstand*, in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, iv. 3, 1909, says, p. 408, of the æsthetic line: "*Sie muss, eben wie eine wirkliche Linie, in einem einfachen Bewegungsakt anschaulich und nicht erst durch die eigenartige kombination von akten erfasst werden durch die wir uns zweidimensionale Ausbreitung zur Anschauung bringen.*" Also p. 422.

My own experience is that of a sensation of *leaving off and beginning again, a sensation of distinct change of motion*, in the eye, accompanying the recognition that certain portions of a painted surface are to be interpreted as *verticals* as distinguished from *perspectived horizontals*, or *vice versa*.

† Cf. *Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 206.

"(1) The colour—acid, shrill, crude, opaque (probably repainted).

"(2) The swarthy, sooty faces.

"(3) Their being set like ill-mended crocks on shoulders.

"(4) The idiotic glowering which makes me feel queer.

"(5) The vague, delusive, changing relations of body and head in space, like masks and bats, waving in space, but waving at wrong discordant intervals, so that I find a protuberance where I expect an emptiness.

"(6) The limpness of arms and hands, particularly contrasted with truculent pose of head and glance.

"(7) The total scatteredness, idiocy, fussiness.

"N.B.—On the whole one of the ugliest pictures I know."

Same inquiry. *Domenico Veneziano*. "At first I don't care much, and have a slight difficulty in attending. Perhaps the acid magenta-ish rose and acid pistachio green chill me. Or rather the sourness of the blue against it. . . . Then I am a little put off by the extreme lightness of colour. At first the saints have no body, having so little shadow. Only little by little I perceive the body due to matchless poise and pressure and directness of thrust. But something in the relation with the background puts me off—there doesn't seem room for more than half of them against those pillars; they are like wafers. Is it the bad perspective worrying me? But I get charmed by the lovely (unrestored) colouring, cold rose, warm grey, vivid geranium; by the exquisite light colours of the floor. The spring of the little Gothic arches

delights me. The splendid line (mountain line) of female saint; the ship-like, swan-like poise of her head (utterly unhuman). The rock-boulder quality of Saint Francis; his stooping head not taking off from his soaring erectness. The fine form, decided gesture of Saint John. The flattening of all the faces delights me. I enjoy the pane of glass, so to speak, between us.

“N.B.—Of course this very fine picture is totally without imaginative or emotional quality, the figures are like chairs and tables simply.”

Giorgione, *Moses*. Why I like this picture :

“The landscape makes me a little breathless by its brown colour, but I enjoy going into it with the eye : I am not sure whether it suggests real landscape. . . . The other colouring, local passages, contrasts, enchants me : the shot quality, laced with white and rose. . . .

“Then the deft, *pat* painting, e.g. in chains, fringes, folds of linen. This indicative slightness gives me high pleasure.

“Then the roominess, none of that frightful crowd. (I am thinking of *Lorenzo Monaco*.)

“Then the figures’ relation of bulk and pressure. Then a certain limp, *posing* way of standing. The plant-quality about the head and neck. The extreme unconcernedness, yet thorough *being there* ; in this very scattered group and vague action, a mysterious unity.

“A sense of leisure, seriousness, effortlessness. Life easy, but very grave.

“This picture is not exhilarating, but very reposeful. Except in the two lovely youths, no expression and no discoverable literary suggestion or

reminiscence. The poetry is visual ; you could not make a sonnet about it.

“ I think the easiest thing to find out whether one likes is the colour. Certain blues and lilacs catch me at once with a sense of slight bodily rapture, unlocalised but 'akin to that of tastes and smells. Also certain qualities of flesh, its firmness, warmth (*realism* undoubtedly), as with Titian's *Flora*. This picture gives a sense of this flood of life : heightening one's own (this seems very unæsthetic, perhaps it is). I confess to a wish to kiss—not to touch with fingers—the *Flora's* throat. The dreadful repainted flesh of the *Duchess of Urbino* gives me a horrid sense of touching cardboard.”

Uffizi Gallery. December 9. “ A very vague notion which came to me in the gallery, and which I note down in its vagueness, trusting that circumstances may make it clearer. After all, may not the perception of form be, normally, a subconscious process accompanying the conscious process of recognition of the subject of the work of art, the utility or name of the thing represented ? And would this not explain our inability to say *why* we like a form, as opposed to our manifest facility in saying *what* that *form* symbolises or suggests ? In other words, are we not pursuing a necessarily unclutchable phenomenon in our pursuit of perceptions of beauty and ugliness ? First, consider that if what we call beauty represents a desirable complex of organic modes, and ugliness the reverse thereof ; would not the stability, the constancy of repetition of the act of preference tend to make it very automatic, and of a degree of ‘ Fusion ’ which defied analysis ? Whereas the ‘ spotting ’ of qualities, the inference of qualities, the reading of the symbol, the calling

things by name and evoking their associations would necessarily be exceedingly varied ; varied because it depended upon the synthesis of desire, need, habit, attention, which in all cases would differ. . . . The real world phenomenon is so individual, so different from the phenomenon of yesterday or a minute ago, that it is bound to be conscious and distinct.

“Secondly, for practical purposes there is no need that we do otherwise than react correctly to æsthetic stimulations, and the more automatically the more safely and correctly. Whereas for practical reasons the mere ‘spotting,’ *naming*, recognising, is most advantageous when very conscious ; if for no other reason because such ‘spotting’ often tends to concerted action between various individuals, and therefore requires to be communicable. The habit of recognising what a picture *represents* is intimately connected with the ability to tell some one else, or store it definitely in one’s memory in the same way that one notes for oneself and others, ‘in such a place I noticed such and such an object, useful or dangerous in such or such cases.’ Hence the recognising process would have a rich analytic vocabulary, while the æsthetic process of attraction or repulsion would, as indeed we find, have no vocabulary at all ; for our names of visible qualities none of them denote *æsthetic ones* : red, blue, tall, long, triangular, square, tell us of no *æsthetic* peculiarities. For those we must go to the names of *our moods* : pleasant, unpleasant, harmonious, jarring, unified, etc.*

“The long and short of all this is that normally, when we look at a picture or statue, we *think* the

* I ought to have added : and to the names of our *modes* of movement : strong, slack, free, light, rapid, harmonious, etc.

subject, and *feel* the form, and express the first in rich and varied language intelligible to every one, while we only indicate the *effect of the other on us* in vague terms not much more than translations of gestures and cries, 'I love!' 'I'd rather never see it again,' etc."

Florence, January 19-20, 1902. *Note on the interior of the Cathedral at nightfall.* "It is on such misty days, and towards dusk, that churches reveal their qualities of spatial arrangement. The people become mere faceless gliding ghosts; one is alone with the building. I note the emotion of heightened being, of vitality as it were from one's head, which is carried higher than usual. I feel lifted with a lighter tread, at the same time there is absolute restful satisfactoriness; not rest in the sense of self-abandonment; but not any of the excitement of French Gothic.* How any one can feel religious *awe* in such a church, I cannot conceive: one becomes a kind of god, and the place is a god.

"The next day under crude light, the people, the ugly arches become visible too much.

"Next morning. Yesterday, being tired and harassed, I walked to the *Opera del Duomo*. As usual the people in the streets on a winter day depressed and grieved me; they seemed a variety only of that foul town mud one picked one's way in. On the staircase of the *Opera del Duomo* my eye met a fragment of freize, carved and set with Cosmati work. I had a very vivid sense of *liberation*, of having slipped into another world, in which mud, bodily and mental, does not enter; a feeling of being where *I ought to be.*"

While staying in Rome during February and

* Cf. *Beauty and Ugliness*, p. 201.

March 1902, I resumed my notes about the Movement of Lines and Real Movement.

February 17. *Capitoline Museum*. "Marcus Aurelius seen from the window. . . . Evidently if the horse had anything like *real* movement, we should be distressed by the pedestal over whose brink the next step must take him. The movement is mainly due to the resistant line of the quarters, hind legs and tail, the forward thrust of Marcus Aurelius' arm. . . . Curious that the raised front leg in which the *real* action of a real horse mainly resides, carries the eye back, and with its hoop-like line is what prevents the horse going over the pedestal. The mane, waving backwards, does much the same, and probably the bridle did it also. . . . The *real* horses—to be sure only Roman cab-horses!—move only because they change place across my eye and across the square. But they have no *line of movement*!

"N.B.—Examine to what extent the knowledge how things in reality grow or lie affects our sense of movement: knowledge, *e.g.* that the *mane* grows backwards from the head.

"Roughly speaking, even the very worst busts have forms of neck, ear, and jaw, mode of carriage of head, wholly unlike those of real people.

"A statue like the Capitoline *Venus* is not one work of art, but several, of which some bad. Seen from in front the only agreeable impression is due to our knowledge that she is *well grown* [for the limbs as such have no beauty of line], physically pure, and to the sense of pleasant resistance and warmth of flesh (like Titian's *Flora*)—in fact a realistic pleasure.

"Seen from the side and back she becomes a

mountain composition, interesting like a Michelangelo. . . .

"The work of art is the joint product, the point of intersection of the process of the attention of the artist who makes it (hence Löwy's *memory images*, etc.),* and of the process of attention of those who look at it.

"Let us try to reconstruct both these. Ask ourselves about, *e.g.* antique statues. What were people doing, thinking, attending to, when statues offered themselves most habitually? Certainly not going round *en touriste*, nor like me at present, half killing themselves in trying to fix, possess, understand. The first way in which a human being meets any statue is when he asks, 'What does it represent?' and (as most tourists show) such meeting rarely goes any further, until we get to the artist's or archaeologist's attitude, 'How?' 'By whom?' 'Why was it made?'

"But we must try to understand what kept the ordinary beholder before the statue, or brought him back to it. First, I think, the statue, commemorative or votive, being there as a natural object, part of scenery or piece of furniture from which the attention could not escape.

* See Löwy's *Naturwiedergabe*. Professor Löwy explains the combination in the same figure of profile face and full-face eye, of profile legs and full-face chest, etc., observable not only in all primitive art but in the drawings of children and savages, by such figures reproducing the memory images of what is easiest to understand and see and most interesting, which persist and impede the "seeing" of the model, the memory image being due to successive impressions, and preventing the immediate artistic perception of simultaneous aspects. In this connexion cf. Mr. Henry Balfour's extremely interesting anthropological study, *The Evolution of Decorative Art*, 1893 (Percival).

“Secondly (this is at least the Christian condition), its being an *idol*, an aid to devotion, something on which the eye is fixed in prayer or in the desire to realise divinity.

“Hence we are quite wrong, we critics, in coming and staring at a statue as such. It is nearer the normal to *spot* a given figure and feel attracted by *what it represents*—as I am attracted here by the thought and attributes of Apollo. The natural process for going into art is either, ‘So *this* is Apollo’—or else ‘O Apollo,’ etc. But it is not, ‘What the deuce is the value or importance of this statue?’ or ‘How does it answer to such and such a demand or definition?’”

This consideration will be resumed later, as we shall see.

The notes go back to other questions. *The Amazon, Braccio Nuovo*. “I am not sure, but it seems as if the quality of *flesh*, possible softness and warmth, certainly helped us to look at her, perhaps by a kind of physiological *Einfühlung*. It may perhaps be merely a question of planes, as in a mountain. But I suspect something more than form interests, the suggestion of a beyond, a life more than the skin, like the possibility of a forest, etc., on the distant mountain. Also, two *Diana* torsos, *Chiaramonti*, of which the drapery charms me. But I am attracted by the idea of the goddess vaguely—the woods, etc.

“When I said that we first make for the eyes of a statue and follow them I was mistaken. This happens only in bad statues, and the following of the glance has the destructive effect of carrying *us out of them*. What we do is, I think, to follow the *line* of the brows, or more properly the brow opposite

our left (owing no doubt to our reading from left to right), to the circumference and thence upwards. For this reason a slight tilt of the head is a help, I think, by taking the frontal line of the right angle. I wish I could make out on what depends the *looking out* of Roman and realistic statues; and the reverse therefore of good Greek work. It has nothing to do with the pupil being marked. The Terme *Dionysos* has the pupil clearly engraved, but is not looking, at least not looking *at*; whereas a very bad Roman Peter Lely-ish *Juno* (?) there has an amazing *looking out*. Probably it would be found to depend upon the presence (or absence) of *some arrangement of lines*, differing in each individual case very likely, which counteracts the outwardness of the glance. It is quite certain that one of the chief charms of, say, the Ludovisi *Ares* is exactly this thorough self-concentration of glance. It makes one think of certain words by Dante about the self-containedness of the Divinity. And it makes one feel similarly to certain old landscapes, *i.e.* Perugino's—and similarly to how one feels *inside* a building. One of the greatest delights of a work of art is when it *encloses* our attention, and that is why architecture is the most easily efficacious art, and sculpture, as a rule, the least so. 'Und Marmorbilder *stehen* und *sehen* mich an' (Goethe's *Mignon*). The good ones do the first, the bad the second."

It was following out such thoughts, which came to me, as we have seen, in the course of my *objective* study of works of art, that there shaped itself a distinct intention of studying the response of the spectator in artistic contemplation. Immediately after the note I have just quoted comes the following :

February 21. *Stanze di Raffaello. Heliodorus.*
 "The chief fresco gives me immediate and thorough pleasure. I find in my mind a phrase of Pergolese's *Salve Regina*, '*Exules—Exules filii Evæ*'—it goes with it. Goes also with the *Liberation of Saint Peter* and the *Miracle of Bolsena*, and portions of *Attila*. Impossibility of taking in *Attila* as a whole. I will try another tune. I try: themes of Choral Symphony: some Mozart: some Bach: nothing goes. I try and imagine the *Parnassus Apollo* playing Minuet of *Don Giovanni*: then *Bist du bei mir*: the Ninth Symphony chorus: then *Che farà, chi mai dell' Erebo*—I find he does play that *Exules*, though slowly, but Virgil in the corner and Sappho distinctly mime it.

"Looking at the *architecture only* of the *School of Athens*, I try again. The *Exules* enables me to see the arrangement of cupolas and arches, to take in very well the depth of the great waggon vault. The Ninth Symphony makes it all joggle. The *Don Giovanni* Minuet makes it (or my attention) sway and shake from side to side, with a result of carrying my eye out of the building.

"If I can trust myself the same applies to ceiling of the *Sala della Segnatura*."

February 23, *Capitoline Museum*. "I find that the *Lo Spagna Muses*, etc., give me a pleasure greater than Raphael's. It is a question of:

"(1) The Umbrian spatial quality—the form of valleys and hills, relation of sky-line.

"(2) The still 'Primitive' angularity of line and reticence. But also,

"(3) Very much of this peculiar pale colour, extremely simple and cool, faded green, pale blue and abundant white, all very diaphanous.

"This Professor Groos would call 'sensuous,' but the attractiveness is wholly different from that of qualities of food or touch or smell : it is an emotional effect, an effect of moods.

"Ideas rather upset. It seemed as if that '*Exules—Exules*' tune helped me to see—or at least did not interfere with—most of the pictures, though it didn't seem absolutely to fit the Titian (*Baptism*). I didn't bring it to the Capitol, nor did it come spontaneously. As I was walking up a tune was knocking about in my head spontaneously, the *Fidelio* quartet theme. It distinctly did not go with any picture, nor did any other theme I tried, except that blessed *Exules*. I ought to say I was tired and had palpitations and didn't see well. Is it possible that *Exules* went not with the pictures, but with my palpitations? But, as I said, before going up the staircase my mind was full of the *Fidelio* theme. Of course it may be that a tune which goes with our momentary state helps us."

February 28, *Sistine Chapel*. "We are forced to strain neck and attention, and to bring mirrors. But in the periods of artistic progress, the work of art really does answer to the natural way in which it was, on the average, seen. The Campo Santo of Pisa, the typical *Salle des pas perdus*, the Chapel or Hall, where you waited for hours, is decorated accordingly. Even the *Loggie* of Raphael become different if we imagine ourselves on business here, waiting our turn of audience or taking the air in bad weather. The eye and interest go spontaneously, and return spontaneously, as we walk and talk, to these histories and arabesques. It is reversing the whole process to go and look fixedly at a work of art, and then never see it again."

March 1. *Sistine Chapel*. "How little the real problems of art are appreciated is shown by the fact that no writer I know expresses any astonishment at the figures of the ceiling staying in their place. Yet this is a far greater feat than the mere mechanical holding together of the vaultings of Gothic buildings; and some of these figures, and of the most colossal, like Jeremiah and Daniel, actually lean forward so far as attitude is concerned. . . . The fact is that not one of these figures has any weight as *human figures*, but acquires weight, shifts it, or transmits it to another, exactly according as our eyes require to be pinned down, or forced up by turns. . . . I owe this—the first satisfactory impression I have ever had of the Sistine Chapel (though I had been there two or three times every year since 1888, not to say that I knew it very well when I was eighteen)—to my refusing this time to walk about, strain my neck or try to see like all the other poor wretches. I simply sat on a bench near the door, allowing myself to look now at the vault, now at the *Last Judgment*, now at the people, now at my writing—in fact tried to exist as one would if one were in this place for some purpose (if no other than waiting) quite separate from *seeing*. I should like one day to be here at a Papal Chapel. I seem to remember, in 1888, that the Palestrina Mass, etc., did enable me to get an impression. But I was ill and have forgotten.

"Very interesting to find that from the *Tribune*, even sitting, this marvellous composition is very much spoilt. The things telescope, and the movement of the lines being interrupted, the single figures begin to gesticulate. *This is a most important fact.* . . .

"It is worth while, in order to realise what art does, to stand on the altar steps and look from here at the ceiling. It is not merely that the subjects of the composition become unintelligible and people stand on their heads: the whole composition is chaos, and the prophets, sibyls, and slaves who remain quite intelligible, make one vaguely seasick. Of course, in this losing of the composition, everything drops on one's head."

March 1. Resuming the observations on the *melodic obsession*. *Raphael Loggie*. "*Exules* do only in part (e.g. "Creation")—perhaps because of the various executions, or because *my step* in walking up and down is naturally not in that measure?"

"I found I had in my head, walking up and down, a slow waltz, a fragment of Chopin, I think. But it didn't help me to see, on the contrary. Whether *Exules* is the *rhythm of my attention* when intense? I notice that while looking carefully at these frescoes (even *Constantine*) and even when writing at this minute, I am keeping my mouth tight shut and breathe hard through the nostrils, with *accent* on expiration.

"Whether it has to do with going up all those stairs? I was not out of breath at all but excited in breath and heart.

"*Exules* again all right for *Heliodorus*. All palpitation gone. I certainly seem to see better breathing through nostrils than through mouth. The open mouth is inattention. More and more I suspect all this breathing business is a question of attention.

"I can't say a picture is more agreeable on account of a given breathing—simply I see it better, and if *seeing it is agreeable*, why then pleasure is increased.

Try same thing on bad pictures. Besides, isn't attention often *pleasant as such* ? ”

March 1902. *Uffizi Gallery*, Florence. (Question of *Inner Mimicry*.) “The arrow through the throat of Sodoma's *Sebastian* ought to give *me* a slight sense of discomfort in my throat. The fact that it doesn't points to something else diverting my attention. What is that something ? When I say to myself, ‘The arrow cut into the flesh, crashed through the bone, and cut through the arteries,’ I feel a vague sickness. When I cover the angel the arrow business becomes more painful ; that cheerful, busy, very alive angel sets up, I think, a feeling which destroys the arrow feeling.

“Coming upstairs and after, I had a certain Neapolitan popular song in my head. It fitted on to the beating of my heart. As long as those palpitations went on, and that song, I couldn't see the *Saint Sebastian* properly.

“Curious how far easier to *see* the unfinished Leonardo is than the *Saint Sebastian*, though everything is intelligible in the latter, little in the former.

“Andrea del Sarto's *Virgin delle Arpie*. I experience the same initial, bored, slight repulsion of over-facile form, of over . . . I don't know what—a sense of emptiness, in short, as I did with Raphael and Michelangelo. Only little by little I am caught by the splendour of Saint John's arm, his head, the Virgin's clutch of the book—and the colour.

“Evidently one artistic period indisposes us for another. That palpitation tune I came with quite interferes *with this*. So does *Exules*.

“After a minute or two, with intensification of effect, with full vision, specially of Saint John, *Exules*

goes all right. It doesn't do with the leap up of the child, but doesn't that come in as a sort of *rubato* in the whole rhythm ?

"How little anatomical form makes artistic pleasantness ; witness Bronzino's *Limbo*."

April 2. *Uffizi Gallery*. "Things which are disagreeable. In Rubens's big battle the fact that Henri IV.'s arm grasping a thunderbolt comes out at a wrong angle. Every time I look at it it gives me a peculiar shock. The sixth or seventh or eighth time, this can no longer be surprise, for I know it is there. The painful effect is partly that his arm, thinly and badly sketched in, is also out of plane (too far in the canvas for its sharp outline) ; but mainly that it stops the movement *of the man and the horse*. Now it does not stop it from realistic reasons. One can imagine the man riding forwards with his arm stretched out laterally, and the 'out of drawing' is no worse than other out of drawing in the picture.

"But that arm stretched laterally prevents the eye and *something more* (though I can't tell what—what I should call *me*) from pushing forward into the picture, as the tail of the horse, the gripping leg bent back, prow-like beard, nose and helmet all make me push. It is of the nature of a wrong note, or rather of a trap, stopping *me*.

"The pleasure I take in this picture (when I cease to see that arm) or at least in its central figure, shows that it takes a minute to learn the rhythm of a master or a school, for it seemed gibberish at first, after coming from the Primitives. A distinct feature in this pleasure is a sense of intensity of pushing forward and of concentration, far greater than a real horse or real man would have : a dynamic *unity of strenuousness*."

"The agreeableness, a certain vague sense of peace and harmony, on entering the sculpture-room seems connected with the steadiness, the monumental quality, the absolute cubic size of the marbles, also, I think, with the fact that the values of their hair, flesh, etc., as substance and solidity are the same, and their drapery of course also."

From a long note on a repainted Van der Goes. "The hatefulness of everything being out of plane as well as out of perspective. I think the view is conceivable (?) but the ground is nowhere under the people. The Virgin and Angels are kneeling on a kind of almost vertical plane; and it gives one a sense of discomfort, very strong in the chest. . . . Of course also the Shepherds . . . are being precipitated, catapulted at a diagonal across this same vertical plane. It is not a question of anatomical attitude. . . . Apart from all this there is the fact that the eye (and I) are forced into an intolerable game of hide-and-seek, absolutely without rhythm, backwards and forwards in the picture. There are no roads into it or in it, nothing to keep *one* in place, and the constant discovery of new items—more angels kneeling or flying, more shepherds to dispose of in this chaos, is a positive distress. . . .

"De Bles' (formerly called Van der Weyden) *Madonna in brown landscape*. The ground under her feet is distressingly wrong, but the two female saints are so solidly, squarely kneeling and sitting on themselves that one feels pretty reassured. The landscape also slopes upwards badly. I notice that to rectify this fact I naturally lean my eye on the parapet, correct it by flattening it (such corrections being automatic is a curious fact in art), and having

flattened it in my sensations, that landscape thereby becomes walkable. . . .”

A visit to Paris, in April 1902, gave me several observations on the *movement represented in a picture*.

Louvre. Prud'hon's Cain and Abel. “In looking at this picture (full of good-looking people) I notice that I never succeed in constructing anything in it, not even the dead body. I try to go into it, but doing so I am arrested by the fact that the people, although not projecting from the picture—although well behind the frame—are *still in front of what my eye claims as the picture*. And I cannot get round them into the landscape from which they are separated by a very real space filled with the visible air of moonlight, and every time I look there they *are doing it*. Cain always in the act of running—actively in the act—the avenging ladies always in the act of outstretching, flying, doing it! No amount of looking makes me a bit more familiar. I always find a little shock of surprise at finding them at it again.

“Similarly the little Prud'hon singer is always tilting up his head, always blowing out his nostrils, squeezing his eyes : always catching my eye with his rather hypnotising little presence ; and I get vexed.

“Is it a mood of mine ? But I find Madame Beauharnais also oddly doing her movement—slipping, propping every time I look ; and the branches of the trees also *do their thrusts*.”

Resuming my observations on *rhythmic obsession*, the rhythm and movement in the lines of a picture ; with indication of my perceptive and æsthetic condition.

December 7, 1902. *Uffizi Gallery, Florence.*
“I walk along and having got to the top of the

stairs and into the gallery find myself with slight palpitations, some sense of hurry and a tune—the Allegro of Beethoven's Symphony in D major. Accidentally I alight before Piero di Cosimo's *Andromeda*, and find it utterly impossible to look at while that tune (come spontaneously) and sense of hurry, last. I remember some one saying it is an early Leonardo, and I cling to it by this question. Gradually examining, from this point of view, I get *en rapport*, though rather with fragments than with the whole. (N.B.—While I am writing this and *not* looking, that tune has come back but no sense of haste.) I certainly see much better if I get rid of that tune. It slackens all the movement of the picture, which, when the tune isn't there (back while writing again) is astonishingly rapid.

“By rapid movement I mean that, *e.g.* Perseus is advancing through the air, wheeling round on himself when on the monster, back with great though perfectly deliberate swiftness. The little crowd of rather ridiculous people is also gathering very swiftly round Perseus, and is moving with swiftness—almost suddenness. The people doing nothing with musical instruments, and those weeping on the ground are also very *swift*. I suppose I mean that their movement looks as if it were transient and new? Of course all these people are making gestures which are *transitory*, even poor tied-up Andromeda is bending quickly away from the snorting monster, and the two naked deplorables, weeping in each other's arms, could not remain long. The tiny figures in the extreme background (and these are probably crucial) are all hurrying.

“It makes the picture *interesting* but fatiguing. There is a mountain, by the way, rearing very

literally, with its top going to overbalance it the next minute. . . . The picture, which I have always shied off, is rather crazy, quite independent of the monster.

"*Unfinished Leonardo*. Totally different impression (the tune distinctly irrelevant and out of measure). This is swift; in fact some things—the raised hand, the gesture of the king screening his eyes—wonderfully so, and the reaching-out arm of the child. But there is absolutely nothing transient. These people balance each other like the lines of a Gothic window. In fact the total effect is very Gothic: exciting, lucid, interesting and yet holding one.

"Above all the thing is a most complex *whole*. And these balanced movements will go on till Doomsday, and have always been there. It is the music of the spheres, the movement of the sun in the song of the Archangels in *Faust*. . . .

"Certainly I feel no tendency to mime any of them—in fact the more I look the less I can separate them.

"Returning to the ridiculous people in Piero di Cosimo, I certainly feel a very faint miming of his separate, very separate figures. I can fancy the next twist of Perseus's waist and legs, and Andromeda, with her gesture of nausea, is rather disgusting.

"Leonardo (?), *Annunciation*. Certainly the tune has nothing to do here. I feel that the angel *has* a tune, but I can't find it. The staccato talking of the people all round is distinctly *out of time* (musical tempo) to the angel. The movement is swift, but marvellously *steady* in that kneeling angel, one of the loveliest of figures it now seems to me. It is the actual *time* (musical tempo) of his profile, of the

wave of his hair, of the knots of his dress which is swift ; something swift happens where the line of his eye meets that of his profile and his very faint eyebrow.

“The thing is in a way wonderfully passionate, in the sense of full of more than human life ; but nothing could be quieter, humanly, than his greeting. Here, again, I feel that Gothic quality, but with more passion.”

December 12. *Uffizi Gallery*. “Coming up the stairs (no palpitations) I discover a tune in my head and which I am actually singing or whistling. I think I discover it on saying ‘I must look up the tune question.’ It is Allegro of a Mozart Sonata. It goes on, and I suppose keeps pace with my a little accelerated heartbeat. I walk quickly and stop at the Baldovinetti *Madonna and Saints*. I know I like the picture and immediately get into a superficial examination. Pleasure comes suddenly with perception of bearded saint’s white gloves. I then begin to see the relief, go *into* the picture. Light bad ; I can’t see whole well. Left-hand corner ; I take pleasure in bearded man and much bulk pleasure in Saint Lawrence and his very beautiful dress, and in his flat but solid existence. Am a little worried by his wrong spatial relation to bearded man. . . . Saint Anthony (though I *spotted* him at once, saying how like Baron A. F.) is difficult to look at, all because he is without solidity.

“In looking I have lost the tune, and I can’t remember it. Another has arisen—something rudimentary I must have heard whistled in the street like a starling’s song. I can’t get it out of my mind while looking. A sort of raising of my hat and scalp and eyebrows seems necessary to see this picture ;

otherwise it is swimmy. By the way, the lilac and crimson give me a vivid cool pleasure, like *taste*.

"Cosimo Rosselli, *Magi*. The colour attracts me. I see it also less well when I don't raise hat and scalp. I can't just lay my eye on it. (Like Baldo-
vinetti above eye-level.) That street-bird tune goes on. I substitute a Chopin Mazurka. I think that makes it much worse. . . . I don't hate the picture, but merely because of its warm colour. The people are all stupid and vulgar. Flat as a wafer, and no going in, even in landscape. Why don't I hate it more?

"I simply *can't* and *won't* look at the 'Virtues' of the school of Pollaiuolo. I am stopped by an unknown Tuscan *Madonna and Child*. The resemblance of the Madonna to somebody at first repels, then attracts, me. I am surprised to find this picture so good. Though I am a little worried by the child *doing* the *cuddling up*, and the *liking it*, too much and always over again (*à la Prud'hon*) and slowly; and I hate catching his eye. But the air and space please me. . . . The tune has subsided. It doesn't go with the picture, nor the Chopin either. I know I shan't *remember* liking this.

"I am tired, can't go on, am bored with the succeeding pictures, as when one doesn't want to speak to people or be spoken to. . . . In looking out of the window there is the relief of not focusing. How out of time to the buildings, etc., to nature, all the people are walking. My idea of time is given by the delightful movement of ripple on the water, of fascinating colour. The people's talking also is out of time.

"*The Venetian Room*. I am tired, bored, disinclined to look at anything. The various paces,

glances, the utter irrelevance of these wallfulls affects me like a crowd. I think a piece of pure colour would revive me (all this is dark and smoky).

"Yes, I can look with pleasure at Veronese's *Sophonisba*—even much pleasure, of which much I somehow know to be physical, located almost in my mouth. I do like this picture so much, although the two men with symmetrical repeated movement make me laugh and bore me. But the very idiocy, *the about nothing at all*, the indifference of executioner and executed, is pleasant. I make no scalp movement. I have a tune, a phrase of Mozart or Beethoven. It goes well—they seem to *say it*.

"Have I always tunes knocking about unbeknownst ?

"Titian's *Flora* takes me. Her glance, gesture, drapery, all drags one in. I have no desire to stroke, touch, or kiss, but there is a delight of life, of clean, warm life, such as one wishes for oneself in her flesh. Somehow she is physically attractive—no, if her head were tilted she wouldn't be. The previous Beethoven or Mozart phrase interrupts her. Why have I the same pleasure, as just now looking into the river ? She attracts me like that water."

December 18. *Uffizi Gallery*. "Already in the loggia below, a tune, I think a bit of a Beethoven Symphony. Arrive upstairs quickly—a little palpitation, but tune still there. (N.B.—It is not produced by the coming up, nor by the palpitations.) Absence of light in the Tribuna bores me, and I am unwilling to look at anything. I find that habit makes me attempt Titian's *Venus* (with room and figures in background). Tune going on hard, and distinct palpitations. The first thing I can look at without effort (initial effort excepted) is background.

T

I go to the window ; the pillar, pots, tree outside attract me. I do not care about the women, though the red one is pleasant. Perhaps I am trying through that window to escape out of the picture ? I cannot go back without effort to *Venus* herself, and give it up. No ! For wide-opening of the eyes and lifting of the scalp or hat (I have glasses, not spectacles) and breathing hard through my nose and mouth, enable me to see her at last. But the effort is too great.

Madonna del Cardellino. "It is nearer the eye and more visible, but lack of light worries.* The tune which I provoke is evidently wrong. Closing nostrils, breathing hard, my eye is first attracted by background. Then by Virgin's head, the child, below my eye, is disagreeable to see. Once seen is platonically recognised as delightful. I give it up.

"*Large Tuscan Room.* The light makes a great difference. *Saint Sebastian.* The opening of mouth seems to prevent focusing. It is only after a minute of having got into the picture that I can do equally without breathing tight. I think this means that an effort is needed, nothing more. So far from going into landscape, it is with great difficulty that I look at it at all. I make straight for Saint Sebastian's head and stop a little below the arrow. The lower part of the body is intolerable, its sudden immobility after that writhing torso annoys me ; and the feet are *out of plane*. The arm also is 'dead'—the tree branches on the other hand have a lot of movement, more than the head. As to the angel descending, its speed is tremendous, and

* My Gallery Diaries since 1904 contain evidence that bad lighting is often a cause of æsthetic irresponsiveness, particularly combined with the general depression of dark weather.

utterly out of connexion with the Saint's. Whether it is this disharmony of pace (query in Prud'hon also ?) which gives me the intolerable sense of constantly repeated action ? Very likely—for one discontinues the angel's pace to verify Sebastian's and *vice versa*. He also, in his slow way, is intermittent. Whereas in the Leonardo Cartoon everything goes the same pace, and one has no sense of momentariness. This observation is important if correct.

"Quite automatically I stop before a large Filippino *Madonna and Saints* I think I have never really looked at. Difficulty extreme, because the architecture and people are all hanging towards one, intelligently seconded by the authorities, who have tilted the picture forward. But once I can get over this impediment, I find considerable satisfaction—a sort of soothingness—due partly to no one catching one's eye ; not even Saint John looking markedly *out*, but mainly to its evident unity of pace, very slow, languid, but harmonised. Even the angels, though the action of the feet and legs is most instantaneous, are poised and scattering flowers, oh, so slowly ! Tune gone—I look for it and find—is it the same ? Yes—and it is much, much too quick.

"I go to the Leonardo (?) *Annunciation*, with a distinct emotion of expectant liking. And as a result, perhaps, am pleased at once. (I have liked associatively the cypresses and landscape for years.) I go into the background, then cypresses, and return at once to the angel.

"That tune is now far too *slow*. I can look and enjoy breathing naturally, without effort, walking about in the picture in a leisurely spirit. I shy off the Madonna because (1) it is impossible, except

at a great distance, to see both her and angel ; (2) because of wall which I hate ; (3) raw colour. I retreat to middle of the room—see the whole—Wonder, miracle ! The Madonna becomes the magnificent other half of the phrase, and angel and Madonna after all go at harmonious pace. Or paces ? or perhaps the cypresses hold one ? But the *tempo* is very rapid, even in cypress tops.

“ This is by a great, great man, but a very *long-sighted one*, for the wall gets into perspective only when I am half-way through room. This matter of long-sightedness might be a crass mechanical test of authorship. This picture, even from where the detail (dark day helping) is lost, is enchanting.

“ The *Annunciation* opposite is certainly by Botticelli (it has been attributed to Raffaellino del Garbo, I believe). Here there is, beside rapidity, *suddenness* ; and of course anatomically, the gestures are most unstable and momentary. But none of the Prud'hon feeling (*i.e.* of sudden repeated motions). The angel may dump on to his knees, and the Madonna may wheel round, like the people on Keats's Grecian urn,* for ever, for they are doing it at the same pace. And the tree gives the needed sense of vertical.

Raphael's *Cardellino*. “ This picture is more compact than the Leonardo, square instead of oblong, and can therefore be seen much nearer, though everything is larger.

- * “ Fair youth, beneath the trees, thou canst not leave
Thy song, nor ever can those trees be bare ;
Bold Lover, never, never canst thou kiss
Though winning near the goal—yet do not grieve ;
She cannot fade, though thou hast not thy bliss,
For ever wilt thou love, and she be fair !

"Of course in a gallery, pictures are simply butchered by reckless hanging above and below the eye-level. The *Madonna del Cardellino* is hung as I shouldn't dare to hang a sketch by an amateur.

"No wonder all art criticism is wrong, when we stand against a rail and look down into our pockets or up under the brim of our hats! Of course a great picture, like that Leonardo, is made to be seen at several goes. You possess the whole; but you also possess these exquisite details. These things are made for leisurely living with, not to make *one* bang! impression with a visual image banged into your brain like a seal on wax. This question of *bang* impression comes in, I fancy, with things like the Sistine Chapel, where, obviously, you *cannot* get nearer. How utterly have we separated art from living life!"

December 24. *Renaissance Sculpture in the Bargello*. " (I have come to verify a theory that the heads by Donatello seem to have more the feeling of breath in the nostrils than those attributed to Desiderio da Settignano.) I find I carry a tune—a phrase of Cimarosa's, which certainly does not go with the *Gattamelata* or Donatello's *Saint John*. The latter I find gets living, all except his leg. There seems an extraordinary rapid life, a deal of pressure."

January 19. *Uffizi Gallery*. "Arrive with hurry and fluster of great cold. A tune, scarcely more than a 1, 2, 3, 4 rhythm (I think a Symphony of Haydn) already in arcade. It continues upstairs, and I enter with considerable palpitations. Am attracted by splendid gold dress in small Ignoto Toscano (Sienese). Look at it easily all except very opaque repainted robe of Madonna and draperies.

"The rhythm is here, but diminished. I get

bored. On the whole I care to look only at the gold parts, and am much attracted by that same garment. . . . I feel the attraction of fretted, patterned gold and dark colour. Tune has suddenly changed; still 4 time; a bit of a symphonic cadence. It is so far from produced by a very poor blue Lorenzetti that I have to suspend its internal performance to see that picture. I try various other tunes, *all* make looking more difficult. The picture is singularly *out of time*, the eyes violently squinting in various directions.

"The splendour of the Simone Martini, seen (for the first time) from the opposite side (as probably intended), so that the eye, instead of focusing faces, goes into that golden sky, makes me literally gasp.

"Without my glasses, from some distance, this glory is still greater; to me enthralling. It is a question not merely of gold but of the *aliveness* of the sharp, acute, narrow, arrow-shaped silhouettes, of the flaming, sharp cusps and finials of frame (the sharp, sharp glory of angels—swallow-tails extended, the spiny, rapid lines of the vase).

"It seems to me I have rarely had such a feeling of rapid flame-like movement. *It seems* to me that the feeling is as if that glory of angels, that frame, really had motion as flame has.*

"What I can't understand is that a tune which seems a little dull (but perhaps leads to something whirly, I think) goes on every time I lift my eyes off that picture. Slight palpitations, at least rapid breathing with shut mouth. I am bound to say I have such a feeling of excitement that the arabesques of the ceiling, when I *take my eyes* off the picture, seem in movement. A man walks by very fast with

* Cf. p. 319.

creaking boots—his movement is *slow* comparatively ; other people pass *quickly*, but slow compared to that picture. The exhilarating rapidity is, I think, the same as inside a good French Cathedral, Gothic.

“ I look at Athlete with a pot, a fine antique decidedly, he is slower than the Martini and its frame, but much quicker than the people going quickly by. I walk twenty yards at a medium steady pace and stop before Doryphoros. I am astonished to find that he is not markedly much slower than the Martini. I keep the same tune.

“ A bad Roman bust next to him jerks up, and I feel is *much, much* quicker—out of step to everything, including the tune. But he is out of step in a series of jerks. A man walks quickly past. But nevertheless he is slower than Doryphoros, perhaps because he walks *across my eye* ; I don't follow him. Whereas in fact compared with Doryphoros I have no feeling of activity connected with him. I note the very immediate and great pleasure of those two antiques. Has the Martini helped me into them ? Very bright day.”

January 19. *Same day.* “ Looking at the people in the Piazza del Duomo while waiting in the rubber shop, it struck me that the *movement* we perceive in them (and in horses, etc.) is of a totally different category from that we feel in works of art. All our ideas of swiftness are relative and in a way conventional ; a man or horse is going quickly *for* a man or horse. But there is no *feeling* of swiftness. It is rather like a judgment—‘ This man or horse *must* be moving quickly to have passed across our eye (or a given space) in so much time.’ There is no *sense of motion*. The only thing that gave it me was the

vibrating movement of the pigeons rising and the rotating of wheels. Why ? ”

January 26. *Uffizi Gallery*. “Walking along, a bit of a Haydn Minuet—goes on although different with quick stairs ascent. Good light but general disinclination. I walk rapidly down corridor, worried by stiff legs of statues and goggle eyes of tapestry. Stop at Bellini’s *Allegory*. This picture hangs too low. Consequently the floor always remains under my eye, and feels as if under my chest.

“It seems odd that a painted floor being lower gives less the sense of being under the feet, showing that we locate our feet in our eye. I sit down so as to be a little lower. Even now, however, I do not use the floor patterns to go in by. I go in about middle, just above people’s heads. I follow the water (which as yet does not affect me as water) in the background and *there* look about me, houses, rocks, skies. Then I come back, so to speak, to myself, and look at middle distance, cavern, Centaur on the other side of the water. It is only after this that I can look at foreground and figures and find it totally impossible to consider that foreground as a whole. Nor can I satisfactorily look at any figures or group long, although each is distinctly *outlined* and pleasant. I am worried as in watching aimless billiard balls.

“The floor isn’t quite right under the people’s feet. Those who are not leaning on the rail look as if they must be pinned on to keep straight. The children affect me as fastened in grooves ; they could assume no other position on that floor. It feels easier for one to walk on that water than on that floor. I take it that we go to the floor or ground only after exploring background, because we

habitually explore the back and middle distance, not the ground under us.

"When I stand quite close to the picture it becomes wonderfully agreeable. I utterly neglect that floor—or rather, in some funny way, it gets into position and I only vaguely feel it. The foreground figures, seen from above, balloon fashion, become all right. The sensation is that of looking from a balcony. The water reflections, village behind, sky, become the essential. The floor under the children is now *quite flat*.

"Veronese's *Esther* hangs high and right. I go straight up the *train* of Esther's lady, catching Ahasuerus in red stooping alongside, and am attracted into the open sky above parapet. The two men leaning down seem to give one leave to go to that sky, while with their leaning prevent one's neglecting Esther, etc. *The exact hanging of the pictures evidently affects enormously* our manner, quite apart from degree, of seeing them.

"The *Mantegna Triptych* is hung too low. It must have been on an altar. It is annoying to have the Magi coming down hill into the region of the pit of one's stomach. If one stoops and thus raises the picture, the procession carries the eye *up*, instead of down. . . . It is clearly the artist's treatment which makes us consider part as below us. . . ."

February 3. *Uffizi Gallery*. "Showed the 'Immature' Giorgione to-day to Professor H——. He agreed about the *difficulty* caused by the people not standing properly, or rather the ground not sloping properly under their feet; also about the hat of that figure. But what seemed to put up his back most was the way the young executioner is holding the child. (The picture represents the judgment of

Solomon.) He could not away with, or rather from it.

"This shows one of the important inner interactions of form as such and form as symbol. I mean one which goes on perhaps automatically, almost unconsciously, bringing only a vague accompanying sense; and on a totally different plane from the action of the 'subject.' This thing worried Professor H——, and worries me, *not* because the executioner and child make a disagreeable, an arresting, checking, or otherwise disagreeable counteraction of lines and masses, but simply because their meaning, realised and drawn into our consciousness, produces there a sense of doubt and discomfort. If we could imagine the child to be a feather-brush, a bunch of flowers, a fan, we should not thus be checked, checkmated. But we cannot attend to the form as such because of the discomfort, the doubt awakened by the *notion* of a large naked baby, struggling with all its might, being held in that particular way by a 'light-weight' young gentleman, not very secure on his feet; and held, moreover, without his arm being stretched; held with the wrist and forearm, as we could not even hold a kitten.

"I believe there is no reflection in this, merely we feel uncomfortable as soon as we spot that item. And it is my belief that we spot the symbol before we realise the form, else why should this symbol stop us? I fancy it is the same with the question of the ground under the feet: if the people were realised as bunches of ribbon, they would not worry us and prevent our going into the picture.

"*A priori* it seems likely that we recognise subject before we realise form; and all our mistakes, erroneous judgments, show this; we jump to con-

clusions. It would be worth while to examine the opposite case: whether, where the form is very agreeable as such, we make light of such matters, allow our experience of standing, lifting, etc., to be set at defiance. . . . Probably some persons, like my father, are so hypersensitive that a horse having only three visible legs upsets them and inhibits all æsthetic pleasure."

The subjective, introspective character of my Gallery Notes increases more and more. My æsthetic observations, interrupted in February 1903, by the sudden death of a very dear friend, were resumed in Rome in April, when I was in a state of nervous collapse, and subject to very strong alternations of feeling. This circumstance led to my giving a maximum of attention to the variations in my own æsthetic receptivity.

April 7, 1903. *Rome. Terme Museum.* "Effect of *emotional tone* on æsthetic perception. The other day, the first time here (but it was pouring, the light extremely bad, and the rooms were most inconveniently crowded), feeling fearfully depressed, the lid down on life, *but not in the least preoccupied*; on the contrary, listless. I not only did not *feel*, but I didn't see 'how beautiful they are.'* Nothing caught my eye.

"To-day, rather tired in body and spirit, but extraordinarily shaken up, (very literally) warmed, vibrating through and through (most literally almost quaking) with yesterday's very strange experience; moreover in the complete grip, obsession thereof (thinking it perpetually backwards and forwards), but also immensely heightened in self-confidence; I find I see very easily, even quite slight things, and

* Cf. p. 248.

feel and vibrate to the movement of them—the swing round of the Niobid, etc. A slight but perceptible state of palpitation, rapid breathing through the nostrils, no sort of distraction or worry from without (perfect sense of freedom from others)—a bit of Bach humming in me. The day perfectly fine, cold, tramontana, light excellent.”

“The rest of that day I suffered from a reaction, from physical lassitude and mental depression.”

April 10. *Capitoline Museum*. “A tune, mainly accompaniment, of *Phyllis* (old French song), on entering, and keeps on. First room I enter (Hall of Nero Antico Centaurs) quite intolerable; impression of gibbering. The statues seem infinitely more intrusive than the moving crowd of tourists; all agog, gesticulating idiotically, a bedlam. Is it that I have become abnormally sensitive to movement? Out of the window Marcus Aurelius even seems to be going unpleasantly fast, distinctly out of time to the architecture. (Slight palpitations, a slight but rather pleasant excitement all morning, perfect lucidity.)

“In the room of *Gladiator* I am arrested, and have a moment of vivid pleasure before the griffin tripod near the window. Griffins have the intense, vivid rhythm of flame. After a little their horrid stiff bodies and legs begin to bother me. And I begin to catch the eye of one rather too much. There is too much emphasis, decidedly.

“By this time, and thanks to the griffins, I am *en rapport* with things. *Gladiator*, for instance. But oddly enough I experience him as a little too quick, a little too exciting in time: the knots of his hair jump out a little too much.

“I have very marked palpitations, and I suspect

that the over-perception of movement is a summation. Oddly the vague, shifting, gravityless movements (if such they can be called) of the crowd do not worry me: they are like ghosts compared with the statues and me.

“ Window. Even the opposite architecture—heaven help it!—is a little bit exciting, and Marcus Aurelius, seen a little back, is thrusting that arm a little more than is pleasant. The people, cabs, etc., in the square, on the other hand, though hurrying for the most part, have no movement I can find.

“ All this seems to shed a light on *Einfühlung*, does it not? The work of art made exciting to me by my own excitement, the reality remaining utterly unreal, passive.

“ *Big Hall*. Again of course it is the beastly restorations largely which make these statues gibber. Also, their being quite remarkably bad. . . . In my present state of excitement (palpitations continuing) it seems to be the gesture of the bad statues which hustles and worries me, and the time of the good ones. Yet even the bad ones, dead as door-nails in line and mass, how infinitely more living and moving than the real people. To add a gesture to a statue is like adding squibs and crackers to already existing music. If real people had no gesture, they would have nothing, be nothing, save to very careful and loving eyes.”

April 15. *Terme Museum. Subiaco Niobid*. “ (Fine day, soon after lunch, very good spirits, state of happy, not at all impatient expectancy. Very slight palpitations from walking rapidly and stairs, only running as a faint rapidity of life, unlocalised, breathing through nose, mouth shut.) I see very well, easily, have no sense of *seeing*, but a

strong, full sense of *it* (the *Niobid*). *It* is the only nominative. Despite the bad architectural building-up the figure is delightful. It seems to be swinging about, thrusting forward, pressing down, hurling up, with a total delightful spiral movement. Oddly this impression is irrespective of the point of view, and exists equally in that total impression. I take it the total impression is one of pushes and pulls and of this unstable equilibrium, which has the same exciting intellectual quality as good Gothic. I am perfectly aware of the remarkable ugliness of the line in many positions.

"The pleasure seems to be in the impetuosity of that spiral cast forward of the body. Still, I do not think there is a vestige of pleasure in anything human: I am familiar with such impressions about landscape. The surface modelling and patina give me another kind of pleasure, like that of the chest of Titian's *Flora*. I find nothing human in this either, for I am conscious of a negative satisfaction in this surface having no tactile softness and no temperature; the fact of the bystanders having both is on the whole repulsive to me.

"Looking at them I realise how utterly the *movement* of this is different: it is not so much an infinitely greater life, spring, thrust, *weight* (weight particularly), but a different one. One wonders how or why the real people do anything: they seem to stand on the principle of inflated paper bags or eggshells on end.

"*Apollo* (Pheidian). How *he* erects himself. But without excitement; it is like the interior of, say, Cappella Pazzi! And he, poor dear, with half a skin too little,* is yet absolutely satisfactory. It

* One side of thorax abraded by water.

is a question of pressure, of splendid cupola-like lifting.

"Leaning on balustrade of terrace outside I get him at a better angle and distance. I get him particularly in the midst of *my* impressions of air, of stirring leaves, flying, chirping birds, children playing outside. He is in my life.

"I find I have now a different tune from the one I came with—it is the *ritournelle* of the end of *Divinités du Styx* of Gluck. Is it a subconscious association of ideas—Apollo, etc. ? For some time I could not identify that tune. Also, though those bars seem to concentrate my seeing of him, the opening bars distinctly improve it.

"Even that brute of a sitting Athlete has an attractiveness in his mountain quality, when one gets his head in profile—the *rise* of the head and *fall* of the shoulders.

"*Cast of Ara Pacis*. There is a great deal too much looking out and about, and this group of toga'd magnificoes is distinctly going at various paces and not in the same direction; their arms grab and hang loose with wonderful motion and irrelevance. . . ."

The introspection henceforth becomes habitual and deliberate, and is extended to one detail after another.

Venice, October 9, 1903. *Academy*. "Cool north-west wind after rain; feel much better, almost braced and relieved, pleased at having come to a difficult resolution. Very pleased also at finding A— below, and relieved about her ill friend, and idea that I may be useful. Rubbed the wrong way in gondola by some mannerless tourists. Attempt at showing them anything frustrated. Find

myself with strong palpitations, a general sense of cat's fur brushed the wrong way. And a tune—I don't know what—apparently bit of symphony, beating itself out inside me.

“Great difficulty, as usual in this gallery, in seeing anything. So far I have *seen* nothing—not a scrap better than my companions.

“I have vainly attempted to see the *Dives and Lazarus* (by Bonifazio). After three or four minutes I begin to see it, attracted principally by the colour. Another vague look at the people in it. The mental irritation diminishes (have got rid of tourists), but the palpitations continue and the tiresome, tiresome emphatic tune. Get up and look into picture nearer. Palpitations still very disagreeable. Great desire to see the picture, and utter impossibility to do so. Distracted and bothered by sense of futility of this whole morning. After some minutes still much the same. I cannot comfortably see the foreground. I feel sure some perspective arrangement makes it difficult to see these very attractive people. I find I am beginning to care for background—all beyond the empty middle of picture. The little altar (which I had never noticed) or Three Graces fountain, and man with bow and spear (?) and dog begins to attract my curiosity and to charm me.

“The dog is greedily thrusting his head into the fountain, climbing energetically on his hind legs, the boy has a sort of lyric, passionate flutter, as if adoring the fountain or the figures. A thought of Hippolytus, scraps of the invocation to Artemis, or at least a *feel* of it, arise in me. It is significant that I am caught by the literary sentimental sight. I *like* it, enjoy it, go with eye into the *charmille* of

garden, and begin to feel considerable reluctance at leaving the picture and looking for my companions, which I suppose I must. By this time I can look at foreground, *feel* the charming people. Palpitations still. But that beastly tune gone—and instead, oh joy! a bit of an accompaniment of Brahms: *Wie ist doch die Welt so schön.*"

October 11. "Cloudy but cold morning, bracing. Walk quickly to Saint Mark's, feeling tall and light, and quietly happy. Had suffered lately from distraction, *aridity*, impossibility of seeing art—seeing the people too much. Surprise at walking into comparative dark, *I go into it*, and *into the organ music during the Elevation*. During that music I see and feel. The central cupola is, indeed, revealed to me the first time. Slight palpitation: *I had no tune*. The organ's tune became mine, and the church lived to it. Ten minutes of very concentrated feeling, perfect.

"Same day. *Ducal Palace*. I clap on to *Bacchus and Ariadne*, see it immediately; that deep, deep blue; I linger, pleased, unwilling to leave. (I was unwilling to leave Saint Mark's also.) I was aware of no tune before, but as soon as I see this I am aware strongly of a theme—I think out of Beethoven, the Seventh Symphony, with which I see this—a sort of waltz tune.

"Same for *Three Graces*, but this picture takes me a little less. I do not notice the tourists, but when they thrust into my attention, I feel violent annoyance at voice or gesture, as at a fly when playing or reading.

"*Sharp* pleasure at the little poppy-pod lanterns on Saint Mark's cupolas, and at downward line of cupolas. The pleasure seems to have the sharp,

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crisp, puckered quality of those lanterns. All these cupolas, at least the three I see from the window, are unlike in the clustering of those lanterns and rosettes.

"Loveliness of opal white grey of lead and Istrian stone—moonstone colour—against white, luminous, delicately cloudy (*not scirocco*) sky.

"As usual, in the inferior pictures of the Ducal Palace I am bothered by the sense of the people, their expression, gesture, personality; *they* are all doing things and in an absurd way—poking out their hands, flying. . . . I said a true thing at the Academy, when we all fell to finding likeness to acquaintances in (of all painters) Rosalba! *When we find strong resemblance in a picture it is that the picture doesn't exist, or our attention doesn't—only the acquaintances exist.* I make an exception in case of loving people. We often find in some very fine work of art a resemblance to some beloved one; but it is rather a state of our *feeling*, a *going-out* of it, and the masterpiece remains, never overlaid by the reality, but rather magnifying it, as sudden music magnifies our emotional state."

October 11. *Ducal Palace*. "In the pleasure at the really scarcely visible Giottesque frescoes discovered where the *Paradise* of Tintoret used to hang, there is distinctly that of the great Simone Martini at Siena, in a somewhat similar hall and scheme of colour and fadedness."

At Florence in the winter of 1903-4, I resumed my observations in the museums with especial reference to *rhythmic obsessions*, palpitations and æsthetic responsiveness.

December 30. *Uffizi Gallery*. "Cold, wet day, feeling well. Drive; and have a tune coming along.

Can't identify it. Palpitations from staircase. Weak glasses and bad light. *Martini*. The tune doesn't answer. The gold attracts me, but I have difficulty in being interested. Shy off Virgin. (Tune continues while writing.) Angel's wing attracts me, and olive branch. Get a little interested in wings. They come into singular relief. The tune while looking at them diminishes, but regains while writing. Still palpitations. . . . Try quick Bach. No. The forward head of angel interferes somehow with my tunes. See Athlete with vase at once and well."

December 30. *Uffizi Gallery*. "Botticelli, as I said to-day to young D——, has an odd intermittence in his pattern and in his energy. You expect a given sort of line—say the other side of an ogive, which he prepares you for by small indications. But he suspends the fulfilment by a brusque line—say a vertical. You have a feeling of heart syncope, hope deferred, something not merely poignant, but letting you down from your excitement, as in a rhythm lapsing or a refused dissonance resolution.

"With Leonardo the intricacy is always a mere unexpected *more*, an increase of complexity in harmony. The one sort of temperament might lead to religious mania, the other be associated very naturally with the passion for nature and generalisation."

January 7, 1904. *Uffizi Gallery*. "Fine, dry, sunny day. Drive. Slight mental irritation and dissatisfaction in portico; march time, no palpitations, but slight feeling of chill. Unwillingness to look. *Venetian Room*. I single out, attracted by light colour (lilac, stone-colour, scarlet) among all these sunk in blackness, Veronese's *Esther*.

"The top attracts me, sky, architecture, with its *good climate* and reminiscence of Venice—a little personally pathetic. The tune goes on and prevents my seeing the body of picture. I fix the charming scarlet robe; the tune vanishes or recedes. Picture, except as colour, difficult to see—there is no resting-place—one tends to climb on to that staircase merely, I think, to find space and quiet air.

"Bassano. *Burning Bush*. Attracted by landscape, and most by crimson draperies. Cannot get over ridiculous notion of the light being projected by magic-lantern or policeman's bull's-eye, or having some curative power on Moses. The same tune there but subsided. I am seeing the picture by an effort of will. First lively movement of surprise, curiosity whether Moses' shoes, which I discover for the first time, are on his feet or alongside. The goat nibbling on hind legs attracts me, partly from opening of landscape.

"Titian. *Duchess of Urbino*. Bored and repelled, yet a little hypnotised by her stupid eyes. I should like to see the blue landscape out of window but somehow can't, all the planes of this scrubbed picture somehow make me slide off.

"*Duke of Urbino*. Taken by crimson velvet, by splendid slick painting, silveriness of armour, and the man's disagreeable face. I stick in the picture, nearest approach to pleasure. The tune (which I revive, for it subsides when I look) does not suit.

"I think I am preoccupied by dissatisfaction with my morning's work. Another rather similar trivial tune, but different rhythm. It seems to help me to see the small Bordone head. I *realise* skin, hair, eyebrows and the Miss C—— physique of the creature.

"Moroni's *Student*, interested in it and physically attracted by paint. Can't get rid of the second tune, but there seems a contrast, intermittence between it and picture. (Feet painfully cold.)

"Titian's *Flora*. I try to go in by pleasure—tactile, thermic—at her flesh and skin, and the vague likeness to a friend I am very fond of. I get to like her—the silky fur quality of her hair, and her brows. I wish her eyes were deeper and am annoyed by lack of modelling of her cheeks. The insufficiency of her *humanity* seems to bore me. It isn't enough to be such an animal or fruit. But there is an interesting synthesis of form and subject ; specially of the sense of bodily cleanness, soundness, and healthy fresh warmth. Yet I do not feel any particular desire to touch or squeeze her ; she is still a picture, a goddess, not a cat or baby. . . .

"The trivial tune has subsided. If I keep it up, I have to slacken it greatly. This is the day of trivial tunes—a Spanish one comes up. She looks calmly, decidedly *away* from it.

"The lullaby of the Christmas Oratorio which I, casting about, revive, seems to help me, to make me see her more as a whole, *circularly*, to get depth of glance, not to think about softness or warmth, etc. She seems to get a soul. Though wretchedly cold, I am beginning to be interested and pleased.

"That Christmas tune has no effect on the Bassano *Burning Bush*. I am too cold, shivery, and must leave this room.

"Coming out of Venetian room, vaguely attracted by *spatial* quality, though false, of Castagno's *Crucifixion*."

January 28. *Cappella Pazzi*. "Fine day, good spirits. But the falseness of our modern art habits !

Having nothing to do but to look at this place (and to look without any definite object) I find myself in continual state of distraction, thinking of, attending to, everything else, painfully trying to steady my thoughts. *Whereas it is the Chapel which should be acting as interlude* to whatever I am doing. Oddly confirming this as soon as I begin writing this note; my attention steadied, I feel the attraction of the place, begin to be in it and unwilling to go out."

Same day. *Uffizi Gallery*. "Pleased to get out after a boring lunch and blood to head. Light step; under arcade a tune—*Ich will dich mein Jesus*, by Bach. No palpitations; go into *painters' portraits* room to see whether Sargent's is there. Look about interested in purely personal way; tune continues strong. Not tempted to look at anything much. Attracted by *Benjamin Constant*, but tune prevents my seeing it. But I can see *Ingres* very well. What a deep, deep magnificent picture. The tune, if anything, helps certainly; and this picture of a quiet man is, like my tune, decidedly exciting (slight palpitations beginning, and breathing with closed mouth). The picture is so interesting I do not even care to spell out inscription in corner; am riveted by the eyes and mouth.

"*Cabanel* goes to bits—dissolves to soapsuds to that tune.

"*Leighton*, I cannot see as a picture. Keep spotting likenesses, my father, etc. The tune prevents and makes the frieze cavalcade in *Leighton's* background go out of time. (The tune seems not to go with the palpitations, which increase, and I have to keep it up artificially.)

"*Millais* fairly well. *Watts* fairly well, with some effort to keep up the tune.

"Morelli, Ussi, Zorn, Boldini, etc., utterly incompatible with the tune.

"Herkomer, already grotesque, becomes under that tune a sort of *pulling-out* doll, a goggle joke.

"Zorn keeps walking out of the canvas under that tune. Most of these portraits are oddly staring. *Tadema* is the real winking human being; he gets mitigated by the tune, but also disappears under it.

"Villegas, easy and agreeable to see (not gibbering and well under his frame), is better without the tune. These portraits are most horribly *speaking*.

"Return to *Ingres*. He has a little lost his hold over me, I suppose by the confusion. But regains it with tune slower. Palpitations distinct. Upstairs. Tune continued, partly voluntarily. I can't see with it the Simone Martini at all. But the gold blinds me in this very strong light. I try five or six other tunes, no good. A slight improvement on *Stabat* fugue, but still little. Perhaps it is mere prolonged attention. What I do see best is the angel's wing. I go nearer it to see. I fix angel's wonderful crown and olive branch. None of that fugue nor Bach. It seems to overpower—*I cieli immensi*—'For unto us'—a near approach at last! First movement of G minor Mozart Symphony; it makes the thing go tearing pace, and the thing makes it go quicker.

"Surprise at seeing Leonardo Cartoon in light. Bach does not fit."

February 6. *Uffizi Gallery*. "(I have been a little unwell lately with dyspepsia and insomnia; and besides, mentally worried.)

"Rainy, warm; but good spirits and amused. Arrive with theme immediately preceding the Minuet of *Don Giovanni*. No palpitations.

"*Martini*. At first difficult ; it soon seems to go (leaves of angel's crown) quicker than my tune. But (now I perceive it well) slower than the tune. Excitement and faint palpitations after looking at it. How the flames of the frame scramble rushing uphill, and the little obelisk !

"*Athlete with vase*. See him well with either, but I *think* (I am surprised) better with the theme in G minor. This statue is very sympathetic to me. How that G minor makes the gaping gesture of a Christ and Saint Thomas more gaping and foolish !

"*Sort of Apoxyomenos*. How the restorations make it all go at different paces. The preoccupation (now spontaneous) of that G minor motive makes Baldovinetti's *Annunciation* fall to pieces and the angel and cypresses go various paces. . . . Extremely distracted, noticing (without annoyance) steps and talking, and struck by likenesses. Shall be glad to go and was unwilling to come. Have just met twice a person with whom I had quarrelled. Am feeling very personal, and what I should like would be a good solitary country walk.

"Eye and curiosity caught by absurd gesticulations of little stories of *Esther*. I am attracted by the story, the people. . . . The G minor theme goes on irrelevantly and excitedly.

"*School of Cosimo Roselli*. Am caught by rug, hot colour, and vehemently craning Jewish angels. . . . I am tired, *distracte*, and impatiently waiting for cart."

February 27. *Vatican Museum*. "Am depressed, distinctly sore about the breast-bone with the bodily sense of misunderstanding. I find in these statues (which I see at once and quite well) an extraordinary

calm, charm, some sort of deep kinship and confidence, which comes out to meet my perfect goodwill, my determination not to let the passing hours be wasted, the beautiful present of life soiled by personal sadness.

"This time, being with friends, neither in the faintest degree inclined to look at anything, I strolled about wholly unprofessionally and thinking about other things. Oddly (and yet my theories might have led me to expect this) I was able to see very well in the intervals of our desultory talk; they seemed to catch my eye, in a way to beckon to me. The interest was a very full and composite one, in which while *thinking* of the statues as people (nay friends) I *felt* them very deeply as form. This is evidently the normal process."

I here insert a note of March 8, on Titian's (?) *Baptism* in the Conservatori Palace, because it shows my mind entirely focused on the poetic quality of a picture.

"How it turns it (Christ's Baptism) into some Keatsian rite; the initiation, let us say, of a mere mortal, a poet, his flesh still white and unaccustomed to exposure, into the life of the woods, by a ruddy Saint John, who is, in reality, a Pan that has only just laid aside his syrinx."

A note of a few days earlier exemplifies the normal interplay of *subject* and *form*, in this case the recognition of the subject distinctly corroborating the desired effect of the form.

"*Sistine Chapel, ceiling.* Daniel, by his oblique position, not only carries the eye violently upwards, but frees a triangular space on one side of him. And here comes the action and reaction of the æsthetic and poetic: that swaggering, braving of heaven

movement of Daniel also reassures us about the vault: he is a titan playing with it."

The following corroborates passages in *Beauty and Ugliness*, pp. 192-3:

March 8. *Interior of Saint Peter's, Rome.* "In Saint Peter's (towards dusk) if I *feel* tall and lightly balanced it is because I actually *am* so; the muscular objective fact precedes the feeling and is due, obviously, to the way the eye is attracted to a high or very distant part, and the step and balance, the whole tensions, are determined by this necessity. Coming out on to the steps, I feel an immediate possibility of walking more or less hunched up. The greatness of the place had taken me and quite unexpectedly at once: the pale shimmer of the marble and the gold, the little encampment of yellow lights ever so far off, close to the ground at the Confession; and above all the spaciousness, vast airiness and emptiness, which seem in a way to be rather a mode of myself than a quality of the place."

March 9. *Vatican Rooms.* "Fine windy day, painful circumstances but deadened; slight bronchitis. Arrive in Stanze after easy strong ascent of stairs, palpitations from it. I find I have, very discontinuously, the final cadence of Caccini's *Amarilli*, heard yesterday.

"*Parnassus.* I don't go in very easily; the voices and shuffling disturb me. The *Amarilli* continues and I am bored and distracted. The heat and closeness worry me. The people attract my attention. I *yield* to this state, and go on and observe people. I go into Sala di Constantino and return to *Heliodorus*. When I think of it, *Amarilli* cadences. *Distraction* continues. I am struck by defects of *Heliodorus*. The *out of plane* of angels'

corner proved too much, and so the grotesque and disgusting, grimacing people near Heliodorus. I have extreme difficulty in going in to where the high priest kneels, and yet it attracts me, or at least I wish it. Cross light intrudes. The gestures of the people affect me as over-real and sudden. The fact is that my wandering attention assimilates all it catches with reality.

"Ceiling—everything strikes me as over-quick, almost spasmodic—the flames of the bush as much as God the Father.

"*Liberation of Saint Peter*. A bothering amount of emphasis, gesticulation, realism, something *stereoscopic*.

"Having met a friend, I proceed upstairs in hopes of Melozzo da Forlì.* The tune has changed to a mere see-saw—minor third downwards.

"I am surprised by the beauty of Melozzo's colour. But the figures even here seem disagreeably projecting—flattened, yes, but still projecting. I long to push them back and deepen the background. The steps and voices, creaking boots affect me painfully. Evidently I am in an *aggressible* humour. The custodian pulls out Melozzo and with the right light, a miracle! all goes into its place, and *I* into it. I see it then quietly, though not intensely, till it is turned away.

"I find a certain relief, pleasure, in a very deep sea-green Perugino background (picture in a good light). I seem to free myself from these visitors. But I don't care for the figures, which again strike me as too salient. The darkness of the great blackened Titian attracts me, but merely as a dark

* *I.e.* Melozzo da Forlì's fresco of Sixtus IV. and his nephews. It was at that time still upstairs.

room might, the figures bore me, and seem grotesque. . . . I believe the bad air is acting on a slight bronchitis oppression. I do not breathe easily.

"Other Perugino, *Four Saints*. The temple perspective and green background please me, but the people seem real, stereoscopic and *posing*. I take pleasure in the few inches of free foreground in front of their feet. I am not exactly bored or in a hurry to get away.

"*Transfiguration*. The hot, emphatic colour! I catch sight of nothing but *hands*; there seem more hands and feet than people, and such vulgar curiosity, pointing, craning, staring—faugh! I am attracted by three small *Saints* by Perugino, and with upturned eyes am looking down blank, dark background. It gives me a sense of rest and silence. Decent people, allowing me to live.

"I can do with Crivelli, even like it; the grimacing is so purely wooden, the composition so splendidly built up; and that *blessed* stone rail, breast high, separating me from them (they are represented one-fourth up the picture, as in a balcony). This gives me pleasure: the very agony, monumental or doll-like, attracts me:—a magnificent picture, mountainlike group. I really enjoy this, am unwilling to go, wish to remember it.

"I am much attracted by Leonardo's *Saint Jerome*. The way it all *goes inward*. The relief, almost pleasure of fresh air, of long vista in going down Scala Regia and the corridor; pleasure of streets in cab."

March 14. *San Pietro in Vincoli*. "Fine tramontana day. Am a little better pleased with life. After ascending the steep steps I go into the

church, very decidedly thinking of other things. Over the back of a Cook's touring party I catch sight of *Moses* (by Michelangelo), head and shoulders, and am *immediately* impressed by his grandeur. The Cook party having gone, I sit down quietly before *Moses*, by no means determined to see him. (What I wanted was the walk and the sense of having been there.) I see him well at once, quite unimpeded by the incongruous monument, and not at all worried by the people. I did not even *see* the Cook's party as they stood close.

"My attention goes slowly, regularly and easily from this book to the *Moses*. I take my chair to the other side, and see his full face equally well. But it is an intermittent attention. I return to my thoughts, go to him, etc. This is much the way in which to-day, with great enjoyment, I heard Miss C—— play some Chopin."

March 15. *Palazzo Doria. Copy of the Concert by Titian.* "A great part of the badness is due to its having been given real human expressiveness. The fat man is digging his hand violently into the thin monk's shoulder, most anxiously interrogating. The thin monk is turning round and staring at him. It may be in the repainting that this 'expressiveness' has been added. I am struck at the awful outward stare—the real stare of the sitter, in a *Paris Bordone* (?) portrait, vilely repainted.

"Either I am in the *aggrieved* mood, or all these pictures have been restored by the same expressive person. No, it isn't subjective. The double portrait by Raphael, hatefully greasy and viscous as it strikes me, by no means catches my eye. These people are well inside and monumental. . . .

"I am in rather happier, less tense mood, weather

fine. And I do not notice the people walking about. An old English tune haunts me ; it does not go with that double portrait.

“ *Herodias*. Visibly a copy or *pastiche*. . . . The English tune recedes as I look. I see the picture easily and without effort. (As a fact I have these last days become indifferent to my work, and go into galleries listlessly, indifferent whether I see or not.)

“ An agreeable copy of the Leonardesque *Joan of Naples* ; monumentally built, no catching of the eye here. I like this picture—dress, scheme of reds and very deep background with view across a pillared yard with blue sky beyond double row of columns and over garden.

“ The room in which she is sitting is itself long, with a vaulted corridor before you get to the yard. Altogether a maximum of depth of background—against this the girl in her ample red draperies is seated with infinite contemplative leisureliness, and eyes looking nowhere. This is one of the most engaging pictures I know, especially seen from a little distance.

“ *Portrait of Innocent X*. How Velasquez has taken trouble, by slightly placing the chair and sitter askew, that we should feel, *as he does, the other unseen side*, the fact that the man and chair have bulk.

“ This, I believe to result psychologically from the intensity, vividness and completeness of the great artist's *feeling* of what he sees (*i.e.* richness of accompanying memory images giving explanation of non-optical detail). But the pleasurable to us depends, I think, mainly on this four-square quality making the eye go on, and preventing all

sense of aggression by this humanly threatening individuality.

"If the chair were straight (no 'round-the-corner' indicated) and the man perfectly straight in it, we should feel that this Pope (who has only a curtain, though skilfully folded tent-like, behind him) was infringing on our life, instead of adding a region for exploration and contemplation to it. . . . It is odd how piercing the glance of this Pope is, and yet I have no sense of aggression or of indiscreet personality.

"The collar, the circular cape and cap, somehow turn him into something vitally unhuman, a great magnificent peony, with those odd eyes looking out of its depths.

"Claude's *Mill*. It is that deep, deep distance of landscape, river, and sky which makes us endure, even like, Claude's *Mill*, and turn it from a *croûte* into a masterpiece."

Same day. "I go into the church of the Minerva by the apse, and realise how much of my pleasure is due to the chapels, embrasures, into which, just like those picture distances, my mind can go."

The following entry gives a singularly typical example of dynamic *Einfühlung*, and as such I have used it and referred to it elsewhere.

April 29. *Florence*. "Yesterday I went into the Baptistery after taking Mlle. K—— to the station. Good spirits, but unwilling, and from mere sense of duty went into Baptistery. The place interested me so little, I felt so completely the hopelessness of such attempt to be interested, that I even began to read the newspaper as a sort of excuse for resting on a bench; the unsuccess of my æsthetic attempts (at enjoyment) being positively degrading. Walking

about, my eye caught that swirl pattern.* I was immensely surprised that from a distance it took the appearance of a double trefoil. I approached; while approaching and while I stood quite still the pattern seemed to move very positively and violently; to *dap* up and down, swirl round and round, as I *remember* water does. I say *I remember*, because it is possible that by comparison with *real* water this would have been motionless—or the contrary? But the movement seemed to stay objective; I could trace no movement of my eye or attention. No work of art has ever given me such a positive sense of movement. I was not inclined to be interested, quite the reverse, and everything else seemed as dead as a door-nail.

“I had been waiting at the station nearly an hour, noticing, *undergoing* the faces and manner and movement of the people with disagreeable vivacity. I did not notice about a tune. At Duomo after; not very receptive.”

May 10. *Church of Santa Croce*. “Came in idly, while awaiting the hour to lunch with a friend. Find a tune in me while walking along here, the answer of Zerlina, *Mi fa pietà Masetto*, where it is repeated quickly, only *I* have made it into a slow 1-2-3-4. To my surprise I continue to have it

* This pattern is on the Baptistery floor, near the N. gate. A somewhat analogous, but quite *dynamically* inferior one exists (or existed!) in the old floor of Saint Mark's, Venice. An eighteenth-century engraving shows an exact but (at least in the reproduction) utterly spiritless Roman duplicate, existing, I think, at Nîmes. And my friend, M. Emanuel Pontremoli, who has done architectural archæology and excavation in Asia Minor, tells me that the pattern is Græco-Asiatic and possibly very old. The Baptistery floor is, I take it, of the late twelfth or early thirteenth century. Cf. also p. 294.

before Desiderio's honeysuckle and palm pattern (*Tomb of Marsuppini*); only I take it quickly and with its natural flutter. Have had rheumatism, much nervous irritation, and feel bored though not depressed after bicycling against high wind and walking. I felt no 'immersion' on entering church, and was interrupted by fumbling at entrance for penny for beggar. No sense of being enclosed. Little desire to see anything. The footsteps irritate me much. Have been worried by thought of people coming and interrupting me this afternoon. The beggar woman alongside of Desiderio tomb strikes me now much more than the tomb. The little boys on it seem pert. The tourists and guide worry me. . . . The tourists keep catching my eye, and seem moving very quickly. I sit down tired. My tendency is not to get absorbed in the place, but rather stupidly distracted, staring without seeing, or at least feeling, minimising sensation, as happens when I have to wait at a station. I *want*, however, to have a look at Donatello's *Annunciation*. Impossible. . . . Different tune; some Beethoven, First Symphony. Impossibility of seeing Donatello, though I want to. Both those tunes impossible. I will make an effort. There seems an actual ocular difficulty, want of light. I like staying simply from laziness. Still I am not dispirited, only worried by constant cramp in hand; I have worked well and easily."

May 14. *Academy*. "Come on bicycle in heat, much jolted; veil has blinded me. Vague sense of pleasure at being among these pictures after a year or so. Impossibility of seeing big *Angelico*—the figures come out and there is no air behind them. I should like to go into background but can't. It is

that puppet show coming forward of figures. Palpitations. . . . I catch eye of figures disagreeably and they gesticulate so. The catching of eye is not due merely to lack of composition, they all actually roll their eyeballs and grimace.

"I was *platonically* attracted from first by little Botticellis and resisted. I see little *Salome* at once most vividly, but the tune remaining (has it to do with palpitations ?) intermittent with it. The other three little panels also seen at once and well (the comfort of a thing small enough to cover, isolate with one's eye !).

"That tune and the palpitations (the tune has a see-saw) seem to make a sort of pattern of excitement at certain beats of which I catch Botticelli well.

"The *Resurrection* (by Botticelli) seems less harrowing, tragic than I remembered it. I go in and feel so comfortable in it.

"But I do not feel inclination to linger, am restless.

"Tune and palpitations continue. Can't see big Gentile da Fabriano. . . .

"Botticelli's *Spring*. In an excellent light but with my palpitations full-cock, I see the *Primavera* *very* vividly, almost hyperæsthetically, but piecemeal. The upward and circular movements become *actual* almost, a sense of lifting and turning—yet not gibbering, though the thing is so fearfully acute as action.

"Curtain closed and diminishing of vitality. I see less well *ocularly*. That see-saw bell tune goes on. I do not see the picture *on* it, but between, in a frame of it.

"I am tired and lean lazily against wall ; when I catch *Primavera* it delights me. I rather like being

in the same room and don't want to go away. Not the faintest inclination to look at other things.

"I seem to see it less well sitting, although glad to sit.

"Extraordinary look of irrelevance in other pictures, such posing. This *Primavera* is really a world of enchantment, and I fancy one remains in it even when not looking. One might experiment with some reading in its presence. Have read my note on a certain fountain with a most vivid feeling of being in the country. I come back quite easily and am at once taken by this picture—made to tread these mazes.

"Palpitations much fainter, but quiet heart-beating and always to that tune. I find myself able to see the small *Nativity* of Lippi, but not as a whole.

"That tune seems to give most absurd movement to Perugino's *Gethsemane*: the people seem to sway or roll like a ship."

Florence. May 24. "Hot evening after stormy day. I have come to town to meet a friend at station. But no excitement. Have been ill and very tired two days. State of vague day-dreams. Have walked from tram and shopped.

"*San Lorenzo*. No impression of enclosure in church, only of rather sweet fresh incense. People are like ghosts. I can make no effort to look. But Verrochio's fountain pleases me by the vivacity of lines. Nothing in it gibbers. I have very little sense of sacristy. I am not distracted by outer life, indeed scarcely perceive even *Cicerone*, but perceive nothing except splash of fountain, echo of evening service and that sweetness of incense and coolness. Everything is dreamlike. If it were the first time I might have an impression, but I am too sleepy. I

am not thinking, I have bad headache on the way, sleepiness, and kept on smelling smells.

"One of the bronze doors in a ray of low light suddenly catches me, and some fig-leaves outside window. Making an effort to see merely makes me hear the talking priests and get bored. I begin to notice conversations a little. It is all very agreeable, but I am too sleepy. A curtain suddenly drawn (always in sacristy) and I awake a little. The frieze of terra-cotta cherubs seems to be making *battements*. It neither vexes nor pleases me. But that bronze door in the light pleases me. So agreeable not to wonder who and what the people are—mere shiny and shadowy surfaces. Pleasure at this as in moonlit garden when tired.

"Having tipped sacristan I linger. It is all so vaguely pleasant—fountain plashing, incense, echoing sounds, beams of light high up, coolness, and I like the marble table very much, with vestments and hats and Donatello tomb mysteriously tucked under it. I catch that glistening bronze gate again and a great stack of wax candles.

"This is really an enchanting form of sleepy impression if one could lie down instead of sitting on a hard bench, and if one hadn't the idea one *ought* to (but *won't*) look up into the cupola.

"Total indifference to tourists. It has cost me an effort to get out this book and write, but far less than to look at anything. How little trouble observing oneself and writing is. It seems part of the drowsiness."*

* Titchener, *Feeling and Attention*, p. 179: ". . . the experience that I want to bring to your mind is this: that, as one is reading, one is able to take mental note of passages to be remembered and employed, without appreciable pause in the process of reading itself,

The extracts from my notebooks finish appropriately with this one, which shows how easily, without being in the least disturbed by it, I could note down my æsthetic conditions. For years all my psychic life has been thus accompanied by consciousness of itself : only logical thought, work, interested conversation and states of extreme emotion suppress the spectator, whom I carry within myself. The greatest æsthetic enjoyment, always very calm in my case, is accompanied, as has been seen, by a constant consciousness of my condition.

Having ended this series of observations taken down rapidly, I will ask leave of the psychologist to place before him certain other extracts from my notebooks which I have taken out of their chronological order. For these notes which follow contain, by pure chance, some of the main conclusions, some of the most striking hypotheses which have come to me in the course of these two years of intimate study of my own relations with works of art, overthrowing or strengthening the æsthetic theories I held before.

They were made either in presence of the work of art, or always under the impression of it (within twenty-four hours).

They are, to tell the truth, merely the omitted synthesis which the reader has been able to gather from the preceding notes, a synthesis come spontaneously and without intention of examining the state of my theories.

and without even momentary loss of the thread of the writer's argument. . . . When we close the covers of a book we have marked down half a dozen passages for further use without interrupting of the main current of consciousness. That is the technical, critical attitude, and the introspective attitude is akin to it."

These notes will, I believe, exempt me from making an examination of the results to be drawn from these studies, by indicating them in a spontaneous and natural way, corresponding to the direct character of my observations.

The first of these notes (December 17, 1901) will perhaps serve to make plain a point frequently alluded to in my notes: "the deciphering of the symbol or the subject," as opposed to the perception of the form; and to unite this artistic phenomenon with the daily act of recognising surrounding objects; an act of which, to tell the truth, psychology has, until now, not taken sufficient notice. This note deals with the phenomenon which despite the explanations of Wundt and more recently of Lipps, writers continue to call "optical illusions."

"Looking down at the little farm just rebuilt in the valley below I saw, most distinctly, that the new shed, open towards us, on the bend of the stream, was filled with the splash of a mill-wheel; and the water ran round quite rhythmically in great heavy white bubblings, filling the dark shed with its flash. I pointed it out to a friend, a painter, who saw it also. But, she said, almost immediately, 'I think it is the smoke out of the chimney in front.' (The chimney was half-way down the hill.) 'Nonsense,' I said, and continued to see the mill-race in that shed for certainly three minutes; and shifting my place a little until I moved sufficiently for the curls of smoke to be visible against the side of the hill, when the shed became empty. But what made me finally believe that it was smoke was my friend pointing out that the movement of the water was towards the hill, *i.e.* backwards.

"The place is called *Mulinaccio*—Horrid old

mill. I said to myself, 'They have turned it back into a mill.' And I had been looking the moment before at one of the tributaries of the stream Mensola rushing downhill opposite with most visible boilings like those of my supposed mill-race; moreover, that wet day my mind was much impressed and delighted by the bubbling and seething of water everywhere."

This recalling of previous visual images by means of which we interpret forms seen by the eye, is shown in a second note made on May 3, 1904 :

"High above Igno, I look down on a very tall white tower outside Pistoia. It turns out to be a straight road. But every now and then I see it as a tower again, and then distinctly feel a third dimension behind it."

I would beg the psychologist to consider this second "optical illusion" together with my observations on the way in which we sometimes correct involuntarily the defective perspective of a picture, and, when we have once grasped the idea the artist wished to represent, we flatten, for example, vertical lines into what we judge to be a sheet of water because of reflections owing to its colour.

To this question of the part played by memory and judgment in the act of recognising real objects, or the artistic representations of real objects, there should be added my various observations on the subject of "real motion" (actual changing of place) and of the "movement" we attribute to lines.

The following note adds a more theoretic development :

April 1904. "I find an old note of my own, April 21, 1901, saying of antiques: 'They are not doing it, because great art does not give movement

of people, but movement of lines and surfaces,' etc. I would now add that what in art is *movement of people* probably varies from artistic generation to generation, because *movement of people* is an inference we make, and because we make this inference on different degrees of suggestion. What may suggest movement (*i.e.* locomotion) to a Byzantine will suggest nothing but immobility to a Renaissance man ; the Greeks probably felt attendant movement of people in the *Discobolus* as much as we do in Sargent, because they were equally looking for it. The more complex the formula of realism becomes, the less satisfied we are. A peasant thinks an oleograph *very like*, because he is not accustomed to something more like : he *spots* and infers more willingly than we. *Reality, real movement*, are in fact equations between our powers of recognition and a symbol, and they are therefore shifting, for the symbol alters. But the equation between our æsthetic faculty and 'form' does not alter, because there is here no symbol."

The above thought came to me after the following observation :

April 22. *Opera del Duomo*. "To-day I showed my young friend D—— the difference between the relation between the real people and the real surroundings (or, more strictly, the lack of relation), and that existing between the people, architecture, etc., in Pollaiuolo's embroideries (first noticed during the study of various works of art, by my collaborator C. Anstruther-Thomson). In the reality the relation) as said, is *zero*. We connect these items by experience, by causal relation, but by no kind of necessity, or affinity or interchange existing between them as visible things. The chairs don't press into

the ground, but stand detached, the people ditto.

“There is no reason why the most mediocre painter, having learnt ‘drawing’ and perspective in the schools, should not give us a faithful portrait of this floor, room, chairs, people. In fact he will give a more faithful one, for this very mediocrity will consist in his freedom from that æsthetic inspiration which forces, however unintentionally, the real artist to alter all these represented things until he has brought them into relations of equivalence and hierarchy and interaction.”

The same thought, due originally to the studies of my collaborator, C. Anstruther-Thomson, for *Beauty and Ugliness*, is very clearly formulated in the two following notes :

January 13, 1903. “Yesterday, looking at some second-rate water-colours, a thought recurred to me which I had had once before about Pennell, namely, that the artist translates what he sees into his own particular kind of form. This is obvious in such large matters as compositions, as anatomy—in the latter we have all the Furtwänglerian and Morellian observations, hands and ears, etc. etc. It is admitted also that an artist has a ‘line’—at least we hear of Leonardo’s, Botticelli’s, nay even Pope had heard of ‘Thy loved Guido’s line.’ *

* My former pupil, Dr. Waser-Krebs, has broached a most suggestive theory connecting the *line* of individual painters, or, rather, the smallest graphic elements composing it, with the same individual’s handwriting, and considering both as the expression, the graphic *gesture*, of his particular temperament. The artist’s peculiarities of composition, departures from or detail of traditional arrangements would, according to Dr. Waser-Krebs, repeat the *gesture scheme* already existing in the elementary forms (*Künstlerische Handschrift*, von Maria Waser, *Raschers Jahrbuch*, i., Zurich, 1910). Dr.

"But I think we do not sufficiently recognise how this latter fact acts upon the spectator. He is shown, by Botticelli, not merely ladies swaying about (let us say) in oddly tied up draperies among trees or fountains, but an assemblage of very particular (as Berenson pointed out) smoke-like spirals. Beardsley also shows not only highly sexual-looking people with diseased nostrils and leering eyes, but a system of vermicular lines quite as disagreeable and diseased as they. And so on. Now these constituent lines act upon the beholder quite as powerfully as the represented subject, or as the convergences, etc., of composition, indeed far more than they do. But inferior artists have *no line*, or no organically recurrent and intelligible one. They feebly try to reproduce the lines in nature. And in so far they have *no style*. . . .

"The boringness of much of Blank's water-colours of the Alps, despite other excellence, is due mainly, I think, to this. There is a helpless vagueness about the modelling *although he has the keenest sense for the lie of the land*, a passionate rendering of mountain form. But the precipices and projections, ledges and crevasses are all rendered in tentative lines and blotches. Very like the real thing, but without definite quality, *without category as form*.

"Hence one comes away feeling that nothing has been said or done to one. I feel the same thing in the Watts drawing of Lady de V. He has got the spiritual value, the bodily presence, of the woman very nobly; but he has rendered it in a confusion of *tentative lines*. One says 'The essential is lacking'—

Waser-Krebs has developed the same most valuable hypothesis in *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, vi. 1, 1911, but in my opinion deformed by building into an æsthetic system of doubtful value.

Not the essential of Lady de V., for that is there, but the *essential of a work of art*, or at least one of the essentials (the other one, the monumental building up, happens to be there).

"That explains the fact why, once I have taken in the fact of Lady de V., I never care to look at the drawing again ; instead of which Sargent's drawings keep calling and alluring the ' Eye.'

"The fact is that an inferior work of art causes us at once to reconstruct it in the sense of reference to reality ; we think of the Alps (in the water-colours), we think of Lady de V., and—we cease to look at the picture. Instead of which we are allowed by Ruskin to think of the Alps only in a constant circular activity within his drawing : to think of the lady singing only in a *labyrinth*, so to speak, of *Sargent*.

"The great artist captures us by filling us with a given movement, exclusive of all others, *his*, to which we willingly yield. In so far there is a certain truth in Souriau's notion of a quasi-hypnotic condition. But the *suggestion* is *not* merely of the object represented, it is, on the contrary, of the mode of representation."

Portrait of a Lady Singing, by Sargent. "A picture gives *not* the value of the seen person or thing, but the *summation* of the person or thing seen, heard, felt, heard about. In this case this assemblage of lines (what would be the value of the mere assemblage of lines, could we separate it, of the real lady ?) gives the value also of the lady's singing.

"The golden rule of art is not, as Lessing thought, to avoid representations of sudden, rapid, fleeting movements, but to make the representation of what

we tolerated or were agitated by when thus sudden and fleeting, satisfying and interesting when permanent."

Development of the idea of movement and rhythm in art.

April 26, 1904. *Bargello Museum. Tuscan Sculpture.* "Fairly well, arrive on foot, a tune, loud (martellato of fugue of *Zauberflöte* overture). Tends to fade on entering large hall, evidently far too quick for one's step there. It prevents my seeing Donatello's *Saint George*; seems to make the mosaic tesserae twinkle and take precedence of statue. The tune seems more alive to me than the statue: I hear it more easily than I see the statue.

"I am taken at once by the bas-relief (under *Saint George*), though the fading away of upper part of horse worries me. . . . The tune of a Schubert *Moment Musical* seems to suit fairly. . . . I have forgotten what the fugue theme of Mozart was like! Let me recall it—here (with a little difficulty)—no, no, how utterly out of time the waving of drapery, the step of the Princess. Let me try and modify it—I *can* make it suit by slackening it and altering it to a sort of waltz time, or rather mazurka.

"Extreme rapidity and sense of the striding of *Saint John*, but no tune. The rapidity is in the locks of fleece, the bend of both wrists and fingers more than in walk, for looking high up I don't see his legs, and there is no walking indication in the torso. I feel rapidity in the muscles strapped over chest—as *form*, also in the relation of mouth, nostril, and eyes. This rapidity is evidently that of my perception. I am really forced along very quickly; a little palpitation (had none coming up the stairs slowly) and breathing hard. . . .

"I go out to the *Bronzes*. The difficulty of getting an impression of any work of art in a gallery is clearly initially the difficulty of isolating it (or oneself) from the vague total chaotic impression of all the surrounding objects, all of which, being works of art, have both a far more definite and stronger 'accent' than any 'natural objects;' and also catch an attention already set on works of art.

"Moreover they project out of their surroundings, they do not fuse, and we cannot dismiss them in a lump as we dismiss 'natural objects.'

"This smaller bronze room is really a Babel of people talking different tongues, vociferating. While for the most part, the details of a landscape, of a street, assume the vague character of natural noises which we scarcely perceive."

Definite conclusions from my numerous observations about the *movement of lines* and *rhythmic obsession* begin to be drawn in the next extract. It contains the experiential formula of that *attribution of our conditions to visible forms*, which constitutes, in my opinion, the solid, irrefutable and distinctive part of the theory of *Einfühlung* set forth by Lipps in his *Raumästhetik* and his *Grundlegung*.

These notes, although the result of personal experience like all the others given in this work, were written while reading a new volume by Lipps, *Grundlegung einer Ästhetik*; and they constitute an attempt to clear up my ideas about the *theory of Einfühlung*. I consider them, as usual, incomplete, and I beg the reader to look upon them as a very provisional synthesis, which I set before him only to make him familiar with the actual state of an æsthetic theory which I desire to see empirically demonstrated.

“(A) I believe what we project is that initial act, sufficient to set going a whole automatic train, which, in the case of all habitual movements, is the only part of them existing in consciousness: the ‘I mount,’ of the ready bicyclist: the word of command: I rise, I sit down, I lie down, etc., which, if it is absolutely successful, precludes all knowledge of muscular conditions.

✓ “That this is so is clear when we consider that the movements thus projected into inanimate or motionless forms are necessarily movements so familiar that they are part of our conception of all existence: they are the most automatic thing we have any consciousness of at all. If they were more recent, less perfectly organised, if any portion of the automatic chain could suddenly start into consciousness, they would be such as we could never project outside ourselves.

“Hence, there can, as Lipps rightly judges (though he seems to give no reason), be no *localisation* in *Einfühlung*; not because we could not localise in ourselves what we project outside, but because we could not project as explanatory *mode*, as necessary way of being, an activity liable to localisation, *i.e.* to imperfect automatism.

“(B) What localised feelings may be called forth are therefore evidently of secondary nature, responses, on our part, to the action we have attributed, in fact imitation consequent on *Einfühlung*: we draw ourselves up because we have perceived the column as doing it, and we perceive the column as drawing itself up because certain relations of lines translate themselves into automatic relations of which we only know the initial fact ‘drawing up.’* ”

* I may add (1910) to this that it has occurred to me that such

"The attribution of this idea thus stripped of localised signs would be *Einfühlung*, putting us into relations of vital similarity with the visible object. The muscular tensions perceived in certain cases (cases as I believe of *least æsthetic* attention, of attention divided between the thing seen *and our own person*) would be a phenomenon of inner imitation aroused by the attribution of our movement to something else; in a word, a result (not necessarily occurring) of *Einfühlung*.

"(C) In fact the image of a thing completed by a memory image tends, when no evident signs of passiveness are present, to be an image also of a movement or gesture. Now, the image, let us say the thought, of a movement or gesture, tends, as we all know, to produce an actual outer miming of that movement or gesture; if that outer miming be

secondary muscular processes may possibly be a means of helping out a naturally insufficient attention, in the same way that silent muscular performance of a melody may be, I believe, a help to deficient auditive memory, or perhaps a means of diminishing inattention by calling on the motor centres.

Titchener, *Thought Processes*, p. 176: "Meaning is originally kinæsthesia; the organism faces the situation by some bodily attitude. . . . And words themselves, let us remember, were at first motor attitudes, gestures, kinæsthetic contexts, complicated, of course, by sound, and, therefore, fitted to assist the other types of attention.

P. 178: But I go further. I doubt if meaning need necessarily be conscious at all, if it may not be 'carried' in purely physiological terms. In rapid reading, in skimming of pages in quick succession, in the rendering of a musical composition in a particular key; in shifting from one language to another as you turn to your right- or left-hand neighbour at a dinner-table; in these and similar cases I doubt if meaning necessarily has any kind of conscious representations."

How much more so, I may add, in cases of æsthetic contemplation where the focus of the mind may be upon the representation or use!—V. L.

✓ checked by our own real movement or gesture, it produces merely a *sense* of the movement.* (And being made to realise it in ourselves, we project it into the seen thing once more: a strengthening of that original attribution of movement.) Anyhow, having attributed movement we feel that movement in ourselves by the fact of partial imitation, and
 ✓ instantly awaken thereby the sense of pleasure or displeasure associated with such movement. . . . And I may add, if that awakening of the initial 'thought' of the movement and its accompanying pleasure or displeasure be very lively, a real bodily disturbance, sometimes mimetically 'muscular,' but
 ✓ more often influencing the great emotional organs, heart, respiration, etc. . . . We must, I now feel convinced, reinstate in all this *Einfühlung* matter the old psychological items of 'thinking,' of 'idea,' of 'memory images,' and above all of association. And to these we must add as most powerful factors of variation, 'checking and neutralising' (*Hemmung*) and emotional synthesis, *i.e.* the domination of a given 'affective tone' on the whole associated images, simply because such 'affective tone' answers to what is after all the most vivid datum of consciousness, our own condition."

February 20, 1904. "I should like to add a few words about *Hemmung* (check, partial inhibition).

"This constitutes one of the main factors of the æsthetic phenomenon. *Einfühlung*, *i.e.* the act of interpreting new visible facts in terms of our previous experience, of seeing a new shape in the light of a familiar one, of attributing movement to form, life to movement, and of *miming* initially the movement thus attributed—this process would doubtless take

* Cf. Extracts from Münsterberg, p. 145.

place constantly if, so to speak, *we had not other fish to fry*. The necessities both of self-defence and of exploitation force us to shorten ever more and more the act of visual perception, and to substitute for its suppressed portions other acts: the thought of the other qualities connected with that form, the thought of the *acts* connected therewith, and of our own acts in answer thereunto. ✓✓

“This is a *checking* of the æsthetical possibility, not merely because we are hurried from contemplation into action (Groos has seen this clearly); but, even more (which neither Groos nor Lipps sees), because this *checking* is in the first instance *a thinking about something which is not the form*. For, before we are hurried away out of contemplation in general, we are already hurried, in the *very act of attribution*, out of the contemplation of the form into that of the subject. The child, for instance, recognises in a curtain tassel a shape similar to that of a woman (I speak from personal recollection). But, instead of attributing to this shape merely the act of erecting body and head and spreading out skirts, and then passing on to the æsthetic empathy (*Einfühlung*), or more properly the æsthetic sympathetic feeling of that act of erecting and spreading, the child at once flies to the other acts of which that shape is susceptible actively and passively: dancing, walking, being nursed, dressed, etc., in fact the child thinks of that object *as a doll*. ✓

“I have used the words ‘that object,’ and this is significant of the whole process of checking æsthetic perception or rather of deviating its initial elements into other processes. Deviating to the extent, perhaps, of preventing the further æsthetic experience going on simply because there is no basis for

it. When one puts together the absence of æsthetic life (save music and colour) in children with their extraordinary activity of, so to speak, turning every shape into a doll or a story, an activity which is probably the preparation in play (overlooked by Groos) for the paramount human instinct of 'interpretation' (*i.e.* connecting sights with qualities, actions, reactions and furthest consequences, *practical* imagination); when we note this coincidence we may suspect that the very generalised, typical, strictly 'initial,' attribution of movement to seen shapes whereof æsthetic *Einfühlung* is a residue, an alluvium of infinitely repeated experiences; an alluvium which *can* exist only after years of habit, and which, even when ready, complete, is probably diminished by the necessary continuance of that activity of 'playing with things' which characterises childhood.

"But my belief is that the starting-point of all habits of æsthetic *Einfühlung*, such as I conceive them, is always interest in things: the question 'What is this?' 'What is it like?' In other words, the æsthetic interest is a complex, late and residual, at least in the life of the individual."

I may add (1911) that as regards paragraphs (B) and (C) of these notes, I put them forward as a mere suggestion, the correctness of which may be proved, but quite as probably, I think, disproved, by such further psychological and psycho-physiological investigations as I refer to at the end of this article.

Having given thus provisorily and for the better understanding of the subject these still very undeveloped discussions of the question of *Einfühlung*, I want to express my conviction that all this question would gain by being reduced to a termin-

ology agreeing less than does that of German æsthetics with metaphysical and almost mystical terminology. I venture to hope that there will be eliminated from this discussion that very gratuitous and ambiguous notion of the *ego* of philosophers—an entity mysterious, indivisible and eluding study—to substitute for it, perhaps, conceptions acquired during the analysis of states of consciousness, and due to the very modest studies of the inner life of an individual; a sample of which studies I hope to have given in this work.

After thus renouncing the habit of *a priori* discussions in æsthetics, I will return to the ideas which have been suggested to me by my individual experience.

May 14, 1904. At the end of a note on the very intense enjoyment given by Botticelli's *Spring*, I find the following observation, which raises the question of activities other than æsthetic, implied in the appreciation of form. The note deals with the very unexpected pleasure received from a picture by Angelico, which I did not know, and this, scarcely half an hour after receiving an unpleasant impression from another picture, which I knew very well, by the same master.

"It struck me at the Academy that the action of *novelty* on æsthetic impression is to set going the inquiring, discovering, prowling, *what's-what* activities on which æsthetic appreciation is carried. *Novelty makes us look because we don't know what there is.* This explains why novelty of place or represented objects acts favourably to æsthetic appreciation, while novelty of style often kills it off. The maximum appreciation is given, perhaps, by *unexpected recognition of the familiar.* We have to

explore, but also to synthesise. Now in the case of the unfamiliar we can explore but not synthesise. In new friendships we are often conscious of attraction by real or fancied likeness to people for whom we have no lively feeling. On the other hand, the dead-level of old friendships is due to our having ceased to explore, and going perpetually over an old synthesis. This explains why showing a place or piece of music to another person often renovates it. We are obliged to synthesise afresh. All this proves that æsthetic pleasure has to be carried on some one of the great utilitarian processes of life. I find in a book of an American psychologist, Mark Baldwin, this phrase, which gives a phylogenetic form to this notion of mine: 'The time when the only function of art was that of attracting attention.' **

I would add that attracting attention is now art's first necessity.

From the action of *novelty* in heightening our æsthetic responsiveness, the next extract from my diaries passes on to a cognate question: the normal alternation in æsthetic attention, and the alliance of various competing kinds of interest to which art has recourse (interest in *subject*, e.g. with interest in *form*) in order to prevent our attention divagating by enclosing it in a rhythmical alternation.†

* *Social and Ethical Interpretation in Mental Development* (1899), p. 151.

† Titchener, *Psych. of Feeling and Attention* (1908), p. 263:

"According to Wundt, attention is discontinuous from force of circumstances and intermittent from its very nature. It is discontinuous because ideas come and go in consciousness, and attention grasps but one idea at a time." Titchener quotes Wundt: "*Ein dauernder Eindruck kann nur fest gehalten werden, indem Momente der Spannung und der Abspannung derselben mit einander wechseln.*"

Palm Sunday. High Mass, Santa Trinità, Florence. "The great function at Santa Trinità, very beautiful to look at, with three-part music, I believe by Lotti. My hopeless state of *distrazione*: I feel that I cannot in the least keep my attention on these sights and sounds, because they are only sights and sounds. Surely this is legitimate, natural. We are not, save by exception, capable of or fit for *mono-ideism*, and what we take for it—for instance, in writing, talking, etc.—is in reality *complete synthesis*, absolute summation. Where such summation cannot, from disparity of subject, take place, there will be unsteadiness and wandering of attention; and this is our habitual condition when not engaged in doing or pursuing something continuously.*

"The *distraktion* in the presence of, say, a work of art, is merely the surging up of the other interests of our life; it is due to the work of art not appealing sufficiently to various of our faculties while not making a sufficiently intense demand on one special group. (If, for instance, one is trying to make out a new piece of music, at the piano, with difficulty, one is usually not distracted.) There is no *distraktion*, or much less, when the work of art has a *subject*, because that subject uses up our powers of associative thinking and forms a summation. If, for instance, I had had the words of the Mass, and particularly if those words had possessed real

Auf diese Weise ist die Aufmerksamkeit ihren Wesen nach eine intermittirende function."

Titchener, p. 265, quotes Ebbinghaus:

"*Dauernde Aufmerksamkeit gibt es nur bei einem stetigen Wechsel der Inhalte, in deren Hervortreten das aufmerksamsein besteht.*"

* Titchener, *Feeling and Attention*, p. 302: "I doubt whether inattention, in the waking life, is not always 'attention to something else.'"

practical emotional meaning for me, there would have been no *distraction*, simply because there would have been a blending or a synthetic rhythm, backwards and forwards, between various items ; there would have been a total, a harmonious state of mind.

“ What I want to point out is that division and oscillation of attention is normal in æsthetic conditions (and in most habitual ones), only that the complexity and the synthetic and regular quality of our activity makes us overlook it. At the bottom of this is of course the perpetual movement, shifting and competing in our attention, without which no consciousness would exist. It is very probable (as M. Krebs at once suggests) that we cannot think of only *one* thing at a time ; we are so constituted that we must, save in most exceptional states, perpetually weave patterns between many items, come and go, fetch and carry. If the work of art gives only one sort of item, then the other items habitual in our life, worries, trifles, will compete with it. Hence the superior average power of composite art, opera, religious art, etc. etc.

“ What it all comes to is that art must occupy our life, or be a mere trifle from which our life is perpetually flowing away. Again, of course much art is made for intermittent attention in the intervals of living : furniture, dress, etc. : it is, so to speak, the garment of life.”

I should like my psychological reader to think over the note I have just put before him. To me it seems to represent the unexpected conclusion of many of the observations and hypotheses given above. The notes immediately subsequent put the same question with more clearness and detail.

March 27. *Florence*. “ With this hangs together

the question of what I must call the *various dimensions of association*. My experience is that however attentive we are to a work of art there is always, on another plane of attention, an associated something ; nay, I cannot even be in a much enjoyed landscape without distinct associations of other landscapes, not preventing my seeing that one, but in a manner continuing it in other planes of consciousness. I see this even in trifles. On a farm-house near my home, there is a stain of sulphate of copper under the spalliered vine. I have rarely remarked it of late without a thought, sometimes a distinct vision, of Tintoret's *Bacchus and Ariadne*, the peculiar blue of the stain being connected with the sea and sky in that picture, while the vine (even when leafless) suggests both visually and poetically Bacchus and the garland on his head and round his loins. The impression is not a fusion, still less a *confusion* ; it is an oscillation between that wall (with escutcheons, stain, and vine) and that picture.

“ And here I may add that a great picture fulfils its purpose quite as much when thus returning to enrich an accidental impression, even if only of a stain on a wall, as when looked at in reality and for its own sake.

“ I noticed this morning in Santa Trinità that whereas I could not possibly keep my attention from straying whilst sitting staring and listening to a performance which had no intellectual or emotional sense for me, I could be absorbed therein for a few seconds of stopping on the way out.

“ Our activities cannot be isolated, we must either act and feel in complete concert with what we see and hear (probably a need for synthetic action developed in self-defence, as seeing, hearing,

adjusting, or escaping) or else *life claims us away from art.*

“We must not be misled (and we are) by the fact that the artist can give all his attention to the picture he is painting or the piece he is enjoying; nay the student can do so to the picture or music he is merely examining. For the artist is doing a dozen things besides merely contemplating his work; and the critic is examining, comparing, measuring, judging. Both are living a very complex life in reference to the work of art. This is the reverse of what the enjoying person is supposed to do, expecting to empty out his consciousness of everything save that seen or heard thing, and then perhaps a little bitterly surprised, almost humiliated, at not being let alone by his habitual thoughts and observations.

“*The action of art is not hypnotic, not mono-ideistic*: it is synthetic; it *excludes*, but by making a little walled garden of the soul of all manner of cognate things, a maze, in which the attention runs to and fro, goes round and round, something extremely complex and complete, taking all our faculties. This is the basis of a theory of art (this and not a theory of *Einfühlung* or anything else), this: the observed phenomenon of æsthetic attention.”

Easter Sunday, 1904. “I have for years felt that the artistic phenomenon was *circular*. It seems to me now that it is perhaps our need for such circular conditions of consciousness, for such unity, attention, summation, as opposed to conflict and interruption, which accounts, quite as much as our two arms, legs, and pair of eyes, for the need of symmetry. An unsymmetrical object is one which

cannot *be felt* in the same manner ; instead of one mood, made of coherent and interdependent impressions, we have the abortive beginnings of two moods, each struggling against the other.

“ But whence this need of unity, co-ordination of mood ? Surely it may be a necessity of the human soul in its effort to affirm itself to itself and to subdue the outer world to its purposes. The soul, consciousness, character, is for ever threatened with disintegration by the various forces of nature ; our surroundings tend to break us to bits, to wash us away. The human personality has purpose, direction, unity, co-ordination as a law of its persistence. And we persist by adapting our surroundings to ourselves quite as much as ourselves to our surroundings ; indeed the latter would be on the road to disintegration, to extinction, it would mean the person, the soul, the type, swallowed up in what compared with it is the endlessly fluctuating chaos.

“ Human life is a certain cycle of activities, strictly interdependent ; and character is the expression, the *sine qua non* of such a cycle. Hence, in the perpetual going on, in the countless alteration to suit altering surroundings, the necessity, for mere human self-defence, of moments of complete harmony, co-ordination, summation, and the perpetual struggle to attain it more or less partially. The satisfaction of our bodily needs—sleep, food, generation, are not related with the persistence of the personality ; they are responses of the individual to the general need. But given that the individual—what we call the soul—has come to exist as a part of the universe, this microcosm must, under penalty of destruction, perpetually seek to put its stamp upon the macrocosm, or at least affirm its existence as

opposed to the macrocosm. Now the macrocosm, except as thought by us, is the external, in a manner the foreign and irrelevant, perpetually threatening us ; and against it the microcosm asserts itself with its insistence on plan, unity, harmony.

“ Looking at the matter from a different standpoint we might say that the line of least resistance for consciousness is the establishment of one mood at a time. Consciousness is for ever trying to arrange the more or less fluctuating and incoherent items it receives into such unity, and trying to carve such unity—what we call either purpose or plan—out of the surrounding chaos.

“ Art would therefore be, from the utilitarian, evolutionary point of view, a school for this unity of mood, purpose, and plan, without which consciousness would disintegrate and human life disappear.

“ As I pointed out before (though I did not see it so clearly)* this is the junction between ethical and æsthetic life. Both are purposeful, co-ordinate, both represent the higher law of consciousness, *i.e.* synthetic unity of mood. The unethical, the unintellectual man, like the unæsthetic, is the one who is in conflict with himself, or who is the mere passive toy of circumstances.

* In my *Laurus Nobilis, Art and Life*.

In her admirable analysis and summing up of the Würzburg æsthetical experiments, Fräulein von Ritoók writes (*Zeitschrift für Ästhetik*, V. Band, p. 539): “ One fact can certainly be formulated, *viz.*, the indispensableness of unity in the æsthetic experience. In no other category of psychic activity does lack of unity act so destructively as in the æsthetic one. It is not a case merely of diminution of intensity, but of actual transforming satisfaction into dissatisfaction.” And (p. 541): “ Harmony is the empathic unity of the psychical experience.”

Cf. Lipps's saying that “ ugliness is dynamic incoherence.”

“The world as *Vorstellung* is Man’s assertion of his own nature as against the world of *Wille* of which he is a dependent, but a separate and self-consistent part. In this Schopenhauer saw correctly.”

Assisi. March 22. “Lower church. Yesterday at sunset and this morning at the Mass of the monks. (I have been recently worried and somewhat unwell.) One of the ways of coming in contact with art is, evidently, to bring one’s troubles, doubts, one’s fluctuating sea or ruffled puddle of distress, and live this life subdued and chastened by that of art. This is, of course, the function especially of music and architecture. Music, seeming to voice our feelings, brings them to harmony, beauty, and an intensity of a higher kind.”

April 23, 1904. “It is natural that a work of art should be a *Hortus inclusus*, since, when we do not *mime* the represented action and then depart, our activity of perception consists in looking round and round, in and out and back again—and looking over and over again. Hence the sense of eternity.”

My Gallery Diaries, continued since the above entries, have covered a greater number of problems, have suggested a new crop of detail hypotheses, have become in fact fuller and fuller, but also proportionately more difficult to deal with; and I have therefore decided not to include any of them in a volume intended, after all, to familiarise students with the chief problems of psychological æsthetics, and even to introduce such æsthetics, its problems and hypotheses, to those who have approached art from other sides. I will, however, forestall on some future publication of this kind by saying that my diaries since 1904 have not invalidated, but only confirmed and enriched, the chief generalisations

drawn from their predecessors. Further observations, more systematic and detailed, have shown me that, as regards myself at least, æsthetic responsiveness is an essentially active phenomenon, and one subject to every conceivable cause of fluctuation in our energy and variation in our moods, to the extent that (as a well-known art critic has confirmed to me in conversation) the judgment of pleasurable and displeasurable passed upon the same work of art may be altered and even reversed within a few days. I find, for instance, that the same pictures by Lotto, a very peculiar artistic personality, are described, in successive entries in my diaries, as having given me the greatest pleasure and as having utterly repelled me according to the bodily and mental condition in which I happened to come into the presence of the work of art ; a fact which, explaining why certain categories of art and certain artistic personalities may be more or less suited to individual beholders as well as to the same beholder in different moods, may show that, although artistic excellence is always due to qualities of harmonious tradition and of individual energy and equilibrium, there is within the limits of such excellence wherewithal to satisfy the cravings of the various types of normal mankind. Briefly my notes subsequent to 1904 have added more detail while further confirming what is implicit in the *Æsthetics of Empathy* : namely, that the work of art requires for its enjoyment to be met half-way by the active collaboration of the beholder, or, I may add, the listener and the reader.

One last remark: these unpublished diaries subsequent to 1904 bear out on every point the contention of modern introspective psychology, namely, that a trained (if also a born) psychological

observer is not only able, but inclined, to notice and record his own psychical conditions and their concomitants, without any appreciable diminution in their spontaneity and genuineness, at least in the case of phenomena so normal, so constant and, I may add, so rarely attaining emotional violence and mono-ideism, as the æsthetic affections show themselves in my own case.

Professor Lipps's testy criticism on *Beauty and Ugliness*, to the effect that *it is impossible* to be aware of bodily sensations while absorbed (*Versunken*) in the joyful contemplation of a Doric column, therefore shrinks into mere evidence to an individual incapacity either for self-observation or for such complex impressions as associate in other folk's minds the visual image of the Parthenon columns with the smell of sunburnt herbs on the Acropolis and the tinkle and bleating of sheep that rise from the valley below. It is quite possible that Professor Lipps's individual æsthetic contemplation at least of Doric columns may be of that absolutely unfluctuating and unmixed type which, in the case of very acute and massive emotion and of intensive intellectual preoccupation, defies all knowledge of its own concomitants; nay characteristics. But such impassioned or Archimedianly concentrated contemplation is, I will venture to say, by no means inevitable in our daily and loving commerce with beautiful things. And I can assure those of my friends who hesitate before æsthetic introspection as before some sacrilegious or abnormal practice, that if they are capable of the attention and self-discipline which such introspection involves, they need not be afraid of diminishing their æsthetic sensitiveness and pleasure, nor of approaching the

great things of art with less of that active participation on which we are taught by empirical æsthetics that our genuine happiness in beauty essentially depends.

March 1911

CONCLUSION

TRYING, after all these years and all this discussion, to sum up my present attitude towards the essay called *Beauty and Ugliness*, I find it necessary to do so from more than one point of view.

In the first place, I feel certain that but for my collaborator's experiments and the suggestion they afforded of a Lange-James or Sergian explanation of formal-æsthetic satisfaction and dissatisfaction, I personally should have had to wait for Lipps's *Empathy* and Groos's *Inner Mimicry* before getting any inkling of a possible *wherefore* of such satisfaction and dissatisfaction ; indeed it is possible that unless I had previously collaborated in *Beauty and Ugliness* I should have failed to recognise the bearing of either Lipps's or of Groos's hypothesis. The experiments described and the theory put forward in *Beauty and Ugliness* had accustomed me to seek the explanation of form-preference in active participation, and in our own movements, their modes and concomitants ; in fact I based such preference upon *Einfühlung* long before having heard the word.

But these movements were movements which actually took place, or which were *felt* as taking place, in the person of my fellow-worker, and æsthetic preference was explained by a direct or indirect participation of the organic life due to those movements being actually taking place or seeming

to take place. For at the time of collaborating in *Beauty and Ugliness* I had no standard of what constitutes psychological experimentation, neither did I discriminate sufficiently between fact and inference, or between testimony and proof. Moreover, the study of individual variations of psychological experience was barely begun in 1897, and it was utterly unknown to me until I read Galton, Binet and Stern, Stricker and Ballet after collaborating in *Beauty and Ugliness*; so that, although modesty made me throw in a saving clause about "Individual Idiosyncrasy," the astounding application of the plural pronoun to experiments which only one of two collaborators had attempted answered to my firm conviction that what was true of my collaborator must hold good of every other human being capable of æsthetic form-preference. Indeed my own unawareness of most of the mimetic movements and organic sensations which I described at second-hand only persuaded me that they took place normally in some "sub-consciousness" whose darkness was a guarantee of its "intuitive" or "biological" all-importance; for, perhaps because I was still unacquainted with M. Bergson's philosophy, I was fully imbued with that quasi-religious respect for the "obscure," the "profound," and the "semi-" or "sub-" or "un-" conscious kinds of consciousness which that philosophy has systematised. In short, the plural pronoun employed by me in *Beauty and Ugliness* meant not *we two collaborators*, but *we, all mankind*, or at all events all mankind capable of formal æsthetic preference. It corresponded to the *Wir Motoriker* for whom, a few years later, my friend Professor Groos claimed a superior intensity of æsthetic perception and emotion.

Only I had not reached Professor Groos's stage of dividing the world into *Motoriker* and not-*Motoriker*. I really thought that everybody was "we." It was only when, reading Lipps, I found that exactly the same (as I now call it) dynamic-empathic interpretation of form took place in a writer who absolutely scouted all Lange-James or Sergian explanations thereof, that I gave up the belief that the phenomena described by my collaborator must necessarily be taking place in some subconscious region of my own self.

So much for my, so to speak, historical indebtedness to the experiments and the theory contained in *Beauty and Ugliness*, and the indebtedness therefore of whosoever may have received suggestions from that Essay. My present estimation of the validity and value of those experiments and of that theory is, as already suggested by the above fragments of autobiography, a very different matter.

And now I am coming to a point on which it is very difficult to make myself clear to others, as it has been difficult for me to attain clearness for myself. The point has been put to me by others in the form of a question : Why, since I now consider formal-dynamic empathy as due, not to actually present movements and muscular-organic sensations, but to the extremely abstract ideas of movement and its modes residual from countless individual and possibly racial experiences, why should I still give importance to present movement *sensations*, and connected organic sensations also present, which I am scarcely ever aware of in my own case, and which are not necessary to explain the purely "mental" phenomenon of interpretation of visible form in terms of movement and energy that I constantly find

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taking place as an essential part of my own formal-æsthetic perception? My reason for taking in consideration these imitative movements and mimetic-organic sensations is not merely because I find a considerable number of observers, headed by Professor Groos and my collaborator, clinging to the belief in their importance. For they can be explained away as resulting from the mental process of dynamic-empathy, reinforcing its effects according to Professor Külpe's simile (which I willingly accept) as with the cymbals and kettledrums reinforcing the effect of music without producing it.

No; it seems to me that we must take into consideration such mimetic-organic sensations because they may possibly afford us a clue to the origin of the odd fact of our associating movement and energy with objects and patterns, with mere *shapes*, of which we know that they *cannot* move, and know also that, nine times out of ten, the real movements originally producing them (growth of plants and animals, geological upheaval and erosion as well as artistic manipulation) are either unthought of by us or of a kind exactly contrary (*e.g. down* instead of *up*) to that of the movements attributed to the forms by æsthetic empathy. For granted that this empathically attributed movement and energy are, as Lipps long since pointed out, *abstract*, or, as I have called it, residual of countless past experiences, there remains the question: Why should these *ideas of movement*, these abstractions from innumerable memory-images of movement, be awakened in connexion with motionless shapes, and, what is more, awakened in a higher degree and in a very varied manner by some shapes rather than others? In fact, must there not be in us some *present move-*

ment however slight, to set going this (to use old-fashioned language) chain of associations of movement, indeed to defend such abstract motor imagination from the competition of the less abstract, richer, newer chains of more or less individual associations which cause us to recognise those shapes as "representing" objects of our concrete experience? *For let it be remembered that formal-dynamic empathy is entirely independent of all suggestion of what a shape "represents," indeed it is inhibited oftener than excited, by the thought of a represented object.* Granted therefore that formal-æsthetic empathy is of the nature of memory, of thought, why should we remember, think of, movement and its modes unless some movement actually going on suggests those abstract ideas of movement? That this actually existing and suggestive movement is largely that of the eyes and of all the bodily parts instrumental in adjusting our sight or affected by such bodily adjustments, I feel more and more inclined to think. I am aware that experiments have shown that the movements of the eyes in following a given shape answer only very imperfectly to that shape; moreover, that it has been repeated over and over again that eye-movements, when not physically unpleasant, are indifferent, and cannot therefore be alleged as a cause of æsthetic pleasure. But my use for eye movements, and all movements connected therewith, is not to explain the æsthetic pleasantness or unpleasantness of shapes. *That* I believe to be explicable by the mental process of formal-dynamic empathy, by the interplay of forces suggested by those shapes, and by the pleasantness or unpleasantness of such inner dramas of abstract movement-and-energy-association.

tions. My use for eye movements, or for any present, actual movement, is to explain why motionless shapes should awaken pleasant or unpleasant dynamic dramas in our mind, and awaken them, very often, far more vividly than the sight of bodies which we know to be really moving through real space, as my gallery observations testify to the real movements of people and carriages seeming dull and dead compared with the intensity of movement attributed to painted or carved shapes.

Now, in the first place, the movements of our eyes normally involved in visual perception imply in the *actual present* a far greater number of other adjustments (head, neck, back, etc.) than we are apt to think of; and secondly, ocular movements replace or symbolise an enormous number of *past* locomotor and tactile experiences, as is universally admitted with regard to the visual interpretation of cubic existence and third-dimensional depth. Thirdly, ocular, or more properly *visual*, attention, produces, if I may trust my own experience, kinæsthetic processes (so-called muscular, and also cardiac and respiratory) analogous to those attendant on other kinds of voluntary attention. Fourthly, ocular movements and their accompanying kinæsthetic changes awaken *verbal* images which may themselves radiate (and with certain individuals undoubtedly do so radiate) into mimetic acts and kinæsthetic disturbances, exactly as verbal images do in other connexions.

It is as thus explaining the starting and keeping up of dynamic empathy that I now think that not only ocular movements, but all directly or indirectly connected bodily processes, should be taken into account. Recent psychological thought as exem-

plified by Wundt, Binet, Külpe, and Titchener, and as boldly summed up in the hypotheses of Semon's *Mneme*, tend to the recognition that the phenomena of consciousness are not the parallels of physiological processes, but rather their signs or vestiges in every degree of complication and every degree of impoverishment. We have been shown the superposition and interchange of various mental processes, and their combinations and vicarious relationships—the tactile-locomotor images replaced, *symbolised*, by the visual ones; the visual images *short-handed*, their values extracted, by the verbal ones. And we should therefore be prepared to find very little likeness between the facts of consciousness and the bodily changes which underlie them, or the symbolical representatives of bodily movements which may have accompanied or perhaps do still accompany, unnoticed, all visual perception, and which account for that otherwise unaccountable stimulation of abstract motor memory by the sight of motionless shapes. And it seems to me possible that the secondary production of kinæsthetic processes by the already existing phenomenon of formal-dynamic empathy may be connected, in the persons who are subject to it, with a survival of such underlying kinæsthetic consciousness superseded in other subjects by a more completely abstract and, so to speak, disembodied kind of dynamic empathy. And in such so-called "motor subjects" it is quite probable that, as Professor Groos believes, the bodily participation of "Inner Mimicry" produces a deeper emotional resonance (Professor Külpe's cymbals and kettledrum) which may surpass or merely equal the excitement of more purely mental empathy.

Having made this proviso concerning the possible underlying suggestive functions of the kinæsthetic accompaniments of æsthetic perception, and left the door open to the recognition of Inner Mimicry and Organic Participation as a multiplying factor of æsthetic emotion, I wish to repeat my present belief that æsthetic preference cannot be explained by Lange-James or Sergian hypotheses, whereas it can be explained by dynamic-formal empathy on a ground prepared by such economy and replenishment of attention as is necessary for any kind of pleasant intellectual activity.

Indeed I should be glad if this volume, in which I have thus tried to do justice to both the kinæsthetic explanation which I once put forward, and to the more psychological hypothesis of dynamic empathy which I now hold by—I should be glad if this volume might result in recommending the study of such formal-dynamic empathy to persons capable of æsthetic analysis, and of relegating the question of the kinæsthetic basis or accompaniment to experimental psychology as such. For the existence of bodily sensations (and still more of objective bodily changes) in connexion with our attribution of our own modes of movement and connotation to lines and shapes is only a detail of the question whether such bodily sensations can be detected in any of our other mental activities; and this is a matter for experimental psychologists, and not, primarily at least, for æstheticians. On the contrary, the question whether æsthetic empathy really exists and what are its characteristics is one which can be adequately dealt with only by æstheticians, meaning thereby individuals with natural and trained sensitiveness to the qualities of



INTERESTING AND DULL SHAPES OF LEAVES OF RAY AND OF IVY,
ALSO A WILD TULIP AND DEBASED GARDEN HOUSE-LEAK
From a photograph by I. Kaverat

visible (or, in the case of music and literature, audible and verbal) form: the finest training in introspection cannot give much result where, if I may frankly criticise some of the scientific or philosophical investigators into the reasons for æsthetic preference—say Herbert Spencer and Grant Allen!—there are no æsthetical phenomena to introspect. The explanation of æsthetic empathy must therefore be left to general experimental psychology. What we psychologically minded æstheticians have to do is to collect and classify all possible data bearing upon æsthetic empathy, and decide whether those data are sufficient to establish the existence of such a mental process and mental habit, and whether, supposing Empathy to exist, those data correspond with the observed facts of æsthetic preference and aversion. A number of experiments should thus be instituted, after experimentally selecting distinctly æsthetic individuals; experiments beginning with preference of the smallest æsthetic units, what might be called “empathic elements,” which æsthetic elements or units would, I need hardly say, *not* be those often æsthetically indifferent geometrical forms experimented upon by Fechner, but elementary schemata of interplay of empathic, *i.e.* imaginary, forces, such as Professor Lipps has collected in the *Raumæsthetik* and even more in the *Æsthetische Betrachtung*. After such experiments on mere preference as such (the experimental subjects being asked to place the specimen forms in the order of their liking and disliking) there might be experiments on the *reasons* of such preference, and others intended merely to elicit verbal description (*e.g.* “This shape is lumbering, that line is swift, jerky, smooth,” etc., “That arrangement lifts up or

presses down," etc. etc.) containing references to movement and energy and affective modes attributed to visible shapes.* These experiments on the subjective side might be, should be, tested by objective examination and classification of the types of visual shape recurring and dominating in all times and countries in ornaments, pottery, textile fabrics, and every possible object susceptible of undergoing alteration of its merely practically required shape to suit individual or traditional liking.

From such simpler subjective and objective study, the psychological æsthetician would go on to the examination both of the beholder's consciousness which is exemplified in the Würzburg experiments, let alone in C. Anstruther-Thomson's and my own; and to such objective (if one may speak of *objective* in regard to Empathy!) analysis of works of art as my collaborator taught me to make, and I hope will teach others also, in her masterly descriptive passages in *Beauty and Ugliness*. . . . But we are still far from that, or rather, alas! we are nearer that

* Psychological experimentation upon preference for simple shapes has already been carried on, I find, in Professor Münsterberg's laboratory, and by other American experimentalists; also by Segal (*Wohlgefälligkeit einfacher räumlicher Formen*, in *Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie*, VII.) and especially by Legowski, a pupil of Külpe's (*Beiträge zur experimentalen Ästhetik*: Leipzig, Englmann, 1908). The part played by formal-dynamic empathy would have been better tested had the experimenters avoided elementary geometrical figures drawn with ruler and compass, and used simple geometrical shapes as they occur in patterns and architecture, that is to say, altered, accentuated, and phrased into æsthetic significance. The mosaic pattern of my frontispiece loses at least half of its *empathic* powers if "mechanically" reproduced, *i.e.* if reduced to absolute regularity. All great artistic periods have practised such "phrasing," and Ruskin, among many other merits, has that of remarking on its necessity for what he calls the Lamp of Life.

in current æsthetic literature, but woefully far away from those more elementary examinations, or rather examinations of more elementary facts, necessary to give all the psychology of the work of art and the artist its scientific basis.

The psychology of art and of the artist ! This leads me to repeat a statement made in several pages of this volume, but likely to be forgotten by my critics and opponents : *the æsthetic problem, as narrowed down by me to that of preference in the realm of mere visible, audible or verbal form, this æsthetic problem met by the hypothesis of empathy, by no means covers the whole ground of artistic phenomena.* The presence of an æsthetic, that is to say (according to the hypothesis of empathy) a formal-imaginative-dynamic principle of selection, is what differentiates artistic activity from a great number of equally disinterested and pleasurable groupings of contemplative activities in which this æsthetic selection does not exist ; and still more, of course, what differentiates artistic activities from those grouped in subservience to practical uses, worldly or other-worldly. But art itself, though thus distinguished, invariably partakes of one or more of these non-æsthetic interests, attractions or uses : there never has been or ever can be an art which neither records, nor expresses, nor designates, nor satisfies the need for intensive emotion, which does not make something easier to see, to think, to feel, or to employ whether in the most mystical or the most material manner. There has never been and never can be an art purely æsthetic ; the art for art's sake of which we used to hear being pre-eminently an art for the display of technical skill or scientific novelty of problem, or for the stimulation of emotions very

far from æsthetic, in fact an art covering the futility or perversity of its appeal by the excuse that everything is permissible and dignified in the service of itself.

Such is my conception of the relation between the æsthetic principle and the various arts which it has, by its peculiar imperative, differentiated into art.* And such being my conception, it is obvious that the artistic phenomenon, not only in the artist but also in the beholder or hearer, must, in my opinion, be a constantly varying interplay of the specially æsthetic with the non-æsthetic interests. Stated in the terms of our hypothesis, artistic contemplation is a combination, usually a rapid and, so to speak, *contrapuntal* alternation of many other mental processes with the particular one we have

* Wörringer, *Abstraktion und Einfühlung* (Munich, 1911), reacting against the theories which derive artistic form from utilitarian or technical necessities and desire for imitation, boldly asserts that only that should be considered art (he excludes the work of cave-dwellers, children, and much primitive representative art) which obeys either the desire for anthropomorphic empathy or that for geometric abstraction and negation of the organic, two desires he treats as opposed and as explaining all the history of art by their warfare and their alliances. I wish this most interesting and readable little book had come into my hands before my own was going to press, for its exaggerations are full of suggestion. I will only remark that the author, like all æstheticians, confuses the various kinds of empathy, confining it to organic form, and explaining by a supposed horror of life those so-called geometrical forms whose peculiarities depend upon formal-dynamic empathy. From the æsthetic standpoint all æsthetic form is equally abstract, because the æsthetic standpoint is that of a play of abstract forces. I do not believe that any artistic form, except in periods of utter perfunctoriness like our own, was ever really geometrical, however much it resembled one of the *schemata* of geometry. Redraw my frontispiece with ruler and compasses! I venture to believe, *a priori*, that Egyptian and Arab art is no less explicable by dynamic empathy.

called *Æsthetic Empathy*; such æsthetic empathy never arising except where the attention has been directed on to given visual, audible, or verbal forms by some of the dozen practical uses, emotional needs, and intellectual interests which press into their service or accidentally appeal to, the eye, the ear, and the habit of speech. The Würzburg experiments have shown, as well as those of C. Anstruther-Thomson and my own, that there is in all artistic contemplation a perpetual interference or co-operation between all manner of factors and what I have called the purely æsthetic one; and that not only the origin of art, but its richness and radiating power, depends upon such action and reaction; nay, there exists a whole literature, and a valuable one, in which, as in the case of Hildebrand or at least of Cornelius, æsthetic preference is explained by artistic methods for making things easy to understand, to interpret, and even merely easy to perceive; while, in the question of the third dimension in painting, it is obvious that no æsthetic preference takes place until we have decided, for totally unæsthetic reasons, which of the lines we are looking at are to be considered as verticals and which as horizontals; in other words, that we do interpret a painting as *form until we know what it is intended to represent*.

I hope now to have explained the limited range I give to æsthetic empathy in the explanation of artistic phenomena. But in so doing let me remind the reader that though thus limited, the importance of the *Einfühlung hypothesis* is *central*: the attribution of our vital modes, of our movement, connotation, intention, will, and character to assemblages of lines and sounds is what explains preference for certain

forms rather than others ; and it is this selection among visible and audible forms which constitutes *art*.

We have spoken so far exclusively of the relation between the æsthetic form and its beholder or hearer. But the hypothesis of æsthetic Empathy is destined also to explain the other question of the relation between the æsthetic form and the artist and the generations of artists who have made it. According to my hypothesis of formal-dynamic Empathy every æsthetic form embodies in its type in the rough, so to speak, the empathic preferences of a group, of a succession, nay, in the last resort, of all groups and successions, of men. But every æsthetic form embodies, in its individual reality, the empathic preferences of one individual ; of this artist or that, who informs that type, that schematic abstract form, given him by school, country, or all mankind, with the modes of his individual psychic, and, very probably, of his physical life : swift or languid, complex or simple, rich or poor, harmonious or chaotic. So that, if we may give our hypothesis a metaphysical, or rather an intellectually symbolical extension, the æsthetic form which gives us joy is giving us the finest vital rhythms and patterns of a great, rich, and harmonious individual, and the scheme, so to speak, of what has proved most beneficial and enduring in the vital modes of the race.

The foregoing considerations will suggest to the reader my reasons for adding to the analyses and discussions of the earlier part of this volume the mass of seemingly heterogeneous notes which I have kept in their chronological order under the heading of varieties and fluctuations of æsthetic responsiveness. I have done so, instead of working them into

orderly essays, because I wanted to place my materials unspoilt at the disposal of other students. And I have left a few notes of theoretic character mixed up with what I tried to make mere sincere observations on my own relations with works of art, in order to show how my hypotheses have arisen from the contact of what I have read and thought with what I have really experienced, allowing my spontaneous æsthetic life to circulate freely among my thoughts on art to leave its, I hope fertile, alluvium and to wash away mere verbal and *a priori* definitions. And finally, I have wanted to suggest by the example of my own, though extremely imperfect, attempts, that the realm of art, so long given up to mere metaphysical and literary dissertation, is very well fitted for the typical, normal study of the more complex, indeed the inevitably and essentially complex, processes of real mental life. Our æsthetic preference is a residue of many other activities, a function not merely complicated and in great part vicarious, but one excessively sensitive to moods, thoughts, and mental habits of all kinds. It is at once emotional and lucid, by its very essence contemplative rather than active; and where it vents in action, expressing itself not in passing gestures and untraceable practice, but in the most stable register of human feeling: the forms visible, audible, or verbal, of the work of art.

MAIANO, NEAR FLORENCE

ADEL, NEAR LEEDS

Easter-August 1911

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
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